Walke v. Malone et al

Filing 30

ORDER granting 20 Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to all ofPlaintiff's federal claims. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims; thus, they are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this case.Costs are taxed against Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 09/24/2018. (thb)

ftLEO
•U.S. DiSTRiCT COURT
AUGUSTA CIV.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
, p„
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ZOloSLrdH rH 0-U /
DUBLIN DIVISION

CLERK
SO. DlS

b A.

*

RALPH WALKE,

*

Plaintiff,

*
*
*

V.

CV 317-046

*

MICKEY MALONE and CHRISTOPHER *

PARKS, Individually and in
their Official Capacities as
Laurens County Sheriff
Deputies, and John Does 1-3,

*

Defendants,

ORDER

Before the Court in the captioned matter is a motion for
summary

judgment

filed

Christopher Parks.

by

Defendants

Mickey

Malone

and

Upon consideration of the record, the

parties' briefs, and the relevant law, the motion for summary
judgment (doc. no. 20) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A.

Overview

This case arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Ralph

Walke in the early morning hours of July 9, 2015 in Laurens
County, Georgia.

Christopher

At that time. Defendants Mickey Malone and

Parks,

deputies

of

Laurens

County

Sheriff's

Department, responded to a 911 call reporting that a man named
Ralph Walke had wrecked his truck, was drunk, and had just
left his residence on a motorcycle.

arrested

by

the

deputies

on

a

Ultimately, Plaintiff was

misdemeanor

charge

of

obstructing law enforcement, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1024(a).

The incident was captured on the dashboard camera in

Deputy Malone's patrol car.

Thus, while the Court must view

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it need not
do

so

when

Plaintiff's

version

of

events

is

plainly

contradicted by the video and audio of the incident.
Scott V. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007).

See

Accordingly,

the Court will describe the interaction between Plaintiff and

the deputies from its viewing of the video, interspersed with
deposition testimony of the parties and the admitted facts set
forth in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("DSUF"),
doc. no. 20-2, when necessary for context.

For the most part,

the facts are not in dispute.
B.

Factual Background

On July 9, 2015, Laurens County 911 received a call at
12:44 a.m. from 1185 Walke Dairy Road, Plaintiff's residence.
The woman stated: "I want to report someone on the road that's

drinking and driving. . . . Ralph Walke just left on a
motorcycle.

He's got his white truck in the ditch at the

four-way stop and he's drunk.

Had to go pick him up.

drunk, so I just wanted to let you all know."

He's

(Defs. Mot.
'

for Summ. J., Ex. C; DSUF tl 3-4.) The 911 dispatcher advised
Deputy Malone of the call and dispatched him to the scene.

(DSUF ^ 6.)
vehicle.

Deputy Parks also responded in a separate

(Parks Dep., Doc. No. 25, at 26-27.)

When Deputy

Malone did not find a crashed white truck at the four-way
stop, he traveled 50 yards down the road.
about three minutes behind him.

Deputy Parks was

(Id. at 31-32.)

The officers

alerted dispatch as follows:

Officer One^:
"This hill on the left, when you turn
right onto Walke Dairy at the four-way, this hill right
here, I see a bunch of lights and a car in the trees. I
think this is going to be it."
Officer Two: "I'm going to be in a field -- the back of
a field. If you -- you're coming from 80 and turn right
onto Walke Dairy at the four-way -- in a field on the
left.

I'm not sure if

this is it or not.

There's a

[car] in the woods and a tractor. I think he probably
drove off into the trees and got stuck and tried to pull
himself out."

Defs. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, at 8.)
'

Deputy Malone

turned off of

the

public road onto a

private dirt road toward the lights that he had observed from
the road.

H 12.)

In doing so, he activated his blue lights.

(DSUF

When Deputy Malone found Plaintiff, Plaintiff was

using his tractor and a tow strap to try to dislodge a stuck

^

The record is not definitive as to which deputy was

Officer One and which was Officer Two.

white truck.

(Id. HH 13-14.)

Despite the obvious police presence, Plaintiff remained
atop the tractor.

(See generally Defs. Mot. for Summ. J.,
'

Ex. E, Video No. 1.)

Deputy Malone, who was in uniform,

exited his patrol car and approached the tractor, directing
and gesturing to Plaintiff to turn off the tractor and come
over to him.

(Id.)

Deputy Malone continued to approach

Plaintiff, issuing the same directive five times (e.g., "turn
that off and come over here").

(Id.)

Plaintiff continued to

operate the tractor and began shouting back at the deputy.
Plaintiff can be heard to say: "You're on my property.

do you want?"

At that point. Plaintiff came down from the

tractor without turning it off.^
As

What

Plaintiff

came

down

(Id.)

from

the

tractor,

he

had

a

motorcycle helmet in one hand and a flashlight in the other.^
(Id.; see also Malone Dep., Doc. No. 26, at 31.)

Plaintiff

complained about the deputy's flashlight, telling him that he
did not like lights in his face.

^

Of

note.

Plaintiff

admits

(See Video No. 1.)

at

deposition: "I

As

was

ignoring them, just trying to get my truck out because didn't
want to talk to them.
1 15.)
^

Didn't want to talk to anybody."

(DSUF

Later, it would be learned that Plaintiff had had an

argument with the woman who lived in his home and had left in
his truck, but he got it stuck on his own property H mile from
the residence.

He

walked back to his house and drove his

motorcycle to the tractor shed to get his tractor, which he
drove to his truck.

Plaintiff approached, Deputy Malone instructed him to put the

helmet down.

(Id.) Plaintiff flung it down and stated "fine"

with his arm

raised above

his head.

(Id. ;

see

also Pi. s
'

Dep., Doc. No. 22, at 50.)
Plaintiff then stood within striking distance of Deputy
Malone. (See Video No. 1.)

Plaintiff is a large and very tall

man; the deputy came up to Plaintiff's shoulder.
Malone

asked Plaintiff

how

his truck got

Deputy

where it was.

Plaintiff only answered: "What's it to you? Who are you?
you on my property?"
Plaintiff

to

flashlight.

"put
(Id.)

(Id.)

that

Why

Deputy Malone then instructed

down,"

referring

to

Plaintiff's

Deputy Malone repeated that command.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff was gesturing and stated: "You got a

flashlight in your hand, I'm out here with a flashlight trying
to get my truck out."

(Id.)

Deputy Malone told Plaintiff for

a third time: "Put your flashlight down."

(Id.)

Plaintiff

continued to exclaim repeatedly that this was his property and

the deputy was trespassing.

flashlight.'^

Plaintiff did not put down his

(Id.)

At this time. Deputy Parks was approaching the two men.
Deputy Malone said to Plaintiff: "Alright, do me a favor real

^ Plaintiff testified at deposition that he put down the
flashlight (Pl.'s Dep. at 43), but this statement is
contradicted by the video showing him holding the flashlight
until the deputies grabbed his arms to handcuff him (see Video
No. 1).

quick, turn around. . . . Put your hands behind your back."®
(Id.)

At first, Plaintiff slapped away from Deputy Malone,

but he appeared to comply within seconds when both deputies

grabbed

him

to

put

on

the

handcuffs.

(Id.)

Plaintiff

continued his protest by cursing and calling them "trespassing
SOBs."

(Id.)

Before

they

could

secure

the

handcuffs.

Plaintiff broke free of the deputies and became resistant.
The deputies and Plaintiff circled around together as the
deputies attempted to bring Plaintiff down by tripping him;

that did not work.

The deputies continued to try to restrain

Plaintiff's arms. Plaintiff then complied and allowed himself
to

be

cuffed.

seconds.®
car.

Plaintiff's

resistance

lasted

about

ten

Plaintiff was then placed in the back of a patrol

(Id.)

Both deputies testified that they could smell alcohol on
Plaintiff when they were close to him.

(Malone Dep. at 33,

®
Deputy Malone testified that he perceived the
flashlight in Plaintiff's hand to be a potential weapon and
decided to detain Plaintiff for the safety of the officers and
Plaintiff. (Malone Dep. at 32-33 ("At that point I was still
concerned for my safety. . . . I did not want to get hurt and
I didn't want something to escalate further and cause anybody
to get hurt."), 50, 52, and 54 ("I didn't feel safe continuing
on without putting him in handcuffs.").)

