Harrell v. Harris et al

Filing 6

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS recommends that the complaint be dismissed re 1 Complaint filed by Julius Harrell. Objections to R&R due by 9/11/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 8/28/14. (bcw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JULIUS HARRELL,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

Case No. CV413-096

V.

SERGEANT HARRIS, CO II
BADE, DEPUTY WARDEN
SINKFORD, DR. WEILEMAN,
DR. MOORMAN, DR. AWE, and
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Julius Harrell, a prisoner confined at Coastal State Prison, has filed
a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his
confinement. As he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
screen his complaint to determine whether it states a claim for relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Even
giving plaintiffs complaint a liberal construction, Boxer X v. Harris, 437
F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), it fails to allege sufficient facts to set

forth an Eighth Amendment claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Plaintiff alleges that while he was being transported in a van from
Jackson State Prison to Coastal State Prison on December 29, 2011, the
van flipped over after its driver, defendant Harris, fell asleep at the wheel.
Doe. 1 at 10. He contends that prior to the accident he kept chastising
Harris for his obvious drowsiness, but that neither Harris nor defendant
Bade, another correctional officer in the van, paid him any attention. Id.
Following the accident, plaintiff was taken to the Medical Center of
Central Georgia, where he was given a neck brace and some Motrin. Id. at
11. He was evidently placed back on a prison transport, but before he
arrived at Coastal State Prison, defendant Bade allegedly confiscated his
neck brace and refused to give it back. Id. Plaintiff further contends that
although he had a 13-day prescription for Motrin, he only received this
medication "for approximately six (6) days." Id. He submitted a Health
Request form for Motrin on January 7, 2012 (nine days after the
accident), but the request was denied on January 10 by "J. Moore" (who is
not a named defendant). Id. The next day, he mentioned his request for

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medical care to Deputy Warden Sinkford, who indicated that someone
would come to speak with him about the matter. Id. at 12. On January
18, he informed the prison psychologist, Dr. Weileman, that he was
"seeing the van wreck in his sleep." Id.
On January 26, 2012, plaintiff saw Dr. Awe, who prescribed muscle
relaxers for his sore neck. On February 16, he informed Dr. Moorman
that he was still having "some problem" when he turned his neck. Dr.
Moorman simply said that his "muscle was [too] soft." Id. at 13.
Plaintiff sues defendants Harris and Bade for endangering his life by
failing to stay awake while operating the prison van. He asserts that this
conduct constituted "deliberate indifference and attempt[ed] murder" in
violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Id. at 14. He
claims that defendant Bade also acted with deliberate indifference to his
medical needs by confiscating his neck brace. He sues Deputy Warden
Sinkford for violating his federal and state constitutional rights by failing
to ensure that he received proper medical care. Id. at 15. He claims that
defendant Weileman violated the Georgia constitution and state law when
she indicated that there was "nothing she could do" about the medical

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department's failure to provide him with additional treatment, and for
ignoring his report of vivid dreams about the accident. He makes no
reference to either Dr. Moorman or Dr. Awe in the "causes of action"
section of his complaint. Id. at 14-15. Nor does he endeavor to state any
cause of action against the Georgia Department of Corrections.
Harrell cannot obtain relief under § 1983 against correctional
officers Harris and Bade for their alleged negligence in causing an
automobile accident while transporting him in the prison van. The
Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from "cruel and unusual
punishments," but it requires conduct by a prison official that is "more
blameworthy than negligence." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (a prison official's
negligence in failing to protect an inmate from harm does not give rise to a
cause of action under § 1983). Negligence law permits recovery against a
defendant whose conduct, viewed objectively, failed to protect plaintiff
from a recognizable risk of harm that the defendant should have
appreciated, even if he did not. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Negligence law
does not require that the defendant have any particular state of mind.

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William L. Prosser, Law of Torts H 31-32 (4th ed. 1971) (negligence law
demands that an actor conform his conduct to an "external objective
standard," § 32, and imposes no state-of-mind requirement, § 31). But
because "only inflictions of punishment" are prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841, a prison official faces liability under
§ 1983 only where he has the requisite mental state of "deliberate
indifference," which the Supreme Court has defined in terms of the
"subjective recklessness" standard used in the criminal law: the official
must be actually aware of the risk to which the inmate is exposed and he
must consciously disregard that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-40.
It is true that Harrell has alleged more than ordinary negligence
here, for he claims that after he noticed defendant Harris falling asleep at
the wheel, he alerted both correctional officers of his concerns. Harrell
has thus stated a plausible claim of "gross negligence" or civil-law
recklessness. These aggravated forms of negligence -- which permit
recovery where a prison official fails to protect an inmate from "an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or is so obvious that it
should be known" -- are subject to the same objective reasonable-man

