Lonon v. Globus Medical, Inc.
Filing
39
ORDER denying 34 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with Prejudice. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/25/2016. (loh)
LI
FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SAVA1j4fl DIV.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
20I6tR25 AHII:55
CL
SO, DIS
ANTHONY LONON,
Plaintiff,
V
CASE NO. CV413-115
.
GLOBUS MEDICAL, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Globus Medical, Inc.'s Motion
to Dismiss. (Doc. 34.) For the following reasons, Defendant's
motion is DENIED. This case will proceed to discovery.
BACKGROUND
This case involves pedicle screws that Plaintiff claims
were defectively designed and manufactured. ' On April 22, 2009,
Plaintiff had pedicle screws implanted into his spine as part of
a surgical procedure. (Doc. 33 ¶I 7, 10.) Defendant designed and
manufactured the pedicle screws used in Plaintiff's surgery.
(Id. ¶ 8.) In June 2011, Plaintiff began experiencing pain and
tightness in his back. (Id. ¶ 11.) After a July 28, 2011 visit
to his doctor, Plaintiff learned that the heads of two screws
1
For the purposes of ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
the Court views the complaint in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff and accepts as true all of Plaintiff's well-pled
facts. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Marinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057
(11th Cir. 2007)
implanted in his back had fractured. (Id. ¶i 13, 15.) On
November 11, 2011, Plaintiff underwent surgery to remove and
replace the fractured screws. (Id. ¶ 16.) However, the surgeon
was unable to remove one of the fractured screws due to the risk
of damaging Plaintiff's vertebrae. (Id. ¶ 17.) As a result,
Plaintiff suffers from chronic back pain, rendering him
disabled. (Id. ¶I 18-19.)
On March 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed suit in the State Court
of Chatham County. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1.) Defendant timely removed the
complaint to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, based on
the diversity of the parties. (Id.) In his second amended
complaint, 2 Plaintiff brings one claim each for negligent design
(Doc. 33 ¶I 20-25), negligent manufacturing (id. ¶I 26-31), and
strict liability (id. ¶t 32-38)
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that "the
proximate cause of his injuries was a defect that existed in the
pedicle screws at issue at the time they were sold." (Doc. 34 at
4.) Also, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's complaint fails
to adequately plead that any alleged defect proximately caused
his injuries. (Id. at 7.) In response, Plaintiff contends that
he sufficiently alleged that the screws were defective and that
2
The Court dismissed Plaintiff's two previous complaints and
both times provided him with the opportunity to amend. (Doc. 17;
Doc. 32.)
the defect caused his injury. (Doc. 35 at 6.) According to
Plaintiff, "the Second Amended Complaint makes sufficient
allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of Defendant's negligence." (Id.)
ANALYSIS
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2) requires a
complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "[T]he pleading
standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual
allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 3 "A pleading that offers 'labels and
conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.' " Id. (quoting Twornbly, 550 U.S.
at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked
assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).
Iqbal makes clear that Twombly has been the controlling
standard on the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 in all cases since it was decided. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 684 ("Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a
complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our
interpretation and application of Rule 8 . . . [that] in turn
governs the pleading standard in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
3
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). For a claim to have facial
plausibility, the plaintiff must plead factual content that
'allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' " Sinaltrainal
v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Plausibility does not require
probability, "but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent
with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.) Additionally,
a complaint is sufficient only if it gives " 'fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' "
Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
When the Court considers a motion to dismiss, it accepts
the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Sinaltrainal,
578 F.3d 1252 at 1260. However, this Court is "not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, "unwarranted
deductions of fact in a complaint are not admitted as true for
4
S
the purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiff's
allegations." Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268. That is, "[t]he
rule 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage,' but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
the necessary element." Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d
1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
545)
II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant raises two arguments
concerning the sufficiency of Plaintiff's complaint. First,
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to allege that a defect
existed in the pedicle screws at the time they were sold. (Doc.
34 at 4-7.) Second, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's complaint
does not provide sufficient factual allegations demonstrating
that the alleged defect proximately caused his injuries. (Id. at
7.)
To state a negligence claim under Georgia law, Plaintiff
must plead facts sufficient to establish (1) the existence of a
duty; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) damages; and (4) that those
damages were causally connected to the breach. Berry v.
Hamilton, 246 Ga. App. 608, 608-09, 541 S.E.2d 428, 429-30
(2000) (citing Tuggle v. Helms, 231 Ga. App. 899, 901, 499
S.E.2d 365, 367 (1998)). For a claim based on strict liability,
a
Plaintiff must allege that "the property when sold by the
manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the
use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause
of the injury sustained." O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) (1). Required for
both claims is an allegation that the product was defective and
that the defect caused Plaintiff's injuries.
While still not an example of quality craftsmanship,
Plaintiff's second amendment complaint sufficiently alleges
those facts that Defendant argues are lacking. With respect to
the negligence claims, Plaintiff alleges that the screws "were
defective by design in that they fractured after being implanted
in Plaintiff's body and caused Plaintiff injury well within the
expected life span of the pedicle screws." (Doc. 33 1 24; accord
id. ¶ 30 (using same language to allege screws were "defective
by manufacture") .) Similarly, Plaintiff's allegation with
respect to his strict liability 4 claim state that the screws were
"defective, unreasonably dangerous, not merchantable, and not
reasonably suited for their intended use at the time the pedicle
screws left the control of the Defendant, as they fractured and
caused Plaintiff [injury] within only twenty-seven (27) months
after their installation." (Id. ¶ 35.) Given a fair reading,
' The Court understands Plaintiff to be alleging strict liability
claims based on defective design and manufacture. In the future,
Plaintiff would be wise to name these counts separately instead
of lumping two distinct theories of relief into one count.
C
these statements allege that the screws implanted in Plaintiff,
which were designed and manufactured by Defendant, were
defective in that they failed to perform as intended or designed
by prematurely fracturing. Therefore, the Court rejects
Defendant's argument that Plaintiff failed to allege that a
defect existed in the pedicle screws at the time they were sold.
Turning to causation, Plaintiff alleged that he "continues
to suffer from chronic pain including soreness, stiffness, and
tightness in his back as a proximate result of said fracturing
screws." (Id. ¶ 18.) Furthermore, the complaint states that
Plaintiff was required to undergo surgery to remove the screws
and that part of one screw could not be safely removed. (Id.
11 16-17.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that he "suffered injuries
to his spine from the fractured pedicle screws." (Id. II 25;
accord id. ¶ 31.) Reviewing these statements, it is clear that
Plaintiff is alleging that the defective pedicle screws were the
cause of his injuries. Therefore, Plaintiff has pled facts
sufficient to establish causation.
In its motion, it appears Defendant seeks a high degree of
factual specificity that is simply not required at this stage.
There were a myriad of issues with Plaintiff's prior complaints.
When dismissing the first complaint, however, the Court noted
that the complaint's "deficiencies should not be difficult to
correct." (Doc. 17 at 7.) Plaintiff may have tested this Court's
7
faith at times, but his second amended complaint provides
Defendant with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a) (2). Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be
DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 34) is DENIED. This case will proceed to discovery.
SO ORDERED this 2f-ia y of March 2016.
WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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