Bostic v. Lauragina Professional Transport, LLC et al
Filing
77
ORDER granting 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 59 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants We Care and LogistiCare are terminated from this case. Bostic is ordered to show cause within 30 days why the case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 6/5/15. (cmr)
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
*
LATORA BOSTIC,
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
LAURAGINA PROFESSIONAL
*
TRANSPORT,
CV 414-083
*
PORTER,
LLC;
JOSEPH L.
SR.; WE CARE
*
TRANSPORTATION, LLC; and
*
LOGISTICARE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
*
*
Defendants.
*
ORDER
Before
the
Court
are
two
motions
for
Defendants We Care Transportation,
LLC
Solutions,
(Doc. nos.
LLC
consideration,
("LogistiCare") -1
both
motions
for
summary
("We Care")
judgment
and LogistiCare
57 & 59,)
summary
by
judgment
Upon due
are
hereby
GRANTED.
I,
A.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background
We
Care
provided
non-emergency
services to patients in Georgia.
primary
office
was
in
Savannah in early 2013.
1
Since
consenting
to
(Doc. no.
Fitzgerald,
(Id.
removal
medical
Georgia,
%% 1-2.)
(Doc.
57-1,
1-6),
and
transportation
1 2.)
it
We Care's
expanded
to
We Care received clients
the
remaining
defendants,
Lauragina Professional Transport, LLC ("Lauragina") and Joseph Porter, Sr., have
not filed an answer or any other motions.
from
LogistiCare,
a
"transportation
requests to providers.
broker"
that
(Doc. nos. 57-1, f 4; 59-2,
referred
trip
ff 3-6.)
We
Care provided the transportation (doc. no. 57-2, f 4); LogistiCare
coordinated
the
referrals
(doc.
no.
% 6) .
59-2,
LogistiCare
verified that the providers with which it contracted to transport
patients
complied
with
Georgia
licensing,
drug screenings,
no.
UK
59-2,
LogistiCare.
Latora
(Doc.
with
she
We
to
Care
was
an
independent
Bostic
Equal
left
% 18.)
her
that
January
30,
with
of
Opportunity
she
had
2013,
2011.
she filed a charge
Commission
suffered
in
("EEOC"),
retaliation
and
in
sexual
(Doc. no. 1-1, f 15.)
Henry
Harris,
We
Care's
owner,
hired
(Doc. no. 57-1, %
She was responsible for billing and marketing in We Care's
Savannah office.
(Id. % 15.)
checks the company received.
Two days
We
(Doc.
contractor
Lauragina
After her departure,
Employment
alleged
employment
Bostic as a probationary employee for 90 days.
11.)
transportation
and criminal background checks.
harassment while at Lauragina.
On
related
(Id. f 11.)
no. 59-2,
the
which
7-8.)
law
Care's
Part of her job involved depositing
(Id.)
after hiring Bostic,
office
in
Fitzgerald,
company's billing practices.
(Id.
Harris asked her to travel to
Georgia,
% 17.)
gas on the way to the Fitzgerald office,
late.
(Id.
f 18.)
to
learn
about
the
After running out of
Bostic arrived two hours
She stayed at the office for no more than an
hour
before
returning
to Savannah.
(Id.
f 19.)
Her
stay
Fitzgerald failed to meet Harris's expectations for her visit,
he told her so when she returned.
On February 7,
2013,
and
(Id.)
Harris
spoke with Lauragina Operations
(Id. % 22.)
Manager Jimmy Duncan.
in
Duncan told Harris that Bostic
had sued Lauragina but did not provide details about the lawsuit.
(Id.
f 24.)
Duncan.
On
Bostic knew about the
(Id. tt 27-28.)
March
11,
Bostic's lawsuit.
tell
conversation Harris had with
Harris
2013,
(Doc.
"about
conversation.
On March
Harris
no.
the
and
Duncan
57-4 at 35.)
sexual
spoke
checks
she
12,
2013,
with
Bostic
Bostic
failed
Harris
insubordinate.
harassment
did not
(Id.
to
about
both
deposit.
found
Bostic
f 41.)
come
during
the
her
to
no. 57-1,
tardiness
% 35.)
