Futch v. Chatham County Detention Center et al
Filing
47
ORDER granting 41 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 5/2/2012. (loh)
I
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
WILLIE FUTCH,
—2
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Plaintiff
mo
CASE NO. CV410-192
CHATHAM COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER; DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA, d/b/a Chatham County
Detention Center; STATE OF
GEORGIA; PRISON HEALTH
SERVICES; and CHATHAM COUNTY,
GEORGIA;
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Chatham County
Detention Center, Chatham County, Georgia, and Prison
Health Services, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Defendants") Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 41.) Defendants
request summary judgment on and dismissal of Plaintiff's
42 U.S.C. 1983 and medical malpractice claims. For the
reasons outlined below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED. The
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
BACKGROUND
On June 16, 2008—prior to his incarceration—Plaintiff
underwent back surgery performed by Dr. Raphael Roybal.
(Doc. 1, Ex. A ¶ 11.)
At Plaintiff's initial follow-up
visit on June 26, 2008, Dr. Roybal planned to have a second
follow-up visit in four weeks to start Plaintiff on
regular, physical activities. (Doc. 42, Ex. 1 at 3.) At
that time, Dr. Roybal recommended only that Plaintiff rest
(Doc. 43 ¶ 8); he did not recommend any follow-up treatment
or therapy (Doc. 42, Ex. 1 at 3).
From July 16. 2008 to
January 5, 2009, Plaintiff was an inmate at Defendant
Chatham County Detention Center.' (Doc. 1, Ex. A ¶ 10.)
During Plaintiff's incarceration, "there were no orders for
any type of rehabilitative services from any of Plaintiff's
medical providers." (Doc. 43 ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff initially brought this action on July 14,
2010 in the Superior Court of Chatham County. (Doc. 1, Ex.
A.) The case was removed on August 8, 2010. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff contends that while incarcerated, Defendants
failed to honor his physicians' prescriptions for a cane, a
double-sided mattress, and a lower bunk.
¶11
(Doc. 1, Ex. A
16, 17.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, he had to
undergo a second, post-confinement surgery. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
In material facts that were undisputed by Plaintiff,
however, the Chatham County Detention Center provided
' Defendant Prison Health Services is a private company that
provides health services to inmates at Chatham County
Detention Center. (Doc. 43 ¶ 2.)
2
Plaintiff with a cane, extra mattress, and lower bunk.
(Doc. 43
1 9.)
On May 12, 2011, the remaining Defendants—with the
exception of Chatham County, Georgia—filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. 2 (Doc. 32.) Defendants also filed a
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's untimely expert witness
disclosure. (Doc. 39.) On February 8, 2012, this Court
dismissed the initial motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45)
and later dismissed as moot the motion to strike
Plaintiff's expert (Doc. 46). Defendants filed an Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41), including a brief in
support of the motion and a statement of material facts.
Plaintiff failed to file any response to the amended motion
for summary judgment or statement of material facts.3
2 The original summary judgment motion inadvertently failed
to request summary judgment on behalf of Chatham County,
Georgia. The Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41)
includes Chatham County, Georgia.
3 in the Court's opinion, Plaintiff's counsel has abdicated
its responsibility to provide diligent representation.
Plaintiff's initial response to the original motion for
summary judgment claimed that counsel could not fully cite
to the specific page numbers of Plaintiff's own deposition
(Doc. 36 at 2
because counsel could not locate a copy.
Plaintiff's counsel also failed to respond to
n.l.)
Defendants' original statement of material facts. Even
more, after a second opportunity to file a response brief
with proper citations to the record and a second
opportunity to respond to Plaintiff's disputed statement of
material facts, Plaintiff's counsel did nothing.
3
ANALYSIS
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a),
[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each
claim or defense—or the part of each claim of defense—on
which summary judgment is sought." Such a motion must be
granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The "purpose of
summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess
the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need
for trial.' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
advisory committee notes)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) . The substantive law governing the action
determines whether an element is essential. DeLong Equip.
Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1989)
As the Supreme Court explained:
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[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
together
with
the
file,
admissions
on
affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that
there is a genuine issue as to facts that are material to
Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929
the nonmovant's case.
