Dugan et al v. Wright et al

Filing 77

ORDER granting 50 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jonathan Wright; granting 59 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Ian Lawson; finding as moot 53 Motion for Hearing filed by Jonathan Wright; finding as moot 68 Motion for Hearing filed by Ian Lawson. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and costs are taxed against Plaintiffs. This case stands closed. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 3/30/2018. (pts)

F!Lf:0

us. D1STF:!CT COURT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION

k^UCTA CIV.

20!eSAR3O
CLERK
SC.TliST.OPUA

EVAN DUGAN and ISAAC

HUFFAKER,

Plaintiffs,
CV 316-050

V.

JONATHAN WRIGHT and IAN

LAWSON,
Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court in the captioned matter are motions for
summary judgment filed

by each of

the

Defendants.

Upon

consideration of the record, the parties' briefs, and the
relevant law, the motions for summary judgment (doc. nos. 50
and 59) are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A.

Overview

This case arises out of the arrests of Plaintiffs Evan

Dugan and Isaac Huffaker in the early morning hours of August
28, 2014, in Milan, Georgia.

Wright,

the

sole

police

At that time, Defendant Jonathan

officer

for

the

town

of

Milan,

arrested Plaintiffs for criminal trespass and burglary of the

Milan Truck and Tractor Supply Store {"MTT").

(See generally

Pis. Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 61, Ex. B.)
'
The Court has been greatly aided by the video taken from

Officer Wright's vehicular dashboard camera.^
Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 50, Ex. C.)

(Def. Wright's

Officer Wright also

wore a microphone on his person that picked up almost all of
his

conversation

while

the

video

camera

was

recording.

Accordingly, while most of the activity cannot be seen on the
video. Defendants' actions can be readily discerned through

the audio portion, particularly when viewed in conjunction
with Officer Wright's Incident Report (Wright Dep., Doc. No.

57, Ex. 8), the deposition testimony of the parties, and the

photographs and drawn maps attached as exhibits thereto (Doc.
Nos. 55-58.)

While the Court must view evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, it need not do so when Plaintiffs'

version of events is plainly contradicted by the video and
audio of the incident.

See Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372,

378-81 (2007). Accordingly, the Court will detail the factual

background from a chronological description of the video
interspersed with deposition testimony and the admitted facts
set forth in Defendant Wright's Statement of Undisputed Facts

^
Significantly, the video was not available to
Plaintiffs prior to filing the Amended Complaint on September

14, 2016. (See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 21, f 17.)

(«DSUF") / doc. no. 50-1, when necessary for context.

most part, the facts are not in dispute.

For the

Where they are, the

Court will address the significance of said "dispute" in the
discussion section.

The Court notes that the video begins after Officer

Wright's

initial

encounter

with

Plaintiffs.

The

video

recording supplied begins as one of the Plaintiffs is seen
with his hands resting on the patrol vehicle's hood while
Officer Wright sat inside and received information from a
dispatcher about Plaintiffs' driver's licenses.

The video

begins at time mark 0:00 and runs continuously to time mark
1:28:30.

At about the 56 minute mark, Plaintiffs were told

that they were going to jail.

Thus, the length of Officer

Wright's investigation into Plaintiffs' conduct that evening
was 56 minutes.^

B.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs Dugan and Huffaker were driving around in a
Chevrolet Lumina in the late evening hours of August 27, 2014.

(DSUF KK 5-6.)

on Highway 280.

Plaintiffs entered Milan traveling eastbound

(Id. f 13.)

As Plaintiffs drove past the MTT, the front of which
faces

^

Highway

280,

they

could

hear

an

alarm

sounding.

The Court did not view and need not consider the video

past the 57 minute mark.

(Huffaker Dep., Doc. No. 56, at 90.)

Plaintiffs turned left

onto Main Street, which is past the MTT, and then turned left

again onto Lee Street.

{DSUF H 15.)

The back of the MTT may

be accessed by a dirt road leading off of the left side of Lee
Street.

Before reaching this dirt road, however, there is a

peanut warehouse, also on the left side of Lee Street.

(See

Lawson Dep., Doc. No. 58, Exs. 1 & 3, Huffaker Dep., Doc. No.

56, Exs. 2 & 3.)

According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Huffaker

recognized that they had turned left off of Main Street too

soon, so he instructed Mr. Dugan to turn around.
Huffaker Dep. at 79-81.)

(DSUF H 16;

Mr. Dugan turned left off of Lee

Street onto a dirt path near the peanut warehouse, making a Uturn between drying bins that were located under a dirying

shed.

(Huffaker Dep. at 82-83; DSUF U 17.)

After making the

U-turn and attempting to re-enter Lee Street, Mr. Dugan drove
the Lumina into a ditch that paralleled Lee Street, causing
the car to become stuck.

(DSUF f 18.)

