T.P. v. Bryan County School District

Filing 11

ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/24/2014. (loh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

T.P., by and through his
parents T.P. and B.P.; T.P.;
and B.P.;
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. CV413-107

)

V.

BRYAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
N)

Defendant.

-4......

)
E
>
ORDER
1

Before the Court is Defendant Bryan County School
District's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 5.) For the following
reasons, Defendant's motion
complaint is DISMISSED.

is GRANTED

and Plaintiffs'

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

close this case.
BACKGROUND

I.

FRAMEWORK OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT
This case questions whether the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 ("IDEA"), 20
U.S.C. §5 1400-1482, imposes a two year statute of
limitations for families to request an independent
educational evaluation ("lEE") in response to a school
district's assessment. As the successor to the Education
of the Handicapped Act, the IDEA represents the federal

government's interest in promoting the education of
handicapped children. See M.M. ex rel C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of
Miami—Dade Cnty., 437 F.3d 1085, 1094 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). The IDEA seeks "to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and
prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living," 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A), and "to
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and
parents of such children are protected," Id.
§ 1400(d) (1) (B). Therefore, to safeguard that disabled
students receive free and appropriate public education the
IDEA guarantees the right to an individualized education
program ("IEP"). See id. § 1414(d).
The public agency responsible for educating the
disabled student formulates and develops an TEP during
meetings between school officials and parents. Id.
§ 1414 (d) (1). Following an initial evaluation, the student
is reevaluated every three years, unless the parent and the
school agree that the reevaluation would be unnecessary.
34 C.F.R. § 300.303. Should a parent disagree with the
school's assessment, the parent may request that the school
provide an lEE at public expense. Id. § 300.502. When

2

such a request is made, a school must elect to defend its
evaluation or provide the lEE. Id. § 300.502(b) (2).
Should the school fail to provide an TEE, the parent
may request a due process hearing in front of an impartial
Administrative Law Judge ("AU") and seek to force the
school to conduct an lEE. Id. § 300.507. However,
[t) he due process complaint must allege a
violation that occurred not more than two years
before the date the parent or public agency knew
or should have known about the alleged action
that forms the basis of the due process
complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time
limitation for filing a due process complaint
under this part, in the time allowed by that
State law .
Id.

§ 300.507 (a) (2);

accord 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(b) (6) (B).

Following a decision by the AU, the aggrieved party may
appeal that decision to federal court. Id. § 1415(i) (2).
When ruling on an appeal, the district court conducts a de
novo review, but has discretion to defer to the AL's
findings of fact. See CP v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Bd. Fla., 483
F.3d 1151, 1156 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007)
II. FACTUAL BACKGROtJND
Plaintiff T.P. is a disabled child who attends school
in Defendant Bryan County School District and is covered
under the IDEA.' (Doc. 1 ¶ 4.) In September 2010,

Unless otherwise noted, the Court is using the facts as
found by the AU. See CP, 483 F.3d at 1156 n.4. However,
3

Defendant conducted psychological, occupational, physical,
speech, and language evaluations of Plaintiff T. P.
Attach. 2 at 1.)

(Id.,

On September 30, 2010, these findings

were presented to Plaintiff T.P.'s parents ("Plaintiff
Parents") along with an IEP. (Id. at 1-2.) Neither of
Plaintiff Parents expressed any disagreement with
Defendant's IEP. (Id. at 2.)
On September 21, 2011, Defendant held an annual review
of Plaintiff T.P.'s IEP. (Id.) Plaintiff T.P.'s father
attended the meeting and did not offer any disagreement
with the IEP. (Id.) On September 19, 2012, Defendant held
a second annual review of the IEP. Both Plaintiff Parents
attended this meeting, neither raising any objections to
Defendant's conclusions. Plaintiff T. P. 's mother indicated
in writing that no additional data was required to
determine (1) "[p]resent levels of performance and
educational needs of the student (e.g. transition and
postsecondary planning);" (2) "[w)hether the student
continues to need special education and related services;"
and (3) "whether any additions or modifications to the
special education and related services are needed to meet

the facts are not in dispute in this case, which presents
only a question of law.
4

IEP goals and participate, as appropriate, in the general
curriculum." (Id. at 2-3.)
On November 5, 2012, Plaintiff Parents met with
Defendant's Director of Special Education—Dr. Laura Murphy—
to add additional goals and objectives to the IEP. (Id. at
3.) It was at this meeting that Plaintiff Parents
expressed dissatisfaction with Defendant's assessment and
IEP, voicing their desire to have Plaintiff T.P. privately
evaluated. (Id.) On November 7, 2012, Plaintiff Parents
emailed Defendant, stating that they considered the
evaluation improper and requesting Defendant arrange
payment for an lEE.

(Id.)

On November 20, 2012, Dr. Murphy sent an email
response to Plaintiff Parents stating that Defendant was
considering their request. (Id. at 3-4.) Dr. Murphy
asked, in light of their lack of concern over the last two
years, which portions of the IEP Plaintiff Parents found
objectionable. (Id. at 4.) In addition, Dr. Murphy
requested that Plaintiff Parents consent to evaluations
conducted by Defendant prior to pursuing any lEE at public
expense. (Id.)
Plaintiff Parents did not respond to Dr. Murphy's
email. Instead, they contacted Defendant's Chairman of the
Board—Eddie Warren—and requested that Defendant provide an

5

lEE

at public expense.

(]:d.) On December 3, 2012,

Defendant's Superintendent—Dr. Paul Brooksher—responded to
Plaintiff Parents' letter, asking that they work with Dr.
Murphy and explaining that Defendant's first response to
lEE

requests is to suggest that Defendant conduct a

reevaluation of the student. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff
Parents emailed Mr. Warren, alleging that Defendant was
violating state and federal law by ignoring their requests.
On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff Parents again contacted Mr.
Warren and inquired whether Defendant would comply with
state and federal law.
Additional email exchanges occurred with Plaintiff
Parents insisting that they had a right to an lEE at public
expense, were not required to supply a reasoning for their
request, and that they would only agree to Defendant's
reevaluation after Defendant provided an lEE.

(Id. at 5.)

In a December 7, 2012 letter from Dr. Murphy, Defendant
denied Plaintiff Parents' request, stating that the
applicable two-year statute of limitations had run on their
right to request an lEE based on the September 2010
assessment. (Id.) Dr. Murphy also stated that Defendant
would treat Plaintiff Parents' time-barred

lEE

request as

seeking reevaluation of Plaintiff T.P. (Id.) The letter
set a meeting to discuss the reevaluation for December 14,

N
.

2012 and notified Plaintiff Parents that they may seek an
lEE if dissatisfied with the results of the reevaluation.
(Id.)

Plaintiff Parents did not attend the December 14,

2012 meeting.

(Id. at 6.) In addition, Plaintiff Parents

failed to respond to Dr. Murphy's request that Defendant be
permitted to conduct its reevaluation of Plaintiff T.P.
(Id.)
On December 21, 2012, Defendant requested a due
process hearing in front of an AU. (Doc. 1 ¶ 51.) In
their request, Defendant argued that Plaintiff Parents'
request for an lEE was untimely. (Id.) On January 14,
2013, Plaintiff Parents requested their own due process
hearing. (Id. ¶ 52.) In their request, Plaintiff Parents
maintained that Defendant had wrongfully failed to provide
Plaintiff T.P. with an lEE at public expense. (Id.) On
January 25, 2013, the ALL7 granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary Determination, concluding that Plaintiff Parents'
lEE requests were barred by the two year statute of
limitations found in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (6) (B) and 34
C.F.R. 300.507(a) (2) . In response, Plaintiffs filed with
this court a complaint (Doc. 1) seeking an appeal of the
AL's decision, to which Defendant has filed this present
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5).

