Williams v. Humphrey

Filing 35

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 30 Motion for Discovery. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 7/26/13. (bcw)

FILED

U S DISTPCT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA L n IJJUnL
SAVANNAH DIVISION

JOSEPH WILLIAMS,

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J p

ç.
H

SO. DL
SD GA.

Petitioner,
CASE NO. CV412-106

V.

WARDEN CARL HUMPHREY,
Respondent.

ORDER

In 2004, Petitioner Joseph Williams was convicted and
sentenced to death by the Superior Court of Chatham County
for the murder of Michael Deal. After the completion of
his direct appeal and state habeas court proceedings,
Williams filed a petition for habeas corpus in this Court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction
and death sentence on a number of grounds. Petitioner also
filed the instant "Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery."
(Doc. 30.) Therein, he claims that discovery is necessary
for the full and proper development of evidence and the
presentation of his habeas case. Respondent opposes this
motion. (Doc. 31.) After careful consideration and for
the reasons discussed below, Petitioner's motion is GRANTED
IN PART, DENIED IN PART, and RESERVED IN PART.

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BACKGROUND

I.

FACTUAL HISTORY
The facts of this case were set forth by the Supreme

Court of Georgia:
[O]n July 24, 2001, Williams was a jail inmate at
the Chatham County Detention Center. See OCGA
§ 17-10-30(b) (9) ("murder was committed by a
person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful
custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement") . Seven other inmates, including
Michael Deal, were being held in the same unit as
Williams. Williams and four of the other inmates,
Leon McKinney, Pierre Byrd, Michael Wilson, and
John McMillan, discovered a loose window and used
an improvised chisel to chip away at the wall
around it. Deal inquired what the men were doing
but left when he was told "to mind his own
business." Williams and other inmates began to
suspect that Deal had informed, or was going to
inform, the jail authorities about the escape
plan. McKinney suggested stabbing Deal with the
improvised chisel, but Williams objected that
there would be too much blood and that their plan
would be frustrated. The group then carried out
an alternative plan to strangle Deal and make the
killing appear to be a suicide. McKinney engaged
Deal in a discussion about their relative body
sizes and then, facing Deal, lifted him in a
"bear hug." Williams then began strangling Deal
from behind with an Ace bandage. Deal fell to the
floor but did not immediately lose consciousness.
The evidence is unclear whether it was Wilson or
Byrd, but one of those two men then assisted
Williams by taking one end of the Ace bandage and
completing the strangulation in a "tug-of-war."
Byrd invited Anthony King, an inmate who had been
friendly with Deal, into Byrd's cell to distract
King as Deal's body was moved. Williams then
dragged Deal's body to Deal's cell, flushed the
Ace bandage down the toilet, cleaned up blood and
hair on the floor with a rag, flushed the rag,
tied a bed sheet around Deal's neck, and finally,
with the assistance of McKinney and McMillan,
lifted Deal's body and tied the bed sheet to a
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grate in the ceiling to make the death appear to
be a suicide. After the murder, Williams and Byrd
favored also killing King and Dewey Anderson, but
McKinney and McMillan objected. Byrd, later
troubled by dreams about the victim, contacted
his attorney, passed a note about the murder to a
jail guard, and then directed authorities to the
improvised chisel, the loosened window, and a
letter about the murder written to him by
Williams. Williams confessed in an audiotaped
interview conducted by a GBI agent.
In
support
of
the
OCGA
17-10-30(b) (1)
§
aggravating circumstance, the State presented
three certified convictions of Williams, one for
the armed robbery of Harry Jaymes, one for the
murder of Iris Hall, and one for the murder of
Taureen Graham. The State also presented
testimony regarding those three crimes. Harry
Jaymes testified that Williams delivered some
stereo equipment, that he gave Williams a cash
gratuity from a bag of money, and that Williams
returned with an accomplice two days later on May
27, 1999, hit Jaymes in the head repeatedly with
a handgun, and threatened to kill Jaymes if he
did not reveal where the bag of money was. Jaymes
escaped, threw a brick through his car's window
to set off the alarm, and had a neighbor call
police. A GBI agent testified that Williams
confessed during an audiotaped statement, which
was played for the jury, to the murders of
Taureen Graham and Iris Hall. Williams explained
in the statement that he had been hired to murder
Taureen Graham's older brother but that, on July
31, 1999, he murdered the wrong person. Janet
Cooper testified that, during a drug deal on July
11, 1999, Williams held Cooper and Iris Hall at
gunpoint, placed Cooper in a bathroom, and
searched Hall's house. As Cooper escaped from the
bathroom window, she heard the shots that killed
Hall. At Williams's trial for Hall's murder,
Williams "made slashing gestures and gunshot
gestures" toward Cooper. Williams later, in March
2004, gave a letter to Cooper in which he stated,
"I've killed many men before that incident, even
killed a couple afterwards." The letter continued
as follows:

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August will be an even five years of
incarceration for me. In those five
years, I've killed two men, slit an
officer's throat with a razor, stabbed
two inmates, and whipped my first
lawyer's ass. I am who I am, Janet.
Those walls can't stop me.
The evidence also showed that Williams had
committed several other criminal acts. A criminal
defense attorney testified that Williams struck
him repeatedly during a jailhouse interview on
September 28, 2001. A prison guard testified that
Williams slashed his face and throat with a razor
blade embedded in a newspaper on December 17,
2001. Testimony from two prison officers to whom
Williams confessed and testimony from the
surviving victim showed that Williams murdered
one prison inmate and repeatedly stabbed another
with an improvised weapon on January 26, 2003. In
his audiotaped confession about the 2003 prison
attack, Williams stated that he had also planned
to kill a third inmate that day but the man's
cell door had been locked.
Williams v. Georgia, 281 Ga. 87, 88-89, 635 S.E.2d 146,
147-49 (2006)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 5, 2004, Petitioner pleaded guilty to malice
murder. (Doc. 11-4 at 52-55.) On April 7, 2004,
Petitioner was sentenced to death by lethal injection.
(Doc. 9-2 at 73-74.) The jury found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the existence of two statutory aggravating factors.
First, that the murder of Michael Deal was committed while
Petitioner was in a place of lawful confinement. Second,
that the murder of Michael Deal was committed by a person

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with a prior record of conviction for murder and armed
robbery. (Id.)
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for a new
trial. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions
and sentence on September 18, 2006. Williams, 281 Ga. 87,
635 S.E.2d 146. A petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court was denied on April 21, 2008.
Williams v. Georgia, 553 U.S. 1004, 1004 (2008)
On March 16, 2009, Petitioner filed a state habeas
corpus petition in the Superior Court of Butts County.
(Doc. 11-30.) In March of 2010, Petitioner filed an
amended petition. (Doc. 12-2.) The court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on July 12, 2010, and ultimately denied
the petition, as amended, on October 18, 2010. (Doc. 2233.) Further attempts to appeal were similarly unavailing.
See Williams v. Humphrey, - U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 530, 530
(2012)
After filing a § 2254 petition in this Court,
Petitioner filed the instant motion for leave to conduct
discovery. Petitioner requests that the Court permit him
to conduct discovery under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing
Cases Brought Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 30-1 at 1.)
Specifically,

Petitioner

seeks

discovery

towards

Petitioner's second claim that the State suppressed

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material exculpatory and impeachment evidence.

(Id.)

In

support of Petitioner's claims, Petitioner ask for leave of
Court to obtain certain files currently in the possession
of the Chatham County District Attorney's office, the
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Federal
Drug Enforcement Agency. Respondent contends that
Petitioner has not established due diligence or good cause
for granting discovery, as required by Rule 6(a) of the
Rules Governing § 2254 proceedings, as interpreted in light
of the applicable provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which govern federal
habeas corpus proceedings. (Doc. 31.)
ANALYSIS

I.

STANDARDS GOVERNING DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
CASES
"A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant

in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter
of ordinary course." Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904
(1997). Under AEDPA, if a habeas petitioner has failed to
develop the factual basis for his claims in state court
proceedings as a result of his own lack of diligence, he
must satisfy the stringent conditions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e) (2) before the district court should hold an

evidentiary hearing.' Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1249
(11th Cir. 2002) ("The discovery provisions of 2254(e) (2)
only apply if the petitioner was not reasonably diligent in
trying to develop the factual record while in state
court.") . " 'Diligence for purposes of the opening clause
depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable
attempt, in light of the information available at the time,
to investigate and pursue claims in state court.' " Id.
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000)).
Where a petitioner has been diligent, Rule 6(a) of the
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases permits discovery upon a
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Section 2254(e) (2) states that
[i] f the applicant has failed to develop the
factual basis of a claim in state court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that (A) the claim relies on (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2).
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"In interpreting the good cause

showing of good cause.

portions of this rule, the Supreme Court noted that 'where
specific allegations before the court show reason to
believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled
to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the
necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate
inquiry.' " Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1248 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Bracy,

520

U.S. at 908-09) . A petitioner

must set forth specific allegations of fact, as opposed to
conclusory assertions, because Rule 6 does not authorize
"fishing expeditions." See Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355,
1367 (5th Cir. 1994)
In this case, Petitioner requests permission to obtain
files from the Chatham County District Attorney's Office
relating to Georgia v. Joseph Williams, Case No. CR0193371; files from the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles
("Board") relating to Pierre Byrd; and files from the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") relating to the victim and
purported confidential informant Michael Deal. According
to Petitioner, this information is critical to a Brady
claim he has filed as part of his § 2254 petition. 2

2

The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963), that "the suppression by the prosecution of

Respondent argues that Petitioner's requests should be
denied because Petitioner did not exercise due diligence at
the state court level and has not shown good cause for the
requested discovery.