Plaintiffs attempted to get the car out of ditch by
pushing from the back and the front.

(Huffaker Dep. at 89.)

Then they walked to a gas station located nearby on Main
Street.

92.)

Plaintiffs could still hear the alarm.

(Id. at 91-

They would later tell Officer Wright that they walked to

the gas station because they thought it would look suspicious

if they were out in the area of the alarm on Lee Street.^
(Id. at 146-47.)

At the gas station. Plaintiffs asked a bystander how long
the alarm had been going off.

The bystander informed them

that the alarm had been going off for 15 to 20 minutes.
at 92-93.)

(Id.

Mr. Huffaker used the restroom and bought a drink

while Mr. Dugan bought cigarettes.

(Id. at 94.)

Plaintiffs

then walked back to the car to try to dislodge it from the

ditch once again.

^

(Id. at 95.)

They then decided to return

Plaintiff Huffaker also explained his conversation

with Officer Wright as follows:

Huffaker: I remember specifically telling him that
I know that this may look suspicious, but I was
telling him, ''Sir, we were just trying to turn
around. We got stuck." . . .

Q:

Why did you think it looked suspicious?

Huffaker:

Well, from the officer's point of view,

I mean, if you were right there in close proximity
with all that stuff that we had in the vehicle that

it just -- a lot of questions would be asked by an
officer.

I mean, we had an honest answer for every

single one of them, but it wasn't good enough for
him.

Q:
But you thought when you said those words to
him, "Officer, I know this looks suspicious," you
could see that there were circumstances that might
cause him to wonder what you were doing. Right?
Huffaker: Yes, sir.

(Huffaker Dep. at 107-08.)

to the gas station to get help.

As they were walking back

along Lee Street toward Main Street, Officer Wright approached

them, activating his flashing lights.
25.)

(Id. at 95-96; DSUF f

Officer Wright testified that he had been called out at

11:23 p.m. to respond to a burglar alarm at the MTT.

(Wright

Dep. at 178-79; Def. Wright's Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B.)
For his part. Officer Wright testified that when he first

passed through Lee Street, he observed the Lumina stuck in the
ditch at the peanut warehouse.

(Wright Dep. at 131 & Ex.8.)

He then drove to the MTT and observed that the rear doors had

been forcibly pried open so that entry into the building could
be made.

(Id. at 128, 132.)

Officer Wright had routinely

patrolled this area and had observed that the MTT rear doors
had never had enough play previously for a person to fit

through.

(Id. at 35-37.)

Officer Wright went into the

building through the rear doors.
patrol

car

Plaintiffs.®

and

was

driving

He then returned to his

around

when

he

encountered

(Id. at 131.)

^
At some point early in the investigation. Officer
Wright called the Alabama tag number into the dispatcher.
(Wright Dep. at 181.)

® The Court recognizes that Officer Wright's deposition
testimony initially contradicts this narrative of his conduct
in that he testified that he did not get out of his car before
he first encountered Plaintiffs. (See Wright Dep. at 30-31.)
He also testified that he could not remember whether or not he

According to Officer Wright, Plaintiffs appeared out of
breath, rattled, and upset.

(Id. at 93.)

During their

initial encounter. Plaintiffs fully cooperated with Officer
Wright, providing their ID cards and explaining that they got
stuck in the ditch when they tried to turn around.
& Ex. 8; Huffaker Dep. at 103-04.)

(Id. at 93

Mr. Dugan presented a

California driver's license, and Mr. Huffaker presented a

Georgia driver's license indicating an East Dublin address.
(Huffaker Dep., Ex. 8.)

Also during this initial encounter,

Mr. Huffaker revealed that he was legally carrying a firearm,
a 40-caliber Beretta, and Mr. Dugan explained that he had a

Taser.

(Huffaker Dep. at 97-98.)

Officer Wright secured the

weapons as well as the pocket knife that each Plaintiff had in
his pocket.

(Id. at 103, 127.)

Both Plaintiffs wore boots.

(DSUF H 39.)

went into the MTT before the time he entered with Deputy

Lawson. (See id. at 58-59, 122-24.) However, upon having his
recollection refreshed with the Incident Report that he wrote
the day of the arrest, he clearly testified that he checked
the building before he drove around the area and encountered
Plaintiffs. (Id. at 125-26, 131-33.)
This version is also
supported by the video in that Officer Wright clearly tells
Deputy Lawson, who arrived after Plaintiffs had been detained,
that he had already been in the building. (Video, at 26:20
mark.)
Because the video and the Incident Report are
contemporaneous accounts of the incident, the Court credits
this version of events, which is not contradicted by any other
evidence in the record, over Plaintiffs' hearsay objections.
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(5) (listing Recorded Recollection as a
hearsay exception); Joassin v. Murphy. 661 F. App'x 558, 559
(11®^^ Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court's refusal to
strike an incident report at summary judgment).