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ANALYSIS

Despite the consideration of matters outside the
complaint, such as the administrative record below,
Plaintiffs' complaint is reviewed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) (6). See Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty.,
Fla. v. L.H. ex rel D.H., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1287-88
(M.D. Fla. 2009). Under this standard, Plaintiff must
provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 (a) (2). "[T] he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does
not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands
more than an unadorned, the -defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twonthly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007))

.2

"A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions'

or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked
assertion [s] devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'

2

Iqbal makes clear that Twombly has been the controlling
standard on the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 in all cases since it was decided. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 684 ("Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of
a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based
on our interpretation and application of Rule 8 . .
[that] in turn governs the pleading standard in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in

original).
In their complaint, Plaintiffs claim that the AU
erroneously applied a two-year statute of limitations when
dismissing their claim that Defendant improperly denied
Plaintiff T.P. an lEE. (Doc. 1 ¶ 55.) The IDEA bars a
party from bringing a due process complaint for violations
that occurred more than two years after "the date the
parent or agency knew or should have known about the
alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or,
if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting
such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the
State law allows."

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (6) (B); accord 34

C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2).

The corresponding section of the

Code of Federal Regulations recognizes that the failure to
provide an lEE is an action that may be remedied by filing
a due process complaint. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507; see 34
C.F.R. § 503(a).
A simple, plain-language interpretation of these
provisions quickly leads the Court to conclude that
Plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the two-year statute of
limitations contained in § 1415 (b) (6) (B) . It is the
September 2010 evaluations that form the basis for
Plaintiff's lEE request. The earliest Plaintiff Parents

expressed any dissatisfaction with those evaluations was
November 5, 2012, approximately two months past the twoyear window. In addition, Plaintiffs do not argue that
sometime later than September 2010 is when they 'knew or
should have known" about the alleged deficiency of
Defendant's evaluations. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (6) (B). Based
on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs' November 5, 2012 complaint is untimely with
respect to requesting an lEE based on Defendant's September
2010 evaluations of Plaintiff T.P. As a result,
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED

and Plaintiffs'

complaint is DISMISSED.
In an attempted end-around, Plaintiffs contend that a
two-year limitations period violates 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.502(e), which prohibits a public agency from
"impos[ing] conditions or timelines related to obtaining an
independent educational evaluation at public expense."
They conclude that

"[t]he applicable federal regulation

directly prohibits

[Defendant] from imposing timelines

related to obtaining an lEE's [sic] ."
(triple emphasis in original).)

(Doc. 7 at 13

This highly questionable

and strained interpretation lacks merit. Again, a plainlanguage interpretation of this regulation indicates that
it, at most, prohibits a public agency from imposing

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timelines on obtaining an lEE.

Contrary to Plaintiffs'

characterization, § 1415(b) (6) (B) is not a limitation
imposed by a public agency, but rather a jurisdictional
limitation imposed by Congress on a party's right to seek
redress for actions greater than two years old.
Defendant's decision to enforce the applicable statute of
limitations does not operate as an agency imposed
limitation and, therefore, is not prohibited by the
§ 300.502(e). 3
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the actual
wrongdoing for which they seek relief is Defendant's denial
of their lEE request. (Doc. 7 at 13-17.) Plaintiffs'
reason that their right to

seek due process is not even

ripe until the denial of their lEE request, permitting them
to request a due process hearing for two years past that
date. (Id.) Plaintiffs' verbal shell-game, however, does
not serve to vindicate their position. It is Plaintiffs'
disagreement with Defendant's September 2010 assessment,
not Defendant's denial of an lEE, that forms the basis of
Plaintiffs' complaint. In that regard, Plaintiffs' request
for an lEE is their remedy, the denial of which is not an

Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs could not direct the Court to
a single decision supporting their interpretation. Indeed,
the Court's search for such authority proved equally
unfruitful.
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independent violation that resets the two-year statute of
limitations imposed by Congress. Plaintiffs' theory would
render the statute of limitations meaningless because a
party may just file suit whenever a school district denies
a request for an lEE, regardless of when the conduct that
formed the basis for the lEE request actually occurred .4
This system would permit endless litigation and completely
subvert the language and purpose of the statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Bryan County
School District's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED and
Plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED.

The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to close this case.
J1-

SO ORDERED this

2',--

day of March 2014.

WILLIAM T. MOORE, K
UNITED STATES DIST ~T COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

For example, even the denial of a second request for an
lEE, the denial of which in the first instance was upheld,
would reset the two-year clock and permit a party to
litigate its merits yet again.
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