Haggins Jr. v. Schroyer et al
Filing
21
ORDER denying 13 Motion for TRO; denying 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 15 Motion for Leave to File; denying 17 Motion to Withdraw ; denying 19 Motion for Reconsideration. The Court grants Haggins 21 days to amend his complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 11/07/2011. (lmm)
El
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
KENNETH B. HAGGINS,
Plaintiff,
V.
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CV411-209
)
OFFICER JACOB SCHROYER; )
DETECTIVE SHINITA
)
YOUNG; SGT. R. GAVIN;
)
GREGORY JACOBS, Assistant
)
District Attorney; STEVE BROWN,)
Assistant District Attorney;
)
TODD MARTIN, Assistant
)
Public Defender,
)
)
Defendants.
)
Currently being prosecuted for, inter alia, felony murder, see
attached state court docket pages, Kenneth B. Haggins invokes 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in response to an ongoing state court prosecution.' Doc. 1. He
1
Having completed his IFP paperwork, does 4 & 5, the Court will now screen his
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (allows a district court to sua sponte dismiss
a claim of an a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis for failure to state a claim
before service of process). The Court also proceeds under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (courts
must identify "cognizable claims" filed by prisoners or other detainees and dismiss
claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2)
I
brings false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against
arresting/prosecuting officers, two assistant district attorneys and his
public defender. Doc. 1. In addition to money damages, doc. 1 at 12, he
also seeks a "Motion for Temporary Restraining Order" to stop the
prosecution against him. Doc. 13. There he describes his
claims for the unconstitutional acts of each defendant for their
participation in the illegal arrest, false imprisonment,
misrepresentation of counsel, the concealment of fact, false
statements and writings, the concurrent negligence of said and
unsaid defendants, and the damages he has suffered from during
his incarceration resulting from a malicious prosecution.
Id. at 52
The police and prosecutors, he alleges, are wrongfully prosecuting
him by doing things like misstating the evidence against him and failing
(allowing dismissal on the same four standards provided by § 1915A as to any
prisoner suit brought "with respect to prison conditions").
The Court applies the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards here. Leal v. Ga. Dep't of
Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). Allegations in the complaint are thus
viewed as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bumpus v.
Watts, 2011 WL 4436591 at * 1 n. 1 (11th Cir. Sep. 26, 2011). But conclusory
allegations advance nothing. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951
(2009) (discussing a 12(b)(6) dismissal). "[T]he pleading standard [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8
announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id., 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (citations omitted); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)
(but pro se pleadings are still construed liberally after Iqbal).
All documents referenced here have been "E-filed." The Court is thus using the
electronic, screen-page pagination inserted onto the top of each page by the Court's
CM/ECF software.
2
to disclose exculpatory evidence. Id. at 6-9. He seems to allege a
conspiracy between them. See Am. Fed'n of Labor and Congress of
Indus. Organizations v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1191 (11th Cir.
2011) (to prevail on § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiff must show that
agreement between two or more people, at least one of whom is state
actor, to violate his constitutional rights resulted in actual violation of
those rights).
As for the prosecutor defendants, see doc. 1 at 13, Haggins has
alleged nothing to pierce the prosecutorial immunities set forth in Imbler
v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)
("[Tin initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the
prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983."), and
Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[Allbsolute
immunity extends to a prosecutor's 'acts undertaken ... in preparing for
the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the
course of his role as an advocate for the State ....."). And public
defenders are not state actors within the meaning of § 1983, so no claim
is stated against Todd Martin. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
3
(1981). Any money-damage claims against those defendants therefore
fail outright.
