Parker v. Economic Opportunity for Savannah-Chatham County Area, Inc. et al
Filing
62
ORDER granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 39 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; dismissing as moot 49 Motion to Strike. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the 1 Complaint. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/21/14. (wwp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
QUEEN E. PARKER,
)
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV412-315
MW
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR
SAVANNAH-CHATHAM COUNTY AREA,
INC.; JOHN H. FINNEY; and
TERRY TOLBERT;
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Economic Opportunity
for Savannah-Chatham County Area ("EOA"), John H. Finney,
and Terry Tolbert's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35)
and Plaintiff Queen E. Parker's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 39). For the following reasons, Defendants'
motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. The
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
BACKGROUND
This
case
involves
allegations
of
gender
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. H 2000e to 2000e-17, and improper
retaliation in violation of Title II of the Americans with
Disability Act ('ADA") , 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, against
Defendant EOA and two of its managers—Defendants Finney and
Tolbert.' According to Plaintiff, Defendant Tolbert rated
Plaintiff in the highest possible category on every
employee performance evaluation since 2006.2 (Doc. 48 at
3.) In 2010, Plaintiff 3 approached Defendant Tolbert about
submitting a request to the City of Savannah for two
parking spaces in front of Defendant EOA's office to be
designated for handicapped parking. (Id. at 4.) Defendant
EOA already had two designated handicapped parking spaces
in its parking lot, located behind the EOA office. (Id.)
However, Defendant Tolbert gave Plaintiff permission to
make the request because he thought it a good idea to have
additional handicapped parking available at the front of
the building, closest to the ramp for handicapped access.
(Id.)
The city granted Plaintiff's request and designated
two parking spaces in front of Defendant EOA's building for
1
As it must at this stage, the Court construes the facts in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88
(1986) . As the Court has used only Plaintiff's factual
account in ruling on the parties' requests for summary
judgment, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 49) is
DISMISSED AS MOOT.
2
Presumably, this is when Plaintiff began her employment
with Defendant EOA. (Doc. 48 at 3.)
Plaintiff is physically disabled and possesses a
handicapped parking decal. (Doc. 48 at 3.) Because
Plaintiff makes no allegations that she was discriminated
against on the basis of any actual or perceived disability,
Plaintiff's physical disability is immaterial to this case.
handicapped parking.
(Id. at 4-5.)
According to
Plaintiff, the Director of Traffic for the City of Savannah
informed her that Defendant EOA would have to monitor the
parking spaces to ensure that only authorized individuals
are parking in those spaces. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff
relayed this requirement to Defendant Tolbert, who then
assigned that responsibility to two of Defendant EOA's
employees—Messrs. Solomon and Johnson. (Id.)
Sometime after the spaces were designated for
handicapped parking, Plaintiff began questioning her fellow
employees' unauthorized uses of the handicapped spaces.
(Id. at 6.)
In addition, Plaintiff voiced her complaints
to Defendants Finney and Tolbert.
(Id.) On at least one
occasion, Defendant Tolbert directed an offending EOA
employee to move her vehicle from a handicapped space.
(Id. at 6-7.)
On May 1, 2012, Plaintiff was preparing for an
upcoming meeting with a handicapped client of Defendant
EOA. (Id.. at 7.) The client requested that a handicapped
parking space be available upon her arrival. In trying to
meet the client's request, Plaintiff checked on the
availability of handicapped parking in the spaces
surrounding Defendant EOA's office, both in the parking lot
and along the street. (Id.) All spaces being occupied,
3
Plaintiff then attempted to determine if any of those cars
were illegally parked in the handicapped spaces. (i)
Plaintiff's investigation revealed that one vehicle
parked along the street was displaying a handicapped
placard. (Id.) She then attempted to cross-reference the
name on the handicapped placard with Defendant EQA's
visitor sign-in-sheet. (Id. at 8.) After determining the
name was not in the register, Plaintiff made inquiries at
the reception desk concerning the owner of the vehicle.
(Id.) Eventually, a fellow EOA employee was identified as
the owner of the vehicle. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff
learned that the handicapped parking placard was issued in
the name of the employee's son. (Id.)
Armed with this information, Plaintiff sought out the
offending employee and discovered that the employee was not
disabled and that the employee's son had not accompanied
her to work. (Id.) In light of this discovery, Plaintiff
asked the employee to move her car from the handicapped
parking space. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the employee
refused and 'said something 'offensive' and 'racial.'"
