Brinson v. Jackson et al

Filing 25

ORDER denying 22 Motion to Stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 3/20/2013. (loh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
PATRICK DEANGELO BRINSON,

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Plaintiff,

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V.

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Case No. CV412-105

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CLARENCE JACKSON,
LUCRITIA HILL and
JAMES COOK,

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Defendants.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Patrick DeAngelo Brinson brought this excessive force case
against his jailers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. He alleged
that he was wrongly suspected of possessing a forbidden cell phone and
that a prison official, Clarence Jackson, "without cause or provocation
body slammed me on the concrete floor[,] causing my left pinky finger to
become dislocated and split from the nail to the backside of my hand.. . ."
Id. at 6. He also sued other jail officials, but the Court has dismissed

them. Doc. 16, reported at 2012 WL 5987541. Jackson now moves to
dismiss, and it is unopposed under Local Rule 7.5 because Brinson has

failed to respond. Doc. 21.
Nevertheless, the Court can only grant a dismissal motion if it is
legally supported.' The gist of defendant's motion is that an unprovoked
body slam to the floor that causes a left pinky finger to become dislocated
and split from the nail to the backside of the hand is a de minimis injury,
which means that at most Brinson can recover nominal damages. But
Congress, Jackson contends, eliminated nominal damages with the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA),
specifically the portion codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 2 Doc. 21-1. The
defendant thus reads § 1997e(e) as prohibiting nominal damages in the

' The Court agrees that to the extent Brinson may be seeking to hold Jackson (a state
employee) liable for damages in his official capacity, such claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. A suit against a state employee in his or her official capacity is
deemed to be a suit against the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Hence, that part of Jackson's motion to
dismiss must be granted.
2

"[T]he availability of nominal damages to a prisoner plaintiff who fails to allege a
physical injury remains an unresolved issue in the Eleventh Circuit." Smith v.
Barrow, 2012 WL 6519541 at * 4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2012). Cf. Banks v. William, 2012
WL 4761502 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (1997(e)'s prohibition against recovery
for mental or emotional injury without a showing of physical injury "does not bar
recovery entirely where physical injury is not alleged; it merely limits a plaintiffs
recovery to nominal and punitive damages. Edwards v. Horn, No. 10 Civ.
6194(RJS)(JLC), 2012 WL 760172, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012) ("To recover
punitive or nominal damages . . . a prisoner need not allege that he has sustained a
physical injury") (citing Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002).").
2

absence of a physical injury beyond the de minimis level. Doc. 21-1 at 9•3
And since, in Jackson's view, that essentially is what Brinson seeks, his
case must be dismissed.

Id. at 10-12.

Jackson's motion must be denied. The case of Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003), on which Jackson partly relies, does not
support dismissal. "In Hughes, we stated that "[n]ominal damages are
appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a fundamental
constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual injury sufficient to
entitle him to compensatory damages." Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162."

Frazier v. McDonough, 264 F. App'x 812, 814 (11th Cir. 2008).
So even if Brinson alleged nominal damages, his claim would be
established because he unmistakably is alleging the violation of a
fundamental constitutional right -- his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. For that matter, he is not

Cf. Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2011) (state prisoner could
not seek punitive damages relief on his § 1983 claim that his First Amendment rights
were violated when prison officials opened his privileged attorney mail outside of his
presence, since prisoner's constitutional claim did not assert a physical injury, as
required for punitive damages).

3

seeking nominal damages.' Doe. 1 at 9. Still, once his complaint is
afforded the liberal construction the law commands, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 7 94 (2007), it is clear that he is alleging that Jackson used
force not "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, . . . [but]
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."

Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1 7 7 (1992). Such allegations support a compensatory and punitive
damages claim.
Note that § 1997e(e) does not define what constitutes a physical
injury, though most de minimis uses of physical force are "exclude[d]
from constitutional recognition."

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Harris v.

' Under the "Relief' section of his form § 1983 complaint he states (in unedited,
verbatim form):
I'd like to have the courts punish the defendant for their negligent and cruel
punishment along with police brutality by awarding plaintiff $50,000 in
monetary damages for violating my rights. I also seek them to pay for any cost
occurred for the filing of this complient.
Doc. 1 at 9. Contrary to Smith, Brinson did not include a request, in the "Relief'
portion of his complaint, to "[g]rant such other relief as it may appear that [P]laintiff
is entitled." Smith, 2012 WL 6519541 at * 5. Hence, there is no cause to liberally
construe his Relief section to include a claim for nominal damages. Cf., Williams v.
Brown, 2009 WL 4906861 at * 2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2009) (recognizing "implied"
nominal damages claim in light of extraordinary length to which appellate panel went
in remanding issue to this Court). Electing not to pursue nominal damages can be a
strategy call that an inmate litigant might make. It is easy to imagine a close case
where nominal damages beckon a mere $1 "compromise" verdict, while restricting
such a jury to compensatory damages may constrain it to award a higher amount.
4

Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir,1999) (force "must be more than de
minimis, [and] need not be significant"), vacated in part on other grounds,
216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Mitchell v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312-1313 (11th Cir. 2002)
(prisoner must allege "physical injuries that are greater than

de

minimis."). A dislocated finger is more than de minimis, though not
significant.' More importantly,
[t]his Court can find no authority limiting a prisoner's damages for
the actual physical injury he may have suffered, even if the court
determines the injury was de minimis. Section 1997e(e) only bars
recovery for mental or emotional injury, and the Eleventh Circuit
has held that "[c]ompensatory damages under § 1983 may be
awarded [] based on actual injuries caused by the defendant...."

Nix v. Carter, 2013 WL 432566 at * 2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2013) (emphasis
added) (citing Williams v. Brown, 347 F. App'x 429, 436 (11th Cir.
2009)). Nix, for that matter, collected cases showing that nominal
The Court has canvassed the case law and finds no authority for holding that a
dislocated finger at most is a de minimis injury. It simply does not equate to the
"nominal" injury level found in other cases. See, e.g., Shaheed-Muhammad v.
Dipaolo, 138 F.Supp.2d 99, 110 n. 31 (D. Mass. 2001) ("[F]atigue, weight loss, and one
episode of fainting that resulted in a minor head injury," are insufficient to satisfy the
physical injury component of section 1997e(e)), cited in Thompson u. Crews, 2013 WL
771843 at * 2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2013) ("Plaintiffs allegation of an improper diet,
resulting in high blood sugar, fainting, headaches, cold sweats, dizziness, weakness,
left arm numbness, weight loss, and other symptoms, is insufficient to establish that
plaintiff suffered more than a de minimis physical injury arising from defendants'
conduct.").
5

damages (again, they are not pleaded here) are available on a de

minimis injury. Id. n. 11.
Jackson's motion to dismiss (doe. 21) therefore must be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. His motion to stay
discovery pending dismissal (doe. 22) is DENIED. Defendant shall,
within 14 days, propose a Scheduling Order designed to advance this
case to its conclusion.

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED this

day of

March, 2013.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

M
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