Channel v. Smith et al

Filing 32

ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant Johnny Smith. Costs are taxed against Plaintiff. This case stands closed. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 10/26/2018. (pts)

-flLEO

U.S. OiSTP/iCT COURT
i\UGUS!A DIV.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

2fll80CT26 PH3:32

DUBLIN DIVISION

CLERK__,„

RONALD CHANNEL,

Plaintiff,
CV 317-060

V.

JOHNNY SMITH, in both his
individual and official

capacities, and LAURENS COUNTY,
Defendants.

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary

judgment. Upon review of the parties' briefs, the record evidence,
and relevant law, the motion is GRANTED for the reasons stated
below.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ronald Channel was a pre-trial detainee in the
Laurens County Jail on August 3, 2015.

On that day, an altercation

occurred between Plaintiff and a Laurens County Sheriff's Deputy,

Defendant Johnny Smith, while Deputy Smith escorted Plaintiff from
the

visitation area

back

to

his

cell.

The

entire

recorded by a hallway video camera in the jail.

incident

was

Other than the

video, the only evidence presented by the parties is the deposition
testimony

of

Plaintiff.

To

the

extent

his

testimony

is

contradicted by the video, however, it is immaterial.

See Scott

V. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007) (announcing that a court

should not rely upon a ''visible fiction," i.e., a version of events
"utterly discredited" by a videotape; rather, a court should view
the facts "in the light depicted by the videotape").

In truth.

Plaintiff's account of the incident at deposition is at complete
odds with the video at almost every critical point.
reason.

Defendants'

Statement of

Material

For that

Facts detailing

the

incident is undisputed, even in the face of Plaintiff's denials.
In other words. Plaintiff's denials, based on his testimony, are

unworthy of credence and will not be discussed further.

On August 3, 2015, Deputy Smith escorted Plaintiff and another
inmate down a hallway; neither inmate was shackled in any way.
(Defs. St. of Material Facts, Doc. No. 27-2,
'
inmate

rounded

a

corner

and

came

into

the

1-2.)
video

The other

frame

Plaintiff followed, and Deputy Smith followed Plaintiff.

first.

As they

rounded the corner and walked down the hallway. Plaintiff pointed

and gestured to the right.^

(Id. H 3.)

Deputy Smith immediately

nudged Plaintiff on his right shoulder and gestured to urge him to
continue walking down the hallway.^

(See id.

4.)

Plaintiff

^
Apparently Plaintiff was speaking to a prisoner in the holding
cell to his right who he knew from the streets. (Defs. St. of
'
Material Facts, ^ 3.)
2 Defendants use the word "tap" to describe Deputy Smith's contact
with Plaintiff. (Defs. St. of Material Facts, ^ 4.)
'
While the
touch was slightly more forceful than a tap, it certainly was not
2

responded to the nudge by stopping and turning to face Deputy
Smith, pointing a finger in his face, and "bowing up" to him.^

(Id. II 5.)

Deputy Smith then shoved Plaintiff in the chest with

an open hand, which forced Plaintiff to step backwards into the

hallway wall.

(Id. H 7.) Plaintiff immediately came back toward

Deputy Smith in a fighting stance, at which time Deputy Smith
lunged into the top of Plaintiff's legs, causing them both to fall
to the floor.

(Id. Hlj 8-9.)

Because Deputy Smith had essentially undercut Plaintiff when

he lunged into him. Plaintiff ended up on top of Deputy Smith as

they went to the floor.

(Id. H 10.)

Two other law enforcement

officials immediately ran over and helped restrain Plaintiff. (Id.
t 11.)

At no time did Deputy Smith or the other guards punch, hit

or kick Plaintiff; rather, the only force that was used by the

three guards, including Deputy Smith, was holding onto Plaintiff
while gaining control of him.

(Id. K 12.)

Deputy Smith actually

stepped away at one point, allowing the other officials to handcuff
Plaintiff and lead him away.

"a great big push" or a shove that "forced [Plaintiff] to take
three or four unaccounted for steps."

30, at 30-31.)

(See Pi.'s Dep., Doc. No.

In fact. Plaintiff completely stops in his tracks

and faces the deputy.

3 The Court acknowledges that the term "bowing up" is colloquial,
but it is used by Defendants and is an apt description of
Plaintiff's response.
It is beyond dispute that Plaintiff's
response was pugnacious.
3

Plaintiff had no visible injuries as a result of the incident.
Within a day of the incident, however, Plaintiff was sent to a

doctor at Hillcrest Urgent Care in Laurens County complaining of

back pain.

His back was x-rayed, he was given steroid shots in

his back, and given steroid pills.

(Id.