(Id.) Based on this response, Plaintiff deemed it
pointless to continue the conversation and returned to the
reception desk. (Id.)
4
Upon her return, Plaintiff summoned Defendant Tolbert
to discuss the parking issue. (Id. at 9.) After
explaining the situation, Defendant Tolbert informed
Plaintiff he was busy, had more important things to do, and
that it was an issue for the police department. (Id. at 910.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Tolbert told her to
"do what you've got to do," to which Plaintiff responded
that she was going to call 911. (Id. at 10.)
Following this discussion, Plaintiff called the nonemergency number for Savannah Police, identified herself as
a concerned citizen, and informed the operator that an
unauthorized individual was parked in a handicapped parking
space in front of Defendant EOA's office. (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiff returned to her office and waited to be informed
of law enforcement's arrival. (Id.) After an hour without
Plaintiff being aware of any police response to her call,
Plaintiff noticed that the vehicle was still parked in the
handicapped parking space. (Id.) In light of the
unchanged circumstances, Plaintiff decided to place a
second call to law enforcement. (Id.)
Eventually, a resource officer responded to the scene
and informed Plaintiff that she assumed the handicapped
placard belonged to the driver of the vehicle. (Id.) In
response, Plaintiff informed the resource officer that the
5
placard did not belong to the driver of the vehicle. (Id.)
However, the officer still questioned her own authority to
force the driver to move the vehicle in light of the
validly displayed handicapped placard. (Id.)
Unsatisfied with this response, Plaintiff asked to
speak to the resource officer's supervisor—Officer Coates.
(Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff related her position to Officer
Coates, telling her that Plaintiff would like to have the
vehicle 'relocated elsewhere." (Id. at 12.) At Officer
Coates's request,
Plaintiff attempted to bring the
offending employee outside to discuss the situation.
(Id.)
However, the employee would not leave the building.
(Id.)
Officer Coates then asked to speak to the employee's
supervisor, who in turn contacted her own supervisor.
(Id.) Sometime during this back-and-forth, the offending
employee moved her vehicle. (Id. at 12-13.)
Meanwhile, Defendant Finney received a phone call
informing him that Plaintiff was involved in a dispute at
the EOA building. (Id. at 13.) Upon his arrival,
Defendant Finney inquired of Officer Coates as to the
situation. (Id.) Officer Coates informed him that the
police were responding to a call concerning a dispute over
handicapped parking at the EOA. (Id. at 13-14.) Based on
the information provided by police, Defendant Finney
1.1
immediately suspended Plaintiff from her employment.
(Id.
at 14.)
Following
the
suspension,
Defendant
Finney
investigated the incident. (Id.) Ultimately, Defendant
Finney terminated Plaintiff's employment on May 4, 2012—
three days following the handicapped parking incident.
(Id. at 14-15.) Defendant Finney stated that he terminated
Plaintiff's employment because she called the police
concerning the handicapped parking space. (Id.)
After exhausting her administrative appeals and
obtaining a timely right-to-sue letter from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Plaintiff filed
suit in this Court. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants violated the anti-retaliation provision of
the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, when they terminated her
employment. (Doc. 1 73-78.) In addition, Plaintiff
brings a claim against Defendant EOA for gender
discrimination in employment, a violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17. 4 (Id. ST 79-83.)
In her complaint, Plaintiff also brought claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations her right to free speech (Doc.
1
5ff 63-72) and her right to be free from gender
discrimination (id.
¶5 84-88) . In her response to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff concedes
that these claims fail because Defendants were not acting
7
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff's Title VII gender discrimination claim
fails because she is unable to identify other similarly
situated male employees whom were treated differently.
(Doc. 37 at 19-22.) In addition, Defendants contend that
Plaintiff's retaliation claims fail because both Defendant
EOA was not engaged in an employment practice made unlawful
under the ADA (id. at 24-25) and Plaintiff lacked an
objectively reasonable belief that Defendant EOA was
engaged in conduct made unlawful under the ADA (id. at 2526) . In her response, Plaintiff identifies two allegedly
valid male comparators—Messrs. Willie Brown and Brian
Orrico—that were treated more favorably after committing
acts of insubordination. (Doc. 48 at 31-36.) In addition,
Plaintiff contends that Defendant EOA's actions were
violations of the ADA (id. at 18-20) and that her
subjective belief that Defendant EOA was engaged in conduct
made unlawful by the ADA was objectively reasonable (id. at
20-30)
under color of state law.
