Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. v. The Hinesville Group, LLC

Filing 39

ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing as Moot 12 Motion to Stay; dismissing as Moot 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/26/2014. (loh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

)

THE HINESVILLE GROUP, LLC,

)

Defendant.

)

CASE NO. CV413-148

-

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(Doc 12), to which Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc.
17) . For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is
GRANTED.

Accordingly, all pending motions in this case are

DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close
this case.
BACKGROUND
On August 28, 2006, Plaintiff entered into a lease
agreement with Defendant to rent certain retail space
located in a shopping center owned by Defendant.' (Doc. 1
¶ 6.) The lease contained a "Co-Tenancy" provision by
which Plaintiff would be permitted to pay a reduced amount
of rent if another Tenant, in this case, Bealls, vacated

For the purposes of Defendant's motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff's allegations, as set forth in its amended
complaint, will be taken as true. See Sinaltrainal v.
Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).

its leased premises or ceased operations at the shopping
center. This reduction in rent would remain in place until
a similar tenant took

its

place. (Id. ¶J 7-10.) In

December 2011, Bealls vacated its leased premises at the
shopping center. (Id. ¶ 12.) Consequently, Plaintiff
began paying the reduced rent agreed upon in the lease.
(Id.

1

13.)

On May

10, 2012,

Defendant sent correspondence to

Plaintiff claiming it had cured the Co-Tenancy provision as
of November 1, 2012 and that Plaintiff was required to pay
full rent from that point forward. (Id.

¶j 14, 16.) In

its correspondence, Defendant identified two new tenants—
Integrated Disability Evaluation System Care Center and Pet
Sense Pet Center—that had together taken over the space
formerly occupied by Bealls. (Id.

¶j 18-21.) Both parties

exchanged correspondence arguing over whether the arrival
of the new tenants satisfactorily cured the Co-Tenancy
provision of the lease and whether any past rent was due.
(Id. ¶J 24-27.)
On June 20,

2013,

Defendant filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of Liberty County, Georgia seeking a writ of
dispossession against Plaintiff.
at 70-73.)

On June 21,

2013,

2

(CV413-154,

Doc. 1, Ex. F

Plaintiff filed this action

for declaratory judgment as to whether the Co-Tenancy
provision of the lease had been cured and whether Defendant
had waived its rights to any unpaid rent amounts before its
May 10, 2012 correspondence. (Doc. 1.) on June 25, 2013,
Plaintiff removed the related case to this Court claiming
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (CV413154, Doc. 1.) Defendant subsequently filed its Motion to
Dismiss or Stay pending remand of the related case to state
court.

(Doc. 12.) On March 21, 2014, this Court remanded

the related case back to state court.

(CV413-154,

Doc. 52.)
ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that, while the Court's jurisdiction
over this matter is permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, it
should nonetheless decline to hear this case because the
same factual issues will be properly determined in the
parties' pending state court dispossessory action. (Doc.
13 at 3.) Plaintiff responds that because it has removed
the dispossessory action to federal court in the related
case, there is no parallel state action with which this
case could potentially interfere. (Doc. 17 at 7-8.)
However, as stated above, on March 21, 2014 this Court
remanded the related case for lack of federal subject
3

matter jurisdiction.

(CV413-154, Doc.

52.)

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's arguments on this matter are moot.
Because there is a parallel proceeding in state court,
the Court must determine whether to dismiss this case to
avoid "gratuitous interference" with that action.
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S.
(1942).

491, 495

As both parties correctly indicate in their

briefs, the Court will look at the nine factors the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals identified in Ameritas
Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach as a guide on the matter.
411 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) . These factors are as
follows:
(1) the strength of the state's interest in
having the issues raised in the federal
declaratory action decided in the state courts;
(2) whether the judgment in the federal
declaratory action would settle the controversy;
(3) whether the federal declaratory action would
serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations at issue;
(4) whether the declaratory remedy is being used
merely for the purpose of "procedural fencing"—
that is, to provide an arena for a race for res
judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in a
case otherwise not removable;
(5) whether the use of a declaratory action would
increase the friction between our federal and
state courts and improperly encroach on state
jurisdiction;
(6) whether there is an alternative remedy that
is better or more effective;
(7) whether the underlying factual issues are
important to an informed resolution of the case;
4

(8) whether the state trial court is in a better
position to evaluate those factual issues than is
the federal court; and
(9) whether there is a close nexus between the
underlying factual and legal issues and state law
and/or public policy, or whether federal common
or statutory law dictates a resolution of the
declaratory judgment action.
Id. at 1331.
With regard to the first factor, Defendant argues that
Georgia has a strong interest in having its courts decide
an action involving only Georgia law. (Doc. 13 at 4.)
Plaintiff responds that the "state interest" factor refers
more to public policy and interpretation of state law and
has little effect on a purely contractual dispute. (Doc.
17 at 9.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Although
Georgia law is at issue in this case, there are no novel
interpretive questions of law that would be better handled
in state court. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in
favor of dismissal.
Both parties agree that the second factor does not
weigh in favor of dismissal (Doc. 13 at 4; Doc. 17 at 9.)
With regard to the third factor, Defendant argues that
because the same issues will be settled in state court,
there is no useful purpose to this declaratory judgment
action. (Doc. 13 at 5.) Defendant responds that because
5

there is no pending action in state court, a declaratory
judgment by this court would serve a useful purpose. (Doc.
17 at 9-10.) However, as stated above, this Court has
remanded the related case back to state court for further
proceedings. Accordingly, because the factual issues of
this matter will be settled by a state court, the Court
sees no utility in making an independent determination on
these issues. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of
dismissal.
With regard to the fourth factor, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff is using this action, as well as the removal
of the related case to federal court, to achieve a federal
hearing on a matter otherwise irremovable. (Doc. 13 at 5.)
Plaintiff responds that its efforts to litigate this matter
in federal court are a response to Defendant's own
"procedural fencing" to keep this case in state court.
(Doc. 17 at 10.) However, because the Court has already
determined that the related case was not properly
removable, Plaintiff's arguments are without merit.
Plaintiff filed this case only after Defendant filed its
dispossessory action in state court and has endeavored to
eliminate the parallel state proceeding simply to avoid

litigating there. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor
of dismissal.
With regard to the fifth and sixth factors, Defendant
argues that this Court should decline to retain
jurisdiction to avoid friction with the pending state court
dispossessory action involving the same contract dispute.
(Doc. 13 at 5.) Defendant further argues that the pending
state court action is a better and more effective
alternative to litigation in this court because it will
eliminate the inefficiencies inherent in litigating two
virtually identical actions. (Id.) Plaintiff responds
that the dispossessory action is not before the state
court, that it is not a "mere dispossessory action," and
that the parties have already made forward progress in this
litigation. (Doc. 17 at 11.) Again, the Court found it
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the related
case and remanded it to state court. Because that action
will decide all the factual issues involved in this case,
these factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
Both parties agree that the seventh factor does not
weigh in favor of dismissal. (Doc. 13 at 6; Doc. 17 at
12.)

I'

With regard to the eighth factor, Defendant argues
that because the state court is only minutes away from
leased premises at issue in this action, it is in a better
position to evaluate the factual issues of this case.
(Doc. 13 at 6.) Plaintiff responds that the issues
involved in this case are matters of contract law and the
location of the state court is inconsequential.
at 12.)

(Doc. 17

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the

geographic proximity between the property in question and
the state court is not of great concern. The fact that
there are no factual issues or parties present in this case
that do not exist in the state court action, however,
illustrates that the state court is the more appropriate
arena for the dispute. Accordingly, this factor weighs in
favor of dismissal.
With regard to the ninth factor, Defendant argues that
there are no federal laws at issue in this case and thus no
compelling reason for the Court to retain jurisdiction over
it. (Doc. 13 at 6.) Defendant responds that, although
there are no federal laws at issue in this case, there are
also no novel question of state law that should preclude
this Court from retaining jurisdiction. (Doc. 17 at 1213.) Given that this is a fairly straight-forward contract

dispute involving settled questions of state law, the Court
finds that this factor has no bearing on its analysis.
While the first, second and seventh factors do not
weigh in favor of dismissal, the rest of the factors—except
the ninth—overwhelmingly illustrate that the Superior Court
of Liberty County, Georgia is the best forum in which to
continue this dispute. To permit the litigation of this
matter in federal court while a state action involving all
the same factual issues and parties is pending would amount
to improper interference with the state court. Brilihart,
316 U.S. at 495. Accordingly, the Court declines to retain
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a) and dismissal is proper.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 13.) is

GRANTED.

Accordingly, all pending

motions in this case are DISMISSED AS

MOOT.

The Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED this

2t

day of March 2014.

WILLIAM T. MO ORE , JR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA