Williams v. Georgia Stevedore Association, Inc. et al
Filing
149
ORDER granting 116 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 120 Motion for Summary Judgment; dismissing as moot 141 Motion to Strike. Plaintiff's claims are hereby dismissed. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/28/2014. (loh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
ROBERT WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV411-284,
V.
GEORGIA STEVEDORE
ASSOCIATION, INC. and
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION LOCAL NUMBER
1414, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Georgia Stevedore
Association,
Inc.'s
("GSA") (Doc. 120) and Defendant
International Longshoremen's Association Local Number 1414,
Savannah, Georgia's ("ILA") (Doc. 116) Motions for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition to
both motions. (Doc. 128; Doc. 133.) For the reasons that
follow, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are
GRANTED
and Plaintiff's claims are hereby
DISMISSED.
Accordingly, Defendant ILA's Motion to Strike (Doc. 141)
DISMISSED AS MOOT.
this case.
is
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close
BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations of improper retaliation
in employment against Plaintiff by Defendants GSA and ILA
for actions Plaintiff took while a worker for Defendants.'
Plaintiff is a male longshoreman employed pursuant to a
Cpllective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Defendants
GSA and ILA. (Doc. 35
1 5.) Defendant ILA is a labor
union that contracts with employers to secure employment
for employees. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant GSA is the collective
bargaining representative for the multiple stevedore
companies operating at the Port of Savannah, Georgia.
(Doc. 128 at 2.) Defendant ILA uses a hiring hail to
supply workers to the companies represented by Defendant
GSA. (Doc. 35 ¶ 10.)
In November 2008, Plaintiff was working as a header—a
person that acts as foreman and selects from the hiring
hail qualified workers to work as a group of longshoremen
known as a gang. (Id. ¶j 20, 21.) Plaintiff is not a
"Company Header," meaning a person who is designated to
normally act as a header by one or more of the stevedore
' For the purposes of these motions for summary judgment,
the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1986). Because
the Court only addresses Defendants' motions, all facts are
construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
companies. However, Plaintiff could act as a header based
on his seniority status when Company Headers were not
available. (Doc. 133 at 2-3.) Persons with the highest
seniority and requisite qualifications have first priority
to fill header positions. (Id. at 2.) Acting as a header,
Plaintiff selected a female longshoreman named Linda Walker
to work on his gang. (Doc. 35 ¶ 22.) on December 12,
2008, Plaintiff was told that he could not take out a gang
as a header despite having the highest seniority of the
workers present. (Doc. 133 at 7-8.) As a result,
Plaintiff filed grievances against Defendant ILA President
Willie Seymore and Vice-President Eddie McBride for
violating seniority header selection rules. (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff continued to serve as a header on various
occasions in 2009 and hired. Walker another four times,
despite his co-workers warning him not to do so. (Id.)
Apparently, Walker had a reputation as a troublemaker and
had frequently complained about gender discrimination by
Defendant ILA in the past. (Id.) In January 2010, after
grievances were filed against Plaintiff for disruption in
the hiring hail, the Grievance Committee ruled that
Plaintiff could not serve as a header for one year. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, former GSA President Steve Zadach
told Plaintiff that he lost his header status for hiring
3
Walker. 2
(Id.)
Following his conversation with Zadach,
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Doc. 35 ¶ 38.)
Throughout 2010, Plaintiff was unable to work as a
header, but was eventually reinstated in January 2011.
(Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff further alleges that two fabricated
disorderly conduct grievances were filed against him in the
second half of 2011, resulting in a 35 day suspension
commencing on December 13, 2011. (Doc. 136, Attach. 8
¶J 40, 44.) After Plaintiff returned to work following his
suspension, the Grievance Committee suspended him again for
30 days and permanently revoked his header status after
finding him guilty of insubordination for an incident on
June 13, 2011. (Doc. 133 at 23-24.) Prior to the January
31, 2013 hearing, but after the June 13, 2011 incident,
Plaintiff received his right to sue from the EEOC and
timely filed this action. (Doc. 35 ¶ 59.) On May 2, 2012,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to recover for
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, as well as attorney's
fees and punitive damages. (Doc. 35.)
2
Zadach passed away some time after this incident occurred
and never offered any testimony regarding his alleged
statements. (Doc. 133 at 9.)
4
Both Defendants ILA and GSA filed motions for summary
judgment. (Doc. 116; Doc. 120.) Defendant ILJ. argues
summary judgment is proper because Plaintiff is unable to
either establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII or that Defendant ILA's proffered legitimate
reasons for its actions are pretextual. (Doc. 116 at 1.)