Therefore,
(Doc. 48 at 3.)
DISMISSED
and need not be further
these claims are
discussed.
8
ANALYSIS
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), "[a] party may
move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or
defense—or the part of each claim of defense—on which
summary judgment is sought." Such a motion must be granted
"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." Id. The "purpose of summary judgment is
to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order
to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory
committee notes)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial."
(1986) .
Celotex Corp.
V.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
The substantive law governing the action
determines whether an element is essential. IDeLong Equip
.
Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1989)
As the Supreme Court explained:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that
there is a genuine issue as to facts that are material to
the nonmovant's case. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929
F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).
The Court must review the evidence and all reasonable
factual inferences arising from it in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 58788. However, the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Id. at 586. A mere 'scintilla" of
evidence, or simply conclusory allegations, will not
suffice.
See, e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d
1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998) .
Nevertheless, where a
reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference
from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue
of material fact, then the Court should refuse to grant
summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923,
933-34 (11th Cir. 1989)
10
II. PLAINTIFF'S TITLE VII GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
In her complaint, Plaintiff brought a claim against
Defendant EOA for gender discrimination in violation of
Title VII. (Doc. 1 ¶I 79-83.) In their Motion for Summary
Judgment,
Defendants argue
that
Plaintiff's gender
discrimination claim fails because she is unable to point
to a similarly situated male employee who engaged in the
same conduct while receiving no discipline.
19-23.)
(Doc. 37 at
In response, Plaintiff identifies Messrs. Brown
and Orrico as similarly situated male co-workers who were
not terminated for allegedly similar violations. (Doc. 48
at 31-36.)
Title VII prohibits an employer from 'discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individuals race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) . A plaintiff may
establish a claim of unlawful gender discrimination by
presenting direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence
of discrimination.
Underwood v. Perry Cnty. Comm'n, 431
F.3d 78, 793 (11th Cir. 2005) .
To assess a disparate
treatment claim 5 based only on circumstantial evidence, such
Plaintiff's claim is one of disparate treatment—Defendant
EOA treated Plaintiff differently based on her gender. See
11
as Plaintiff's claim in this case, the Court must employ
the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Brooks v.
Cnty. Comm's of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F. 3d 1160, 1162
(11th Cir. 2006) . Under this test, a plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination by
proving four elements: (1) she was a member of a protected
class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3)
similarly situated employees outside of the plaintiff's
protected class were treated more favorably; and (4) she
was qualified for the position.
F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008) .
Crawford v. Carroll, 529
If a plaintiff can
demonstrate the elements of a prima facie case, then a
burden of production falls to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., 207 F.3d
1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000) . If the employer articulates a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Id. At this point, should the plaintiff fail to establish
the presence of a genuine issue of material fact that the
R a ytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977))
12
employer's reason was merely pretextual, then the employer
is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. Cuddeback v.
Fla. 3d. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004).
In their motion, Defendants only disputed one element
of Plaintiff's prima fade case: whether a similarly
situated employee outside of Plaintiff's protected class
was treated more favorably. (Doc. 37 at 19-23.) In
response, Plaintiff identified Messrs. Brown and Orrico as
valid comparators. (Doc. 48 at 31-36.) After reviewing
the record in this case and taking the facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that
neither Mr. Brown nor Mr. Orrico is a similarly situated
employee and, as a result, Plaintiff is unable to establish
a prima facie case of gender discrimination.
To determine whether an employee is similarly
situated, the Court must look at whether both the plaintiff
and the employee engaged in or were accused of the same
conduct, but were disciplined by their employer in
different fashions. Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368
(11th Cir. 1999)
(quotin2 Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med.
Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998)) . When
assessing the similarity of employees subjected to
discipline, the nature of the offenses necessitating
discipline and the types of punishments meted out are the
13
prime analytical factors.
Id.
In this circuit, both the
quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct must be
nearly identical so that courts do not second guess an
employer's human resources decision. Id. While exact
correlation is neither likely nor necessary,
[1
the cases
must be fair congeners," Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth
Call., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989), overruled on other
grounds by Educadores Puertorriguenos en Accion
V.
Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2004) , to prevent
"confusing apples with oranges," Maniccia, 171 F.3d at
1368.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, this Court is unable to conclude that the
quality and quantity of either Messrs. Brown's or Orrico's
misconduct was sufficiently similar to Plaintiff's such
that either could be considered a valid comparator. With
respect to Mr. Brown, he and Plaintiff performed two
entirely different
lob functions. While Plaintiff's
position as a housing counselor required her to work with
individual clients, Mr. Brown was employed in a management
capacity as Director of the Tom Austin House.