F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991)
The Court must review the evidence and all reasonable
factual inferences arising from it in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 58788. However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts."
Id. at 586.
A mere "scintilla" of
evidence, or simply conclusory allegations, will not
suffice.
See, e.g, Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d
1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998) . Nevertheless, where a
reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference
from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue
of material fact, then the Court should refuse to grant
summary judgment."
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923,
933-34 (11th Cir. 1989)
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Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary
judgment to file a "separate, short, and concise statement
of the material facts as to which it is contended there
exists no genuine issue to be tried." S.D. Ga. L.R. 56.1.
Further, "[a] 11 material facts set forth in the statement
required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to
be admitted unless controverted by a statement served by
the opposing party." Id. "Where the party responding to a
summary judgment motion does not directly refute a material
fact set forth in the movant's Statement of Material Facts
with specific citations to evidence, or otherwise fails to
state a valid objection to the material fact pursuant to
[Local Rules], such fact is deemed admitted by the
respondent."
Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
1302 (11th Cir. 2009) . Accordingly, the district court
should "disregard or ignore evidence relied on by the
respondent—but not cited in its response to the movant's
statement of undisputed facts—that yields facts contrary to
those listed in the movant's statement." Reese v. Herbert,
527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir, 2008)
Plaintiff filed neither any response to Defendants'
statement of undisputed facts nor a brief in opposition to
the motion for summary judgment. As such, Defendants'
statement of material facts is deemed as admitted for the
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purposes of this motion. See Williams v. Slack, 438 F.
App'x 848, 850 (11th Cir. 2011); BMU, Inc. v. Cumulus
Media, Inc., 366 F. App'x 47, 47 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a plaintiff's failure to submit response to
defendant's statement of undisputed facts on motion for
summary judgment constituted admission of those facts)
However, in such a circumstance, this Court is still
required to determine if there is a genuine issue of
material fact. Reese, 527 F.3d at 1269; see also United
States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th
Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (11th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim
A.
The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on
municipal liability under § 1983. A county's liability
under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989)) .
when
the
Additionally, a county is liable only
county's
11
'official
policy' "
causes
a
constitutional violation. Id. (quoting Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)) . Monell provides
that "it is when execution of a [county's] policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
7
policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury that the
[county] as an entity is responsible under § 1983." 436
U.S. at 694.
Further,
to survive summary judgment a § 1983
plaintiff must present evidence of a specific,
unconstitutional, organizational "policy or custom" with
evidence that this "policy or custom" caused injury.
Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329. To plead a § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff is "obliged to identify a policy or custom that
caused their injury." Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403
(1997)
(internal quotations
omitted). To establish such a policy, a plaintiff must
identify either an "officially promulgated county policy"
or "an unofficial custom or practice of the county shown
through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the
county." Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329 (citation omitted)
Nowhere in Plaintiff's pleadings is there even a
modicum of evidence that shows any "policy or custom" by
Defendants that was consciously indifferent to Plaintiff's
medical needs. The evidence before the Court reveals that
Defendants could not—and did not—breach any duty of care to
Plaintiff. The allegations contain no genuine issue as to
proximate cause and Plaintiff has provided no evidence
suggesting that Plaintiff ever validly raised concerns
8
during his incarceration about the conditions of his
medical treatment. Plaintiff has failed to identify any
evidence of a specific written, or even unwritten, policy
or custom of any of Defendants that caused injury to
Plaintiff. Indeed, regardless of whether prescribed or
not, it is undisputed that while at the Chatham County
Detention Center, Plaintiff was provided a cane, extra
mattress, and lower bunk.
(Doc. 43 11 9.)
Moreover, Defendants have come forward with specific
undisputed facts that they received no order from
Plaintiff's doctors prescribing a specific course of
treatment, and that they provided an acceptable standard of
care.
For example, Defendants provided a report from a
prison medical care expert. (Doc. 42, Ex. 1.) The report
stated that Defendants' policies and customs are "squarely
within the acceptable standards for correctional health
care providers." (Doc. 42, Ex. 1 at 3.) Because Plaintiff
has failed to identify any policy or custom that caused his
alleged injury, the cause of action must be dismissed as a
matter of law.