(Id.
be
and she was
and
% 31.)
several
During
disrespectful
57-3,
he fired her.
U 20.)
(Doc.
the
and
After
no.
57-
After Bostic departed, Harris found billing errors in
(Id. K 49.)
Procedural History
On March
with
to work,
(Doc.
her work and undeposited checks in her desk.
B.
charges"
f 40; see also Doc. no.
speaking with her for a few minutes,
1,
about
(Id.)
had
conversation,
again
Bostic overheard Duncan
late to work the following day as well.
Harris
spoke
the
28,
EEOC,
2013,
Bostic
alleging
filed a
that
We
3
charge
Care
and
of
discrimination
LogistiCare
had
retaliated against her because of her previous EEOC charge against
Lauragina.
letter,
(Doc.
59-3
dated December
"Logistic Care."
19,
no.
2014
(doc.
20,
(Id.
no.
at
41.)
2013,
at 43.)
1-1),
She received a right-to-sue
which
included both We
Care
and
Bostic filed this lawsuit on March
and LogistiCare removed it to this Court
five days later (doc. no. 1).
II.
"The
court
shall
SUMMARY
grant
JUDGMENT
STANDARD
summary judgment
that there is no genuine dispute as
if
the movant
to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).
shows
In ruling on summary judgment,
Fed. R. Civ. P.
the Court views
the facts
and inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.
Corp. , 475 U.S.
1271
(11th
See Matsushita Elec.
574,
Cir.
587
(1986);
2008).
Indus.
Reese v.
Courts,
Co. v. Zenith Radio
Herbert,
moreover,
527
may
F.3d 1253,
consider
materials in the record, not just those cited by the parties.
R. Civ. P.
The
moving
the
party
district
"bears
court
identifying those portions of
interrogatories,
affidavits,
genuine
Fed.
56(c) (3) .
informing
to
all
if any,
issue
of
and
of
the
the
initial
basis
for
the pleadings,
admissions
on
responsibility
file,
its
motion,
depositions,
together
of
and
answers
with
the
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
material
fact."
Reese,
527
F.3d
at
1268
(internal
Catrett,
quotation
477 U.S.
The
(quoting
then
[its]
of
"Amay
pleading [s],
showing
that
Fed.
exists
R.
when
Civ.
Athe
not
there
City of Palm Bay,
2004) (quoting
fact
omitted)
P.
return
a
verdict
I.C.
Inc.,
629
F.3d
1263,
1270
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Corp.
the
is
upon
but
a
.
the
.
issue
for
genuine
"A
nonmoving
(11th
U.S.
860
genuine
such
that
a
242,
The
motions
Clerk
for
judgment
nos.
60
summary
rules,
materials
gave
Owen v.
(quoting
(1986)).
61.)
Wainwright,
772
Bostic
appropriate
judgment
including
Thus,
F.2d
A
the suit
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
822,
and
the
in opposition and
&
of
reasonable
2011)
248
(11th
issue
party.'"
Cir.
mere
set
fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of
under governing law.
v.
. must
358 F.3d 859,
56(e)).
evidence
for
rest
is
Fla.,
jury could
Sys.,
Celotex
(1986)).
party
facts
Young v.
material
323
or denials
specific
trial.'"
Cir.
317,
nonmoving
allegations
forth
marks
the
right
the
informed
to
file
consequences
notice
825
notice
her
of
1985)
satisfied and the motions are ripe for review.
of
Defendants'
the
affidavits
requirements
(11th Cir.
of
summary
or other
default.
of
(Doc.
Griffith
(per curiam)
v.
are
Ill,
A.
DISCUSSION
We Care's Motion for Summary Judgment:
Bostic alleges that We Care fired her in retaliation for the
EEOC charge she
filed against Lauragina.
(Doc.
no.
1-1,
UK 45-
55.)
1.
Bostic
has
not
provided
direct
evidence
of
discrimination.
Title VII
[s]he
has
practice
prohibits
opposed
by
testified,
U.S.C.
§
treatment
by
a
satisfy
Douglas's
McDonnell
Direct
or
making
this
975
of
the
(11th
"by
has
a
made
any
VII
proving
1081
VII]."
42
"the
Crawford
(quoting
direct
an
discriminatory
(11th Cir.
presenting
in
claim,
evidence.'"
