Armstrong v. Ocwen Mortgage Company et al

Filing 105

ORDER granting 83 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 9/14/15. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORU c
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

r

I

S E P I 5 ff5
EDNA ARMSTRONG, as Attorney in
Fact for Thomas Flood, and
THOMAS FLOOD,
)
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. CV413-010

V.

OCWEN MORTGAGE COMPANY; OCWEN
LOAN SERVICING, LLC; OCWEN
FINANCIAL CORP.; and THE
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORP.;
Defendants.
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 83), to which Plaintiffs have filed a response in
opposition (Doc. 91) . For the following reasons, Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment is (Doc. 83) is

GRANTED

and

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
BACKGROUND

This case arises from the foreclosure of Plaintiffs' home,
located at 522 West 45th Street, Savannah, Georgia (the
"Property"). '

1

(Doc. 32 ¶ 27.) Prior to the foreclosure sale,

For the purposes of ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1986).

Plaintiff Flood held all legal interest in the Property. (Id.
¶ 3.) Pursuant to a New York short-form power of attorney,
Plaintiff has handled most all matters regarding the Property,
including filing this action. Id. Plaintiff Armstrong has also
been the primary resident of the Property since 2003. (Doc. 91
at 2.)
On July 23, 2007, Plaintiff Flood purchased the Property
with the assistance of a mortgage from Taylor Bean & Whitaker
Mortgage Company. 2 (Doc. 32 91 33.) Later that year, Plaintiff
Armstrong became concerned by increased escrow account payments
in the monthly mortgage payments. (Doc. 91 at 4.) Pursuant to
the terms of the mortgage, the escrow payments were designated
to cover taxes and insurance on the Property. (Doc. 83, Attach.
2 ¶ 7.) While Plaintiff apparently did not understand it at the
time, the larger escrow payments were necessary to cover
additional City of Savannah and Chatham County property taxes
based on an increase in the Property's assessed value. (Doc. 91,
Attach. 1 ¶9 8-11.) Plaintiff Armstrong contacted TB&W to obtain
an accounting of the escrow funds, but never received one. (Doc.
91 at 4.)
In July of 2009, Defendants Ocwen Mortgage Company, Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC, and Ocwen Financial Corporation took over
service of Plaintiffs' mortgage loan. 3 (Doc. 91, Attach. 1 ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff Armstrong stated that she requested an accounting of
2

Taylor Bean & Whitaker, a former co-defendant, has been
voluntarily dismissed from this action. (Doc. 55 at 2.)
The Court will refer to these Defendants collectively as
"Defendant Ocwen."

the escrow funds from Defendant Ocwen as well, but none was ever
provided. (Doc. 91 at 4-5.) In November of 2009, however,
Defendant Ocwen sent Plaintiff Flood an "Annual Escrow Accout
Disclosure Statement Account History" that included a history of
the mortgage's escrow payments, the expenditures from the escrow
account, and projections for the upcoming year. (Doc. 83,
Attach. 2

IN

21-24.) Plaintiff Armstrong states that she never

saw these documents. (Doc. 91 at 5.)
Still concerned about the increased escrow payments,
Plaintiff Armstrong contacted Defendant Ocwen. Id. In response
to Plaintiffs' concerns, Defendant Ocwen told Plaintiff
Armstrong in a telephone conversation that the loan could be
considered for a modification—with potentially lower monthly
payments—if Plaintiffs let the loan fall into default. (Id. at
2.) There is no evidence suggesting that Plaintiffs were
interested in a loan modification at this time, however, and
Plaintiff Armstrong informed Defendant Ocwen that she would make
no further payments until she received an accounting of the
escrow fund. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs made their last mortgage
payment in February of 2010. (Id., Attach. 1 T 28.)
In September of 2011, roughly eighteen months after
Plaintiffs made their last loan payment and were already in
default, Defendant Ocwen sent Plaintiff Armstrong a loan
modification application package. (Id., Attach. 2 ¶ 38.) From
that point up until the Property was sold at foreclosure,
Plaintiff Armstrong spoke with Defendant Ocwen's representatives

3

in numerous telephone conversations and submitted multiple loan
modification applications. (Doc. 83, Attach. 2 ¶91 39-51.)
However, no such modification ever materialized. (Id., Attach. 2
¶ 55.)
Defendant