The Court will now finish the narrative using the video

supplemented by relevant evidence.
Video, at mark 1:56-2:13^

Officer Wright told Plaintiffs that he is detaining them
until

he

can figure

out

what is going on.

Plaintiffs in the back of his patrol car.

He

placed

(DSUF tt 48-49.)

Video, at mark 2:40-3:15

Officer Wright drove his vehicle down Lee Street to the
site of the Lumina in the ditch.

During this very short

drive, Officer Wright asked Plaintiffs where they had been
when he had come by two or three minutes earlier.

Mr.

Huffaker told Officer Wright that they had gone to the gas

station because "the alarm was going off and we didn't want to
be back here because we didn't want to look suspicious."

also DSUF H 51.)

(See

Officer Wright responded that it already

looked suspicious being back there, to which Mr. Huffaker
volunteered that the alarm had been going off for 30 minutes
before they even got there.
Video, at mark 3:15-3:37

Officer Wright pointed out that Plaintiffs were not "from
here" and asked what they were doing "over this way." Mr.
Huffaker explained to Officer Wright; "GPS is going this way.

®

The time marks are only approximations, and the quotes

from the video are the result of the Court's transcription
after viewing the video numerous times.

and I told him we were going the wrong way, and he tried to
turn around and he backed up in that, and he got stuck and he

tried to go back through there and it just plain got stuck.
We tried pushing it out both ways, forward and backwards, and
it just won't go out."
Video, at mark 3:40

Plaintiffs gave Officer Wright consent to search the
Lumina.
that

(DSUF H 52.)

there

was

a

Mr. Huffaker informed Officer Wright

lot

of

military

gear.

According

to

Plaintiffs, the Lumina contained all of Mr. Dugan's worldly

possessions because he had just arrived in the Dublin area
from Alabama two days prior with the intent to live there with
Mr. Huffaker.''

(Huffaker Dep. at 109.)

Therein, Officer

Wright found a black CRKT knife, a Smith & Wesson knife. Smith
& Wesson special ops knife and sheath, machete and sheath,
flexi cuffs, cuff cutters, bolt cutters, and a lock picking

set. (DSUF H 53.)
Video, at mark 6:10-6:24

After Officer Wright had partly searched the vehicle,® he

Both Plaintiffs recently had been honorably discharged from

the United States Army. They had met in the service and had been
roommates for a number of years prior to getting out of the service.
They had planned to work and live in the Dublin area, where Mr.

Huffaker had family.

(See generalIv Huffaker Dep. at 33-37.)

®
While the search is not on video, the audio contains
noises consistent with a search. Indeed, Officer Wright asked
for the keys at the 5:12 mark, presumably to access the trunk.

called for assistance to 10-12^ {"Stand By") until he could
"get this thing pieced together."
Videof at mark 8:31-9:56

Dispatch

informed

Officer

Wright that the

registered to Robert Reed from Alabama.

Lumina

is

Mr. Huffaker again

volunteered that his buddy had just purchased it and was in
the process of moving to Georgia.
Video, at mark 10:55-22:45
Audio consistent with a further search of the Lumina and

its contents can be heard, including opening zippers.
Video, at mark 24:30-26:20

Defendant Ian Lawson, a Telfair County Sheriff's Deputy,

arrived on the scene with his "K-9 companion," Fred, reputed

to be a tracking bloodhound.

(DSUF H 61.)

Deputy Lawson

approached the scene from the opposite direction on Lee
Street; the front of his vehicle faced the front of Officer

Wright's vehicle.

According to Deputy Lawson, Fred is a

ground disturbance tracker, not an article tracker.
Dep. at 55.)

(Lawson

He had only been tracking a short time with

There is no dispute that the vehicle was searched or that
Plaintiffs had given consent.

^

The police code 10-12 means "Stand By." Police Codes,

zipscanners.com, htto;//www.zipscanners.com/resources/policecodes (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); accord Police 10 Codes,

PoliceCodes.org,

http;//www.policecodes.org/police-lO-codes

(last accessed on Mar. 8, 2018).
10

Deputy Lawson.

(See generally id. at 24-26.)

In fact, this

was Fred's first night track with Deputy Lawson. (Id. at 26.)
In the video, Officer Wright told Deputy Lawson that the

alarm had been going off and he had *^two ex-military nuts" in
his car, one from

California and the other from Dublin,

Georgia and a car from Alabama, one had a pistol and the other
a Taser, and they had bolt cutters in a bag.

Deputy Lawson

could be heard to say ''something don't add up at all."
Video, at mark 26:20-26:40

Deputy Lawson asked if Officer Wright wants him to "check
out the building."

Officer Wright responded: "I done checked

it - I went through it."

