Capehart v. Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections et al

Filing 5

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that Plaintiff's #4 Amended Complaint be dismissed for failure to follow a Court order and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that this civil action be closed. Objections to R&R due by 5/28/2024. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 5/10/2024. (gmh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION
RANDY LEE CAPEHART,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF THE GEORGIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
OVERSEEING DELIVERY OF HEALTH
CARE; WHEELER CORRECTIONAL
PRISON; and DR. NEAV,
Defendants.

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CV 324-030

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the above-captioned
case. Because he is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be screened to
protect potential defendants. See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
I.

Screening the Amended Complaint
A.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this case by submitting a complaint that did not provide any
details about the participation of any named Defendant in the medical treatment, or lack
thereof, about which he complained. In fact, he did not mention any Defendant in his
Statement of Claim. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 3-4.) Nor did he provide any details about his medical
condition or injury for which he claims to have received constitutionally inadequate treatment.

In the Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, the Court provided explicit
instructions about how to file an amended complaint, including what information must be
included in numbered paragraphs: “(i) the alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date on which
such misconduct occurred; (iii) the names of each and every individual who participated in
such misconduct; and (iv) where appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct
occurred.” (Doc. no. 3, p. 5.) Moreover, the complaint form provided to Plaintiff by the
Clerk of Court instructs the pro se litigant to describe in the Statement of Claim what each
defendant(s) did to cause harm or violate the plaintiff’s rights. (Doc. no. 4, p. 4.) In
particular, the plaintiff is instructed to provide dates and places for the alleged wrongful
conduct, and if more than one claim is stated, number each claim and write a short and plain
statement for each count. (Id.)
In response, Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint that added one Defendant but
failed to follow the instructions described above concerning the requirement to provide
factual details about the alleged misconduct correlated to specific Defendants.

Indeed,

Plaintiff again fails to provide any details about the participation of, or connection to, any
named Defendant concerning the medical treatment about which he complains. Likewise, he
again fails to mention any Defendant in his Statement of Claim.
While the Court must take all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true for purposes of
the present screening, the Court can determine only that during an approximately eight-month
period from May 2022 through January 2023, Plaintiff lost strength in his right arm and left
hand. (Id.) He also experienced numbness and loss of feeling in the same two extremities.
(Id.) Although Plaintiff does not explain what caused his physical ailments, he alleges he was
refused medical care. (Id. at 3.) He seeks ten million dollars in damages from the following
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Defendants: (1) Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections; (2) Assistant
Commissioner Overseeing the Delivery of Health Care; (3) Wheeler Correctional Prison; and
(4) Dr. Neav. (Id. at 1-2, 4.)
B.

Discussion
1.

Legal Standard for Screening

The amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same
standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H
& S, Inc., 366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490
(11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
allegations in the amended complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The amended complaint is

insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
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cause of action,’” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the amended complaint must provide a
“‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Finally, the Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding
them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). However, this liberal
construction does not mean that the Court has a duty to re-write the amended complaint. See
Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020); Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d
1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Failure to
Follow a Court Order

A district court has authority to manage its docket to expeditiously resolve cases, and
this authority includes the power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to
comply with a court order. Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv.,
Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Dismissal without
prejudice is generally appropriate pursuant to Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to
comply with a court order, “especially where the litigant has been forewarned.” Owens v.
Pinellas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 331 F. App’x 654, 655 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding
dismissal appropriate where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a court order, “especially
where the litigant has been forewarned” (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th
Cir. 1989)); Loc. R. 41.1(b) (Court may dismiss an action sua sponte for “willful disobedience
or neglect of any order of the Court”).

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Here, the Court previously explained to Plaintiff he had not provided sufficient
factual detail about his claims and cautioned him that failure to submit an amended
complaint as instructed would result in a recommendation for dismissal. (See doc. no. 3.)
The Court also specifically cautioned Plaintiff about the need to provide the details of alleged
misconduct, including dates and locations for alleged misconduct. (Id. at 4.) The Court also
provided Plaintiff a standard complaint form containing explicit instructions to separately
number each claim and provide information about the specific actions taken by Defendant
that are alleged to have harmed Plaintiff or violated his rights.
Yet, Plaintiff completely ignored those instructions and simply provided a date range
during which he experienced loss of strength and feeling, as well as numbness, in his right
arm and left hand. And other than adding the name of a doctor as a Defendant, without any
explanation of when that doctor may have examined Plaintiff or providing information about
the circumstances under which he was (or was not) examined, Plaintiff did not provide any
additional information from what was provided in the original complaint.
It is long settled in the Eleventh Circuit that the dismissal of a pro se complaint is
appropriate where a plaintiff fails to heed the pleading instructions from the court regarding redrafting the complaint. Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x 616, 620-21 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam); Goodison v. Washington Mut. Bank, 232 F. App’x 922, 923 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court finds that the imposition of monetary
sanctions is not a feasible sanction for disobeying the Court’s instructions about amending,
and having been given an opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies to no avail, Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations should be dismissed. See Hudson v. Morris, CV 420-120, 2022 WL

