Essex Insurance Company v. SEGA Ventures, LLC et al
Filing
71
ORDER granting in part and denying in part and dismissing in part 47 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court hereby declares that Defendant Revolutions is not an insured under the policy. Plaintiff's request to withdraw its defense of Defendan t's Sega, Mamedd, and Woods in the underlying suit is granted. However, Plaintiff's request to recoup its already-expended costs is denied. Plaintiff's arguments with respect to its duty to indemnify are dismissed. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/28/2015. (loh)
L
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY,
'-
-
S0.OiST.OFGA.
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV413-253
V.
SEGA VENTURES, LLC; REVOLUTIONS
NIGHT CLUB, INC.; MAMEDD, LLC;
DERRICK WOODS; and JEROME BROWN;
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's First Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 47.) Defendants Mamedd, LLC ("Mamedd"),
Revolutions Night Club, Inc. ("Revolutions"), Sega Ventures, LLC
("Sega"), and Jerome Brown have filed responses in opposition.'
(Doc. 50; Doc. 54; Doc. 58.) Plaintiff has filed replies to each
of Defendants' responses. (Doc. 60; Doc. 61; Doc. 62.) For the
reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 47) is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,
PART.
and DISMISSED IN
The Court hereby DECLARES that Defendant Revolutions is
not an insured under the policy. Plaintiff's request to withdraw
its defense of Defendants Sega, Mamedd, and Woods in the
underlying suit is
1
GRANTED.
However, Plaintiff's request to
Defendant Woods has not made an appearance in this case and is
currently in default. (Doc. 29.)
recoup its already-expended costs is
DENIED.
Plaintiff's
arguments with respect to its duty to indemnify are DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an injury suffered by Defendant
Brown at the hands of Defendant Woods. 2 Defendant Sega owns and
operates Revolutions Nightclub in Hinesville, Georgia. (Doc. 58
at 2.) Defendant Mamedd is Defendant Sega's landlord and
Defendant Revolutions is the former owner of the club. (Doc. 50
at 5.) On or about October 15, 2011, Defendant Sega was hosting
a large music-filled event called "Hoodfest" at Revolutions
Nightclub. (Doc. 54 at 6.) On that date, Defendant Woods was
working as one of the club's security guards. (Doc. 54 at 7.)
Near the end of the event, Defendant Woods's boss instructed him
to go into the parking lot and "defuse" any altercations that
were taking place. (Id.) Once in the parking 1st, Defendant
Woods encountered a number of men accosting one of his female
co-workers and attempted to intervene. (Id.) Defendant Woods
positioned himself between the men and his female co-worker, but
was subsequently struck in the back of the head. (Id.) Upon
being hit, Defendant Woods quickly turned around and punched the
person he believed had struck him—Defendant Brown. (Id.)
2
For the purposes of ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most
favorable to Defendants. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1986).
2
As a result of Defendant Woods's punch, Defendant Brown
filed suit against Defendants Woods, Sega, Mamedd, and
Revolutions in the state court of Liberty County, Georgia. (Id.
at 8.) In that case, Defendant Brown brought negligence and
assault and battery claims against Defendant Woods as well as a
variety of derivative liability claims against Defendants Sega
and Mamedd. (Id., Attach. 6.) Although Defendant Revolutions was
originally a party to the underlying case, it has since been
dismissed. (Doc. 50 at 5.)
Prior to the incident between Defendants Brown and Woods,
Plaintiff issued a commercial general liability insurance policy
to Defendant Sega. (Doc. 58 at 1.) Defendant Mamedd is an
additional insured party under the policy. (Doc. 47 at 4.)
Pursuant to the policy's terms, Plaintiff has provided a defense
to Defendants Sega, Revolutions, Mamedd, and Woods in the
underlying suit. (Id. at 12.) However, before undertaking their
defense, Plaintiff issued a reservation of rights letter to
Defendants stating that Plaintiff would discontinue its
representation once the underlying suit's costs reached the
policy's coverage limit. (Id.) Plaintiff then brought suit in
this Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to
further defend or indemnify Defendants Sega, Mamedd, Revolutions
or Woods because the policy's coverage limit had been reached.
(Doc. 11)
3
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff contends that
it owes no further duties to Defendants because Plaintiff's
costs in the underlying suit have exceeded the policy's coverage
sublimit of $25,000 for claims resulting from an assault or
battery. (Doc. 47 at 13-14.) Plaintiff further maintains that it
owes no duties to Defendant Woods and Defendant Revolutions
because they are not insureds under the policy. (Id. at 18-19.)
Also, Plaintiff argues that the policy provides no coverage for
punitive damages and limits an injured party's recovery for
medical expenses to only $1,000. (Id. at 19.) Finally, Plaintiff
seeks to withdraw its representation of Defendants in the
underlying suit (id. at 20-21), and recoup its already-incurred
defense costs beyond $25,000 (id. at 22).
In response, Defendants argue that Defendant Woods was
acting in self-defense and thus his actions should not be
considered an assault and battery under the policy. (Doc. 50 at
4-5; Doc. 54 at 16-17; Doc. 58 at 4-8.) In addition, Defendants
Brown and Sega argue that the policy's assault and battery
provision is ambiguous and should not limit coverage to $25,000,
if at all. (Doc. 54 at 11-15; Doc. 58 at 3-4.) Defendant Brown
further contends that the policy's punitive damages exclusion
and medical expenses limitation are ambiguous. (Doc. 54 at 1921.) Defendant Brown also maintains that Plaintiff must continue
its defense of Defendants because Defendant Brown's amended
4
complaint in the underlying suit includes a negligence claim.
(Id. at 15.) Finally, each Defendant maintains that, regardless
of the success of Plaintiff's other arguments, Plaintiff should
not be allowed to recoup its already-expended defense costs.
(Doc. 50 at 5-6; Doc. 54 at 22; Doc. 58 at 8-15.)
ANALYSIS
I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), "[a] party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part
of each claim of defense—on which summary judgment is sought."
Such a motion must be granted "if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The "purpose of
summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the
proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for
trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee
notes)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant "fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive law governing
the action determines whether an element is essential. DeLong
5
Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505
(11th Cir. 1989)
As the Supreme Court explained:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that
there is a genuine issue as to facts material to the nonmovant's
case. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991)
The Court must review the evidence and all reasonable
factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. However, the
nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. A
mere "scintilla" of evidence, or simply conclusory allegations,
will not suffice. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d
1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998) . Nevertheless, where a reasonable
fact finder may "draw more than one inference from the facts,
and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact,
N
.
then the Court should refuse to grant summary judgment."
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1989)
II. DEFENDANT WOODS AND DEFENDANT REVOLUTIONS
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff's
arguments that Defendants Woods and Revolutions are not insureds
under the terms of the policy. For its part, Defendant
Revolutions has admitted it is not an insured. (Doc. 50 at 5.)
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has no duty to defend or
indemnify Defendant Revolutions in the underlying suit. However,
because Defendant Revolutions has already been dismissed from
the underlying suit, the issue is moot.
Defendant Woods has not made an appearance in this case and
is currently in default. (Doc. 29.) On September 19, 2014, the
Court denied Plaintiff's motion for default judgment against
Defendant Woods, noting that a default judgment should not be
rendered against one defendant where similarly situated nondefaulting defendants remain in the case. (Doc. 64.) To do so
would risk inconsistent or incongruous verdicts by the Court.
(Id. at 4.) After careful consideration, the Court can discern
no reason to disturb its prior order. Defendant Woods is subject
to the terms of this order in the same manner as his coDefendants. However, Plaintiff may reassert its default judgment
motion against Defendant Woods at the conclusion of proceedings
against the remaining Defendants.
7
III. DUTY TO DEFEND AND DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
Plaintiff has argued broadly that it has no further duty to
defend or indemnify Defendants in the underlying suit. (Doc. 47
at 3.) However, in cases involving insurance coverage, the duty
to defend and the duty to indemnify are distinct and analyzed
separately. See City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 231 Ga. App. 206, 208, 498 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1998) ("An
insurer's duty to defend and its duty to indemnify are separate
and independent obligations.") . The duty to indemnify "is
triggered only when the insured is determined to be liable for
damages within the policy's coverage." Erie Indem. Co. v. Acuit
Nut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2048310, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 19, 2006).
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit "has cautioned against the
exercise of jurisdiction in suits for declaratory judgment when
the question of . . . insurance coverage may never arise due to
the lack of a judgment establishing the liability of the
insured." Edwards v. Sharkey, 747 F.2d 684, 686 (11th Cir.
1984) . District courts have frequently heeded the Eleventh
Circuit's cautionary advice and declined to decide questions of
indemnification liability while the underlying action is still
pending. See, e.g., Smithers Constr., Inc. v. Bituminous Cas.