Ocwen's

records

indicate

that

Plaintiff

Armstrong's applications were all either incomplete or simply
denied. (Id., Attach. 2 ¶91 40-42, 47-50.) However, Plaintiff
Armstrong insists that she provided all the requested
documentation. (Id., Attach. 2 ¶9! 40-42, 47-50; Doc. 91, Attach.
1 ¶ 41, 46-50.) In response to the loan modification
applications, Defendant Ocwen sent letters to Plaintiffs
indicating that Plaintiffs would receive a non-approval notice
if the application was denied and have a thirty-day period
thereafter to cure any deficiencies. (Doc. 91 at 6.) The letters
also stated that "no foreclosure sale will be conducted and you
[Plaintiffs] will not lose your home" while either the
application was being considered or during the thirty-day review
period. Id.
Plaintiff Armstrong denies ever receiving a non-approval
notice for any of the loan modification applications, but did
receive a letter in mid-April stating that the Property would be
sold at foreclosure. (Doc. 84, Attach. 1 at 23.) Defendant
Ocwen's records indicate that notices of denial were sent to
Plaintiff Flood, but Plaintiff Armstrong denies ever seeing
these notices. (Doc. 83, Attach. 2 91 52; Doc. 91, Attach. 1
91 52.) Nevertheless, Defendant Ocwen informed Plaintiff

4

Armstrong over the telephone that the loan modifications had
been denied. (Doc. 84, Attach. 45-46.) Despite these
communications, however, Plaintiff never cured the default or
made any further mortgage payments and the Property sold at
foreclosure on June 5, 2012. (Doc. 91, Attach. 1

11 78.)

Defendant Ocwen then transferred the Property to Defendant
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ('FHMLC") pursuant to a special
warranty deed. (Id., Attach. 1 91 79.) Defendant FHMLC is the
current owner of the Property. (Id., Attach. 1 ¶ 80.)
To avoid dispossession after the foreclosure sale,
Plaintiffs filed the present action in the Superior Court of
Chatham County, Georgia, after which Defendants removed to this
Court pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f). (Doc. 1.) On January 23,
2013, this Court entered a consent order enjoining Defendants
from dispossessing Plaintiffs and requiring Plaintiffs to make
regular payments into the registry of the Court. (Doc. 6.) On
July 29, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 32.) On February 25, 2015, Defendants filed this Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 83.)
ANALYSIS

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

According to Federal

Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(a), '[a]

party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or
defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary
judgment is sought." Such a motion must be granted 'if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
5

fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Id. The "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 advisory committee notes)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant "fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) . The substantive law governing
the action determines whether an element is essential. DeLong
Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505
(11th Cir. 1989)
As the Supreme Court explained:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion and identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that
there is a genuine issue as to facts that are material to the
nonmovant's case. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604,
608 (11th Cir. 1991)

n
.

The Court must review the evidence and all reasonable
factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. However, the
nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. A
mere "scintilla" of evidence, or simply conclusory allegations,
will not suffice. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d
1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998) . Nevertheless, where a reasonable
fact finder may "draw more than one inference from the facts,
and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact,
then the Court should refuse to grant summary judgment."
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989)
II. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, CONVERSION,
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED, AND PETITION FOR ACCOUNTING
Defendants have moved for summary judgment with regard to
Plaintiffs' claims of conversion, money had and received, breach
of contract, as well as Plaintiffs' petition for an accounting
of the escrow funds. (Doc. 83, Attach. 1 at 13-16, 26-27.)
Plaintiffs offer no argument in opposition and appear to have
abandoned these claims. Regardless, the Court finds no genuine
issue of material fact exists to sustain any of these causes of
action and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

