Halliburton v. Liberty County School District et al
Filing
21
ORDER denying 14 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 9/30/2015. (loh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
DR. LAVERNE HALLIBURTON,
Plaintiff,
V
CASE NO. CV414-179
.
LIBERTY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
DR. JUDY SCHERER, individually
and in her official capacity as
Superintendent of the Liberty
County School District; LILY H.
BAKER, individually and in her
official capacity as a Board
Member of the Liberty County
School District; MARCIA
ANDERSON, individually and in
her official capacity as a
Board Member of the Liberty
County School District; BECKY
CARTER, individually and in her
official capacity as a Board
Member of the Liberty County
School District; CHARLIE J.
FRASIER, individually and in
his official capacity as a
Board Member of the Liberty
County School District; CAROL
GtJYETT, individually and in her
official capacity as a Board
Member of the Liberty County
School District; VERDELL JONES,
individually and in his
official capacity as a Board
Member of the Liberty County
School District; and HAROLD
WOODS, individually and in his
official capacity as a Board
Member of the Liberty County
School District;
Defendants.
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ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Remand.
(Doc. 14.) For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case stems from the Superintendent of Defendant
Liberty County School District's ("Defendant District")
decision not to recommend renewal of Plaintiff's contract
as principal. (Doc. 15 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff initially filed suit
in the Superior Court of Liberty County alleging various
state law claims. (Id. 11 1, 4.) In a one-sentence order,
the Superior Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
(Id. ¶ 5.) However, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed
that decision in part and dismissed the claims against
Defendant District and the individual Defendants, in their
official capacities. (Id. ¶ 7.)
In response, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in
Superior Court. (Id. ¶ 9.) The amended complaint alleged
the same claims, including those previously dismissed, and
added claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 82, Attach. 2; id., Attach. 24.) Based on the
inclusion of these federal claims, Defendants invoked this
Court's federal question jurisdiction and removed the case
to this Court. (Doc. 1.) The Notice of Removal, signed by
2
counsel for all Defendants, states that the notice is being
filed on behalf of all Defendants in this case. (Id. at 12.)
In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff raised two
arguments in support of remand. First, Plaintiff contends
that Defendants failed to file individual written notices
of their consent to removal. (Doc. 14, Attach. 1 at 2.)
According to Plaintiff, the lack of individual consent in
the record fails to establish the unanimous consent of all
Defendants that is required for removal to this Court.
(Id.) Second, Plaintiff maintains that the record is
insufficient to establish that a majority of Defendant
District's School Board voted in favor of removal. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, majority approval by the board is
required for Defendant District's consent to be effective.
(Id. at 2-3.)
In their response, Defendants argue that the signature
of counsel for all Defendants stating their desire for
removal is sufficient to satisfy the unanimity requirement.
(Doc. 15 at 5-7.) In addition, Defendants contend that a
majority vote of Defendant District's School Board is not
required for counsel to consent to removal on Defendant
District's behalf. (Id. at 7.)
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DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction:
they may only hear cases that they have been authorized to
hear by the Constitution or Congress. See Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). For
cases first filed in state court, a defendant may remove
the matter to federal court only if the original case could
have been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Conversely, if no basis for subject matter jurisdiction
exists, a party may move to remand the case back to state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). When a case originally
filed in state court is removed by the defendant, the
defendant has the burden of proving that federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). All doubts about federal
jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of a remand to
state court. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 1092, 1095
(11th Cir. 1994)
Little discussion is required in this case because
Defendants' position is correct. In Cook v. