CSX Transportation, Inc. v. United States of America

Filing 43

ORDER dismissing 12 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 17 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and directing the Clerk to transfer this case to the Court of Federal Claims. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 9/30/14. (bcw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

SE 2O
*

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

i ..

A.

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV413-208

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 17), to which Plaintiff has
filed a response (Doc. 18).
numerous replies and sur-replies.
Doc. 40; Doc. 42.)
motion is

GRANTED.

Both parties have also filed
(Doc. 22; Doc. 32; Doc. 38;

For the reasons that follow, Defendant's
However, the alternative relief sought in

Plaintiff's response is also GRANTED and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to TRANSFER this case to the Court of Federal Claims.

Because this action is transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631,
the Court makes no ruling on the factual arguments presented in
Defendant's motion. Upon transfer, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case. All other pending motions in this

case are DISMISSED AS MOOT.

BACKGROUND

On or about October 8, 2010, Plaintiff, an interstate rail
carrier, delivered forty-four railcars to Defendant.' (Doc. 18
at 3.) Contained within the railcars were pieces of equipment
necessary for their use and operation. (Id.) After receiving
the railcars, Defendant eventually moved twenty-two of them to a
railcar storage area known as "Shaw Road" in Hinesville,
Georgia. (Id.) A further eleven railcars were moved to a
storage area known as the "Beer Joint," also in Hinesville,
Georgia. (Id.) Neither area was fenced off, and crimes of
theft and vandalism had previously been reported in both areas.
(Id.)
Prior to Defendant's acceptance of the railcars, Plaintiff
and Defendant entered into a contract whereby Defendant assumed
responsibility for any damages that may occur to the railcars or
their contents, even if such damages were caused by third
parties. (Id. at 5.) On or about April 14, 2011, however,
Plaintiff discovered that some of its equipment had been stolen
from the railcars stored at both the Shaw Road and Beer Joint

' For the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff's allegations set
forth in its amended complaint will be taken as true. See
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir.
2009)
2

locations.

(Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff reported the theft to

Defendant, but the railcars were not relocated.

(Id.) Further

thefts occurred in or around May of 2011. (Id.)
On October 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim
with Defendant, seeking damages for losses caused by the prior
thefts. (Id. at 5.) Defendant denied Plaintiff's claim on
March 13, 2013.

(Id.)

Thereafter on September 12, 2013,

Plaintiff filed suit in this court. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed
an amended complaint on December 20, 2013, pursuing relief in
both contract and tort. (Doc. 14.) Both claims request damages
in the amount of $267,238.14 for Defendant's failure to protect
Plaintiff's railcars from theft. (Id.) On January 3, 2013,
Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the action is
time-barred and that the dispute is one of contract, rather than
tort, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims. (Doc. 17.)
ANALYSIS

I.

STANDARD OF LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2) requires a

complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "[T]he
pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed
3

factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Aschroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ati. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))

.2

"A pleading that offers

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(internal quotations omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if
it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement." Id.
Normally, when the Court considers a motion to dismiss, it
accepts the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true.
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir.
2009). However, this Court is "not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. Moreover, "unwarranted deductions of fact in a
complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing
the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations." Sinaltrainal, 578
F.3d at 1268. That is, "[t]he rule 'does not impose a

2

Iqbal makes clear that Twombly has been the controlling
standard on the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 in all cases since it was decided. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 684 ("Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a
complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our
interpretation and application of Rule 8 . . . [that] in turn
governs the pleading standard in all civil actions and
4

probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead
simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element."
Watts v. Fla. Intl Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545)
II. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIM IN COUNT TWO
In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's contract
claim should be dismissed because the Court of Federal Claims
has exclusive jurisdiction for contract claims in excess of
$10,000. (Doc. 17 at 11.) Plaintiff responds that the action
was first brought without the contract claim, and its addition
in Plaintiff's amended complaint cannot divest the Court of
jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. 18 at 19-21.) In the
alternative, Plaintiff contends that, if the Court finds it does
not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's contract claim, it should
transfer this case to the Court of Federal Claims. (Id. at 2122.)
Normally, "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune
from suit save as it consents to be sued."
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, (1941) .

United States v.

Pursuant to the Tucker

Act, the United States has waived this immunity for claims based

proceedings in the United States district courts." (internal
5

"upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1).

28

However, the Court of Federal Claims has

exclusive jurisdiction for such contract claims seeking in
excess of $10,000. Begner v. United States, 428 F.3d 998, 1002
(11th dr. 2005) . District courts, such as this one, are
limited to hearing contract claims against the United States
involving damages of only $10,000 or less. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (a) (2).
Here, Plaintiff's contract claim seeks damages in the
amount of $267,238.14 and, accordingly, clearly falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Plaintiff's argument to the contrary relies on the general
principle that jurisdiction is dependent on " 'the state of
things at the time of the action brought.' " (Doc. 18 at 19
(quoting Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824)).)
Plaintiff argues that its addition of a contract claim in the
amended complaint does not divest the Court of subject matter
jurisdiction because such a claim was not included in its
original complaint. (Id. at 20.)

quotations and citations omitted)).
6

However, "[a] plaintiff cannot avoid the jurisdictional
limitations of the Tucker Act . . by artful pleading."
Friedman v. United States, 391 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). Accordingly, the Court will not allow Plaintiff to
circumvent obvious jurisdictional requirements simply by adding
in its prohibited claims after initiating this action.
Furthermore, even assuming the Court had jurisdiction over this
case when it was first filed, 3 there nevertheless exists no means
by which the Court could now extend supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's contract claim. Indeed, where a plaintiff
brings both a claim under the tort action and a Tucker Act
claim, "the district court is powerless to entertain the
[contract] claim." See Ware v. United States, 626 F.2d 1278,
1287 (5th Cir. 1980) .' Quite simply, there is no way Plaintiff
may pursue its contract claim in this Court. See Rease v.
Harvey, 238 F. App'x 592, 495 (11th Cir. 2007) (district court

The Court, however, concludes that Plaintiff's alleged tort
claim is fully dependent on its contractual rights, and the
entire case should be transferred to the Court of Federal
Claims. See Analysis.III-IV.
' In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding
precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to October 1, 1981.
7

properly dismissed Tucker Act claim because relief sought was
greater than $10,000)
III. PLAINTIFF'S TORT CLAIM IN COUNT ONE
Defendant has also moved to dismiss count one of
Plaintiff's amended complaint, arguing that it "sounds in
contract rather than tort." (Doc. 17 at 8.) Accordingly,
Defendant argues, count one is subject to the same Tucker Act
jurisdictional restrictions as discussed above. (Id. at 9-10.)
Plaintiff responds that although it does allege a contract
between the parties, its tort claim is separate and distinct
from any contractual duty it seeks to impose on Defendant.
(Doc. 18 at 15-16.)
If a claim is " 'essentially for breach of a contractual
undertaking, and the liability, if any, depends wholly upon the
government's alleged promise, the action must be under the
Tucker Act, and cannot be under the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
Wood v. United States, 961 F.2d 195, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(quoting Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir.
1963)). Accordingly, where a plaintiff seeks to assert a tort
claim naturally stemming from a breach of contract, " 'the cause
of action is ultimately one arising in contract, and thus is
properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
[;3

Federal Claims to the extent that damages exceed $10,000.'
Friedman v. United States, 391 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Awad v. United States, 301 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2002)). Furthermore, a plaintiff may not simply recast a
contract claim as a tort claim, or allege tangential or
dependent tort claims as a means to avoid the jurisdictional
limitations of the Tucker Act. See id. at 1315.
In its amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts generally that
Defendant "owed [Plaintiff] a duty to exercise ordinary care to
protect the railcars from foreseeable third-party criminal
acts." (Doc. 14 at 4.) Although it is unclear from the amended
complaint under what tort theory Plaintiff is actually seeking
relief, Plaintiff asserts in its response that such a duty is
imposed by both Georgia bailment law and general land owner
liability. (Doc. 18 at 18.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant
owed it a "public duty" independent of contract to protect its
property because Defendant was the carrier and custodian of that
property. (Id..) Plaintitt also reasons that ]Jetendant, as the
landowner upon which the harm occurred, " 'has a duty to
exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous
characters.' " (Id. (quoting Norby v. Heritage Bank, 284 Ga.
App. 360, 361, 644 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. App. 2007)).)