® Plaintiff's claim that he acted "perfectly normal" and
that there was "no struggle to put handcuffs" on him (Pl.'s
Resp. to DSUF
33, 35, 37) is clearly contradicted by the
video.

44; Parks Dep. at 36.)

Rather than administer a field

sobriety test themselves, they called for a state trooper, per

the department's policy, to work the crash as a DUI incident.
(Malone Dep. at 33-34; Parks Dep. at 46-47.)
It took

the state trooper anywhere

minutes to arrive.

between 35

to 60

(See Malone Dep. at 48; Parks Dep. at 35.)

In any event, it had been over two hours from the time that

Plaintiff had an opportunity to consume alcohol and the time
that the state trooper administered a breathalyzer test.

(DSUF H 63.) The test was positive for alcohol, but Plaintiff

was not above the legal limit.''

(Id. il 66.)

Plaintiff was

therefore not arrested for DUI by the state trooper; rather,

the

Laurens

County deputies arrested

him

for misdemeanor

obstruction.

While he was in custody. Plaintiff did not ask for or

receive medical attention.

(Id. ^ 73.)

Moreover, Plaintiff

told the state trooper when he arrived that he was not hurt

but the handcuffs were too tight.®
C.

(Id. ^ 62.)

Procedural Background

Plaintiff originally filed a complaint and an amended

''
Plaintiff admitted to drinking alcohol earlier that
evening. (Pl.'s Dep. at 29.)

®

Plaintiff's claim that the deputies' actions toward

him were "clearly violent" (Pl.'s Resp. to DSUF H 41) is
contradicted by the video.

complaint in the Superior Court of Laurens County. Defendants
timely removed the case to this Court on August 2, 2017.
the

Amended

violated

Complaint,

his

Fourth

Plaintiff

and

claims

Fourteenth

that

In

Defendants

Amendment

rights

by

"detaining, arresting, and prosecuting him for absolutely no

lawful reason or cause."

(Am. Compl., Doc. No. 1, H 38.)

Plaintiff also includes a claim of excessive force.
40.) Finally,

(Id. H

Plaintiff also claims that his First Amendment

rights were violated because he was arrested "in response to
the content of [his] speech, namely his lack of desire to

interact with officers . . . ."®

(Id. f 41.)

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on

all of Plaintiff's claims.

The Clerk gave Plaintiff notice of

the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of
the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition,

and

of

the

consequences

of

default.

(Doc.

No.

23.)

Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright,
772

F.2d

satisfied.

822,

825

(11th

Cir.

1985)

(per

curiam),

are

The time for filing materials in opposition has

expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration.

®

Plaintiff also asserts several state law claims based

upon his arrest and prosecution. (Am. Compl.
8

28, 30-34.)

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to dispose

of unsupported claims or defenses which, as a matter of law,

raise no genuine issues of material fact suitable for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts
and reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the

nonmoving party.

Hoaan v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 361 F.3d 621,

625 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat
summary judgment unless the factual dispute is material to an
issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules
of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact.

A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there
is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transo., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (quoted source omitted) (emphasis supplied).

The

party opposing the summary judgment motion, however, "may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.
Rather, its responses . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue to be tried."
Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990).

Walker v.

III. DISCUSSION

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. §§

1983, 1985 and 1986 to support his federal claims against the
Deputy Defendants. Plaintiff has sued the deputies in both
their official and individual capacities.

Through their

summary judgment motion. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has
failed to show any evidence to support claims under §§ 1985
and

1986,

that

they

are

entitled

to

Eleventh

Amendment

immunity as to any official capacity claims, and that they are

entitled to qualified immunity on all of Plaintiff's § 1983
claims.

A.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986

Section 1985 prohibits engaging in conspiracies "for the

purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws . . . . 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3).

In order to maintain a claim under § 1985(3), a

plaintiff must show that a defendant was motivated by racial
or class-based "invidiously discriminatory animus."
V.

Breckenridcre.

403

U.S.

88,

102,

91

S.

Ct.

Griffin

1790,

1798

(1971), cited in Lves v. Citv of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d

1332, 1337 (11""^ Cir. 1999).