22, 25.)

Plaintiff

was also taken by ambulance to Fairview Hospital to have an MRI

scan approximately two days after the incident.

(Id. ^ 26.)

On July 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed this case in the Superior
Court of Laurens County, asserting federal claims of excessive
force and deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state

law claims of failure to provide medical care, negligence and

battery.

Defendants removed Plaintiff's case to this Court on

October 25, 2017.

On March 23, 2018, this Court denied Defendants' motion for

judgment on the pleadings because the videotape and medical records

upon which they relied were matters outside of the pleadings.
(Doc. No. 16.)

The Court was nevertheless able to narrow the

federal claims, concluding that the claims of excessive force and
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs remain only

against Deputy Smith in his individual capacity.

(Id. at 6-7.)

Upon the close of discovery. Defendants filed the instant
motion for summary judgment.

The Clerk gave the nonmoving party,

the Plaintiff, notice of the summary judgment motion and the

summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or other
materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default.

No.

28.)

Therefore,

the

notice

requirements

of

(Doc.

Griffith

v.

Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are

satisfied.

The

time

for

filing

materials

in opposition

has

expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The

purpose of the summary judgment rule is to dispose of unsupported
claims or defenses which, as a matter of law, raise no genuine
issues

of

material

fact

suitable

for

trial.

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the nonmoving

party.

Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621, 625 (11th Cir.

2004).

Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not

defeat summary judgment unless the factual dispute is
material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.
The

relevant

rules

of

substantive

materiality of a disputed fact.

law

dictate

the

A genuine issue of

material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient

evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (ll^h cir. 2000) {en

hanc) (quoted source omitted) (emphasis supplied).

The party

opposing the summary judgment motion, however, "may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.

Rather, its

responses . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue to be tried."

Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573,

1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990).

III.

DISCUSSION

At summary judgment. Deputy Smith asserts that he is entitled

to qualified immunity for Plaintiff's federal claims of excessive
force and deliberate indifference.

Qualified

immunity

is

a

judicially-created

affirmative

defense under which "government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

"To receive qualified immunity, the public official must first

prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred."

Lumley v.

City of Bade City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (ll^h cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).

Courts consider whether the public official was "
(a)
6

pursuing a legitimate job-related function {that is, pursuing a
job-related goal), (b) through means that were in his power to
utilize."

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252,

1265 (ll'^^ Cir. 2004).

Here, the incident occurred when Deputy

Smith was acting within the scope of his duties by escorting
Plaintiff back to his cell in his capacity as a prison guard.

Accordingly, Deputy Smith was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when he engaged in the conduct presently
challenged by Plaintiff.

See, e.g., Jenkins v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga.,

528 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1336-37 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (stating that even
if a correctional officer "makes a mistake and violates a rule,

policy or procedure does not mean that the officer is no longer

acting within the scope of his duties as a correctional officer") ,•
Smith

V.

Andrews,

2015

WL

4716037

(S.D.

Ga.

Aug.

7,

2015)

(concluding that prison guards are within the scope of their
discretionary authority when they are escorting a prisoner to a
cell); Bogus v. Ala. Dep^t of Corr., 2008 WL 11379957 (N.D. Ala.

Sept. 22, 2008) (finding that a prison guard was acting within the
scope of his duties in asking a prisoner to return to his cell).
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that
qualified immunity is not appropriate.
1194.

See Lumley, 327 F.3d at

''In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary
judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry."
Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014).

Tolan v.

"The first [prong] asks

whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, show the officer's conduct violated a federal

right."

Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(alterations omitted)).

"The

second

prong of

the

qualified-

immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was 'clearly
established' at the time of the violation."

Id. at 1866 (citing

Hope V. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). "Courts have discretion

to decide the order in which to engage these two prongs . . . [b]ut
under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of
fact in favor of
(citations

the

omitted).

party seeking
Because

summary judgment."

Plaintiff

cannot

Id.

establish

a

constitutional violation as a matter of law, the Court need not

address the clearly established prong.
A.

Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff

claims

that

the

altercation

caused a significant back injury.
further

claims

that

Defendants

with

Deputy

(Compl. H 18.)

allowed

him

"to

Plaintiff

suffer

proper or adequate medical care" for his back injury.

Smith

without

(Id. H 25.)

To establish a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need, a plaintiff must show (1) he had a serious medical

8

need - the objective component; (2) the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to that need - the subjective component;

and (3) his injury was caused by a defendant's wrongful conduct.
Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11^^ cir. 2007).

In this case, the Court has already noted that Plaintiff is

pursuing his federal claims only against Deputy Smith (see Order
of March 23, 2018, at 6); thus, only the actions of Deputy Smith
are relevant to Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference.