As for plaintiff's quest to enjoin the alleged bad faith criminal
prosecution, principles of equity, comity, and federalism constrain federal
courts generally to "abstain from exercising jurisdiction in suits aimed at
restraining pending state criminal prosecutions." Jackson v. Georgia,
273 F. App'x 812, 813 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971)). Exceptions to this rule: (1) there is a "great and
immediate" danger of irreparable harm to be suffered as a result of the
prosecution; (2) the state law is flagrantly and patently violative of the
federal constitution; (3) there is a showing of bad faith or harassment; or
(4) other unusual circumstances that call for equitable relief. Mitch urn v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 46-54); Cole
v. State of Florida, 2010 WL 2711861 at * 3 n. 4 (N.D. Fla. Jun. 3, 2010).
Iqbal ended the ability of a plaintiff to allege that an individual or group of people
"harmed me," then rely on discovery and summary motion processes to separate the
wheat from the chaff. Hence, it is simply not sufficient for Haggins to allege that
various defendants conspired to maliciously arrest and prosecute him; he must plead
specific details. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148654 F.3d
1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Legal conclusions without adequate factual support are
entitled to no assumption of truth."). For that matter, Haggins does not allege that a
private actor conspired with any state actors to deprive him of any civil rights.
Haggins' attempt to invoke the Younger exception fails, as he offers
no "substantial allegation' showing actual bad faith." Hudson, 358 F.
App'x at 118 (footnote omitted). "Under Younger, intervention cannot be
predicated on mere allegations; rather, the federal plaintiff must prove
bad faith or harassment before intervention is warranted." Phelps v.
Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1066 (10th Cir.1995); see Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 338 (1977) (the bad faith or harassment exception to Younger
"may not be utilized unless it is alleged and proved that [the defendants]
are enforcing the contempt procedures in bad faith or are motivated by a
desire to harass"); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (federal
courts should limit intervention to "cases of proven harassment or
prosecutions undertaken by state officials without hope of obtaining a
valid conviction.") (emphasis added).
It follows that plaintiff must plead sufficient facts which, if proven,
would support Younger relief. Just saying that a prosecution is brought
for "bad purposes," "in bad faith," or some similar variant, is not
enough.' Ramey v. Georgia, 2010 WL 786806 at * 7 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 5,
Haggins does allege specific defects in the process thus far accorded to him. For
example, he complains that during his October 6, 2010 preliminary hearing "there
was no oath administered to the State's only testifying witness. . . ." Doc. 1 at 7. He
2010) ("conclusory and speculative allegations cannot meet this
standard."). Nor has Haggins pled enough to support any of the other
Younger exceptions. Instead of running to federal court, Haggins should
raise his contentions before the state courts, which are perfectly capable
of determining whether his federal rights have been violated. See
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) ("State courts, like
federal courts, are obliged to enforce federal law.").
His remaining damages claims, as currently pled, also fail. He
alleges that he was falsely arrested, doe. 1 at 6 ("I was unlawfully
detained . . . without the existence of probable cause."), and he was not
brought before a magistrate from the August 9, 2010 date of his
warrantless arrest until the October 6, 2010 preliminary hearing
provided for him:
[ajfter a warrantless arrest, I was never brought before a
magistrate or judicial officer to determine whether there w[erel any
grounds to issue a warrant for my arrest[,] and the state used the
also cites a discrepancy in the dates in which the State says it is using to establish its
chain of custody over the knife it says plaintiff used to commit the murder. Id. at 7.
This is far from the stuff of a conspiracy to manufacture evidence to wrongly convict
an innocent man, or harass someone. Instead, it is part of the generic layer of
discrepancies and defects running through routine prosecutions -- and for which the
state judicial review process is equipped to examine. Defendants like Haggins do not
get to "jump the tracks" to obtain de facto federal review of the prosecutorial process;
rather, subject to the rare Younger exception noted above, they must first exhaust all
state remedies and only then seek federal habeas relief.
return of an indictment . . . 86 days after my arrest, to provide
probable cause for my arrest.
Doc. 1 at 8; see also doc. 1 at 6; doc. 13 at 10-11. 5 Finally, he alleges that
"[t]he state is maliciously prosecuting me...." Doc. 1 at 8.
