Hall v. McConnell et al

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS dismissing re 5 Complaint filed by Juwan Hall. Objections to R&R due by 7/10/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 6/26/2014. (loh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JUWAN HALL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
GREG McCONNELL, DETECTIVE )
ROD TYREN, STATE ATTORNEY )
GENERAL, )
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV414-072

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Juwan Hall has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against two
prosecutors and a detective involved in his 2005 arrest and prosecution
for identity fraud. (Doc. 1 at 5-6.) Following the dismissal of the state
criminal charges “for lack of prosecution” (on some unspecified date),
( id . at 6), Hall commenced this action seeking $20,000,000 in damages
for “wrongful arrest/wrongful detention” and “false imprisonment.” ( Id.
at 6.) His case does not survive initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 1

1

That statute permits a district court to dismiss sua sponte an IFP plaintiff’s
complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See also 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.

Hall has failed to mention any of the named defendants in the body
of his complaint. While pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney, Haines v. Kerner , 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Hall does not furnish
any clue as to what these defendants did or how their actions wronged
him. His narrative simply shows that he was investigated for identity
fraud based upon a tip from “Robert Schamber,” charges were filed
against him, and the case was ultimately dismissed. (Doc. 1 at 6.)
Nothing in the complaint suggests any wrongdoing on the part of
defendants.
The action also appears to be untimely. An action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred if not filed within two years after the cause of
action accrues. Mullinax v. McElhenney , 817 F.2d 711, 715-16 n.2 (11th
Cir. 1987); Williams v. City of Atlanta , 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986)

2

(“the proper limitations period for all section 1983 claims in Georgia is
the two-year period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 for personal injuries.”).
The last court date listed in the Chatham County, Georgia court
docketing system reflects that nothing has happened in Hall’s criminal
case since November 16, 2005. See Eastern Judicial Circuit of Georgia
Case Details,

available at http://www.chathamcourts.org/Case -

Details/caseno/120783-01 (last visited June 23, 2014). Given that nearly
a decade has passed since that date, Hall’s complaint appears to be
untimely by many years.
Finally, even if the complaint is timely filed, the state prosecuting
attorneys are personally immune from suit for damages for their actions
in pursuing the criminal charges against him. 2 Imbler v. Pachtman , 424
U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages
under § 1983.”); Jones v. Cannon , 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“[A]bsolute immunity extends to a prosecutor's ‘acts undertaken . . . in
2

Unless Georgia’s Attorney General took an active role in the prosecution,
which seems extremely unlikely under the circumstances, Hall has named him for his
supervisory oversight. Claims brought pursuant to § 1983, however, cannot be based
upon generalized theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Polk County v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981);
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d
1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).

preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which
occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State’”). They are
also immune in their official capacity as state agents, as such suits are
barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985) (the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits claims for damages against a state unless the state has waived
immunity; official capacity suits against state officials are effectively
suits against the state, so the same protection applies). 3
As Hall has utterly failed to state a claim against any of the
defendants, his § 1983 action should be DISMISSED .
He must now pay the Court’s filing fee. Based upon his furnished
information, he owes an initial partial filing fee of $83.27. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1) (requiring an initial fee assessment “when funds exist,”
under a specific 20 percent formula). Plaintiff’s account custodian shall
set aside 20 percent of all future deposits to the account and forward

3

“[S]uits against an official in his or her official capacity are suits against the
entity the individual represents.” Parker v. Williams , 862 F.2d 1471, 1476 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1989). For purposes of § 1983 liability, whether an official acts on behalf of the
state or county is a question of state law. The Eleventh Circuit has examined this
issue and determined that “the district attorney’s authority over prosecutorial
decisions . . . is vested by state law pursuant to state authority.” Owens v. Fulton
County , 877 F.2d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 1989).

4

those funds to the Clerk each time the set aside amount reaches $10,
until the balance of the Court’s $350 filing fee has been paid in full. In
the event plaintiff is transferred to another institution, his present
custodian shall forward a copy of this Order and all financial information
concerning payment of the filing fee and costs in this case to plaintiff’s
new custodian. The balance due from the plaintiff shall be collected by
the custodian at his next institution in accordance with the terms of this
Order.
A copy of this Order and a copy of the Consent to Collection of Fees
from Trust Account shall be served upon plaintiff and his current
custodian. The payment portion of this Order is to be implemented
immediately, as it is not subject to the adoption provision of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b).

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of
June, 2014.

LTN1TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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