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344556, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2022) (Baker, J.) (dismissing federal claims after concluding
court need not provide limitless attempts to correct repeatedly noted pleading deficiencies).
3.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can Be Granted

Plaintiff’s refusal to follow the Court’s Order regarding amendment of his claims
provides one basis for dismissing the case, but the failure to include factual detail as
instructed also results in a finding that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. First, to properly raise a claim, a pleading must associate the purported violation with
a specific defendant. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we
do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with
some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.” (citation
omitted)). Conclusory allegations devoid of specific factual detail connecting Defendants to
the alleged wrong(s) not only fail to comply with the Court’s prior Order, but also do not
satisfy minimum pleading requirements of connecting Defendants with a purported
constitutional violation. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (requiring in § 1983 case
allegation of violation of right secured by Constitution or laws of United States by person acting
under color of state law).

Plaintiff’s conclusory “the-defendants-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusations” will not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Roberts v. Houston Cnty.
Superior Ct., No. 20-14857, 2021 WL 6099478, at *3-4 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2021) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint that failed to provide specific facts about what
defendant did or failed to do and subsequent attempt to add facts failed “to specify which
individuals allegedly violated [plaintiff’s] rights and when h[is] rights were allegedly violated”).
Second, to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff
must allege that:

(1) he had a serious medical need –the objective component, (2) a
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defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need – the subjective component, and (3)
his injury was caused by a defendant’s wrongful conduct. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d
1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1317 n.29 (11th Cir.
2010) (explaining that in addition to objective and subjective components of Eighth
Amendment claim, a plaintiff must “show a causal connection between the constitutional
violation and his injuries” to prevail on any § 1983 claim). Plaintiff’s lack of factual detail is
fatal to any intended medical deliberate indifference claim because there is no information
about Plaintiff’s medical need, let alone any information that a Defendant acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in disregarding a serious risk of harm about which they
aware. See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326-27; Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2004). In addition, mere allegations of negligence or malpractice do not amount to
deliberate indifference. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363-72 (11th Cir. 1999); Harris
v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Palazon v. Sec’y for Dep’t of
Corr., 361 F. App’x 88, 89 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (requiring more than “merely
accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice
actionable under state law” to establish deliberate indifference claim).
Third, even if Plaintiff had stated a valid deliberate indifference claim against a
medical provider within the prison system, Plaintiff cannot hold the Commissioner and
Assistant Commissioner liable by virtue of their supervisory positions.

“Supervisory

officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the
basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269
(11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rosa v. Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 522 F. App’x 710, 714 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “Because vicarious liability
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is inapplicable to § 1983 actions, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Rosa, 522 F. App’x at 714 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676) (internal quotations omitted).
Therefore, to hold either of these two supervisory Defendants liable, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that they (1) actually participated in the alleged constitutional violation, or (2)
there is a causal connection between the individual’s actions and the alleged constitutional
violation. See Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (citing Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th
Cir. 1990)). Here, Plaintiff appears to name the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner
as Defendants by virtue of their supervisory positions, but because he fails to even mention
them in his Statement of Claim, he has not alleged actual participation in, or a causal
connection to, any alleged constitutional violation. Therefore, he fails to state a valid claim
against them.
Finally, Defendant Wheeler Correctional Prison is not a proper party, as jails and
prisons are not legal entities subject to liability in § 1983 claims. See Jamelson v. Unnamed
Defendant, No. CV 617-103, 2017 WL 6503630, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2017) (explaining
“Georgia State Prison . . . is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued”), adopted by 2018
WL 616142 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2018); Parks v. Georgia, No. CV 517-047, 2017 WL 2930832, at
*3 (S.D. Ga. July 10, 2017) (explaining “penal institutions . . . are generally not considered legal
entities subject to suit”). Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 include “persons” who
participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West, 487 U.S. at 48; see also
Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting
§ 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such

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quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted).
As Defendant Wheeler Correctional Prison is a state prison, it is not a proper party.
II.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS

Plaintiff’s amended complaint be DISMISSED for failure to follow a Court order and failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that this civil action be CLOSED.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of May, 2024, at Augusta,
Georgia.

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