The problem for Haggins is that he fails to name any particular
defendant here. In any event, the constitutional tort of false arrest, a
"species" of false imprisonment, arises from "detention without legal
process." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). False arrest claims
provide recovery for damages between the time of arrest or seizure and
the issuance of legal process. Id. at 390 ("false imprisonment ends once
the victim becomes held pursuant to [legal] process"); Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (false arrest claims "cover the time of detention
up until the issuance of process or arraignment, but not more"); Whiting
v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585 n. 8 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
Here Haggins alleges false arrest but has since undergone a
preliminary hearing and has been indicted, so his false arrest claim at
the latest ends with his indictment (i.e., when he came to be held
pursuant to "legal process") -- which is also when his malicious
5 The (attached) state's docket sheet does not reflect any activity in plaintiff's
criminal prosecution until his November 3, 2010 indictment.
7
prosecution claim begins. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389-90 (false
imprisonment [or arrest] involves detention "without legal process," and
ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process, whereas
"the 'entirely distinct' tort of malicious prosecution ... remedies
detention accompanied ... by wrongful institution of legal process.");
Joyce v. Adams, 2007 WL 2781196 at *3 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 20, 2007).
Mindful of his pending prosecution, Haggins has filed an
"abeyance" motion, citing Heck, doc. 20 at 1, in which he seeks to stay
this case until his prosecution terminates in his favor. See Heck, 512
U.S. at 486-87. He thus is aware of the statute of limitations clock
running on him. That clock ticks for false arrest and false imprisonment
claims "where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, [and]
begins when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process." Wallace,
549 U.S. at 389. Plaintiff's motion thus presupposes that Heck applies.
Some courts once applied Heck to ongoing prosecutions, see, e.g., Smith
v. Holt, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3rd Cir. 1996), but that practice was rejected by
[S1
[•1
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94; Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d
181 1 188 (3rd Cir. 2010).
Wallace, for that matter, addressed the tension created by Heck.
Prior to Wallace, courts reasoned that plaintiffs like Haggins could
advance no such claim until first showing either an acquittal or proof
"that [any] conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254."
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.; Blackmon v. Johnson, 2008 WL 2397480 at * 4
(S.D. Ala. Jun. 11, 2008). Because that rendered statute-of-limitations
management unwieldy (again, the claim accrues when legal process
commences, and in this case it was at least by the date of Haggins'
indictment), Wallace thus
6
Wallace characterized Heck as delaying "what would otherwise be the accrual date
of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success in that
tort action would impugn." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. In order to defer accrual of the
claim in false arrest cases, the Heck principle would have to be extended to mean
"that an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be
brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside." Id. Finding such a principle to
be impracticable, the Wallace Court held that it was "not disposed to embrace this
bizarre extension of Heck." Id.
held that when a plaintiff files a false arrest/false imprisonment
claim prior to the disposition of the charges against him, "it is in
the power of the district court, and in accord with common
practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the
likelihood of a criminal case is ended." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94.
Following disposition of the charges, the plaintiffs claim will be
either barred under Heck or allowed to proceed, absent some other
bar to suit. Id. at 394.
LeBlanc v. Stedman, 2011 WL 2983080 at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 21, 2011)
(emphasis added).
Haggins has pled a false arrest claim, and possibly the makings of a
"McLaughlin" claim arising from the gap between Haggins' August 9,
2010 warrantless arrest and the August 25, 2010 preliminary hearing.
See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). He correctly
notes (doe. 1 at 8, 11) that after his arrest the state was required to
As the Smith court explained, there are constitutional claims which can be litigated
without interfering with a prosecution or impugning conviction:
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable
search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiffs stilloutstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and
inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even
if successful would not necessarily imply that the plaintiffs conviction was
unlawful.
Smith, 87 F.3d at 112.