2008)
charge,
manner
[Title
Title
of
"because
employment
under
Cir.
907 F.2d 1077,
burden
in
a
burden
an employee
unlawful
[s]he
hearing
ultimate
961,
an
participated
preponderance
F.3d
made
because
When
*the
Champion Int'l Corp.,
intent to
or
2000e-3(a).
529
or
proceeding,
bears
may
practice
VII],
assisted,
plaintiff
Carroll,
any
[Title
investigation,
retaliation against
v.
Earley v.
1990)).
evidence
She
of
an
discriminate or circumstantial evidence using McDonnell
burden-shifting
Douglas
evidence
Corp.
includes
framework."
v.
Green,
"Aonly
the
411
Id.
U.S.
most
at
975
(citing
792,
802
(1973)).
blatant
remarks,
whose
intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis
of some impermissible factor.'"
Akouri v.
State of Fla.
Dep't of
Transp.,
408
F.3d 1338,
Florida,
285
F.3d
1347
1339,
1342
alleged statement suggests,
motive,
(11th Cir.
n.2
but
2005)
(11th
does
Cir.
not
(quoting Rojas
2002)).
prove,
"If
v.
the
a discriminatory
then it is considered circumstantial evidence."
Id.
Bostic has presented no direct evidence that her termination
was
specifically a
Lauragina.
She provides
testimony fails
deposition,
her
of
discriminate."
motive
no
for
the
EEOC
charge
her own deposition
she
filed against
testimony,
but
to prove direct evidence of retaliation.
the
"whose
short,
of
she never claims
because
statements
In
result
EEOC
intent
See Akouri,
piece
of
terminating
that Harris
charge.
She
could
mean
told her he
has
nothing
408 F.3d at 1347
direct
Bostic
evidence
had
failed
other
firing
point
to
than
to
(quotation omitted).
indicates
anything
In her
was
to
that
to
that
do
with
Harris's
the
EEOC
charge against Lauragina.
Thus,
does
not
taken
prove,
as
a
a
whole,
Bostic's
discriminatory
testimony
motive."
See
"suggests,
id.
Since
but
her
testimony provides a mere suggestion of a discriminatory motive,
it is circumstantial evidence.
2.
Bostic
has
established
a
prima
facie
case
of
retaliation.
"A plaintiff bears
case
of
discrimination
circumstantial
F.3d 1160,
1174
the burden of establishing a prima facie
in Title
evidence."
(11th Cir.
VII
Brown
2010) .
7
v.
cases
that
are
Ala.
Dep't
of
supported by
Transp.,
597
When a plaintiff produces only
circumstantial evidence,
established
in
McDonnell
Juvenile Justice,
omitted).
present
courts use "the burden shifting framework
Douglas."
564 F. App'x 421,
Mealing
427
(11th Cir.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
sufficient
circumstantial
evidence
facie claim of retaliation,
see Rives v.
at
2015),
*3
(11th Cir.
establish
that
expression;
the
(2)
adverse
Mar.
she
to
Lahood,
in
Dep't
2014)
of
(citation
a plaintiff must
establish
which requires
engaged
Ga.
a
prima
2015 WL 1320586,
a
plaintiff
statutorily
to
protected
she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)
action
was
causally
Harden Mfg.
related
Corp.,
to
the
291 F.3d 1307,
protected
1311
(11th
2002).
Here,
first
25,
"(1)
expression," Weeks v.
Cir.
v.
two
neither party disputes that Bostic has established the
elements
Court agrees:
of
a
prima
facie
case
of
retaliation.
The
she did engage in statutorily protected expression
when she filed her EEOC charge against Lauragina, and she also was
terminated.
See Weeks,
in whether Bostic's
291 F.3d at 1311.
termination was
The disagreement lies
causally related to her EEOC
charge.
Establishing causality is
order
to
retaliation
satisfy
case,
establish that
expression at
the
a
often the crux of the debate.
^causal
link'
prong
of
plaintiff
must,
at
minimum,
a
a
the defendant was actually aware of
the
time
the defendant
took the
prima
"In
facie
generally
the protected
adverse
employment
action."
Raney v.