At

summary judgment. Defendants point out that there is no evidence

that Deputy Smith was involved in any of Plaintiff's medical care
after the altercation.

determine

that

For this reason, no reasonable jury could

Deputy

Smith's

conduct

vis-a-vis

Plaintiff's

medical care caused harm to Plaintiff let alone that Deputy Smith
acted with deliberate indifference to his back injury.

In response. Plaintiff does not address Defendants' motion
for summary judgment on his claim of deliberate indifference; thus,

he appears to have abandoned the claim.

Regardless, there is no

evidence to support a deliberate indifference claim against Deputy
Smith.

Deputy Smith is therefore entitled to summary judgment on

the claim.
B.

Excessive Force

The use of physical force against a pretrial detainee may
constitute

a

deprivation

of

due

process

in

violation of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

rather

than

the

Eighth

Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

Cottrell v.

Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 {11^^ cir. 1996).

To establish an

excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial

detainee "must show only that the force purposely or knowingly
used against him

was objectively unreasonable."

Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473-74 (2015).

Kingsley v.

A court considers

the following factors in considering the reasonableness of the
force used: (1) the relationship between the need for the use of
force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the injury

inflicted upon the plaintiff; (3) any effort made by the officer

to temper or limit the amount of force; (4) the severity of the
security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by
the officer; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id. at 2473.

Deference is given to prison officials acting to

preserve discipline and security.

Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d

1212, 1217 (ll*^^ Cir. 2009); see Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473

("Courts must also credit the government's need to manage the

facility where an individual is detained, and defer to policies
and practices that jail officers believe are needed to preserve
order, discipline, and security.").
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff "bowed up" and
pointed a threatening finger at Deputy Smith when he was nudged by

10

the deputy.

This created a security problem, particularly since

the officer was escorting two unshackled inmates at the time.
Plaintiff's conduct could have been reasonably perceived as a

threat

to

the

officer.

As

one

court

has

noted,

"physical

resistance by a prisoner in the close confines of a prison is an

exceptionally dangerous event that must be stopped immediately."
Youman v. Wood, 2010 WL 3958703, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2010).

Deputy Smith's response

was to shove Plaintiff.

This shove

precipitated Plaintiff's further aggression toward Deputy Smith,
which ultimately resulted in Deputy Smith's lunge into Plaintiff
and the fall that allegedly caused Plaintiff's back injury. Again,

Plaintiff's continued aggression (coming back at Deputy Smith in
a fighting stance) is active resistance and is certainly a threat.
Moreover, Deputy Smith's take down of Plaintiff showed a certain
amount of restraint.

Deputy Smith quelled any threat by Plaintiff

within seconds and exerted no more force than was necessary to

bring the matter to a swift conclusion.
The

facts

critical

to

this

constitutional

analysis

are

compressed into less than twenty seconds from which Plaintiff
believes a jury could conclude that Deputy Smith's response to his
"bowed up" and threatening conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Yet, to submit this to a jury would be to ignore the deference

that must be given to prison officials under similar circumstances.

11

Whether Deputy Smith's initial shove^ and subsequent take down were
necessary is not the issue.
over the

"The existence of ^a mere dispute

reasonableness of a particular use

of force or the

existence of arguably superior alternatives' is not enough to

support a claim of excessive force in an institutional setting."
Scroggins v. Davis, 346 F. App'x 504, 505 (ll^'^ Cir. 2009) (quoting
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (ll^h cir. 1999)).

Moreover,

the Court is to apply the objectively reasonable standard in light
of the facts confronting the officer at the time of the incident,
not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff Dep't, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11^^ cir. 2015).

This case exemplifies the admonition of the United States

Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989):

"Not

every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional
rights."

In short, in viewing the video of the incident in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court concludes that no jury

could find that the force used by Deputy Smith was objectively
unreasonable.

Cf. Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11*^^

Cir. 1990) (holding that grabbing an inmate by the throat and

^ The Court is referring to the deputy's shove of Plaintiff after
Plaintiff "bowed up" at him, not the mere nudge of Plaintiff's
shoulder.
12

pushing him against the bars of his cell was not excessive after
the inmate failed to follow instructions and disrupted prison

procedures).

Accordingly, Deputy Smith is entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing, Defendant Smith's motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff's federal claims (doc. no. 27) is GRANTED.
The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state
law claims^; thus, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The Clerk

is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant Johnny

Smith and CLOSE this case.

Costs are taxed against Plaintiff.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

day of October,

2018.

UNITED STA-JJBTs DISTRICT

5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has
dismissed all claims under which it has original jurisdiction.
13