Defendant ILA also argues that some of Plaintiff's claims
should be dismissed for improper pleading. (Doc. 118 at
12.1 Defendant GSA argues that summary judgment
is proper
because Title VII does not apply to it, the decision of the
Grievance Committee was final and binding pursuant to the
CBA, and Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation under Title VII or show that the
Grievance Committee's proffered legitimate reasons for its
actions are pretextual.
(Doc. 120 at 1-2.) Plaintiff has
filed responses in opposition to both motions.
(Doc. 128;
Doc. 133.)
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a),
"[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each
claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on
which summary judgment is sought." Such a motion must be
granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
5
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The "purpose of
summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess
the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need
for trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
advisory committee notes).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986).
The substantive law governing the action
determines whether an element is essential. DeLong Equip.
Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1989)
As the Supreme Court explained:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that
there is a genuine issue as to facts that are material to
the nonmovant's case. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929
F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991)
The Court must review the evidence and all reasonable
factual inferences arising from it in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 58788. However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Id. at 586. A mere "scintilla" of
evidence, or simply conclusory allegations, will not
suffice.
See, e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d
1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998).
Nevertheless, where a
reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference
from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue
of material fact, then the Court should refuse to grant
summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933
(11th Cir. 1989)
II. PLAINTIFF'S TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
While each Defendant presents their own independent
defense theories, both argue that Plaintiff cannot
establish a prima fade case of retaliation or, even if
Plaintiff can establish such a case, there were legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment
actions of which Plaintiff complains. In the interest of
7
efficiency, the Court addresses these issues together and
prior to addressing Defendants' other arguments. However,
because the Court ultimately finds no questions of material
fact that could support Plaintiff's retaliation claims
against either Defendant, it need not address Defendants'
other arguments.
A. Prima Facie Retaliation
Title
VII'S
anti-retaliation
provision,
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any
[employee] . . . because he has opposed any
practice made unlawful by [42 U.S.C. § 2000e],
or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
Retaliation under Title VII occurs when an employee
engages in protected activity, and suffers a materially
adverse employment action that is causally related to that
activity. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d
1385 1 1388 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Hopkins v. St. Lucie
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 399 F. App'x 563, 566 (11th Cir 2010). An
adverse employment action is a "tangible employment action
[that] constitutes significant change in employment status
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities or a decision
10
causing a significant change in benefits."
Indus., Inc.
V.
Burlington
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1991).
However, "not all conduct by an employer - negatively
affecting an employee constitutes adverse employment
action." Davis v. Town of Lake Park Fla., 245 F.3d 1232,
1238 (11th Cir. 2001) . A plaintiff must show "a serious
and material change in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." Id. at 1239. A plaintiff's subjective view
is irrelevant, "the employment action must be materially
adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the
circumstances." Id. Further, to establish the necessary
causal link, "a plaintiff merely has to prove that the
protected activity and the negative employment action are
not completely unrelated."
E.E.O.C. v. Reichhold Chem.,
Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1993).
"At
minimum, a plaintiff must generally establish that the
employer was actually aware of the protected expression at
the time it took adverse employment action." Goldsmith v.
City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993).
With regard to the first prima facie element of a
retaliation claim, Plaintiff argues he engaged in protected
activity in three ways: (1) he hired Walker, who had
previously complained of employment discrimination; (2) he
filed an EEOC claim; and (3) he tiled this instant lawsuit.
(Doc. 133 at 7.) There is no question that filing an EEOC
charge or a civil rights lawsuit, such as this one,
qualifies as protected activity. 3 See Gerard v. Bd. of
Regents of Ga., 324 Fed. App'x 818, 825 (11th Cir. 2009)
("[Protected activity] includes . . . complaints lodged
with the EEOC and discrimination-based lawsuits."). These
actions are protected under the "participation clause" of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which prohibits retaliation against
the employee for participating in any investigation,
proceeding, or hearing pursuant to Title VII. See E.E.O.C.
V.
Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F. 3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.
2000). Plaintiff's hiring of Walker, however, may only
qualify as protected activity if it falls under the
statute's "opposition clause," which prohibits retaliation
for opposing an employer's discriminatory practices. See
id.
For a plaintiff to show that he has engaged in
protected activity under the opposition clause, he must not
only show that he had a subjective, good faith belief that
Defendant ILA argues that Plaintiff should be prohibited
from alleging retaliation for the EEOC claim or this
lawsuit because they were not mentioned in Plaintiff's
amended complaint. (Doc. 118 at 12.) Although the Court
agrees that the amended complaint is not particularly clear
or well-pled, a broad reading could conceivably encompass
the EEOC claim and current litigation as well. Regardless,
because these claims still fail on the merits, the issue is
moot.
10
his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices,
but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in
light of all the facts. See Little v. United Techs.
Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir.
1997). Plaintiff alleges he hired Walker in the face of
Defendants' unlawful and discriminatory practice of
discouraging headers from hiring her. But even assuming
Plaintiff truly had a subjective belief that Defendants
discriminatorily opposed Walker's employment, 4 the Court can
find no evidence to support that such a belief was
objectively reasonable. It is undisputed that Plaintiff
knew nothing of the facts surrounding Walker's
discrimination complaints and never witnessed any acts of
discrimination against her. Plaintiff also alleges only
that his co-workers, rather than either Defendant, ever
advised against hiring her. (Doc. 133 at 8.)
Plaintiff admits he had no idea why he was subject to
discipline in December 2008 following his hiring of Walker,
and did not file his EEOC complaint until after allegedly
hearing the reason from Zadach in January 2010. (Doc. 128
at 22-23.) While neither Defendant argues the point, and
although it is not pivotal to the Court's analysis, it is
nonetheless difficult to conceive that Plaintiff could
subjectively believe he was engaged in protected antidiscrimination activity to the bereavement of his
employers, yet fail to consider until over a year later
that the disciplinary actions taken against him might be
related.
11
Plaintiff's argument that hiring Walker was a
protected act because she had a reputation as a
troublemaker who had complained of gender discrimination in
the past is wholly without merit. (Doc. 133 at 8.) Even
assuming that Walker did have such a reputation, the record
is devoid of any evidence to suggest that Defendants sought
to prevent her employment because of it. On the contrary,
Walker was hired a total of 333 times by 104 different
headers between March 31, 2008 and August 20, 2012,
apparently without any other headers incurring similar
retaliatory action. (Doc. 123, Attach. H ¶ 26.) Also,
Plaintiff admits that Walker had not even filed an EEOC
claim alleging employment discrimination until 2009, well
after Plaintiff hired her in an act of alleged protected
activity. (Doc. 133 at 7.) Quite simply, Plaintiff has
put forth no evidence that could support an objectively
reasonable belief that Defendants discriminatorily opposed
Walker's hiring. Accordingly, Plaintiff's retaliation
claims stemming from his hiring of Walker must fail.
As to the second element of a prima facie retaliation
claim, Plaintiff has presented four possible adverse
employment actions. The first two—losing his header status
in December of 2008 and again after the January 5, 2010
Grievance Committee hearing—were allegedly in response to
12
his hiring of Walker. (Doc. 133 at 12-16.) However, these
claims necessarily fail because the Court concludes that
this action does not qualify as protected activity.
Plaintiff also alleges he suffered retaliation in the form
of various grievances that resulted in multiple suspensions
and the permanent loss of his header status on January 31,
2012 for filing both an EEOC claim and this lawsuit. (Id.
at 17-19.) As discussed above, these actions clearly
qualify as protected activity. See Gerard, 324 Fed. App'x
at 825. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the
grievances and their resulting punishments qualify as
adverse employment actions under Title VII.
As discussed above, an adverse employment action is
one that constitutes a significant change in a plaintiff's
employment status such as "hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits." Burlington, 524 U.S. 742, 761. Here, the
Court finds that the suspensions and permanent revocation
of Plaintiff's header status represent significant changes
in his employment status. 5 These actions resulted in
Defendant ILA argues that the mere filing of grievances
alone does not qualify as a materially adverse action.
(Doc. 140 at 7.) However, because the grievances resulted
in an eventual thirty-five day suspension, the Court sees
13
obvious financial losses to Plaintiff through diminished
employment opportunities and a permanent loss of his
ability to serve in a higher-paying managerial position.
Accordingly, the Court finds them to constitute adverse
employment actions under Title VII.
Finding that Plaintiff both engaged in protected
activity and suffered adverse employment actions, the Court
turns to Plaintiff's contentions that a causal connection
exists between the two. In general, this is not an
incredibly high bar, as plaintiffs must only present some
evidence to indicate the adverse employment actions were
not completely unrelated to the protected activity in order
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Reichhold,
988 F.2d at 1571-72. Here, Plaintiff specifically argues
that the disorderly conduct grievances and their resulting
suspension were in retaliation for filing the EEOC claim
(Doc. 133 at 17-19), while the thirty-day suspension and
permanent loss of his header status was retaliation for
filing the instant lawsuit (id. at 19).
Plaintiff has presented no direct evidence that the
disorderly conduct grievances were related to his EEOC
charge. However, Plaintiff correctly points out that a
no reason to distinguish between the separate stages of the
disciplinary process. The suspension would never have
occurred but for the filing of the grievances.
14
causal connection can be shown where the protected activity
and the adverse employment action occur very close in time
to one another. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268, 273 (2001) . Plaintiff relies on this "temporal
proximity" argument to establish a causal link between his
EEOC filing and his eventual suspension in December 2011.
While Plaintiff admits that no actions were taken against
him in 2010, he argues that the almost two-year delay can
be explained because he was not allowed to serve as a
header in 2010 and thus, Defendants had no opportunity to
retaliate against him. (Doc. 133 at 17.) However, the
Court finds this argument wholly without merit. Unlike the
circumstances in the numerous cases Plaintiff cites,
nothing prevented Defendants from retaliating against
Plaintiff prior to the filing of the first disorderly
conduct grievance in the middle of 2011. Cf. Dale v.
Wynne, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1346 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (finding
temporal proximity not defeated because first opportunity
for retaliation occurred after Plaintiff's return to work
after six-week gap)
•6
In addition, Plaintiff regained his
6
Plaintiff's response to Defendant ILP.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment also seems to suggest, but does not actually
argue, that the grievances may also have been filed in
retaliation for Plaintiff hiring Walker four times in the
first half of 2011. (Doc. 133 at 18.) However, there
again exists no direct evidence for this causation argument
15
ability to serve as a header, and did so serve, for
approximately six months before a grievance was ever filed
against him. This gap in time is simply too long to
establish any kind of causal connection to support a claim
of retaliation. See Clark Cnty., 532
U.S.
268 (finding
three month delay too long to infer causation). Lastly,
Plaintiff told the Grievance Committee at the December 13,
2011 hearing that he thought the disorderly conduct
grievances were filed in retaliation for previous
grievances he had filed against McBride and Seymore
regarding his seniority status. (Doc. 133 at 31.) While
Plaintiff may feel his seniority was not properly
respected, such is not grounds for a retaliation claim
under Title VII. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has
offered no other evidence that would suggest the grievances
were filed in retaliation for the EEOC charge, Plaintiff's
and the temporal gap between the first hiring and the first
grievance filed was well over four months. (Id.) The
Court finds this temporal gap simply too large to indicate
any sort of causal connection. See Thomas v. Cooper
Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) ("A
three to four month disparity between the statutorily
protected expression and the adverse employment action is
not [close] enough."). Accordingly, to the extent that
Plaintiff may also have intended to allege that the
grievances were filed in retaliation for instances of
hiring Walker in 2011, these claims fail as a matter of
law.
16
claims regarding the disorderly conduct grievances must
fail.
With respect to the January 31, 2012 hearing—the last
possible incident that could satisfy the requirements of a
prima facie retaliation claim—Plaintiff can point to but
one piece of evidence to suggest that his suspension and
permanent revocation of header status were connected to the
filing of the instant lawsuit. 7 Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant ILA's President, Willie Seymore,
stated at the hearing "we have to be careful what we say
because there was a lawsuit being filed."
11.)
(Doc. 133 at
While Defendants dispute the truthfulness of this
allegation, the Court nonetheless finds that the evidence
could allow a reasonable jury to find the Grievance
Committee was at least aware of the lawsuit.
Beyond simple awareness, however, it is less clear as
to how the statement may be indicative of causation.
Plaintiff argues that Seymore's statement and subsequent
discussion of the insubordination grievance with the
Plaintiff also argues that the loss of his header status
and the filing of this lawsuit are close enough in time to
show causation (Doc. 128 at 26), but this argument fails
for the same reasons that doomed his EEOC retaliation
claims. Over a year passed since Plaintiff filed this
lawsuit to when his header status was permanently revoked,
thus making the temporal gap simply too large to support an
inference of causation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364.
17
Grievance Committee is evidence of discriminatory intent.