31.)
(Doc. 48 at
However, even ignoring the vast differences in the
positions held by Plaintiff compared to Mr. Brown, the type
14
and severity of Mr. Brown's misconduct is sufficiently
dissimilar to preclude his use as a valid comparator.
According to Plaintiff, Mr. Brown failed to timely
complete assigned tasks on several occasions and routinely
ignored "critical criticisms." (Id. at 32.) As a result,
Defendant Tolbert gave Mr. Brown a very low rating in two
areas during Mr. Brown's 2011 performance evaluation.
(Id.) Plaintiff points out that Mr. Brown was never
or
reprimanded,
suspended,
shortcomings.
terminated
for
these
(Id. at 32-33.)
It is clear, however, that Plaintiff's misconduct is
of a markedly different nature than Mr. Brown's. While
Defendant Tolbert characterized both Plaintiff's and Mr.
Brown's conduct as insubordinate. 6 the nature of the
underlying conduct is extremely dissimilar. Mr. Brown was
failing in his role as a manager and not performing
assigned tasks. Plaintiff was terminated for calling
6
In her response, Plaintiff attempts to use Mr. Brown as a
they
were
both
guilty
of
because
comparator
insubordination. (Doc. 48 at 31.) Simply because
Defendant EOA described both Plaintiff's and Mr. Brown's
conduct as insubordinate does not render their individual
conduct as comparable. It is the individualized conduct of
both employees that must be sufficiently similar when
compared, not the label management elected to ascribe to
that conduct. As outlined below, a simple review of Mr.
Brown's conduct easily reveals it to be so dissimilar as to
preclude Plaintiff's use of Mr. Brown as a valid comparator
for her Title VII gender discrimination claim.
15
police, during business hours, about a fellow employee who
was possibly illegally parked in a handicapped space.
Indeed, Plaintiff's conduct involved investigating parking
lots, searching for the owner of a vehicle, approaching
fellow employees about their alleged improper parking,
calling the police twice, disturbing Plaintiff's
supervisor, and much more.
Plaintiff's
actions
Unlike Mr. Brown's conduct,
severely disturbed the working
environment of Defendant BOA. Both the quantity and
quality of Plaintiff's conduct is vastly different from Mr.
Brown's. As a result, the Court does not consider Mr.
Brown to be a valid comparator.
Plaintiff's attempt to utilize Mr. Orrico as a valid
comparator suffers from the same fatal flaw. Even assuming
Plaintiff and Mr. Orrico held similar positions with
Defendant EOA, 7 the type of misconduct committed by
Mr.
Orrico is too dissimilar from Plaintiff's for his use as a
valid comparator.
According to Plaintiff, Mr. Orrico was
given a warning for insubordination.
(Id. at 35-36.)
However, Plaintiff has failed to provide any detail as to
the nature of Mr. Orrico's conduct that prompted the
warning. As a result, the Court has no means by which it
The Court notes the rather generous nature of this
assumption in light of Mr. Orrico's employment as a
"Maintenance/Security Guard." (Doc. 37 at 22.)
can conclude that the type of misconduct committed by
Mr.
Orrico is sufficiently similar to Plaintiff's actions such
that he could be considered a valid comparator.
Plaintiff also relies on a warning given to Mr. Orrico
for his use of an inappropriate word in the presence of an
EOA client. (Id. at 36.) In Plaintiff's estimation, Mr.
Orrico is a valid comparator because he was only suspended
without pay for his "embarrassing and disgraceful" conduct, 8
while Plaintiff's actions resulted in her termination.
(Id.) Again, both the quantity and quality of Plaintiff's
conduct is sufficiently dissimilar to Mr. Orrico's such
that he cannot be considered a valid comparator. Because
Plaintiff is unable to identify a similarly situated
employee outside of Plaintiff's protected class that was
treated more favorably, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
WITH
II. PLAINTIFF'S
AMERICANS
RETALIATION CLAIM
DISABILITIES
ACT
Plaintiff has brought a retaliation claim under the
ADA based on Defendants' decision to terminate her
employment. (Doc. 1
¶11 73-78.) The anti-retaliation
8
Again, Plaintiff attempts to use the label management
ascribed to the misconduct to conclude that the misconduct
was similar. As noted above, however, the proper focus is
on the individualized actions of Plaintiff and the
comparator, not the label placed on that conduct. See
Supra note 6.