He further stated that he had gone

around and was coming back to the Lumina to get the car towed
when he saw Plaintiffs.

Video, at mark 26:47-27:22

Deputy Lawson mentioned his new dog and stated: "He needs
to track somebody."

Deputy Lawson quipped that they could let

Plaintiffs loose to see if he could hunt them.

Officer Wright

then asked Deputy Lawson if Fred could "track okay" and
suggested that Deputy Lawson "see if he runs a track anywhere
from

[the MTT] to back towards this car."

agrees.

Deputy Lawson

Officer Wright clearly tells Deputy Lawson: "Because

I ain't been out on foot other than I walked right straight
into the building. I parked at the back door and walked in the

11

building."

Deputy Lawson drove his patrol car backward down Lee
Street and then up the dirt road off of Lee Street to the

right side of the MTT.

He and Fred began their track.

(Lawson Dep. at 39, 53.)

Fred reportedly picked up a track

about 5 to 10 feet left of

the

rear door of

tracked down a dirt path leading to Lee Street.^®
42.)

the MTT and

(Id. at 40-

Deputy Lawson observed boot prints on this path.

(Id.

at 56 ("I located a pretty fresh boot print along that path.

How fresh it was, I don't exactly know.

I know that it was

not in any way degraded by environmental conditions.")

Once

Fred reached the paved Lee Street, his track ended, but the

Lumina was visible, a hundred yards away.

(Id. at 51.)

Video, at mark 27:50-29:00

Directly after Deputy Lawson left the scene. Officer
Wright made a telephone call inquiring about the owner of the
MTT.

During this conversation. Officer Wright remarked as

follows; "There's entry been made into the [MTT]. And I mean,
one of these cats got a gun on him and one of '
ems got a
Taser.

And, they ain't from nowhere around here.

And the

car's conveniently stuck back here within walking distance of
the place.

So it ain't looking too good for them.

Looking

This dirt path is not the same as the dirt road that
Deputy Lawson drove down to access the MTT. Rather, it was on
the opposite side of the MTT and closer to the peanut
warehouse. (See Lawson Dep., Exs. 1 & 3.)
12

like the alarm scared them off . . .

Video, at mark 33:07

Officer Wright called someone to come and get the Lumina.
Video, at mark 33:45

Walking on Lee Street toward the front of the patrol car,

Deputy Lawson returned to Officer Wright on foot and with Fred
on leash. Deputy Lawson told him he had boot prints and asked
if Plaintiffs were wearing boots.

Deputy Lawson and Officer

Wright walked back down Lee Street toward the MTT together.

Officer Wright remarked: "I'm pretty sure [Plaintiffs were]
going to be 10-95 to the jail anyway.
adding up.

Because it just ain't

The whole situation ain't adding up."

Video, at mark 35:05

Deputy Lawson explained that there is a "little dirt
path" and that he had "marked one of them (presumably boot

prints) with my boot."^^

He claimed that Fred "hit right on

'
em."

Video, at mark 35:30

Deputy Lawson could be heard showing Officer Wright
something, indicating "that's me . . . this ain't."

The police code 10-95 means "Subject in custody."

See

note 9, supra.

Photographs of the investigation include multiple
shots of boot prints; one photograph shows two different boot
prints side by side, presumably one is Deputy Lawson's.
(Lawson Dep., Ex. 4, at JW000081.)
13

video, at mark 35:41-36:44

Officer Wright shouted an expletive and he hurried back
to his patrol car, shining his flash light into the front
windshield of the patrol car as he approached. When he got to
the car, he asked Plaintiffs, "Was that you?", referring to
what he described as a "loud clank."

Plaintiffs responded no.

Video, at mark 36:40-38:20

Mr. Huffaker asked Officer Wright for an explanation of
what was going on.

Officer Wright mentioned the alarm and

that there had been forced entry.

Mr. Huffaker complained

that Officer Wright had searched their person and the car and
that they did not have anything.

Once again, Mr. Huffaker

volunteered that he knew it looked kind of suspicious being
there.

Plaintiffs denied that they went up toward the MTT.

Officer Wright asked Plaintiffs about the tools he found in
the Lumina such as the bolt cutters.
that it was all from the Army.

Plaintiffs

that

the

Army

Plaintiffs explained

When Officer Wright challenged

would

have

kept

those

items.

Plaintiffs explained that they had purchased the items to
practice breaking open doors and clearing rooms because they
had been in the infantry.
Video, at mark 38:19-38:49

As this conversation took place. Deputy Lawson and Fred
came back on foot to join Plaintiffs and Officer Wright at the
patrol car.

Deputy Lawson again mentioned that Fred had "come

14

through" to "right here." Deputy Lawson said he was going to
put up Fred, and he walked back to his patrol car which was
still parked to the right side of the MTT.

Officer Wright

stated that he was putting Plaintiffs' belongings back in the
Lumina.