However, even if the Court were to assume Georgia bailment
law or landowner liability could potentially allow a tort action
in this matter, it does not alter the fact that Plaintiff is
seeking the same relief for the same harm in both claims. Such
belies Plaintiff's assertion that the claims are "separate and
distinct" (Doc. 18 at 15), and Plaintiff may not recover twice
for the same harm simply by suing under alternate theories. In
addition, any potential duty Defendant had to safeguard
Plaintiff's property as either a bailor or landowner ±5 purely
dependent on a contract, either express or implied, whereby
Defendant accepted custody of Plaintiff's property onto its
premises. Accordingly, the Court fails to see how Plaintiff's
tort claim could possibly be "independent of any contract
between the parties." (Doc. 18 at 18.)
The Court finds Plaintiff's procedural maneuvering nothing
more than an attempt to have its cake and eat it to. Plaintiff
does not want to let go of the possibility of raising a tort
action because Defendant has refused to stipulate that the
parties have an enforceable contract. (Doc. 18 at 12.) Fearing
that Defendant would argue in the Federal Court of Claims that
this action is actually one of tort, Plaintiff attempts to
portray both its claims as independent of one another in an
10

attempt to preserve all potential avenues for relief.

Such

concerns are outside the scope of the Court's determination of
its subject matter jurisdiction, however, and the Court finds
Plaintiff's arguments both transparent and without merit.
Although Plaintiff purports to bring its suit pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the Court concludes
the tort claim described in count one of Plaintiff's amended
complaint actually stems from Plaintiff's alleged contract with
Defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds it does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because it is
subject to the same Tucker Act jurisdictional limitations as
described earlier.
IV. TRANSFER OR DISMISSAL
Finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court must now decide what to do with this case. Plaintiff
contends that if jurisdiction for its claims is not proper
before this Court, "the appropriate action by the Court would be
to transfer [Plaintiff's] action, not dismiss it."' (Doc. 18 at

Plaintiff appears to argue against itself with regard to
transfer, as it also contends that transfer to the Court of
Federal Claims would be inappropriate because its tort claim is
separate and distinct from its contract claim. (Doc. 18 at 1519.) However, because the Court concludes that the alleged tort
claim is not independent of Plaintiff's contract claim, the
issue is moot. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
11

21.)

Where a Court determines that it does not have

jurisdiction over a case, "the court shall, if it is in the
interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other
such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought
at the time it was filed . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Arguing
that the Court should dismiss the action, Defendant responds
that Plaintiff has not exhausted its administrative remedies
under the Contracts Disputes Act, and thus Plaintiff's claims
are not ripe for review by the Court of Federal Claims. (Doc.
32.)
Because this Court has determined it does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over this action, it is inappropriate to
consider Defendant's factual objection to suit in another court.
If Plaintiff's claims are barred for procedural defects, or for
any other reason, this determination is best left for the Court
of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the Court is unable to discern
any reason why this action should not be transferred pursuant to
§ 1631. Upon transfer, Defendant may reassert its argument.

States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Court of Federal
Claims will not consider claims arising from same operative
12

Conclusion

For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 17) is GRANTED. However, the alternative relief sought in
Plaintiff's response is also GRANTED and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to TRANSFER this case to the Court of Federal Claims.
Because this action is transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631,
the Court makes no ruling on the factual arguments presented in
Defendant's motion. Upon transfer, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case. All other pending motions in this
case are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
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SO ORDERED this oe 7 day of September 2014.
-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

facts and seeking the same relief as parallel claims in district
court)
13