17
provision of the ADA9 provides that
"[n]o person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual
has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter."
41 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) that she suffered a
materially adverse employment action; and (3) that there
was a causal connection between the two events.
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs. Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th
Cir. 1998) (citing Steward v. Happy Herman's Cheshire
Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278. 1287 (11th Cir. 1997)). To
establish a prima fade case of retaliation, a plaintiff
must not only subjectively have a good-faith belief that
her employer was engaged in unlawful conduct, but that
belief must also be objectively reasonable. Little
V.
United Tech., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997)
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue
that their actions did not violate the ADA because
Due to their similarity, ADA retaliation claims are
assessed under the same framework used for retaliation
claims arising under Title VII. Standard v. A.E.E.L.
Servs. Inc.. 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998)
18
Defendant EOA did not own or control access to the
handicapped parking space, which was owned by the city.
(Doc. 37 at 23-25.) In addition, Defendants contend that
Plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable, goodfaith belief that Defendant EOA was engaged in unlawful
discriminatory practices. (Id. at 25-26.) In response,
Plaintiff maintains that Defendants' conduct actually
violated the ADA. (Doc. 48 at 23-27.) Plaintiff also
reasons that, even if Defendants did not violate the ADA,
her retaliation claim survives because she held an
objectively reasonable belief that Defendants' conduct was
a violation of the ADA. (Id. at 20-30.)
Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails both because
Defendant EOA was not engaged in conduct that violated the
ADA and because any belief that Defendant EOA violated the
ADA by failing to force its employee to move from a cityowned handicapped parking space is objectively
unreasonable. While Plaintiff attempts to paint
Defendant's actions as a violation of the ADA, the record
establishes that the handicapped parking space at the
center of this dispute was located on the street in front
of Defendant EOA's office. There is no evidence in the
record, other than Plaintiff's ipse dixit, that Defendant
EOA was ultimately responsible for policing the use of this
19
parking space. While Defendant EOA may have been informed
that they would have to monitor the handicapped spaces for
illegal parking, the record does not establish that
Defendant EOA was either required to report parking
violations or possessed any authority to enforce parking
regulations with respect to those spaces by removing
illegally parked vehicles.
In this respect, Plaintiffs reliance on Cottrell
V.
J&D Liquor Gallery, Inc., 2010 WL 3906786 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2010) (unpublished), is entirely misplaced. In Cottrell,
the defendant violated the ADA by failing to provide for
the availability handicapped parking on its premises. Id.
at *5 . Dispositive in Cottrell was the fact that the
defendant completely and routinely failed to keep
unauthorized vehicles from parking in the handicapped
designated spaces located in the parking lot, which was
owned by the defendant. Id. at *5. In other words, the
defendant in Cottrell was violating the ADA by effectively
failing to provide any of the handicapped parking spaces
required under the ADA. In this case, however, Defendant
ECA provides handicapped parking in the lot behind its
building. Even assuming Defendant EOA abrogated its
responsibility to enforce parking restrictions with respect
to the handicapped spaces on the street in front of its
20
office, Defendant EOA was not violating the ADA because the
spaces behind their office provided the access to
handicapped parking required under the ADA.
Moreover, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff
held an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant EOA,
or anyone else for that matter, was violating the ADA.
Again, it is patently clear that these spaces were located
along the street in front Defendant EOA's office.
Basically, Plaintiff argues that it was reasonable for her
to believe that Defendant EOA was violating the ADA by
failing to force an employee to move her vehicle from a
publically owned parking space despite the vehicle
displaying a valid handicapped parking placard. Or, that
Plaintiff reasonably thought that the employee was somehow
violating the ADA by improperly parking in a handicapped
parking space and it was Defendant EOA's responsibility to
have the employee move her vehicle. Both scenarios are
equally far-fetched and evidence the general lack of
reasonableness regarding Plaintiff's belief that Defendant
EOA's conduct violated the ADA.
Based on the lack of either any actual violation of
the ADA or an objectively reasonable belief held by
Plaintiff that Defendant EOA was violating the ADA,
Plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
21
Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
this claim. Because Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment, Plaintiff's request for summary judgment in her
favor with respect to her ADA retaliation claim must be
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants EOA, Finney, and
Tolbert's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED.
As a result, Plaintiff Parker's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 39) must be DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED this
•
irr
'day of March 2014.
WILLIAM T. MOORE, J
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
22
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