Dopson v. Steverson et al

Filing 62

ORDER denying 59 Motion for Hearing; granting 20 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 21 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. It is Ordered that this case be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case and TERMINATE all motions and deadlines. Costs are assessed against Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 10/18/2018. (maa)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F0R^4k(^^|^
CnTTTWP.DKI nTQTPTf"? HTT GEORGIA
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP aRnPf^TA

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DUBLIN DIVISION

t.

20I8OCTI8 PH3:07

JOHN DOPSON,

so. GIST. OF

Plaintiff,

CV 317-053

V.

CHRIS STEVERSON; JEFFERY DEAL;
RON BOWDOIN; BETTY RIDDLE;
ATHANIEL KING; JERMOE DANIELS;
TOMMY BARRENTINE; CHRIS SCREWS,

*
*
*
*
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Defendants.

*

ORDER

Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction,

(Doc. Nos. 20, 21.)

Defendants

Steverson, Bowdoin, and Riddle filed the first motion to dismiss
and Defendants Barrentine, Daniels, Deal, King, and Screws adopted

and

incorporated

their

co-Defendants'

jurisdiction into their own motion.

arguments

regarding

Accordingly, the Court will

address the two motions together.

This

case

arose

from

Plaintiff s

imprisonment at the Dodge County Jail.
Doc. No. 1.)

alleged

wrongful

(See generally Compl.,

His Complaint alleges five counts: (1) false arrest

and imprisonment under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-1 and 51-7-2, (2) cruel

and unusual punishment under art. 1, § 1, para. XVII of the Georgia
Constitution,

(3)

intentional

and

negligent

infliction

of

emotional distress under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, (4) punitive damages.

and (5) attorneys' fees and costs under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.

(Compl. SISI 25-42.)

Defendants answered the complaint (doc. nos.

4, 5, 6), raised the defense of subject matter jurisdiction, and
filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1).

''Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, or

in other words, they have the power to decide only certain types
of cases."

(11th

Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61

Cir.

2000).

jurisdiction

over

Lower
cases

federal

for

jurisdiction by Congress.

which

See id.

courts
there

can

has

only

been

a

exercise
grant

of

Thus, "[a] federal court must

always dismiss a case upon determining that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, regardless of the stage of the proceedings." Goodman
ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1331 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001).

In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, a plaintiff must
properly "allege the jurisdictional facts, according to the nature
of the case."

McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana,

298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Here,

there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction because all parties
are Georgia residents.

(See Compl. M 1-9.)

Thus, for the Court

to exercise jurisdiction there must be a federal question.
Federal

courts

have

jurisdiction

over

"all

civil

actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."

law

is

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

determined

by

the

Whether a claim arises under federal

well-pleaded
2

complaint

rule,

which

requires a federal question to be presented on the face of the
plaintiff's complaint.

Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381

F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004).

''The rule makes the plaintiff

the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction

by

exclusive

reliance

on

state

law."

Caterpillar,

Inc.

v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint relies upon only Georgia statutes
and constitutional provisions as a basis for his claims.

In fact,

it would appear that the Complaint was drafted specifically to
avoid federal court based on its absence of any federal statutes

or constitutional provisions.

Plaintiff's exclusive reliance on

state law calls into doubt whether the Court has jurisdiction over
this case.

When a plaintiff uses only state-law causes of action, a
federal court may still have jurisdiction if either the state law
claims raise substantial questions of federal law or federal law
completely preempts the state law claims.

1290.

Dunlap, 381 F.3d at

So called "complete preemption" only occurs in statutes

with "extraordinary" preemptive force. Geddes v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court has

found only three federal statutes that completely preempt state
law, none of which are applicable to this case.^
at 1291.

Dunlap, 381 F.3d

As such, the complete preemption exception to the well

^ Those statutes are § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, § 1132 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank
Act.

3

pleaded complaint rule does not provide the Court with jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's claims.

Similarly,

Plaintiff's

state

substantial question of federal law.

law

claims

do

not

raise

a

Federal jurisdiction can lie

over a state law claim if a federal issue is (1) necessarily

raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state

balance approved by Congress.

Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258

(2013); Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 314 (2005). To be substantial, the issue of federal law

must be important to the federal system as a whole.

Id. at 260.

In other words, the proper focus is not on the interests of the
specific litigants, but rather on the broader significance the
issue poses to the federal system.

Id.

In this case. Plaintiff contends that his complaint raises
substantial

federal

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

issues

under

the

The Court disagrees.

Eighth

Amendment

and

Plaintiff's claims are

''poles apart from Grable" where the resolution of what notice is

required

to

seize

property

"controlling

in

numerous

Assur.,

v.

McVeigh,

Inc.

from

other
547

a

delinquent

cases."

U.S.

677,

Empire
681

taxpayer

was

Healthchoice

(2006).

Instead,

Plaintiff's claims are "fact-bound and situation specific" and
involve

a

more

"backward-looking"

Plaintiff's rights were violated.

Id.

analysis

into

whether

Accordingly, Plaintiff

cannot satisfy the substantial element of the Gunn test and the
Court is without jurisdiction to hear this case.^
In accordance with

the foregoing, Defendant's motions to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (doc. nos. 20, 21)
are GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing (doc. no. 59) is
therefore

DENIED.

IT

IS

ORDERED

that

this

case

be

DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The

Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case and TERMINATE all motions and

deadlines. Costs are assessed against Plaintiff.^
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

day of October,

2018.

UNITED STATES 2)1STRICT JUDGE

2 Plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint is DENIED.

Plaintiff's

request was made after the Court's Scheduling Order deadline for civil motions
had passed. Although Plaintiff contends he deserves one opportunity to amend,
Plaintiff has not shown good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)
to modify the Scheduling Order. See Sosa v. Airlift Sys., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419
(11th Cir. 1998) (good cause requires diligence on the party seeking extension).
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