Vinson Guard Serv.,
(11th Cir. 1997).
causation prong,
Sch. Dist. v.
Harris
7;
532 U.S.
2013,
that
268,
Bostic
"about
nos.
the
(Doc.
no.
57-4
(Doc.
no.
57-1,
57-1,
% 8;
v.
Cooper
(holding
at
35.)
Two
KH 31-41.)
sufficient
Lighting,
that
"a
57-4
three
at
2013.
sexual harassment
established causation.
and
1197
days
Clark Cnty.
(2001).
had
litigation
(Doc.
34.)
charges"
later,
over
Harris
facts
issue"'
no.
the phone.2
Bostic.
light most
the Court thus finds Bostic has
This sort of temporal proximity is
to meet
Inc.,
months
the
506
burden
of
F.3d
did
also
Duncan told
fired
in the
on
57-2 at
But Harris
On that date,
Taking the
favorable to the non-moving party,
close"
273
shortly after he hired her.
learned more details on March 11,
Harris
F.3d 1192,
such proximity must be "very close."
Breeden,
see also Doc.
120
For temporal proximity alone to establish the
learned
February 7,
Inc.,
1361,
not
rise
causation.
1364
to
(11th
the
"very
Cf.
Thomas
Cir.
2007)
level
of
"very
close") .
The
Court
relation
and,
finds
that
therefore,
Bostic
also
has
a
established
prima
facie
this
causal
case
of
discrimination.
2
We Care's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (doc. no. 57-1) does not
mention this conversation.
Upon due examination of the entire record, however,
the Court nevertheless makes an inference in the light most favorable to Bostic,
the non-moving party.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.
9
3.
We
Care
has
Bostic's
articulated
nondiscriminatory
reasons
for
termination.
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
xx[t]he
burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory
reason
defendant
produces
that
legitimate
the
illegal motive."
(11th
Cir.
pretext,
such a
the
564
F. App'x at
405 F.3d
reason
1276,
1289
the
was
marks
discrimination.
plaintiff
a
Advance Sec,
must
mere
Inc.,
that
"To
for
an
597
establish
the proffered reason
(quoting Jackson v. Ala.
2005)).
the
then prove
19 F.3d 586,
the employment decision.'"
(11th Cir.
If
pretext
omitted).
'must demonstrate
true reason for
427
alleged
offered
(quotation
a plaintiff
not
the
reason,
Mulhall v.
1994)
was
for
Mealing,
State Tenure Comm'n,
"If the
employer offers
more than one legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff
must rebut each reason."
Id.
to be pretext "unless it is
and that
The plaintiff cannot prove a reason
shown Jboth that the reason was false,
discrimination was
the
real
reason."
St.
Mary's
Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)(emphasis in original).
Since
Bostic
discrimination,
legitimate
the
attendance
presented
burden
shifts
The
Mulhall,
reasons
issues.
only produce,
not
(Doc.
prove,
a
We
F.3d
forth
no.
prima
Care
reason
19
set
a
to
nondiscriminatory
discrimination."
omitted).
has
58
at
597
some
marks
performance
defendant
reason."
of
alleged
(quotation
"[T]he
nondiscriminatory
10
the
Bostic's
10.)
case
"articulate
for
at
are
to
facie
and
need
Walker v.
NationsBank
of
Fla.
N.A. ,
53
F.3d
1548,
1556
(11th
Cir.
1995).
We
Care's
The Court finds that We Care has done just that.
4*
Bostic
has
failed
to
demonstrate
that
reasons are pretextual.
Bostic now bears the burden of rebutting We Care's reasons as
pretextual.
reasons
She
are
cannot
both
succeed
and
false
that
termination was retaliation.
at
515.
She must
which is
for
not the
firing
reason,
"The
a bad reason,
reason."
as
Nix
(11th Cir.
v.
Care
Care points
(Doc.
shows
true
that
Care's
for
Bostic's
Mary's Honor Ctr.,
509 U.S.
Care's
reason
We
reasons
are
mere
pretext,
showing that We Care's had poor reasons
employer may
fire
an
employee
for a
a reason based on erroneous facts,
long as
WLCY
first
good
or for no
its action is not for a discriminatory
Radio/Rahall
to
Commc'ns,
64
at
In
that Bostic was
58 at 11.)
738
F.2d
her
15.)
fired due
1181,
1187
and
failure
That
checks
toward Harris.
checks
to
the
acknowledging
requirement of her employment
deposit
that
(see doc.
they
them
were
she
as
(Id.)
argues
checks
11
to her poor
To support its contention,
failure to deposit
attitude
deposit
implying
irrelevant.
no.
to Bostic's
failed
no.
argues
(Doc.
her disrespectful
amounts,
she
1984) .
performance.
she
the
See St.
that We
same as
her.
reason at all,
We
show
unless
for
failed
no.
expected and
Bostic
were
was
57-1,
for
admits
small
unimportant.
small
to
We
amounts
accomplish
1f 15),
is
a
Bostic
fails
to
demonstrate
that
We
Care's
to
rebut
proffered
reason
is
mere
pretext.
Bostic
also
fails
disrespectful to Harris.
We
Care's
argument
that
she was
Not only does she admit her disrespect
(doc. no. 57-1, % 47), and that she gave him an ultimatum at their
last meeting,
asking "are you going to fire me or are you going to
write me up"
(id. % 39), she also misunderstands the nature of the
required
rebuttal.
behavior
15.)
and
But
that
She
she
Bostic's
was
See
Alvarez
(11th
Cir.
v.
collected.
her
behavior
(Doc.
is
no.
her
64
at
irrelevant
to
actually believed she was
being disrespectful.
Atl.
employer's
beliefs,
not
about
not
Developers,
inquiry
the
Inc.,
into
employee's
reality
as
Bostic
head.").
of
misremembered
the relevant inquiry
("The
maker's
and
Harris
pretextual;
Royal
on
that
reason is
2010)
it,
calm
perception
showing that We Care's
is whether Harris
argues
it
has
exists
presented
610
pretext
beliefs
outside
no
F.3d
1253,
centers
and,
to
of
the
evidence
to
1266
on
be
the
blunt
decision
rebut
We
Care's contention that Harris actually perceived Bostic's behavior
as disrespectful.
(See Doc.
no.
57-1,
%% 40-41.)
Thus,
Bostic
again fails to demonstrate that We Care's reason is mere pretext.
Finally, We Care argues that Bostic was fired due to repeated
late
attendance.
Care's
outline
responds only
(Doc.
of
a
no.
58
pattern
at
of
10.)
late
Instead of
attendance
rebutting We
(id.),
Bostic
to the instance in which she ran out of gas and
12
arrived late
at
the
Fitzgerald office
(see
doc.
no.
64
Bostic's explanation for her tardiness implicitly admits
at
15) .
that she
was in fact late while providing no evidence that Harris knew why
she was
list
late
of
to
that
other
explanations
office.
instances
fall
Bostic
of
short
of
late
also
does
not
attendance.
providing
a
rebut
In
rebuttal
We
Care's
short,
to
We
her
Care's
argument that she was fired for poor attendance.
Bostic
her
fails
termination
Care's
alleged
are
false,
See
the
establish
and
discrimination
termination.
Therefore,
to
St.
Court
Mary's
finds
that
We
Care's
given
she
also
fails
was
the
real
Honor
Ctr.,
that she has
to
reasons
show
reason
509
reasons
We
her
at
515.
failed to meet her burden
of establishing that We Care's reasons are mere pretext.
Care's
that
for
U.S.
for
are plausible and unrebutted,
the Court
Since We
finds
that
Bostic has failed to meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas.
Therefore,
Judgment.
B.
(Doc.
Court
no.
grants
We
Care's
Motion
for
Summary
57.)
LogistiCare's Motion for Summary Judgment
"A
plaintiff
lawsuit."
Ga.
the
2003) .
must
Cooper v.
Thus,
between two parties,
be
an
^employee'
S. Co. , 260 F. Supp.
if
an
employment
to
bring
2d 1258,
relationship
a
Title
1263 n.l
does
not
VII
(N.D.
exist
all claims under Title VII must be dismissed.
13
LogistiCare argues that there never was an employment relationship
between it and Bostic.
1.
The
EEOC's
warrant
Initially,
(Doc. no.
failure
59-1 at 4-9.)
to
serve
LogistiCare
does
not
dismissal.