Corp., 563 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 (S. D. Fla. 2008) ("[A]n
insurer's duty to indemnify is not ripe for adjudication in a
declaratory judgment action until the insured is in fact held
liable in the underlying suit.") (citations omitted); (Emp'rs
Mut. Cas. Co. v. All Seasons Window & Door Mfg., Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 2d 1205, 1211-1212 (S.D. Ala. 2005) ("It is simply
inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction over an action seeking a
declaration of the plaintiff's indemnity obligations absent a
determination of the insured's liability.").
The Court can discern no reason to depart from the wise
course of action embraced by the other district courts. Here,
the underlying suit is ongoing and any liability has yet to be
established. Should the defendants in the underlying suit
prevail, any decision by this Court on Plaintiff's duty to
indemnify would necessarily be moot and a waste of judicial
resources. Accordingly, although the parties do not raise the
issue, the Court shall follow the Eleventh Circuit's warning and
not address the parties' arguments concerning Plaintiff's
prospective duty to indemnify. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co
v. Dillard House, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1372-73 (N.D. Ga.
2009) (holding sua sponte that parties' duty to indemnify
arguments were premature)
IV. THE ASSAULT AND BATTERY PROVISION
In this case, the policy includes an endorsement that
purports to limit Plaintiff's coverage of damages—including
investigation and defense costs—"which result[] from 'assault'
or 'battery.' " (Doc. 47, Attach. 1 at 48.) According to the
OJ
endorsement, " '[a]ssault' means any attempt or threat to
inflict 'injury' to another person including any conduct or
action that would reasonably place such person in apprehension
of such 'injury.' " (Id., Attach. 1 at 49.) "Battery" is defined
as "the intentional or reckless physical contact with or any use
of force against a person without his or her consent that
results in 'injury' or offensive or abusive touching whether or
not the actual 'injury' was intended or expected." (Id.)
"Injury" includes both bodily injury and property damage. (Id.)
Defendants first argue that it is currently uncertain
whether Defendant Woods's strike of Defendant Brown qualifies as
an "assault" or "battery" under the policy. Specifically,
Defendants point out that Defendant Woods maintains he hit
Defendant Brown in self-defense. (Doc. 50 at 4-5, Doc. 58 at 48; Doc. 54 at 15-17.) Because the underlying suit has yet to
resolve this factual dispute, Defendants insist that this Court
cannot determine whether the incident falls within the terms of
the policy's assault and battery provision.
As stated above, the Court is presently concerned only with
Plaintiff's duty to defend in the underlying case. All parties
agree that Georgia law applies to the policy in this case. As a
result, it is immaterial whether Defendant Woods prevails in the
underlying action with his self-defense argument. "[W]hether an
insurer has a duty to defend depends on the language of the
10
policy as compared with the allegations of the complaint."
Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co., 291 Ga. 402, 407-08, 730 S.E.2d 413,
418 (2012) . To avoid a duty to defend, the allegations of the
complaint must unambiguously exclude coverage under the policy.
JNJ Found. Specialists, Inc. v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 311 Ga. App.
269, 271, 717 S.E.2d 219, 223 (2011) . " 'Thus, the issue is not
whether the insured is actually liable to the plaintiffs in the
underlying action; the issue is whether a claim has been
asserted which falls within the policy coverage and which the
insurer has a duty to defend.' " Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. N.
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 249 Ga. App. 532, 533, 548 S.E.2d 495, 497
(2001) (quoting Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 224
Ga. App. 557, 562, 481 S.E.2d 850, 851 (1997)).
Defendant Brown alleges in the underlying suit that he "was
struck in the face by Defendant Woods." (Doc. 54, Attach. 6
¶ 9.) In addition, the Defendant Brown repeatedly alleges that
Defendant Woods "punched" him. (Id., Attach. 6 591 27, 40.) As
stated above, an assault exists for purposes of the policy where
there is an "attempt [] to inflict 'injury' to another person."
(Doc. 47, Attach. 1 at 49.) A "battery" includes both "any use
of force against a person without his or her consent" and
"offensive or abusive touching whether or not the actual
'injury' was intended or expected." (Id.) As a result, the Court
finds that Defendant Woods's alleged strike or punch to
11
Defendant Brown's face clearly qualifies as both an "assault"
and "battery" for purposes of the policy. While "assault" and
"battery" may have alternate legal definitions in a civil suit,
the Court uses an insurance policy's defined terms when
determining coverage. See, e.g., Am. Empire Surplus lines Ins.
Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., Inc., 288 Ga. 749, 750-751, 707 S.E.2d
369, 371 (2011) (using term "occurrence" as defined by insurance
policy) . As Defendants do not dispute, the provision's language
covers all claims "resulting from" an assault and battery, which
includes Defendant Brown's derivative claims against Defendants
Sega and Mamedd. See Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dunn, 269 Ga.
213, 215, 496 S.E.2d 696, 699 (1998) (holding derivative claims
covered by assault and battery exclusion because "but for"
assault and battery by employee, there could be no claim against
insured employer) . Accordingly, the facts alleged in the
underlying suit clearly implicate the policy's assault and
battery provision.
Defendant Brown attempts to avoid the parameters of the
assault and battery provisions by pointing out that the
underlying complaint has been amended to include a negligence
cause of action. (Doc. 54 at 16.) As a result, Defendant Brown
reasons that if Defendant Woods was merely negligent in his use
of force against Defendant Brown, the policy's assault and
battery provision should not apply. (Id.) However, the Court
12
finds this argument without merit. Even if Defendant Woods's
punch or strike was somehow the result of mistaken identity, the
policy's assault definition makes no exception for attempts to
injure that are the result of negligence. In addition, the
policy clearly states that a "battery" may occur even if the
resulting injury was not "intended or expected." (Doc. 47,
Attach. 1 at 49.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the policy's
assault and battery provision still applies despite Defendant
Brown's amendment of his complaint. 3
Finally, Defendant Brown argues that the assault and
battery provision is ambiguous because Plaintiff's amended
complaint omitted the page of the policy's endorsement defining
"assault" and "battery." (Doc. 54 at 12-15.) However, it is
readily apparent that this omission is purely the result of
Plaintiff's counsel's mistake when filing this action. A
complete and accurate copy of the insurance policy, with the
assault and battery endorsement intact, is part of the record in
this case. (Doc. 47, Attach. 1 at 48-49.) Accordingly, the Court
finds Defendant Brown's argument without merit.
While the Court uses the policy's defined meanings of assault
and battery, the Court notes that Defendant Woods's actions
would still qualify as an assault and a battery even if the
Court were to apply Georgia's legal definitions of the torts.
See Eady v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 232 Ga. App. 711, 713, 502
S.E.2d 514, 515 (1998) (holding unintentionally injured
plaintiff was victim of assault and battery because of
transferred intent doctrine)
13
V.
SUBLIMIT COVERAGE
Defendants next argue that even if the assault and battery
provision does apply, the coverage sublimit has not been
exhausted. (Doc. 54 at 11-12, Doc. 58 at 3-4.) As originally
delivered to Defendant Sega, the assault and battery endorsement
stated that Plaintiff's liability was limited accordingly: "Per
Occurrence or Each Common Cause: $50,000 Aggregate Limit:
$25,000." (Doc. 47, Attach. 1 at 27.) Plaintiff later issued an
amended endorsement that transposes these amounts to $25,000 per
occurrence with an aggregate limit of $50,000. (Id., Attach. 1
at 48.) While this amended endorsement was not issued until
February 2012, it includes an effective date of September 15,
2011. (Id., Attach. 1 at 31.) Nevertheless, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff's duty to defend in the underlying suit must
continue until its costs reach at least $50,000. Specifically,
Defendants argue that the original endorsement's $50,000 per
occurrence limit should be enforced as the conflicting
occurrence and aggregate limits create an ambiguity in the
policy that should be resolved in Defendant's favor. (Doc. 54 at
11-12, Doc. 58 at 3-4.)
The Court finds Defendants' arguments without merit. Any
potential ambiguity in the original contract was resolved by the
amended endorsement's more comprehensible modification. Under
Georgia law, an insurance policy "includes all clauses, riders,
14
endorsements, and papers attached or issued and delivered for
attachment to the contract or agreement and made a part of the
contract or agreement." O.C.G.A. § 33-24-1. In addition, an
endorsement's language controls where there is any conflict
between it and the original policy because the endorsement is
the more current expression of the parties' intent. See Utica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 106 Ga. App. 877, 878 (1962) . Defendants
offer no argument that the endorsement is defective, either for
lack of consideration or otherwise, and Defendants have not
cancelled the policy. See Ga. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragan, 122 Ga.
App. 56, 57, 176 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1970) (holding forbearance to
cancel policy sufficient consideration to sustain modifying
endorsement) . As a result, the Court concludes the endorsement
applies in full with regard to all its terms. See Dunham v.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co, 115 Ga. App. 625, 626, 115 S.E.2d 690, 69192 (1967) (giving effect to life insurance policy endorsements
correcting amount of coverage even after death of insured)
Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants' coverage limit for a
single occurrence of assault and battery is $25,000 as described
in the amended endorsement.
