Marshall v. Colvin

Filing 18

ORDER adopting the Magistrate Judge's 13 Report and Recommendation as the Court's opinion; and dismissing this case with prejudice. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 8/17/2015. (jah)

UNITED

STATES

SOUTHERN

DISTRICT

DISTRICT

OF

COURT

GEORGIA

SAVANNAH DIVISION

JENNIFER WRENE MARSHALL,

Plaintiff,
Case No.

v.

CV414-081

CAROLYN COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

ORDER

After a careful, de novo review of the file, the Court concurs with

the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, to which objections
have been filed, doc. 15.

Jennifer Wrene Marshall sought judicial

review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her Child
Insurance Benefits based on disability and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI).

Doc. 1.

It was Marshall's ultimate burden to show that

she was disabled due to Asperger's syndrome, attention deficit disorder,

central auditory processing disorder and the other maladies she claimed.

The Magistrate Judge found sufficient record support for the
Commissioner's determination that, during the relevant time period,

plaintiff suffered no impairment, or combination of impairments,
expected to last at least twelve months, that left her unable to perform

any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Doc. 13.
Marshall's objections: (l) the ALJ failed to weigh properly the
medical evidence and properly determine her Residual Functional

Capacity (RFC); and (2) the ALJ failed to evaluate properly her
credibility.

Doc. 15.

As for her first objection, she specifically

challenges the conclusion that the ALJ did not err by giving "no weight"

to the opinion of her treating psychologist, Dr. Patrice Butterfield.
Doc. 15 at 2.

To that end, the ALJ recognized a disparity between

Butterfield's opinions and the GAF score1 of 65 assigned by her

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Kevin J. Winders.

1

The Social Security

"A GAF score is a subjective determination that represents 'the clinician's

judgment of the individual's overall level of functioning.' Am. Psychiatric Ass'n,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed., Text Revision
2000)." Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin, 597 F. App'x 604, 615 n . 2 (llth Cir.
2015). It "is just one tool used by clinicians to develop the clinical picture and it
cannot be used in isolation from the rest of the evidence to make a disability

decision." Penna v. Colvin, 2015 WL 859091 at * 4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2015). "A
rating of 51-60 reflects '[mloderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial
speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning (e.g, few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers') Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed., Text Revision),
p. 34." Id. at* 10 n. 4. "[A] GAF of between 61 to 70 represents mild symptoms."
Dobson v. Colvin, 2014 WL 6432855 at * 6 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 14, 2014).

Administration, Marshall points out, has "specifically stated that GAF

scores are not indicative of any particular severity of mental
functioning."

Id.

It is true that the utility of GAF scores have been questioned.

See Hadley v. Colvin, 2015 WL 451072 at * 3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2015).
Nevertheless, GAF scores are routinely used by "mental health
physicians and doctors ... to rate the occupational, psychological,
and social functioning of adults." See McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F.

App'x 410, 413 n. 2 (llth Cir. 2006) (citing American Psychiatric
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
32 (Text Revision, 4th ed. 2000)). Further, an ALJ must consider all
materially relevant evidence and "state with particularity the
weight he gave the different medical opinions and the reasons

therefor." Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279-80 (llth Cir.1987);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3) ( "We will consider all evidence
in your case record when we make a determination or decision
whether you are disabled."). Therefore, while a GAF score may not
reveal specific functional limitations, it is often accompanied by a
description of a plaintiffs specific symptoms and may be useful in
determining how a given medical source viewed a plaintiffs
broader mental functionality at a given moment in time. Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that an ALJ may not simply ignore
GAF scores in the medical record when they indicate serious

symptoms. See McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F. App'x 410, 413 n. 2
(llthCir.2006).
Id.

The flip side of McCloud, and cases like Thornton, 597 F. App'x at

615 (such scores do not necessarily reflect a person's ability to do work),

is that the ALJ may still consider GAF scores -- though certainly not
standing alone2 -- when they may be useful in determining individual

functioning. Hence, the ALJ properly relied on the GAF scores here

while weighing record evidence to determine the plaintiffs RFC. And,
as the Commissioner correctly points out, the ALJ properly rejected
Butterfield's opinion while doing so. Doc. 16 at 3-4. Marshall's
remaining objection is simply evidence-reweighing in disguise (she and
even this Court may disagree with the result, but so long as substantial

evidence supports the weighed result, this Court must uphold it).

The Court therefore OVERRULES Marshall's objection (doc. 15) to
the Report and Recommendation and this case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgians _7^day of
Augustr ^O/zHONORkBLE J. RANDAL HALL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
2

«

"Courts in this circuit have noted that a GAF score is not an assessmpnt nf »

claimant's ability to work, but aglobal reference scale to aid7n the t^ent ofIn

ongoing condition." Garrard v Colvin, 2014 WL 6972120 at *6(KD iTa DeC 9
c> y'

2014) (quotes and cite omitted).