LogistiCare
argues
that
it
never
received notice
of Bostic's EEOC charge of retaliation against it and that Bostic
therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
2-4.)
that
(Id.
at
LogistiCare is correct that the record contains no evidence
anyone
ever
LogistiCare's
first place,
notice
of
5(b).
served
argument
it
is
with
notice
insufficient
for
of
the
two
charge.
But
reasons.
In
the
it is not the complaining individual's job to serve
the
charge;
LogistiCare
it
is
offers
the
no
EEOC's.
See 42 U.S.C.
arguments
as
to
why
§ 2000e-
the
EEOC's
failure should prejudice Bostic's claim.
Second,
suffered
LogistiCare
any
has
failed
ill
from
the
effects
"A[W]hen an agency neglects
failure
inflicts no
observance
of
administrative
the
or
to
to
EEOC's
judicial
the
failure
error
does
action.'"
that
it
serve
it.
rule but
its
to
follow a procedural
significant injury on
rule,
demonstrate
the party entitled to
not
prevent
E.E.O.C.
v.
Bd.
Educ. for City of Savannah & Chatham Cnty. , 643 F. Supp.
(S.D.
Ga.
1986)(discussing
requirements)(quoting
1042
(5th
Cir.
the
E.E.O.C.
1976) ) .
EEOC's
v.
Airguide
LogistiCare
14
failure
to
Corp.,
does
not
follow
539
further
of
Pub.
134, 136
service
F.2d
identify
1038,
any
significant
Therefore,
2.
injury it
suffered as
a
result
of
not being
nothing prevents "further judicial action."
served.
See id.
LogistiCare is not an employer under Title VII.
The Court now turns to the question of whether LogistiCare is
Bostic's employer.
That Bostic is not an employee under Title VII
is
does
undisputed;
The
she
statute defines
employer,"
42
an
U.S.C.
not
employee as
§
interpreted
to
compensation
from
an
Lab,
Inc.,
163
who
2000e(f),
F.3d
individuals
deemed
that
mean
LogistiCare
evidence
that
only
1236,
paid
it
the
see
the
so.
that
(11th
the
who
v.
employer
is
the
has
Mini-Circuits,
an
Bostic
is.
receive
1998)
record
Therefore,
Circuit
Cir.
from
she
employed by an
Eleventh
Llampallas
statute.").
and
argue
individuals
1243
her,
did
which
compensation
under
to
"an individual
those
employer,
receive
'employees'
even attempt
does
P[0]nly
not
devoid
Court
can
be
argue
of
finds
any
that
LogistiCare is not an employer under Title VII.
3. LogistiCare is not a joint employer of Bostic.
More
complicated,
LogistiCare
was
a
however,
whether
as
joint employer
"concentrate [s]
entity
of
Bostic
of
determination of whether an entity qualifies
degree
of
question
We
the
employer
the
with
on
joint
is
control
an
a
adverse employment decision on which the Title VII
Id. at 1244-45.
while
the
two
"are
in
fact
15
separate
has
over
The
the
suit is based."
This control must be actual control,
entities
Care.
meaning that
. . . they
share or
co-determine
conditions
Stores,
those
of
matters
governing
employment."
Inc.,
128
the
Swallows
F.3d 990,
993,
n.4
essential
v.
Barnes
(6th Cir.
terms
&
Noble
and
Book
1997) (emphasis in
original).
Other factors include the entity's authority and power
to
the
control
Ltd.,
employee.
30 F.3d 1350,
1361
Bostic presents
that
fire her.
a
(11th Cir.
a
no.
v.
Riviera
Beach
Assocs.,
1994).
evidence to support her claim
joint employer with We
LogistiCare
(Doc.
Virgo
two pieces of
that LogistiCare was
argues
See
manager,
65 at 4-5.)
Allen
Care.
Davis,
First,
told
she
Harris
to
But Bostic's testimony alone is
insufficient to establish that LogistiCare actually possessed the
authority
Bostic
or
power
misstates
"Logisticare' s
(Doc.
to
no.
65
she
had no
and
[sic]
at
Harris.
the
make
a
decision
facts
in
her
manager directed We
8.)
(Doc.
knowledge
no.