10
timely bring him before a magistrate.' McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53
(under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), "persons arrested without
a warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a
judicial determination of probable cause"). 9 And in a typical McLaughlin
claim, a plaintiff subjected to a warrantless arrest alleges that he was
kept in custody for days, weeks, or months without a judicial
determination of probable cause. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 1664
(plaintiffs detained for days without a judicial probable cause
determination pursuant to county policy combining probable cause
determinations with arraignment procedures); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106
(plaintiffs detained for a substantial period of time solely on the decision
of a prosecutor); Gapestany, 289 Ga. App. at 52 n. 10 (noting civil remedy
for McLaughlin violation).
Under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62, any person who is arrested without a warrant and who
is not brought before an appropriate judicial officer within 48 hours of arrest "shall
be released," but that release right expires when a warrant or indictment is obtained.
Capestany v. State, 289 Ga. App. 47, 50 (2007); see also O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 (providing
for a first appearance hearing within 72 hours after an arrest with a warrant).
8
McLaughlin held that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of
probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein." 500 U.S. at 56. Where a probable cause
determination does not occur within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest, "the burden
shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or
other extraordinary circumstance." Id. at 57. A win on this claim would at most
fetch a damages award but not disturb any prosecution or conviction.
11
Again, however, Haggins names no particular defendant on this
claim. He says his preliminary hearing was constantly delayed, yet he
also discloses that, by August 25, 2010, he was represented by counsel.
Doc. 1 at 6. If his own lawyer waived his McLaughlin rights then his
claim, to the extent it arose while he was represented, is waived. His
lawyer is his agent so he is bound by his agent's acts. Hynko v. Hilton,
198 Ga. App. 308, 309 (1991); Stephens v. Alan V. Mock Const. Co., Inc.,
302 Ga. App. 280, 286 (2010). And such "procedural" rights are routinely
traded for benefits -- part of the bread and butter of the plea-negotiation
process.
Still, Haggins is unclear about what happened during the August 9
- 25, 2010 period. If he was represented and his lawyer waived his
McLaughlin rights for that period, too, then this would affect the
viability of such a claim here. So before this Court can consider a stay,
see, e.g., Turner v. Nirenberg, 2010 WL 1752512 at * 5 (D.N.J. Apr. 30,
2010), Haggins must supply it with more information. The Court
therefore grants him 21 days to amend his complaint.
Finally, to the extent Haggins seeks immediate release from
confinement, he must bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas action, not a §
12
1983 claim. See Hudson v. Hubbard, 358 F. App'x 116, 119 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003));
see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) ("[A] prisoner in
state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge `the fact or
duration of his confinement.") (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 489 (1973)); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 553-55 (1974)
(delineating distinctions between using § 1983 to pursue damages, and
habeas for claims affecting confinement). That means he must first
exhaust his state court remedies. 1° So if he wishes to proceed with such a
claim, he should file a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, but it would
likely be subject to immediate dismissal for lack of exhaustion (and thus
he should exhaust his state court remedies first).
10
Plaintiff does not plead, nor can he credibly claim, that judicial review is not
available to him in the Georgia courts:
So long as review is available in the Georgia courts ... "this Court is precluded
from the consideration of the substance of [plaintiff's claims] until the issues
have been squarely and fairly presented to the Georgia courts for their
consideration." Fields v. Tankersley, 487 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
As Petitioner apparently has not sought relief in state court, he has not
exhausted his state court remedies. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 109
S. Ct. 1056, 103 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1989) (holding that a claim is only exhausted if
it was presented to the state courts under remedies available under state law).
Ellis v. Unnamed Defendant, 2010 WL 3842806 at * 1 (N.D. Ga. Sep. 28, 2010); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c).
13
Accordingly, Kenneth B. Haggins' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, doc. 13, is DENIED. The Court will reach his "abeyance"
motion (doc. 20) after he amends his complaint. Meanwhile, it DENIES
his "amend" motion, doc. 15, his "withdraw" motion, doc. 17, and his
"consideration" motion. Doc. 19. Finally, the Court has disregarded
plaintiff's attempt to name each defendant in his "official" capacity, doc.