Section 1986 provides a cause of

action against anyone who has "knowledge that any of the

wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in [42 U.S.C. §

10

1985], are about to be committed, and having the power to

prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,

neglects or refuses so to do . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1986, cited

in Park v. Citv of Atlanta. 120 F.3d 1157, 1159 (11*^^ Cir.
1997).

Thus,

violations.

§

1986

claims

are

derivative

Parks. 120 F.3d at 1159-60.

of

§

1985

That is, "§ 1986

requires the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy."

Id. at 1160.

Here, Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis
that

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

present

any

evidence

of

a

conspiracy or racial or class-based invidious discrimination.
Plaintiff did not address Defendants' motion on these claims

in his response and thus, he has failed to show that there
exists a genuine issue for trial.
reveals no such evidence.

In any event, the record

For these reasons. Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's §§ 1985 and 1986
claims.

B.

Official Capacity Claims

Defendants claim

that they are

entitled

to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from all federal claims asserted against
them in their official capacities.

The Eleventh Amendment

protects a state from being sued in federal court without a
state's consent.

Carr v. City of Florence. 916 F.2d 1521,

1524 (11"^ Cir. 1990).

Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars

suits brought against employees or officers sued in their

11

official capacities for monetary damages because those actions
actually seek recovery from state funds.
473 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1985);

Kentucky v. Graham.

Hobbs v. Roberts. 999 F.2d 1526,

1528 (11'^'' Cir. 1993).

"To receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant need
not be labeled a 'state officer' or 'state official,
' but

instead need only be acting as an 'arm of the state, which
'
includes agents and instrumentalities of the state."
V.

Lee.

338

omitted).

F.3d

1304,

1308

(11"^"

Cir.

2003)

Manders

(citations

Whether a defendant is an "arm of the state" is

determined by examining his function in a particular context.
Id.

This entails analyzing four factors:

defines

the

entity;

2)

what degree

of

1) how state law
control

the

state

maintains over the entity; 3) where the entity derives its

funds; and 4) who is responsible for judgments against the
entity.

Id. (citations omitted).

The Court need not provide a Manders analysis in this
case,

particularly

because

Plaintiff

fails

Defendants' contention on this point in brief.

to

oppose

Instead, the

Court simply references other cases that have examined a
sheriff deputy's duties vis a vis state law in similar cases

and found Eleventh Amendment immunity:

Manders. 338 F.3d 1304

(holding that a Georgia sheriff is considered an "arm of the
State"

when

performing

law

enforcement

functions

such

as

detaining and arresting suspects); Buraest v. Colquitt Cnty..

12

177 F. App'x 852 (11"'^ Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment
in favor of sheriff's employees based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity on claims related to the plaintiffs' detention and
arrest); Richardson v. Ouitman Cnty.. Ga. , 912 F. Supp. 2d

1354 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (dismissing official capacity claims

against deputies involving strip searches, an investigatory
stop and arrests); Townsend v. Coffee Cntv.. Ga.. 854 F. Supp.

2d 1345, 1352 (S.D. Ga. 2011) (concluding that "investigatory

stops and arrests fall squarely within the traditional lawenforcement responsibilities of a sheriff and his deputies"
and

thus,

the

deputy defendant

was entitled

to Eleventh

Amendment immunity).

Here, the Deputy Defendants acted as agents of the State

in investigating and arresting Plaintiff.

Thus, Plaintiff's

claims against them in their official capacities are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.

C.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff also brought individual capacity claims against

the Deputy Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983

provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred."

Graham

v.

Connor.

490

U.S.

386,

393 (1989).

Accordingly, for a plaintiff to prevail on his § 1983 claim,
he must show that a person acting under the color of state law

deprived him of a federal right.
Locka■

261 F.3d 1295,

1303

Griffin v. City of Qpa-

(11'^^ Cir. 2001) .
13

In this case, Plaintiff claims that his arrest violated

his constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable seizures
and excessive force and to free speech, invoking the Fourth
and

First

Amendments

respectively.

to

the

United

States

Constitution,

At summary judgment. Defendants contend that

they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims.
Qualified immunity is a judicially-created affirmative
defense

under

which

"government

officials

performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable

person

would

have

Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

known."

Harlow

v.