57-4
of
at
any
66.)
her
brief,
Care
In her deposition,
personal
about
to
claiming
fire
however,
this
dispute
as
is
to
testimony is
been
offering
not
the
true,
a
sufficient
relevant
to
issue
establish
of
control.
Plaintiff."
between Davis
testified
Harris told her that Davis had told him to fire her.
Again,
that
Bostic admitted
conversation
She
employment.
a
only
(Id.
genuine
Even
if
that
at 60.)
factual
Bostic's
Davis could have overstepped his authority or
suggestion.
mistaken about what Davis said.
Harris
could
In short,
16
have
been
lying
or
Bostic's argument falls
far short of
establishing that LogistiCare exercised any kind of
control over her termination.
Second,
requested
check,
from
describes
her:
her
and so forth.
are not
All
Bostic
sufficient
independent
follow
these
various
name,
(Doc.
her
no.
contractors
state
date
65
to establish a
information
with
LogistiCare
regulations.
(Doc.
it
patients
(Id.
ff
7-11.)
transport
As
Bostic
57. )
In
addition,
relationship.
were
no.
complied
acknowledges,
LogistiCare's
background
required
59-2,
^f
to
10-11.)
the providers with which
"mandated solely" by the State of Georgia,
S[
a
But these requests
joint employment
verify that
to
birth,
at 3-4.)
LogistiCare was required to
contracted
of
LogistiCare
with
law.
requirements
the
Georgia
were
not LogistiCare.
request
for
this
(Id.
information
does not demonstrate that it exercised any degree of control over
We
Care's
employees.
nothing to do
This
collection
of
basic
with establishing "the degree of
suit
is
based."
Llampallas,
163
F.3d
has
control an entity
has over the adverse employment decision on which
VII
information
at
[Bostic's]
1244-45
Title
(emphasis
added).
Other
Bostic's
undisputed
claim of
facts
also
cast
joint employment.
She
significant
admits
that
doubt
on
LogistiCare
never hired her (doc. no. 59-2, f 48), that it never paid her (id.
U 49) , that no LogistiCare employee ever told she was an employee
(id.
K
53) , and
that
she
never
17
entered
any
agreement
with
the
company (id. f 55).
She even testified in her deposition that she
was "not contending that" LogistiCare was her employer.
(Doc.
no.
% 60.)
57-4 at 60; see also Doc. no. 59-2,
Weighing the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to
Bostic,
the
Court
cannot
conclude
sufficient control over Bostic
to
that
LogistiCare
qualify as
her joint employer.
The evidence Bostic provides
is
to survive summary judgment.
See Walker v. Darby,
1577
the
(11th Cir.
conclusion
LogistiCare.
1990).
that
We
Because
a mere
Rather,
Care
the
alone
Bostic's
exercised
"scintilla,"
insufficient
911 F.2d 1573,
undisputed evidence
was
claim
Bostic's
against
compels
employer,
not
LogistiCare
is
predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
and
because
no
joint employer,
matter
of
law.
LogistiCare
reasonable
jury
could
find
LogistiCare
was
her
see id., her claims against it cannot survive as a
After
cannot
have
all,
without
violated
an
Title
employment
VII.
relationship,
See
42
U.S.C.
§
2000e-2.
Therefore,
Judgment.
(Doc.
the Court grants
no.
59.)
IV.
For
the
reasons
Motion
for
Summary
GRANTS
LogistiCare's
LogistiCare's Motion for Summary
stated
Judgment
Motion
CONCLUSION
herein,
(Doc.
for
the
no.
Summary
18
Court
57)
GRANTS
and
Judgment
the
We
Care's
Court
(Doc.
no.
also
59).
The clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE each of these parties from the
case, as well as all deadlines and motions pertaining to them.
Two
They
have
defendants
remain:
filed
no
answer
entry
of
default
sought
an
ORDERS
Bostic
to
show
Lauragina
with
the
against
cause
within
and Joseph
L.
Porter,
Sr.
Court,
but
Bostic
has
never
them.
Therefore,
the
Court
THIRTY
DAYS
why
the
case
against them should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta,
Georgia,
this
day of June,
2015.
HONOROTLE J.
RANDAL HALL
unitedTstates DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
19
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