1 at 13, because he has not pled the necessary elements to hold the
county or state liable to him. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 169 (1985); Bradshaw v. Stewart, 2011 WL 882183 at * 2 (M.D. Ga.
Feb. 9,2011).h1
SO ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2011.
F
UNITED STATES MAGLSTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
The arresting officers, and hence the county making the arrest, are responsible for
conveying the offender before a judicial officer. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62. But even here,
facts must be pled. Absent a policy, practice or custom of tolerating McLaughlin
violations, the county had no independent duty to guarantee that each arresting
officer provides an arrestee with a proper probable cause determination, only a duty
not to impede them from doing so. Dempsey v. Elmore, 2010 WL 2195682 at * 7 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 23, 2010).
14
I
Case Details
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•ES
HAGGINS, KENNETH
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•
Defendant Information
Case Information
Court:
Superior
Name:
HAGGINS, KENNETH
Case Number
CR102560
DIN
X0144327
Case Type
MURDER
Gender MALE
Judge:
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
AFRICAN
AMERICAN
Race:
Assistant District Attorney: STEPHEN BROWN
Date Filed:
11/3/2010
Status:
ACTIVE -
Next Event:
11/14/2011 MOTION HEARING
(MTH)
F riff 5 144327
.
Height: 67
Weight: 150
click tor large iicture
Eyes:
BROWN
Hair:
Attorney Information
Co
Lb tl
BLACK
Defendant Histo
WILLIAM S LEWIS
540 EAST OGLETHORPE AVE
SAVANNAH, GA
31401
Bondsman Information
N/A
CSfltO
Action
Date
Time
Code
Judge
11/14/2011
09:30AM
JURYTRIAL
PERRY BRANNEN,JR.
1MOTION HEARING (MTH)
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
11/14/2011
3:00PM
9/26/2011
0930AM 4/URY TRIAL
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
RESCHEDULE EVENT
9/26/2011
3:00PM
MOTION HEARING (MTH):PERRY BRANNEN,JR.
RESCHEDULE EVENT
7/5/2011
09:30AM
JURY TRIAL
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
RESCHEDULE EVENT
JURY TRIAL
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
RESCHEDULE EVENT
PRETRIAL HEARING
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
PRETRIAL HEARING
PERRY BRANNEN, JR.
5/16/2011- 09:3OAM
2/22/2011
112:00PM
12:00PM
1/3/2011
I000IENDARCALL
12/6/2010
RESCHEDULE EVENT
PERRY BRANNEN JR
(ReturnjQTop]
Charge
Description
Counts Severity
Charge Date Disposition
FELONY
11/3/2010
1
FELONY
11/3/2010
1
FELONY
11/3/2010
16-11-106 ROSS FIREARM/KNIFE IN COMMITTING CRIME
1
FELONY
11/3/2010
16-11-126 CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON
1
FELONY
11/3/2010
16-5-1(A) MALICE MURDER
1
FELONY
11/3/2010
16-11-106 POSS FIREARM/KNIFE IN COMMITTING CRIME
1
tELONY
11/3/2010
16-5-1(C) JFELONY MURDER
16-5-21
16-7-23
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 2ND DEGREE
[Return..to ToRI
1 of
11/1/20112:00 PM
Case Details
http://www.chathaincourts.org/CaseDetails.aspx?caseno=CRI 02560
11/14/2011
09:30AM JURY TRIAL
PERRY
BRANNEN,
JR.
11/14/2011
3:00PM MOTION HEARING (MTI-l)
PERRY
BRANNEN,
JR.
10/21/2011
ORDER
ORDER DENYING NOTICE OF DEF/
10/18/2011
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
WILLIAM S LEWIS!
10/17/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
10/17/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
10/17/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
10/17/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
NOTICE OF INTENTION OF
DEF ENS EJDECLARATION BY DEF!
UED/
ORDER
9/26/2011
RESCHEDULE PERRY
BRANNEN,
EVENT
JR.