Video, at mark 39:36-40:26

Officer Wright got back into his patrol car and drove to
the MTT and also parked on the right side.

Deputy Lawson's

patrol vehicle was now in sight.
Video, at mark 40:28-41:00

Officer Wright arrived at the MTT in his patrol car at
the same time that Deputy Lawson arrived on foot.

Deputy

Lawson asked Officer Wright to tell dispatch that he had

"logged one successful track; back at the unit."

Lawson then put Fred in his patrol car.

Deputy

Officer Wright told

Plaintiffs to "bear with me" while he looked around.

Video, at mark 41:39-42:20

Deputy Lawson asked Officer Wright if he had seen the
back door, and Officer Wright reconfirmed that he had already

been in the building.

Officer Wright explained that he had

not had a chance to look around there "for footprints and
whatnot."

Deputy

Lawson

reconfirmed

that

he

had

Officer Wright some footprints "back on the path."
Video, at mark 42:50-44:43

15

showed

Officer Wright and Deputy Lawson went out of sight of the
video to the patrol car's left and toward the MTT.
conversation could be clearly heard however.

Their

Deputy Lawson

explained where he and Fred picked up their track.

They

then

discussed the rear door, making remarks such as "it was plumb

pried loose, broken loose" and "they just forced this thing
off of there."

Video, at mark 44:45-47:16

Having

entered

the

bay

area

officers discussed boot prints.

of

the

building,

the

They observed one print that

"looks like one of the tracks out in the dirt."

held a light while the other took pictures.
the interior door, which was still locked.

One officer

They also discuss
The officers could

be heard theorizing that Plaintiffs must have triggered the

alarm

by tampering

with the

interior door."

They also

theorized that some of the boot prints were so good because
Plaintiffs had been running.
Video, at mark 48:29-52:24

Officer Wright and Deputy Lawson left the building and

The audio inside the building's bay area is distinctly
different

than

it

is

when

the

officers

are

outside

of

the

building.
Apparently, the alarm system was tied into the
interior door as opposed to the rear doors. On the other side
of the interior door were guns and ammunition because the MTT
sold firearms as well as tractor supplies.
One officer
remarked that they were "trying to get into the guns."
16

then could be heard observing several boot prints along the

dirt path, presumably the one that Deputy Lawson and Fred had
walked earlier.

They surmised again that the boot print

impressions show that the person had been running.

The

officers retraced the path and took more pictures.
Video, at mark 55:37

The officers returned to their patrol cars.

Lawson

left

the

scene,

and

Officer

Wright

got

Deputy

into

his

vehicle.

Video, at mark 55:50

Officer Wright began pulling away from the MTT.

Mr.

Huffaker asked Officer Wright if he was going to arrange for

a tow truck for them, to which Officer Wright informed them
that they would be going to jail.

He further remarked: "Cuz

that dog run a track right straight back to your car from the

building and there's footprints out here all in the dirt
walking right straight back to your car."

Officer Wright took Plaintiffs to the Telfair County
Jail.

(Wright Dep.

at

122.)

On

August

29,

2014,

the

magistrate judge issued arrest warrants against Plaintiffs for
criminal trespass and burglary.

(Id. at 155.)

2014, the charges were dismissed.

17

On December 8,

(Huffaker Dep. at 132.)

C.

Procedural Background

On March 30, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior
Court of Telfair County, Georgia, alleging both state and
federal

claims

defendant.

against

Officer

Wright

and

a

John

Doe

Officer Wright removed the case to this Court on

June 22, 2016.

On September 14, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an

Amended Complaint, naming Deputy Lawson as a party defendant.
The Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the
case.

Therein, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants illegally

detained and falsely arrested them in violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.
(Doc. No. 21, Count I.)

Plaintiffs also claim they were

falsely imprisoned in violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.

(Id..

Count II.)

Plaintiffs also assert the

denial of rights under the Georgia Constitution as well as
state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(Id.. Counts

III-VI.)

Defendants have filed motions for summaiy judgment on all

of Plaintiffs' claims.

The Clerk gave the nonmoving parties,

the Plaintiffs, notice of the summary judgment motions and the

summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or
other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of
default.

(Doc.

Nos.

54

and 60.)

Therefore,

the

notice

requirements of Griffith v. Wainwriaht. 772 F.2d 822, 825

18

(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied.

The time for

filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motions
are ripe for consideration.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to dispose
of unsupported claims or defenses which, as a matter of law,

raise no genuine issues of material fact suitable for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts
and reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the

nonmoving party.

Hoaan v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 361 F.3d 621,

625 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will
not defeat summary judgment unless the factual
dispute is material to an issue affecting the
outcome

of

the

case.