"To receive qualified

immunity, the public official must first prove that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when
the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Lumlev v. City of Bade
City, 327 F.3d 1186, 94 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

Here,

Defendants

were

acting

within

the

scope

of

their

discretionary authority when they engaged in the conduct

presently challenged by Plaintiff because making an arrest is
a

quintessential

officials.

See,

discretionary
e.g..

Howell v.

act
Citv

of
of

law

enforcement

Lithonia.

397

F.

App'x 618, 620 (11"*^ Cir. 2010); Peach State Recovery. Inc. v.
Goodwin. 290 F. App'x 233, 234 (ll'^'^ Cir. 2008).

Accordingly,

the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified

14

immunity is not appropriate.

See id.

"In resolving cjuestions of qualified immunity at summary
judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry."
Cotton. 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014).

Tolan v.

"The first [prong] asks

whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the

party

asserting

the

injury,

violated a federal right."

show

the

officer's

conduct

Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (alterations omitted)).

"The second

prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the

right in question was 'clearly established' at the time of the
violation."

Id. at 1866 (citing Hope v. Pelzer. 536 U.S. 730,

739 (2002)).

"Courts have discretion to decide the order in

which to engage these two prongs . . . [b]ut under either
prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in
favor of the party seeking summary judgment."
omitted).

Id. (citations

Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff

cannot establish a constitutional violation as a matter of

law, the Court need not address the clearly established prong.
1.

False Arrest

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

A "seizure" occurs "when there is a

governmental termination of freedom of movement through means

15

intentionally applied."

Brewer v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S.

593, 596-97 (1989).

Generally, a seizure is reasonable if it is supported by

probable cause.

Groom v. Balkwill. 645 F.3d 1240, 1246 (11*^^

Cir. 2011) ("Traditionally, seizures by law enforcement have
been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if justified

by probable cause to believe that the detainee committed a
crime.").

In fact, an arrest made with probable cause is "an

absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the
arrest."

Gates v. Khokhar. 884 F.3d 1290, 1297 (ll'^'^ Cir.

2018) (quoted source omitted).
"Probable

cause

to

arrest

exists

if

the

facts

and

circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information,

would cause a prudent

person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the

suspect has committed or is committing an offense."

Ortega v.

Christian.

(citation

85

F.3d

1521,

1525

(ll'^^

Cir.

1996)

omitted); United States v. Flovd. 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11'^''
Cir. 2002) (stating that probable cause to arrest exists when
a law enforcement official has "facts and circumstances within

[his] knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that

the

suspect

had

committed

(quotation marks omitted)).

or

was

committing

a

crime"

Probable cause requires only "a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an

actual showing of such activity."

16

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S.

213, 243 n.l3 (1983).

Probable cause determinations are

guided by reviewing the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at

233.

In the context of a qualified immunity defense, all that

is required of an arresting officer is "arguable probable
cause to believe that a person is committing a particular

public offense; that is, where reasonable officers in the same
circumstances

and

possessing

the

same

knowledge

as

the

Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to

arrest the plaintiffs."
1302

(11"^^ Cir.

2001)

Scarbrough v. Myles. 245 F.3d 1299,
(quoted sources

omitted); Jones

v.

Cannon. 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.3 (11'^'" Cir. 1999) ("Arguable
probable cause, not the higher standard of actual probable

cause,

governs

the

qualified

immunity

inquiry.").

This

standard recognizes that a law enforcement official may make
a reasonable but mistaken judgment regarding probable cause.

In the case at bar, the Deputy Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims of false arrest if
arguable
determine

probable
whether

circumstances

and

cause
a

exists.

reasonable

possessing

the

Thus,

this

officer

same

in

Court

must

the

same

knowledge

as

the

deputies could have believed that probable cause existed to
arrest Plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction.

In Georgia, a person commits the offense of "Obstruction

17

of

Officers" if

he "knowingly and

willfully obstructs or

hinders any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful
discharge of his [] official duties . . . ."

10-24(a).

O.C.G.A. § 16-

A person commits the offense by refusing to comply

with reasonable instructions, or by acting belligerently and

confrontationally during an investigatory stop.

Draper v.

Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11"^^ Cir. 2004).
In the case at bar, the following facts are undisputed.