standard as ordinary negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836; Prosser, § 34.
Harrell has advanced no facts to suggest that defendants intended any
form of punishment, or that they knew he would be harmed and
consciously disregarded the risk. Obviously, Officers Harris and Bade
were occupants of the van they were operating and therefore were exposed
to the same danger as the prisoners they were transporting. There is no
allegation that those defendants consciously desired to harm themselves
or were criminally reckless as to their own safety. Harrell's allegations,
therefore, do not meet the demanding standard of criminal law
recklessness -- that defendants not only were "aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exist[ed]," but that they also subjectively "dr[ew] the inference." Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added). Harrell alleges that these officers fell
below the objective standard of conduct required of a reasonable man
while operating a vehicle. That is a classic common-law tort claim, but it
falls short of the deliberate-indifference standard required to recover for
"cruel and unusual punishments" under the Eighth Amendment.

N
.

Harrell next seeks to recover against Correctional Officer Bade,
Deputy Warden Sinkford, and Dr. Weileman for an alleged deprivation of
necessary medical care.' To state a constitutional claim based upon a
failure to provide adequate medical care, a prisoner must establish that a
prison official exhibited "deliberate indifference" to his "serious medical
needs," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), and show that the
defendant's conduct caused the harm of which he complains. Goebert v.

Lee County, 570 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). A medical need is
serious where the denial of treatment would result in the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
While Harrell was taken to an emergency room following the
accident, he has not alleged any particular diagnosis by a physician. Nor
has he suggested that he had any serious injury or was ever in severe pain.
After receiving some Motrin and a neck brace, he was released and placed
back on a non-medical transport to the Coastal State Prison in Savannah.
Plaintiff alleges that during this transport defendant Bade confiscated the
neck brace that he had received during his visit to the emergency room.
'Again, while Harrell also names Dr. Moorman, Dr. Awe, and the Georgia Department
of Corrections as defendants, he never states a cause of action against any of these
defendants. Doc. 1 at 14-15.
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The law provides, of course, that a correctional officer may be liable for
interfering with prescribed medical treatment.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at

104-05. But Harrell never alleges that the emergency room personnel told
him that a neck brace was essential for his care. Nor does he assert that
the deprivation of the brace increased his pain, hampered his recovery, or
caused him any permanent damage. Indeed, there is no allegation that he
ever sought the return of the neck brace once he arrived at Coastal State
Prison. Harrell, therefore, has stated no facts suggesting that defendant
Bade's actions posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future
health. Motorists involved in traffic accidents frequently sustain minor
soft tissue injuries that cause immediate discomfort but that, given time,
heal of their own accord. Such injuries, like a sprained ankle or a pulled
muscle, are commonplace occurrences that often fail to pose a serious
health problem worthy of constitutional significance. See, e.g., Dotson v.
Corr'l Med. Seru., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (ankle
sprain did not rise to the level of a serious medical need) (citing numerous
cases), aff'd on other grounds, 385 F. App'x 468 (6th Cir. 2010). While
Harrell may have sustained some minor injury, he never sets forth an

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objectively serious medical need, which is an essential element of an
Eighth Amendment claim.
His claim against Dr. Weileman, the prison psychologist, also fails.
He alleges that he told her "about seeing the van wreck in his sleep," doc.
1 at 12, 15, but he never alleges either that he suffered from any serious
psychological disorder or that she misdiagnosed or mistreated him in any
way. He further claims that after he told her about "his not being able to
get the Medical Department" to take some unspecified action, she stated
that there was nothing "she could do about that." Id. at 15. He has not
alleged that her statement was untrue, much less that she was
subjectively aware that the medical department was actually denying him
proper medical care. Harrell has stated no plausible § 1983 claim against
this defendant.
Finally, Harrell has not set forth any facts establishing that Deputy
Warden Sinkford violated his Eighth Amendment right to humane
conditions of confinement. Harrell states only that he spoke with
Sinkford regarding his request for additional care and that Sinkford
informed him that "someone" would come speak to him. He never alleges

-I,,

that Sinkford failed to honor that promise or that Sinkford knew for a fact
that the medical staff was failing to provide proper treatment. Even
assuming that he had a serious medical need, Harrell has not made out a
claim of deliberate indifference by this official.
As Harrell has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against
any of the named defendants, his complaint should be DISMISSED.
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED this jay of August,
2014.
UNITE I1 S ATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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