9/26/2011
09:30AM JURYTRIAL
9/26/2011
3:00PM MOTION HEARING (MTH) RESCHEDULE PERRY
EVENT
EBRANNEN,
11
1
FILED BY DEF!
NOTICE
11
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
DET S YOUNG!
11
MOTION -TO SUPPRESSJACKSON D
AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
EXCLUDE ALL STATEMENTS OF DEF ADN
DEMANDF OR JACKSON DENNO HEARING!
11
MOTION - TO DISMISS
AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO
DESTRUCTION OF MATERIAL AND
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE!
9/14/2011
MOTION -TO SUPPRESSJACKSON D
AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS!
9/14/2011
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
TO DET S YOUNG!
9/13/2011
MASTER LIST FOR
WITNESSES
9/13/2011
PETITION FOR BOND/NISI
:NOTICE
9/8/2011
LOWRY!
FILED BY DEF REPRESENTED BY LOWRY!
9/8/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
9/8/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
9/7/2011
MASTER LIST FOR
WITNESSES
8/29/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
REQUESTING TRANSCRIPTS-NAN NOTED NO
TRANSCRIPTS IN FILE!
8/23/2011
MOTION - TO DISMISS
MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO DESTRUCTION
OF MATERIAL AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE!
8/17/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
REQUESTING TRANSCRIPTS-FORWARD TO
NAN!
8/15/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
•: AND CLERKS RESPONSE
8/10/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
7/29/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
7/6/2011
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
LOWRY!
ORDER
CASE CONTINUED!
7/5/2011
7/5/2011
6/28/2011
2 of 3
09:30AM JURY TRIAL
MEMORANDUM
RESCHEDULE PERRY
BRANNEN,
EVENT
MEMO FROM JUDGE IN RESPONSE TO PRO SE
11/1/20112:00 PM
Case Details
http://www.chathamcourts.org/CaseDetails.aspx?caseno=CR102560
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
6/27/2011
RESCHEDULE :PERRY
:BRANNEN,
EVENT
JR.
09:30AM JURYTRIAL
5/16/2011
4/7/2011
4/7/2011
MEMO IN SUPPORT OF LETTER TO OBTAIN
MISSING DISCOVERY-FILED BY DEF/
SEALED DOCUMENT
3/11/2011
.
MEMORANDUM
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
________
PERRY
BRAN N EN,
JR.
12:00PM PRETRIAL HEARING
2/22/2011
2/4/2011
STATE'S DISCOVERY
DISCLOSURE
1/27/2011
CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT
1/21/2011
CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS
PACKAGE
1/19/2011
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
1/10/2011
PROSE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
RESCHEDULE PERRY
BRANNEN,
EVENT
JR.
12:00PM PRETRIAL HEARING
1/3/2011
12/30/2010
PRELIMINARY HEARING 10-6-10/
TRANSCRIPT RECEIVED
12/28/2010
MEMORANDUM
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED MOOT
12/27/2010
.
CORRESPONDENCE
12/3/2010
12/3/2010
PERRY
BRANNEN,
JR.
10:00AM CALENDAR CALL
12/6/2010
.
BOND ORDER
j
FROM JUDGE OFFICE-RETURNING PRO SE
LETTER-DEF REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL!
DENIED!
PROSE LETTER RECEIVED
12/2/2010
.
CORRESPONDENCE
11/29/2010
•
•
FROM JUDGE OFFICE RETURNING SPEEDING
TRIAL PRO SE LETTER-DEF REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL!
11/22/2010
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
AND CLERKS RESPONSE
11/19/2010
CORRESPONDENCEFROM BRANNEN OFFICE!
11/17/2010
PRO SE LETTER RECEIVED
11/16/2010 j
11/15/2010
PETITION FOR BOND/NISI
11/5/2010
BENCH WARRANT ISSUED
J
BENCH WARRANT
EXECUTED
11/4/2010
ENTRY OF APPEARANCETODD MARTINI
11/3/2010
4:23:31 PM
SCREENING
Initial Case Screening! Scanning
11/3/2010
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