The Deputy Defendants were dispatched to the area of a fourway stop on Walke Dairy Road and told that a drunk driver had
crashed his white truck and was now driving a motorcycle.

In

the early morning hours on a dark road, the deputies noticed

lights

in

the

vicinity

of

the

four-way

stop.

Upon

investigation, they found a stuck white truck being dislodged
by a man on a tractor.

The man on the tractor refused to

comply with Deputy Malone's repeated instruction to turn off
the tractor and come down to talk to him.

comply,
helmet

he
and

approached Deputy Malone
a

flashlight.

The

man

When the man did

holding a
was

motorcycle

confrontational.

The Court derived most of the relevant facts from the
video

of

the

incident.

A

few

facts

are

derived

from

an

undisputed transcript of the dispatcher's calls and the
deposition testimony of the parties. Any attempt by Plaintiff
to create a genuine dispute of these facts in his response to
Defendants'
Statement
of
Undisputed
Fact
is
clearly
contradicted by the video.
Thus, as far as the Court is
concerned the relevant facts are undisputed.
18

insisting that the deputies should not be on his property.
The man refused to comply with a repeated directive to drop
the

flashlight.

Deputy

Malone

perceived

the

larger,

confrontational man with a potential weapon as a threat and
therefore decided to handcuff him.

The man resisted.

Given

Plaintiff's confrontational manner, his refusal to comply with
reasonable instructions, and his active resistance to putting

on the handcuffs, any reasonable officer in the deputies'
position would have believed that probable cause existed to
arrest Plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction.

See Draper, 369

F.3d at 1276-77 (finding ample probable cause to arrest for
obstruction where the arrestee was confrontational and refused

to comply with officer's instructions during a legitimate
traffic stop); Hayaood v. State. 789 S.E.2d 404, 407 (Ga. Ct.
App.

2016)

interfered

disturbance

(finding
with

the

call

by

probable
lawful

cause

where

investigation

refusing

to

comply

the
of

a

with

arrestee
domestic

officers'

instruction to leave the home and then struggling with the
officers).

Plaintiff's

sole

response

to

the

claim

of

qualified

immunity is his insistence that the Deputy Defendants had no

right to be on his private property in the first instance, and
once he told them to leave, they had to discontinue their
investigation.

Plaintiff's contention in this regard is not

19

only erroneous but ill-conceived.
The dispatch of the Deputy Defendants to the area was

legitimate police business.

On that call, the deputies saw

lights and a car in the woods from Walke Dairy Road and
entered the property to investigate the report that a drunk
driver had crashed a white truck in the vicinity and was now

driving a motorcycle. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, they
were well within their investigative authority to enter the

property.

See, e.g.. United States v. Taylor. 458 F.3d 1201,

1204 (11"^*^ Cir. 2006) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated by entry upon private land when officer proceeded
down driveway that provided access to house, went to the front
door, and knocked on it); United State v. Tobin. 923 F.2d

1506, 1511

(11"^ Cir. 1991) ("Reasonable suspicion cannot

justify the warrantless search of a house . . . but it can

justify the agents' approaching the house to question the
occupants." (citations omitted)).

It is worth noting that the deputies never entered
Plaintiff's home or surrounding curtilage.
Rather, they
discovered Plaintiff on an open dirt road surrounded by trees,
^ mile from his residence.

Thus, it is doubtful that the

Fourth
Amendment
is even implicated
since
they
were
essentially standing in an open field.
See, e.g., United
States V. Tavlor. 458 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11"^^ Cir. 2006)
(recognizing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not extend
protection to open fields, which includes any unoccupied or
undeveloped area beyond the 'immediate domestic establishment
of the home'" (quoting Oliver v. United States. 466 U.S. 170,
180 n.ll (1984))).
20

Nor were the officers required to leave upon command by

the property owner.

According to Plaintiff, the deputies

"should not have stuck around in defiance of his orders and

tried to talk to [him], smell [his] breath, approach [him],

put [him] in handcuffs, or otherwise do anything more on [his]
property other than leave."

(Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Defs.
'

Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 24, at 3.)
is untenable.

Plaintiff's position

It implies an expectation that law enforcement

should ignore evidence of illegal activity on private property
simply at the owner's behest.