VI. WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENSE AND RECOUPMENT OF COSTS
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's request to withdraw its
defense in the underlying suit and recoup its costs beyond the
$25,000 sublimit. (Doc. 47 at 20-22.) The parties do not contest
15
that Plaintiff has already spent more than $25,000 on the
underlying suit. The insurance policy states that once coverage
is exhausted by Plaintiff's representation of Defendants,
"[Plaintiff] will not defend or continue to defend any 'suit.'
(Doc. 47, Attach. 1 at 48.) Plaintiff additionally states that
it expressly reserved its right to seek recoupment in a
reservation of rights letter to Defendants. (Id. at 22.) In
support of its argument for recoupment, Plaintiff points to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia's decision in Illinois Union Ins. Co. v. NRI Constr.
Inc., which held that an insurer was entitled to reserve its
rights to recoup costs incurred defending claims "it had no duty
to defend." 846 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff may withdraw its
defense if the Court determines, as it has here, that
Plaintiff's coverage limit has been exhausted. However,
Defendants argue strenuously that Plaintiff should be estopped
from recouping its additional expenditures beyond the $25,000
sublimit even if there is no further duty to defend. First,
Defendants Brown and Sega contend that Plaintiff's letter
reserved only a right to recover costs expended in defense of
non-covered claims. (Doc. 54 at 22; Doc. 58 at 14.) Defendants
reason that this reservation of rights does not permit
recoupment because Plaintiff's costs in the underlying suit were
16
incurred defending covered, but simply limited, claims. In
addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's reservation of
rights letter is ineffective because the policy itself does not
provide for recoupment of costs. (Doc. 50 at 5-6; Doc. 58 at 1213.) Finally, Defendant Sega urges the Court to adopt the
reasoning of other courts that have found a right of recoupment
to be against public policy. (Doc. 58 at 10-12.)
"For a reservation of rights to be effective, the
reservation must be unambiguous; if it is ambiguous, the
purported reservation of rights must be construed strictly
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured."
World Harvest Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., 287 Ga.
149, 152-53, 695 S.E.2d 6, 10 (2010) (citations omitted) . A word
or phrase is ambiguous "when it is of uncertain meaning and may
be fairly understood in more ways than one." Walton v. Datry,
185 Ga. App. 88, 94, 363 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1987) (quoting Dorsey
v. Clements, 202 Ga. 820, 823, 44 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1947). Here,
the reservation of rights letter states:
[un the event it becomes evident that there is no
coverage for the Underlying Lawsuit, SEGA, Revolutions
Night Club, Mamedd, and Mr. Woods agree that
[Plaintiff] may, and [Plaintiff] reserves the right
to, recoup and recover any all [sic] attorneys' fees
and/or defense costs incurred, expended, or associated
17
with SEGA's, Revolutions Night Club's, Mamedd's,
and/or Mr. Woods' [sic] defense of non-covered
claim(s)
(Doc. 47, Attach. 1 at 64.) Here, there is no question that the
policy provides at least some coverage for the claims in the
underlying suit. This is in direct contrast to the situation
described in Illinois, where there was no coverage whatsoever
for the defended claims. 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. As a result,
the Court concludes that the letter could reasonably indicate
Plaintiff reserved only a right to recoup its costs where the
underlying claims entirely uncovered by the policy. Accordingly,
construing any ambiguity in favor of Defendants, Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment on this matter must be denied.
VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND MEDICAL PAYMENTS
Finally, Plaintiff moves the Court to declare that the
policy excludes coverage for any punitive damages that may arise
from the underlying suit as well as any medical payment coverage
beyond $1,000. (Doc. 47 at 19.) However, all liabilities and any
attendant damages have yet to be determined in the underlying
suit. As a result, the Court finds the Plaintiff's arguments on
the matter premature. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment with regard to these issues must be dismissed.
Alm
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 47) is
DISMISSED IN PART.
GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,
The Court hereby
DECLARES
and
that Defendant
Revolutions is not an insured under the policy. Plaintiff's
request to withdraw its defense of Defendants Sega, Mamedd, and
Woods in the underlying suit is
GRANTED.
However, Plaintiff's
request to recoup its already-expended costs is
DENIED.
Plaintiff's arguments with respect to its duty to indemnify are
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED this 28day of March 2015.
WILLIAM T. MOOR VJR.,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?