Grech, 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir.
2003) . Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of
establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact that Defendants had a 'policy or custom" that was
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Plaintiff.
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B.
Medical Malpractice Claim
The judicial test for determining whether an action is
one for medical malpractice is whether the acts or
omissions at issue involved medical knowledge and judgment
outside the knowledge of the ordinary layman. Atlanta
Women's Health Grp. v. Clemons, 287 Ga. App. 426, 427, 621
S.E.2d 762, 764 (2004) . Under Georgia law, to recover
damages for alleged medical malpractice claims, a plaintiff
must prove the applicable standard of care, a deviation
from that standard, cause-in--fact, proximate causation, and
injury.
Zwiren v. Thompson, 276 Ga. 498, 499, 578 S.E.2d
862, 864 (2003) .
There is a rebuttable presumption that
physicians, nurses, and other medical professionals
exercise due care and skill in their treatment of patients
based on their education, training, and experience, but the
person claiming an injury may overcome this presumption by
introducing expert testimony to the contrary. See Beach v.
Lipham, 276 Ga. 302, 305-06, 578 S.E.2d 402, 406 (2003)
The degree of care and skill required of the physician
is that which, under similar conditions and like
surrounding circumstances is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally."
McLendon v. Daniel, 37 Ga. App.
524, 524, 141 S.E. 77, 78 (1927) (citation omitted) .
A
defendant's breach of this standard of care in a medical
10
malpractice action must be the proximate cause of the
injury sustained. Grantham v. Amin, 221 Ga. App. 458, 471,
S.E.2d 525, 527 (1996) (citations omitted) To the extent
that such a breach was the proximate cause and cause-in-fact, a "bare possibility" that the injury resulted from
the negligence is not sufficient. Maddox v. Houston Cnty.
Hosp. Auth., 158 Ga. App. 283, 284, 279 S.E.2d 732, 734
(1981) (citation omitted) . Recovery is precluded absent a
showing to a reasonable degree of medical probability that
the patient's injury or death could have been avoided.
Zwiren, 276 Ga. at 499, 578 S.E.2d at 864.
Further, res ipsa loquitur does not apply in medical
malpractice cases and an unintended result does not raise
See Oakes v. rc4agat, 263 Ga.
an inference of negligence.
App. 165, 167, 587 S.E.2d 150, 152 (2003) (citations
omitted); Hayes v. Brown, 108 Ga. App. 360, 366, 133 S.E.2d
102, 107 (1963) (res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in medical
malpractice action); Wimpy v. Rogers, 58 Ga. App. 67, 69
197 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1938) (same) . A plaintiff must point
to facts in the record that prove the defendant actually
caused the injury, as opposed to a preexisting injury or a
surgical complication in the absence of negligence.
Berrell v. Hamilton, 260 Ga. App. 892, 895-96, 581 S.E.2d
401, 401 (2003)
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At present, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for
medical negligence upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff's complaint merely states that Defendants'
actions or inactions failed to provide Plaintiff with
appropriate medical care" and that such acts 'constitute
medical malpractice for which Plaintiff is entitled to
recover." (Doc. 1, Ex. A ¶IJ 17, 18.) Plaintiff also
alleges that "Lals a result of the injuries Plaintiff
incurred in the Detention Center, Plaintiff was forced to
undergo revision surgery." (Id. ¶ 27.) Based on the
undisputed facts in this case, Plaintiff has failed to
establish that his alleged injuries were caused by any
negligent acts or omissions by Defendants.
Any
complications Plaintiff experienced were a "common
occurrence even in the best of circumstances after fixation
and grafting" (Doc. 42, Ex. 2 at 3) and the revision
surgery would have been required regardless of whether
Plaintiff was incarcerated (Doc. 42, Ex. 1 at
)
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there exist any
genuine issues of material fact as to Defendants' purported
medical malpractice. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations
are wholly inadequate and, as such, warrant summary
judgment. Accordingly, his medical malpractice claim must
fail.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. For the foregoing reasons,
Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary judgment is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED this ,0
day of May 2012.
WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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