Respondent also claims that some

issues have been procedurally defaulted.

After careful

consideration of each of Petitioner's requests, the Court
finds as follows.
II. DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S FILES
Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to
discovery of the District Attorney files because he did not
exercise sufficient due diligence at the state habeas level
warranting discovery of the information he now seeks.

evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment." Thus, the evidence in a Brady violation "must
be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence
must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) . The prejudice prong
is satisfied if "there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) . To do so, a court
evaluates each undisclosed item and then makes a
Kyles v.
determination about their "cumulative effect."
For present purposes,
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37.
"[p] romises made by the state to a witness in exchange for
his testimony relate directly to the credibility of the
witness. A prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence of
any promises made by the state to a prosecution witness in
exchange for his testimony." Moore v. Kemp 809 F.2d 702,
719 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972))

Petitioner contends that the withheld portions of the
District Attorney file "likely contain information
regarding the prosecution's use of Pierre Byrd as its star
witness and the benefits Byrd may have been promised or
otherwise anticipated receiving as a result of his
assistance." (Doc. 30-1 at 13-14.)
As part of Petitioner's August 29, 2009 state habeas
proceedings, he filed a "Motion to Compel Production of a
Privilege Log of the District Attorney's Files and for In
Camera Inspection," requesting that the state habeas court
order the Chatham County District Attorney's office to
compile a privilege log detailing any documents withheld
pursuant to Petitioner's June 2008 open records request.
(Doc. 27-10.) The District Attorney's office created a
privilege log and indicated that those items withheld were
"juror questionnaire [s] with attorney's handwritten notes,
attorney notes for trial preparation, trial strategy, and
juror questionnaire/ information, and inter-office attorney
emails." (Doc. 28-6 at 9.) After the state habeas court
denied Petitioner's motion, he renewed his request—asking
the state habeas court to compel the District Attorney to
provide the privilege log documents to Petitioner. (Id. at
1-5.) Ultimately, the state habeas court denied
Petitioner's renewed motion.

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Petitioner contends, and the facts seem to indicate,
that he made a reasonable effort to investigate and pursue
this information during his state habeas review. Although
he was prevented from obtaining the privilege log
documents, he attempted to obtain them through an initial
motion to compel, a later renewed motion, and argument at
the July 12, 2010 evidentiary hearing

.

3

In light of these

efforts, it does not appear that AEDPA bars discovery for
lack of diligence. Limited discovery, moreover, is proper
so that Petitioner can determine if any documents relevant
to his Brady claim or claims are contained therein. 4
Accordingly, Petitioner's request is

GRANTED

and the

District Attorney's file should be provided to Petitioner
at this time.
III. BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES FILES
Petitioner also requests that the Court allow him to
obtain the parole file of Pierre Byrd—currently in the
possession of the Board—to further prove his Brady claim.
The Court disagrees with Respondent's position that
Petitioner's claims were not diligently pursued because he
presented neither testimony or evidence at the evidentiary
hearing, nor argued the Brady claim in his post-hearing
brief or proposed findings to the state habeas court. The
Court addressed the motion at length before the evidentiary
hearing and there was extensive discussion between
Petitioner's counsel, the Court, and Respondent's counsel.
(Doc. 12-4 at 26-36.)
The Court, however, makes no finding at this point
regarding the merits of Petitioner's Brady or any other
claims.
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(Doc. 30-1 at 16-19.)

In the alternative, Petitioner

requests that the court conduct an in camera review of
Byrd's pardon and parole file. Respondent argues that
discovery of the Board's files is not proper because
Petitioner has failed provide any evidence to demonstrate
that he may be entitled to relief. (Doc. 31 at 18-23.)
As part of the state habeas proceedings, the state
habeas court granted Petitioner's motion for an in camera
inspection of Byrd's parole file. The state habeas court
reviewed the documents in camera and found that "the
inspection [did] not reveal any potential exculpatory
evidence which could be used by Petitioner in the above
matter." (Doc. 29-6 at 1.) According to Petitioner, he
now "fears that [the state habeas court's] review was
insufficient and requests that the records be disclosed."
(Doc. 30-1 at 16-17.)
Except for this fear, Petitioner has provided nothing
to the Court to suggest that the state habeas court's
review of Byrd's parole file was insufficient or improper.
Petitioner does not explain what type of information he
expects to find in the files that the state habeas court
passed over when conducting its review. Petitioner's
contention that the state habeas court review was
inadequate is mere hypothesis. Such unsupported

