Uhlig v. Darby Bank & Trust Co. et al

Filing 69

ORDER dismissing 41 Motion for Summary Judgment; dismissing 47 Motion to exclude testimony ; dismissing 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims and dismisses the action. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 6/24/13. (wwp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
THOMAS UHLIG,
Plaintiff,
4:11-cv-145

V.

DRAYPROP, LLC; DRAYPARK, LLC;
MICHAEL BROWN; REUBEN CROLL,
and MARLEY MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Liability, ECF No. 41; Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiffs Alleged Damages,
ECF No. 50; and Motion to Exclude
Testimony of Plaintiffs Expert Steve
Adams. ECF No. 47. The Court, however,
declines to exercise jurisdiction over
plaintiff's claims and so DISMISSES this
action.

II.

BACKGROUND

This case began in Chatham County
Superior Court when Thomas Uhlig brought
suit against his lender, Darby Bank and
Trust, and several companies involved in the
redevelopment of Drayton Towers in
Savannah, Georgia. See ECF No. 1-2 at 2.
Uhlig purchased two condominiums in
Drayton Towers from Restore Savannah,
who in turn had purchased the condos from
Drayprop. ECF No. 62. After the discovery
of asbestos delayed Uhlig's planned
renovations, he filed suit against Defendants

negligent
of
claims
asserting
misrepresentation, breach of contract,
negligence, and fraud. See ECF No. 1-3 at
69-72.
After Uhlig filed suit, Darby failed and
the FDIC took over Darby's assets as
receiver. The FDIC then moved for
summary judgment in this case, claiming
that the D Oench, Duhme' doctrine
precluded all Uhlig's claims against Darby.
See ECF No. 16. This Court agreed and
granted summary judgment in favor of the
FDIC, dismissing all claims against the
agency. ECF No. 24. At that point, and
continuing to the present, the only remaining
claims are state law claims against nondiverse defendants.

III.

DISCUSSION

"[A] federal court is obligated to inquire
into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte
whenever it may be lacking." Flintlock
Const. Servs., LLC v. Well-Come Holdings,
LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).
So, "[i]n light of the Court dismissing the
only federal issue present in this case, the
Court will now . . . examine whether it
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over [Uhlig's] claims against the remaining
Defendants." Reinke v. Darby Bank & Trust
Co., No. 4:11-cv-144, 2012 WL 1100669, at
*6 (S.D. Ga. Mar 30, 2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that courts
"may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over
which it had original jurisdiction." This
case landed in federal court solely because
'D Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447

(1942).

would in essence simply give Chatham
County Superior Court a one case breather.

of the FDIC's involvement. See 12 U.S.C. §
1819(b)(2)(A) (stating that all suits with the
FDIC as a party "shall be deemed to arise
under the laws of the United States"); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. And now the FDIC
is gone. All claims over which this Court
had original jurisdiction therefore have been
dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION
So, the Court declines to exercise its
jurisdiction under § 1367(c) and instead
DISMISSES Uhlig's complaint and the
Defendants' three pending motions. The
Clerk is ORDERED to close this case.

The Court, then, must consider whether
it should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. In making that decision, courts
consider factors such as judicial economy,
See
convenience, fairness, and comity.
Reinke, 2012 WL 1100669, at *6 (citing
Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22
F.3d 1559, 1569(11thCir. 1994).

Thiy of June 2013.

. AVANT EDENFIELD, JUD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF Ql

Looking at those factors here, the Court
cannot find a reason to retain jurisdiction
over this case. A case composed entirely of
state law claims should be tried in a state
court absent some other basis for federal
jurisdiction, like diversity. Such an
approach promotes comity and proper
respect for state institutions, both principles
that federal courts must always be mindful
of. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.,
560 U.S. 413, 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2330 (2010)
(noting that the comity doctrine "reflects a
proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire county
is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief
that the National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in
separate ways.") (internal quotations
omitted). By contrast, exercising
supplemental jurisdiction here would not
serve the development of Georgia law and
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