Miller v. Garibaldi's Inc. et al

Filing 52

ORDER denying 38 Motion for Equitably Toll Statute of Limitations re 29 MOTION to Certify Class. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 3/30/2016. (loh)

HLED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SAVANNAH DIV.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
2016 MAR 30 AM II: 59
SAVANNAH DIVISION

CLER(

so.r

JASON MILLER, on his own
behalf and all similarly
situated individuals,
Plaintiff,
V

CASE NO. CV414-007

.

GARIBALDI'S INC., a Georgia
for-profit corporation; and
THE OLDE PINK HOUSE, INC., a
Georgia for-profit
corporation;

)

Defendants.
ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Equitably
Toll Statute of Limitations. (Doc. 38.) In the motion,
Plaintiff requests that the Court "toll the statute of
limitations as of April 24, 2014, the date on which
Plaintiff initially sought the Court's permission to send
notice of the pending claims to putative class members."
(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff reasons the fifteen months that
elapsed between his filing a motion seeking class
certification (Doc. 29) and the Court's final approval of
his proposed notice to potential class members (Doc. 39) is
an extraordinary circumstance that warrants tolling. (Doc.
38 at 7-11.) Defendants oppose Plaintiff's request,

contending that Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable
tolling because the fifteen-month delay is insufficiently
extraordinary. (Doc. 40 at 5-11.)
Equitable tolling permits a party to extend the
statutory time for filing suit where that party has been
prevented from filing by some inequitable circumstances.
Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706
(11th Cir. 1998). It is an extraordinary remedy to be used
sparingly. Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.
2000). The party requesting equitable tolling must
establish both that it has been diligent in the pursuit of
its rights, and that some extraordinary circumstance stood
in in the way of that pursuit. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d
1311, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)
In this case, Plaintiff's request fails to meet the
requirements necessary for equitable tolling. First, this
Court concludes that the fifteen months needed for the
parties and this Court to arrive at an agreed upon notice
to potential class members does not represent an
extraordinary circumstance. The parties vigorously
litigated the issue of class certification, ultimately
filing a motion (Doc. 29), response (Doc. 31), reply (Doc.
33), sur-reply (Doc. 35), and supplemental authority (Doc.
34). After this Court granted conditional certification, it

provided the parties with an opportunity to confer on the
appropriate notice to potential class members. (Doc. 36.)
The Court acknowledges that it takes time to shepherd these
types of cases through the legal process. However, there is
nothing about this process taking fifteen months that
renders that length of delay extraordinary.
Second, the fifteen month delay did not operate to
preclude potential class members from pursuing their
rights. Potential class members had two options for filing
a timely claim: (1) opt in to this collective action; or
(2) file their own individual action. Moreover, neither
this Court nor any party acted to induce potential class
members from diligently pursuing their rights. Because
Plaintiff has not established an entitlement to equitable
tolling, his motion (Doc. 38) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this

day of March 2016.

WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

3