In essence. Plaintiff posits

that the officers should have ignored a possible drunk driving
incident because they were told to leave by the suspected
perpetrator.

Indeed, had the officers simply walked away at

Plaintiff's first insistence without further inquiry, they
would have been in dereliction of their duties to protect the
citizens

of

Plaintiff

Laurens

County.

It

is also

noteworthy

was belligerent and did not cooperate

deputies at any point.

that

with the

Thus, the deputies were stymied from

the beginning in their reasonable investigation of a reported
incident.

In

conclusion.

immunity for

Defendants

Plaintiff's

Fourth

21

are

entitled

Amendment

to

claim

qualified

of

false

arrest.

2.

Excessive Force

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: "Defendants

violated Plaintiff's rights by using unlawful and excessive

force

against

Plaintiff

by

handcuff

(sic)

and

arresting

Plaintiff while trying to trip him." (Am. Compl. H 40.)
In determining whether the force used in effectuating an
arrest is reasonable, the Court must consider "the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight."

Thornton v. Citv of Macon. 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11"^^

Cir. 2000) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

"An officer

will be entitled to qualified immunity if his actions were

objectively reasonable, that is, if an objectively reasonable
officer in the same situation could have believed that the
force used was not excessive."

F.3d

1243,

1247

(11th

Cir.

Kesinger v. Herrinqton, 381

2004)

(quoting

Anderson

v.

Creiqhton. 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).

Because

Plaintiff's arrest

was

constitutional,

he

cannot state a claim for false imprisonment or malicious

prosecution. See Atterburv v. City of Miami Police Dep't, 322
F. App'x 724, 727 (11*^^ Cir. 2009) (noting that the existence
of probable cause to make an arrest forecloses the arrestee's
claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution).
22

In

this

case,

the

video

clearly

reveals

that

the

deputies' use of force in effectuating the arrest of a larger,
confrontational man who was refusing to drop an item that
could be used as a weapon was reasonable.

In fact, the only

point at which the officers became "forceful" by trying to
trip

Plaintiff

to

the

ground

occurred

when

he

actively

resisted the arrest.

In excessive force cases, "qualified immunity applies

unless application of the standard would inevitably lead every
reasonable officer in [the position of the defendant officer]
to conclude the force was unlawful."

Nolin v. Isbell. 207

F.3d 1253, 1255 (11'^'' Cir. 2000) (quoted source omitted).

In

this case, the Court readily concludes as a matter of law that
no reasonable officer would conclude that the use of force

against Plaintiff was unreasonable.

Accordingly, the Deputy

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's
claim of excessive force.
3.

First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he was
arrested "in response to the content of [his] speech, namely
his lack of desire to interact with officers[,] in order to

Plaintiff presents no argument in support of his
excessive force claim in response to the motion for summary

judgment. The claim is therefore not only unsupported by the
undisputed evidence, it has essentially been abandoned.
23

chill Plaintiff's speech."

(Am. Compl. ^ 41.) This claim is

defeated by the existence of probable cause.

The Eleventh

Circuit has held that if an officer had arguable probable

cause

to arrest a

officer

is

also

plaintiff's

plaintiff

entitled

First

for

disorderly conduct,

to qualified

Amendment

claim.

immunity from
Redd

v.

City

Enterprise. 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (ll*^*^ Cir. 1998).

the
the
of

"When a

police officer has probable cause to believe that a person is
committing a particular public offense, he is justified in
arresting that person, even if the offender may be speaking at
the time that he is arrested."

Id.

Moreover, Plaintiff in

this case has not presented any evidence of protected speech.

His claim hinges upon a finding that his detention and arrest
were unreasonable; this is simply not the case.

Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First
Amendment claim as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon

the

foregoing.

Defendants'

motion

for

summary

judgment (doc. no. 20) is GRANTED with respect to all of
Plaintiff's federal claims.

The Court declines to exercise

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims^^; thus, they

" Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims

if

it

has

dismissed

all

original jurisdiction.
24

claims

under

which

it

has

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The

Clerk is directed to

ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and CLOSE this case.

Costs are taxed against Plaintiff.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this,
September, 2018.

UNITED STATE'S DISTRICT

25

day of