The

relevant

rules

of

substantive law dictate the materiality of a
disputed fact.
A genuine issue of material fact
does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence

favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury
to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transp.. 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (quoted source omitted) (emphasis supplied).

The

party opposing the summary judgment motion, however, "may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.

19

Rather, its responses . . . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue to be tried." Walker v.
Darby. 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

In this case. Defendants assert that they are entitled to

qualified immunity for Plaintiffs' federal claims of false
detention and arrest and false imprisonment.

Qualified immunity is a judicially-created affirmative
defense

under

which

''government

officials

performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Harlow v.

"To receive qualified

immunity, the public official must first prove that he was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when
the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Lumlev v. Citv of Dade
City. 327 F.3d 1186, 94 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Here,

it

is

clear

that

Defendants

were

acting

in

their

discretionary capacities when they engaged in the conduct

presently challenged by Plaintiffs, a point which Plaintiffs
do not contest.

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs

to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate.
See id.

20

resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary

judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry."

Tolan v.

Cotton. 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014). "The first [prong] asks

whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the

party

asserting

the

injury,

violated a federal right."

show

the

officer's

conduct

Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (alterations omitted)).

"The second

prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the
right in question was ^clearly established' at the time of the
violation."
739 (2002)).

Id. at 1866 (citing Hope v. Pelzer. 536 U.S. 730,
"Courts have discretion to decide the order in

which to engage these two prongs . . . [b]ut under either

prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in
favor of the party seeking summary judgment."
omitted).

Id. (citations

Because the Court has determined that Plaintiffs'

cannot establish a constitutional violation as a matter of

law, the Court need not address the clearly established prong.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

A "seizure" occurs "when there is a

governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied."

Brower v. Cntv. of Invo. 489 U.S.

593, 596-97 (1989).

Generally, a seizure is reasonable if it is supported by

21

probable cause.

Croom v. Balkwill. 645 F.3d 1240, 1246 (ll*^*^

Cir. 2011) ("Traditionally, seizures by law enforcement have
been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if justified

by probable cause to believe that the detainee committed a
crime.").

In fact, an arrest made with probable cause is "an

absolute bar to a siibsequent constitutional challenge to the
arrest."

Gates v. Khokhar.

F.3d

, 2018 WL 1277395, *4

(ll*^^ Cir. Mar. 13, 2018) (quoted source omitted).
"Probable

cause

to

arrest

exists

if

the

facts

and

circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he has

reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent

person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Ortega v.
Christian.

85

F.3d

1521,

1525

(11*^^ Cir.

1996)

(citation

omitted); United States v. Flovd. 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11*^^
Cir. 2002) (stating that probable cause to arrest exists when
a law enforcement official has "facts and circumstances within

[his] knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that
the

suspect

had

committed

(quotation marks omitted)).

or

was

committing

a

crime"

Probable cause requires only "a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity."
213,

243 n.l3

(1983).

Probable

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S.
cause

determinations are

guided by reviewing the totality of the circumstances.
233.

22

Id. at

In the context of a qualified immunity defense, all that

is required of an arresting officer is "arguable probable
cause to believe that a person is committing a particular

public offense; that is, where reasonable officers in the same
circumstances

and

possessing

the

same

knowledge

as

the

Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to
arrest the plaintiffs."
1302

Scarbrouah v. Mvles. 245 F.3d 1299,

(11*^^ Cir. 2001) (quoted sources omitted); Jones v.

Cannon. 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.3 (ll'^'^ Cir. 1999) ("Arguable

probable cause, not the higher standard of actual probable

cause,

governs the

qualified immunity inquiry.").

This

standard recognizes that a law enforcement official may make
a reasonable but mistaken judgment regarding probable cause.

In the case at bar. Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiffs' claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment

if

probable cause.

their arrests

are

supported

by

arguable

Thus, this Court must determine whether a

reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing

the same knowledge as Defendants could have believed that
probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs for criminal
trespass and burglary.

Deputy Lawson's

motion for summary judgment is

premised in part upon his contention that he did not make the
decision to arrest Plaintiffs, rather it was the decision of
and within the sole discretion of Officer Wright.
Because

this Court concludes that arguable probable cause exists to
support Plaintiffs' arrest, the Court need not differentiate
between the responsibilities of Defendants.
23

In Georgia, a person commits the offense of burglary in
the second degree "when, without authority and with the intent
to commit a felony or theft therein, he or she enters or

remains within an occupied, unoccupied, or vacant building
[or] structure . . .

O.C.G.A. § 16-7-l{c).

A person

commits a criminal trespass "when he or she intentionally

damages any property of another without consent of that other
person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less . .
O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a), or "when he or she knowingly and

without authority [e]nters upon the land or premises of
another person . . . for an unlawful purpose," O.C.G.A. § 167-21(b)(1).

In

the

case

at

bar.