(Doc. 133 at 30.) However, it seems more likely that the
statement simply suggests to the committee that it
cautiously evaluate Plaintiff because an improper
punishment could come back to haunt them. Still, it is at
least possible that a reasonable jury could have the same
impression of the evidence as Plaintiff, and the Court
cannot conclude that the two incidents are unrelated as a
matter of law. Thus, taking the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds a prima facie case
of retaliation is established for this one claim alone and
proceeds to the next step of analysis.
B. Leqitimate Reason or Pretext
Should a plaintiff establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, "the employer has the burden of articulating a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
employment decision." Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
197
F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th dr. 1999) . The plaintiff must
then demonstrate that the proffered non-discriminatory
reason can be shown at trial to be mere pretext for
unlawful retaliation. Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire
Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287
(11th Cir. 1997). If the
proffered non-discriminatory reason might motivate a
reasonable employer to take the same action, a plaintiff
18
must rebut that reason directly, and a plaintiff "cannot
succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that
reason." Chapman v. Al Transport,
229
F.3d
1012,
1030
(11th Cir. 2000)
Here, Plaintiff permanently lost his header status and
received a thirty-day suspension because of a dispute he
had with a supervisor on June 2, 2011. Plaintiff, serving
as a header, was ordered to terminate another employee and
refused. (Doc.
128
at
28.)
In what was apparently a
heated exchange, the supervisor first attempted to
terminate the employee directly, but the employee refused
to leave. (Doc. 133 at
21.)
Plaintiff sided with the
employee and argued that it would be difficult or
impossible to find a replacement at this point in the
workday. (Id. at 20.)
The supervisor instructed Plaintiff
to terminate the employee or Plaintiff would himself be
terminated. (Id. at 19.) When Plaintiff refused to do so,
grievances were then filed against both Plaintiff and the
employee, leading the Grievance Committee to ultimately
permanently revoke Plaintiff's header status and suspend
him for thirty days. (Id. at 20-21.)
The Court finds that the facts presented indeed
demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to
support the disciplinary action taken. It is undisputed
19
that Plaintiff disobeyed a direct order from a superior,
and the June 2, 2011 hearing found Plaintiff guilty of
insubordination. Plaintiff fails to identify any facts
showing Plaintiff did not commit the act for which he was
disciplined, nor is there any indication that the act
should not give rise to disciplinary action. Accordingly,
the Court finds Defendants have met their burden, and
Plaintiff must now show evidence that Defendants' proffered
reasons are actually pretext for retaliation.
Plaintiff argues that the June 2, 2011 incident is mere
pretext because the punishment is out of line with those
received by others charged with insubordination (Doc. 133
at 25), because the standards for punishment in the CBA are
arbitrary (Doc. 133 at 31), and because the Grievance
Committee improperly relied on evidence from another
hearing when determining Plaintiff's guilt (Doc. 133 at
19). However, the Court finds all of these arguments
wholly inadequate to even suggest pretext in this case.
Plaintiff may take issue with how his punishment was
administered, or feel that it was unfair, but "[f]ederal
courts 'do not sit as a super-personnel department that
reexamines an entity's business decisions . . . our inquiry
is limited to whether the employer gave an honest
explanation of its behavior.' " Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck &
20
Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mechnig
V.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir.
1988)). Plaintiff disobeyed a direct order from his
superior, an act the Court finds could easily motivate an
employer to take action. Plaintiff's disagreement with the
severity of the consequences of his actions does not make
the Grievance Committee's determination retaliatory. Also,
the fact that no other longshoreman's header status was
permanently revoked fails to demonstrate to the Court
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
find them unworthy of credence.' " Alvarez v. Royal Atl.
Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). At most, Defendants are
guilty of treating Plaintiff unfairly in the grievance
process, but there is simply no evidence before the Court
to indicate that the June 2, 2011 incident was used as
pretext to retaliate against Plaintiff's filing of this
lawsuit. Defendants have presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the actions taken, and it is not
the purview of the Court to second guess the wisdom of
their decision or protect Plaintiff from an overly harsh or
21
mean-spirited employer.
See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs.,
Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998)
(The heart of
the pretext inquiry is not whether the employee agrees with
the reasons that the employer gives for the discharge, but
whether the employer really was motivated by those
reasons.") . Accordingly, the last of Plaintiff's claims
also fails and the Court need not address Defendants'
additional arguments regarding Plaintiff's claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons the foregoing reasons, Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 116; Doc. 120) are
GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED.
Accordingly, Defendant ILA's Motion to Strike (Doc. 141) is
DISMISSED AS MOOT, The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close
this case.
SO ORDERED this Jday of March 2014.
WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?