7

The claims for breach of contract, conversion, and money
had and received all rely upon Plaintiffs' allegations that
Defendants misappropriated funds contained within the escrow
account. (Doc. 32 at 18-21.) However, the record in this case is
devoid of any evidence suggesting that Defendants wrongfully
possessed, converted, or otherwise misused any escrow funds
belonging to Plaintiffs. Rather, it is readily apparent from the
record in this case that the escrow funds were legitimately used
to cover taxes and insurance on the Property. (Doc. 91, Attach.
1 191 8-11.) Furthermore, it appears that an accounting of the
escrow funds actually was provided to Plaintiff Flood, who
simply neglected to pass on the information to Plaintiff
Armstrong. (Doc. 91, Attach. 2 ¶ 22-24.) Accordingly, the Court
finds summary judgment in Defendants' favor to be appropriate
with regard to these claims.
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Defendants also move for summary judgment with regard to
Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim. (Doc. 83, Attach. 1 at
22-24.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not
detrimentally rely on any promise by Defendants, that any
purported reliance was objectively unreasonable, and that
Plaintiffs cannot show any damages as a result of their
reliance. Id. In response, Plaintiffs insist that their decision
to withhold mortgage payments was a reasonable and detrimental

i:i

reliance on Defendants' promise not to foreclose on the property
while Plaintiffs' loan modification was under consideration.
(Doc. 91 at 14-18.)
Georgia law states that

"[a] promise which the promisor

should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44 (a) . To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim under this
statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "(1) the defendant
made a promise or promises; (2) the defendant should have
reasonably expected the plaintiff[] to rely on such promise; (3)
the plaintiff[] relied on such promise to [his or her]
detriment; and (4) an injustice can only be avoided by the
enforcement of the promise, because as a result of the reliance,
plaintiff[] changed [his or her] position to [his or her]
detriment by surrendering, forgoing, or rendering a valuable
right." Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406,
412, 634 S.E.2d 162, 168 (2006) .
Here, Plaintiffs insist that their decision to withhold
mortgage payments was caused by reasonable and detrimental
reliance on a letter from Defendant Ocwen stating that no
foreclosure sale would take place until thirty days after
Plaintiffs received a non-approval notice for their loan

w
e

modification. (Doc. 91 at 14-15.) However, Plaintiffs admit that
they received the letter only after they had already let the
loan fall into default. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs actually
admit that they ceased making their monthly payments not because
they believed they were immune from foreclosure sale during this
grace period, but because of unfounded suspicions of Defendants'
misuse of escrow funds. (Id., Attach. 1 at 6.) Indeed, Plaintiff
Armstrong specifically told Defendants that she 'would not make
any more monthly mortgage payments until she received an
accounting of the escrow money." Id.
Quite simply, the Court finds that even if Defendant Ocwen
expressed a promise not to sell the Property at foreclosure,
Plaintiffs have failed to show any evidence to suggest that they
relied on this promise. Plaintiffs intentionally entered default
well before Defendant Ocwen made any representations regarding
selling the property at foreclosure, and Plaintiffs never
deviated from this course. Because there is no evidence to
suggest Plaintiffs reasonably relied on a promise by Defendants,
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact with regard to their promissory estoppel claim

.4

Even if the Court construed Plaintiffs' continued default as
reliance on Defendants' promise, Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel
claim would still fail. Plaintiffs received repeated
notifications—both in writing and verbally—that the property was
at risk of being sold at foreclosure. Defendant Armstrong even
admits to receiving a letter approximately six weeks in advance
10

Accordingly,

summary

judgment

in

Defendants'

favor

is

appropriate with regard to this claim.
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Defendants also move for summary judgment with regard to
Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim. (Doc. 83, Attach. 1 at 2224.) As with their promissory estoppel argument, Defendants
maintain that Plaintiffs have presented no evidence
demonstrating reasonable and detrimental reliance on a statement
by Defendants. Id. Plaintiffs meanwhile assert that they
defaulted on the loan pursuant to Defendant Ocwen's advice, thus
Defendants should be estopped from dispossessing Plaintiffs from
the Property. (Doc. 91 at 5, 18-19.)
Under Georgia law, equitable estoppel requires 'generally
[] some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the
party to be estopped, or such gross negligence as to amount to
constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his or
her injury." O.C.G.A. § 24-14-29. To establish an equitable
estoppel

claim,

a

plaintiff

must

show:

(1)

a

false

that the home would be sold at foreclosure. (Doc. 84, Attach. 1
at 23.)
Prior to that, Defendant Ocwen informed Plaintiff
Armstrong in a telephone conversation that all the loan
modification applications had been denied. (Id., Attach. 45.)
Plaintiffs are not entitled to blindly operate as if they are
immune from foreclosure in spite of such clear communications to
the contrary. while it is possible that Plaintiffs once
genuinely believed they could withhold their mortgage payments
without repercussions, they were certainly given fair and timely
notice of the risk inherent in their actions.