Defendants

knew

the

following

undisputecP-^ facts on the evening of April 27. Officer Wright
was called to the area when the alarm system at the MTT had

been triggered.

When he arrived shortly thereafter, he

spotted a car stuck in the ditch of Lee Street, from which the
back

of

the

MTT

can

be

accessed

by

a

dirt

road.

He

investigated the MTT and noticed that the rear door looked as

The Court derived most of these undisputed facts from
the uncontradicted video of the investigation.
The other

undisputed facts are from Officer Wright's testimony and are
supported by statements he contemporaneously made in the video
or in his Incident Report.
Other than point to minor
inconsistencies in Officer Wright's deposition testimony given
two and a half years later. Plaintiffs have set forth no
evidence to create a genuine dispute of these facts.
24

though it had been pried loose.

He then got back into his

patrol car and located Plaintiffs on Lee Street, walking away
from their car in the ditch and the MTT.

Both Plaintiffs had

weapons on their person and wore boots.

Shortly thereafter,

Officer Wright discovered items consistent with burglary tools
such as bolt cutters, gloves, and a lock picking set in
Plaintiffs' vehicle.

Plaintiffs

were

not residents of

the

area, and the car they were driving was registered to a third
person in Alabama.

Of

note. Officer Wright was already

forming the opinion that Plaintiffs had gained access to the
MTT

with

arrived.

the

intent

to

steal

at

the

time

Deputy

Lawson

Deputy Lawson and Fred then ran a successful track

from the left rear of the MTT down a dirt path to Lee Street,

indicating that the ground had recently been disturbed on that

path.

Deputy Lawson also found boot prints along that path

and later showed them to Officer Wright.

When Officer Wright

re-entered the MTT with Deputy Lawson, they found more boot

prints leading up to and around the interior office door,
which was still locked.

The boot prints seemed to match the

ones along the dirt path and appeared to be left by somebody
running.

At this point. Defendants determined that probable

cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs for criminal trespass and

burglary. Taking into account the statutory elements of these
crimes and the undisputed facts known to Defendants, the Court

25

readily concludes that an objectively reasonable officer at
the scene could have believed that probable cause existed to
arrest Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs'
twofold.

response

to

these

undisputed

facts

is

Plaintiffs either contend that Defendants should

have done more in their investigation or they attack the
credibility of Officer Wright, and to some extent Deputy

Lawson, by pointing out inconsistencies in their deposition
testimony.

First, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants did not reach
the owner of the MTT, therefore, they did not determine the

condition of the rear door prior to that evening or find out

whether anything had actually been stolen from the MTT.^'' They
further complain that Defendants never looked at their boots

to compare them to the tracks that they found prior to their

Plaintiffs state; "If the owner had confirmed there

was nothing stolen from the business, [Defendant] Wright would
not have charged Plaintiffs with burglary." (Pis. Br. in
'
Opp'n to Wright's Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 61, at 8 (citing
Wright Dep. at 105).) The hypothetical presented to Officer
Wright at deposition is irrelevant, however, because it is
undisputed that Officer Wright did not know that nothing was
stolen either. Besides, this fact would not have prevented
Officer Wright from charging attempted burglary or criminal
trespass.

With respect to the condition of the door. Officer Wright
testified that he was familiar with the rear entry from his
prior patrols of the area.
26

arrest."

Plaintiffs also complain that Defendants did not

seek out other potential witnesses (e.g., at the gas station)
to confirm how long the alarm had been going off or contact
the owner to find out whether it was simply a false alamn.

Police officers, however, are not tasked with ruling out or

chasing down every eventuality or rationalization offered by
detained suspects.

Kinaland v. City of Miami. 382 F.3d 1220,

1229 & n.lO (11''^ Cir. 2004) (An officer "'is not required to

explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of
innocence before making an arrest.

(quoted source omitted));

Williams v. Citv of Homestead. Fla.. 206 F. App'x 886, 888-89

(ll''^ Cir. 2006) ("[W]hile a police officer should consider a

suspect's explanation in evaluating the existence of probable
cause, he 'is under no obligation to give any credence to a

suspect's story nor should a plausible explanation in any
sense require the officer to forego arrest pending further
investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide

There is a dispute about whether Officer Wright looked
at Plaintiffs' boots at the scene, and the Court could not
locate a time in which he asked to do so.

Nevertheless, the

fact remains that Plaintiffs wore boots and fresh boot prints

were found in the building that matched ones on a dirt path
running away from the building and toward Plaintiffs' car.
The fact that Officer Wright did not attempt to confirm an
exact match at the scene of the crime does not negate probable
cause. Besides, Officer Wright further testified that he took

photographs of the boot prints at the scene and of Plaintiffs'
boots at the jail when they were removed. (Wright Dep. at
69.)
27

probable cause.'" (quoted source omitted)).
Second, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants "falsified" the

facts is unavailing in light of the uncontradicted video and
audio evidence.