12

postulization is insufficient to establish good cause that
the facts, if fully developed through discovery, would be
any different than from those found by the state habeas
court. 5 See Arthur v. Allen, 459 F.3d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir.
2006) ("[G]ood cause for discovery cannot arise from mere
speculation . . . discovery cannot be ordered on the basis

Petitioner attempts to analogize Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d
702 (11th Cir. 1987) , to the present case. In Moore, the
state habeas court conducted an in camera review of parole,
probation, and criminal history files of one of the State's
key witnesses, looking for whether he testified with a
formal or informal grant of immunity, or with a possible
deal for parole or probation. Id. at 726. Critically, the
state habeas court in Moore refused to turn over relevant
files because it deemed them confidential under Georgia
law. Id. After petitioner's habeas claims were denied in
federal district court and affirmed by an Eleventh circuit
panel, the Eleventh circuit sitting en banc, reversed. The
en bance Eleventh Circuit held
that the state habeas court,
in denying
petitioner's counsel access to that information,
denied petitioner the opportunity to prove his
claim. It follows that the state habeas hearing
was not full, fair, and adequate; therefore, the
findings produced by that hearing regarding the
Brady/Giglio claim are not entitled to deference
[and] the [federal district court] erred in
adopting them and in denying petitioner an
evidentiary hearing.
Id. at 730.
Here, unlike in Moore, the state habeas
court's in camera review of the confidential files found
there to be no exculpatory evidence that could be used by
Petitioner. Here, the state habeas court did not refuse to
turn over any relevant exculpatory evidence like in Moore
because it found that there was no possible Brady/Giglio
evidence to provide. Thus, Petitioner's state habeas
hearing on this matter was full, fair, and adequate and the
findings are entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). See Moore, 809 F.2d at 730.
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of pure hypothesis.")

And while a Petitioner's right to

identify potentially mitigating evidence outweighs any
confidentiality concerns, Pope v. Georgia, 256 Ga. 195,
212, 345 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1991), Petitioner's mere fear and
speculation does not rise to a level warranting discovery.
Thus, Petitioner's request for discovery related to Byrd's
parole files is DENIED.
IV. DEA FILES ON MICHAEL DEAL
Finally, Petitioner requests that he be provided files
from the DEA regarding the alleged confidential informant
he murdered. (Doc. 30-1 at 19-21.) According to
Petitioner, he diligently sought the information from the
DEA through Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests
and the State was aware, but never disclosed, Michael
Deal's confidential informant status prior to trial. (Id.
at 19-20.) Respondent contends that "this information was
turned over to trial counsel." (Doc. 31 at 23-24.) While
Respondent acknowledges that evidence of Deal's
confidential informant status was turned over at the state
habeas hearing (id.), Respondent never acknowledges whether
Petitioner's trial counsel was ever told of Deal's
confidential informant status.
After a review of the voluminous record in this case,
the Court is unable to discern when such disclosure took

14

place, if such disclosure was material, and the extent
Petitioner pursued these files during his state habeas
proceedings. Further, the Court feels that neither party
adequately addressed these matters in their briefs.
Accordingly, the Court

RESERVES

ruling on Petitioner's

request as to discovery of the flEA files of confidential
informant Michael Deal. The parties are DIRECTED to each
file a single brief within thirty days of this order
addressing only the following issue: whether Petitioner
developed the factual basis for his claims as it pertains
to the DEA files on Michael Deal in his state court habeas
proceeding and, if so, whether there is good cause to
permit discovery. 6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's Motion for
Discovery is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,
IN PART.

and RESERVED

The parties are DIRECTED to each file a single

brief within thirty days of this order addressing only the
following issue: whether Petitioner developed the factual
basis for his claims as it pertains to the DEA files on
6

Because the Court is reserving ruling as to the DEA files,
any scheduling order deadlines—namely, the 120-day
discovery period (Doc. 26)—will not begin until the Court
enters an order specifically addressing discovery of the
DEA files. Additionally, any motions for reconsideration
of this order shall be considered timely made after the
Court's entering of the order addressing discovery of the
DEA files.
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Michael Deal in his state court habeas proceeding and, if
so, whether there is good cause to permit discovery.
SO ORDERED this 4

'day of July 2013.

WILLIAM T. MOORE,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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