Hall v. Hall et al

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS that the 1 Complaint be dismissed and this civil action be closed. Objections to R&R due by 7/2/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 06/13/2018. (jlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION
TRAVION TERRELL HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
PHILLIP HALL; RODNEY MCCLOUD;
and MS. LEWIS,
Defendant.

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CV 318-015

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Telfair State Prison (“TSP”) in Helena, Georgia,
commenced the above-captioned case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because he is

proceeding IFP, Plaintiff’s complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants.
Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x
733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006).
I.

SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
A.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names as Defendants (1) Phillip Hall; (2) Rodney McCloud; and (3) Ms.
Lewis. (Doc. no. 1, p. 1.) Taking all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, as the Court
must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows.
On December 22, 2017, several gang members with knives threatened Plaintiff, telling
him to leave the B-C-D building and they would be assault him if he returned. (Id. at 5.)

Because Plaintiff left and did not return, he was given a disciplinary report for refusing housing
and lost an opportunity to receive parole points. (Id.) Plaintiff was then placed in Room 118 in
Building B-2. (Id.; doc. no. 1-1, p. 1.)
While housed in Room 118, gang members came to Plaintiff’s cell and assaulted him,
beating him and placing him in a chokehold. (Doc. no. 1-1, p. 1.) They told him he needed to
pack his stuff and get out of the dorm, and they escorted him to the officer booth. (Id.) When
Sergeant Mathis arrived, Plaintiff informed her of the situation. (Id.) Instead of taking him to
get medical attention from the assault, Sergeant Mathis placed him in segregation with a Crip
roommate. (Id.) By notarized letter, Plaintiff norified all Defendants of him “being assaulted
and threatened again for the second time.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff has also written several statements
and grievances about the incident. (Id. at 1-3.)
B.

DISCUSSION
1.

Legal Standard for Screening

The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A
claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson
v. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
allegations in the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not
require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it
“offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’”
or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement’
possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding them to a
more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal construction does not
mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314,
1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2.

Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Supervisory Liability Against
Defendants

Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendants liable because they knew about the gang assault
after the fact but took no action. However, “[s]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983
for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th
Cir. 2003). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 actions, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.” Rosa v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 522 F. App’x 710, 714 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, to hold a
supervisor liable, Plaintiff must demonstrate that either (1) he actually participated in the
alleged constitutional violation, or (2) there is a causal connection between his actions and
the alleged constitutional violation. See Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (citing Brown v. Crawford,
906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)). Here, Plaintiff merely alleges Defendants were informed of
his assault. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege Defendants were the individuals responsible for
allowing these gang members to commit the assault or failed to provide him with medical care
after the fact.
Moreover, Plaintiff does not show Defendants were directly involved with failing to
protect him from gang violence by merely alleging they viewed grievances or statements
Plaintiff wrote after the second assault. See Asad v. Crosby, 158 F. App’x 166, 170-72 (11th
Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s dismissal of supervisory liability claims against two
defendants who failed, inter alia, “to afford [plaintiff] relief during the grievance process,”
because record failed to show they “personally participated in the alleged constitutional
violations, or that there was a causal connection between the supervisory defendants’ actions
and an alleged constitutional violation”); see also Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999) (refusing to impose liability under § 1983 on supervisory officials who denied
administrative grievances and otherwise failed to act based on allegations contained in the
grievances), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000); Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005-06 (7th
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Cir. 1982) (rejecting claim that Commissioner of Department of Corrections could be held
liable for damages from any constitutional violation at facility within his jurisdiction based on
receipt of letter describing allegedly improper prison conditions).
Likewise, Plaintiff has not alleged a causal connection between these Defendants and
the asserted constitutional violation. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.
1986) (requiring affirmative causal connection between defendant and alleged constitutional
violation). The “causal connection” can be established “when a history of widespread abuse
puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and
he fails to do so,” Brown, 906 F.2d at 671, or when “the supervisor’s improper ‘custom or
policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.’” Hartley, 193 F.3d at
1269 (quoting Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)). The standard for
demonstrating “widespread abuse” is high.

In the Eleventh Circuit, “deprivations that

constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious,
flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown, 906
F.2d at 671 (emphasis added). A causal connection may also be shown when the facts
support “an inference that the supervisor [or employer] directed the subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff does not draw the necessary causal connection to any alleged constitutional
violation. Simply notifying Defendants he was assaulted does not show personal participation
by Defendants in the dangerous conditions leading to it, let alone suggest they have instituted a
policy or custom causing such a problem. In sum, Plaintiff has not shown Defendants actually
participated in the alleged constitutional violation; nor has he drawn the necessary causal
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connection to any alleged constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s

complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and this civil action be CLOSED.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of June, 2018, at Augusta,
Georgia.

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