For instance, Plaintiffs point out that

Officer Wright "changed his story" about when he determined
that entry was made into the rear door because at deposition
he stated that he first determined that the door had too much

play in it when he entered with Deputy Lawson but later stated
that he made this determination upon his initial entry.
Plaintiffs make much of Officer Wright's statement to Deputy

Lawson as they approached the rear door together that he was

"still trying to figure out exactly how they got in [the
building.]"

As the Court has already pointed out, see note 3

supra. in his deposition testimony two and a half years later.
Officer Wright was initially confused about whether he made an

initial entry prior to Deputy Lawson's arrival, but his
recollection was refreshed with his Incident Report.

In any

event, there is no dispute that the officers believed that

entry was made in the rear door, which was "pried loose or
broken loose." Plaintiffs attempt to create a dispute of fact

by stating that Mr. Huffaker could see the rear door from the
back of the patrol car and noticed that the door appeared
closed and

had not been forced open.

Nevertheless,

the

officers were able to simply bend the door to allow each other

28

to walk in.

Thus, the appearance of the door to Mr. Huffaker

from his vantage point prior to the officers gaining entry
during their investigation is irrelevant.

It certainly does

not impugn the veracity of the officers' investigation and the
theory that someone had entered the MTT through the rear door.
Plaintiffs also point to Deputy Lawson's testimony at
deposition that if he had known that Officer Wright had walked

all around the building and the dirt path that evening, he

would not have employed Fred to run a track.

Wright should not have relied on the track.

Thus, Officer

The hypothetical

presented to Deputy Lawson at deposition, however, is not
based on actual fact. The undisputed facts from the video are

that Officer Wright informed Deputy Lawson prior to running
the track that he had pulled up to the rear door of the MTT

and only walked into and out of the building.

Thus, Officer

Wright did not contaminate the left side of the MTT where Fred

picked up the track or the tracked dirt path on which they
observed boot prints.

Plaintiffs' representation to this

Court that Officer Wright had "walked the property" or "walked

the very path that the K-9 later allegedly tracked"

is

disingenuous.

Officer Wright actually testified that he walked the
dirt path "at some point." (Wright Dep. at 81.)
29

Plaintiffs set forth other minor arguments such as the

fact that while they had so-called burglary tools in their
Lumina, there was no evidence that Plaintiffs used any of the
tools

to

enter

inexperienced.

the

MTT

and

the

fact

that

Fred

was

Plaintiffs' beleaguered attempt to have this

Court view and analyze each piece of evidence in hindsight and
in isolation, i.e., not in conjunction with the whole of the

investigation that occurred on the evening of the arrest, is
erroneous.

See United States v. Allison. 953 F.2d 1346, 1349-

51 (11*^^ Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that probable cause factors

must be considered together, as a whole, rather than analyzed

separately for whether an innocent explanation for each factor
exists). Plaintiffs' red herrings do nothing to disabuse this
Court

of

its

conclusion

that

their

arrests

were

wholly

supported by undisputed facts that reasonably and objectively
lead to a finding of arguable probable cause. In other words,
any reasonable officer knowing the facts that Defendants knew
could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest
Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs contend that they were simply in the wrong
place at the wrong time.

Yet, qualified immunity protects

officers who mistakenly arrest the innocent man in the wrong
place at the wrong time.

See Hunter v. Brvant. 502 U.S. 224,

227 (1991) ("Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but

30

mistakenly

conclude

that

probable

entitled to immunity."); Gates.

cause

F.3d

is

present

are

, 2018 WL 1277395,

at *4 ("[T]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the

guilty will be arrested." (quoting Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.S.
137,

145

(1979)).

Remarkably,

even

Plaintiff

Huffaker

contemporaneously conceded twice that the circumstances in
which Plaintiffs found themselves that evening would appear

"suspicious" to any police officer who came upon it.
Court agrees.

This

It was entirely reasonable, reasonable as a

matter of law, for Defendants to conclude that Plaintiffs'

suspicious activity rose to the level of probable cause to
arrest.

Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

for Plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims.^®

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing. Defendants' respective motions for
summary judgment (doc. nos. 50 and 59) are GRANTED with
respect to all of Plaintiffs' federal claims.

The Court

declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law

Because Plaintiffs' arrest was constitutional, they
cannot state a claim for false imprisonment.

Because the Court determined that oral argument would
not aid the resolution of the instant motions, the motions for
oral argument (doc. nos. 53 and 68) are DENIED AS MOOT.
31

claims"; thus, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The

Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and

CLOSE this case.

Costs are taxed against Plaintiffs^

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

day of

March, 2018.

UNITED

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims

if

it

has

dismissed

all

original jurisdiction.
32

claims

under

which

it

has