11

representation or concealment of facts; (2) knowledge of the
party making the false representation or concealment of facts;
(3) ignorance of the truth on behalf of the party affected
thereby; (4) intent or gross negligence amounting to
constructive fraud on behalf of the party seeking to influence
the conduct; and (5) action by the aggrieved party induced by
such conduct. Kim v. Park, 277 Ga. App. 295, 296, 626 S.E.2d
232, 233 (2006) As with a claim for promissory estoppel, the
party asserting a claim for equitable estoppel must show
reliance on the false representation as well as 'action based
thereon of such character as to change his [or her] position
prejudicially." Medders v. Smith, 245 Ga. App. 323, 324-25, 537
S.E.2d 153, 155 (2000).
Plaintiffs insist that they withheld their mortgage
payments because Defendant Ocwen's representative told them in a
telephone conversation that, to be eligible for a modification,
Plaintiffs would have to be in default on their loan. (Doc. 91
at 5.) However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have consistently
stated that their misguided fears about escrow funds were the
impetus for withholding the mortgage payments. Again, Plaintiff
Armstrong informed Defendant Ocwen directly that she would not
make her monthly mortgage payments until • her concerns regarding
the escrow funds were satisfied. (Id., Attach. 1 at 6.)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence that they

12

even pursued a loan modification until eighteen months after
they first went into default. (Doc. 83, Attach. 2 91 38.) As a
result, the Court finds no reasonable jury could conclude that
Plaintiffs changed or altered their position in response to
Defendant Ocwen's statement—it is obvious that such is not the
case. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on this issue.
Even if the court were to construe Plaintiffs' default as
partially reliant or somehow encouraged by Defendant Ocwen's
statement concerning loan modification eligibility, Plaintiffs'
equitable estoppel claim would still fail. As stated above, the
statement giving rise to an equitable estoppel claim must amount
"to a false representation or concealment of facts." Nedders,
245 Ga. App. at 324, 537 S.E.2d at 155. Here, Defendants'
statement that Plaintiffs would need to default to be considered
for a loan modification is not false or otherwise misleading. In
fact, the evidentiary record demonstrates that Plaintiffs were
considered for a loan modification, and that the parties
communicated frequently with regard to Plaintiffs' modification
applications. (Doc. 91, Attach. 1 191 53-64.) The fact that
Plaintiffs never obtained a loan modification is not evidence of
fraud or gross negligence on the part of Defendant Ocwen. By
truthfully informing Plaintiffs that a loan modification might
be possible once the loan was in default, Defendant Ocwen did

13

not convey a promise or guarantee that Plaintiffs were entitled
to such.
Furthermore, Defendant Ocwen informed Plaintiffs of the
numerous risks of default, and gave Plaintiffs timely notice of
the Property's imminent foreclosure sale. (Doc. 84, Attach. 1 at
23.) Quite simply, Plaintiffs can point to nothing in the record
to suggest Defendants' statement was false, misleading, grossly
negligent, or concealed an important fact. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have failed to present a genuine issue of material
fact to sustain their equitable estoppel claim and Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment.
V.

WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE
The Court now turns to Plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure

claim. As with Plaintiffs' promissory and equitable estoppel
claims, Plaintiffs insist the foreclosure sale was wrongfully
undertaken because Defendants previously advised Plaintiffs they
might obtain a loan modification if they defaulted, and because
Plaintiffs were not given proper notice before the property was
sold at foreclosure. (Doc. 91 at 14.) As with Plaintiffs'
aforementioned claims, however, the Court finds these arguments
unavailing.
Under Georgia law, a debtor bringing a claim for wrongful
foreclosure must show (1) a legal duty owed to it by the
foreclosing party; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal

14

connection between the breach and the injury sustained; and (4)
damages. See Heritage Creek 0ev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank, 268 Ga.
App. 369, 371, 601 S.E.2d 842, 844 (2004). In general, the mere
fact that a debtor is in default does not alone completely bar a
wrongful foreclosure action, or the possibility to set aside a
foreclosure, because it is at least plausible that a defaulting
debtor could still show the above elements. Brown v. Freedman,
222 Ga. App. 213, 215, 474 S.E.2d 73, 76, (1996) . However, these
claims will fail if the facts show that a plaintiff went into
default through no fault of the defendants. See Heritage Creek,
268 Ga. App. at 371-72, 601 S.E.2d at 845. Quite simply,
'[w}hen a power of sale [in a security deed] is exercised all
that is required of the foreclosing party is to advertise and
sell the property according to the terms of the instrument, and
that the sale be conducted in good faith.' " Ceasar v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 322 Ga. App. 529, 532, 744 S.E.2d 369, 373
(2013) (quoting Kennedy v. Gwinnett Commercial Bank, 155 Ga.
App. 327, 330, 270 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1980)
The Court again notes that Plaintiffs admit they
intentionally defaulted on their mortgage obligations due to
suspected misuse of escrow funds by Defendants. (Doc. 91 at 5.)
Because the record is clear that no misuse of the escrow funds
ever took place, the Court finds no wrongdoing on Defendants'
behalf as to this issue. To the extent that Plaintiffs could

15

have been motivated to default by Defendants' statements
regarding the loan modification, Plaintiffs again fail to
establish how such statements created a duty not to foreclose on
the property. At most, Defendants truthfully informed Plaintiffs
that a loan modification may be available if Plaintiffs were in
default. Plaintiffs were repeatedly advised of the risks
associated with this course of action, yet still abstained from
making payments by their own volition. because this was a purely
intentional decision based on Plaintiffs' independent
misunderstanding of the facts, the Court can discern no reason
to hold that Defendants had a duty to abstain from selling the
property at foreclosure.
Again, Plaintiffs nevertheless attempt to complicate the
issue by insisting that the sale was "in bad faith" because
Defendant Ocwen promised not to proceed with the sale while
Plaintiffs' loan modification was under consideration. (Doc. 91
at 20.) As previously discussed, however, this gratuitous
promise did not create a separate duty for Defendant Ocwen to
refrain from selling the property at foreclosure because
Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence indicating they
actually relied on it when choosing to default on the loan.
Without evidence that Defendants breached some duty, Plaintiffs'
claim for wrongful foreclosure fails as a matter of law.

10

Furthermore, the "good faith" element of a foreclosure sale
is simply immaterial to the facts of this case. A foreclosing
party is required only to conduct the sale in good faith "to
obtain the amount produced by such a sale." Gordon v. S. Cent.
Farm Credit, ACA, 213 Ga. App. 816, 818, 446 S.E.2d 514, 516
(1994) . That is, the good faith requirement focuses on the
manner in which the sale was conducted—ensuring that the
property was sold fairly on the open market—and not on whether
the foreclosure itself was wrongful. As such,

"[a] foreclosure

sale may only be set aside in equity when 'the price realized is
grossly inadequate and the sale is accompanied by either fraud,
mistake, misapprehension, surprise or other circumstances which
might authorize a finding that such circumstances contributed to
bringing about the inadequacy of price.' ' Ceasar, 322 Ga. App.
at 533, 744 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting Kennedy, 155 Ga. App. at 330,
270 S.E.2d at 871) . Plaintiffs do not allege that the home was
sold in violation of any terms of the security deed or that the
manner in which the property sold was fundamentally unfair.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue
of material fact to sustain their wrongful foreclosure claim,
and Defendants' request for summary judgment should be granted.

17

VII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF, ATTORNEY'S
FEES, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Plaintiffs have sought various equitable remedies and
statutory damages in addition to their claims of promissory
estoppel, equitable estoppel, and wrongful foreclosure.
Specifically, Plaintiffs petition for a writ of possession and
to set aside the foreclosure, a declaratory judgment regarding
their rights to possession of the property, and attorney's fees
and punitive damages. (Doc. 32 at 29-34.) However, each of these
claims is contingent upon one of Plaintiffs' underlying claims
establishing a right to possession of the property. Because the
Court finds that none of these underlying claims survive summary
judgment, each of these contingent claims must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 83) is

GRANTED

and Plaintiffs' claims against

Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED this

J

day of September 2015.

WILLIAM T. MOORE, J
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA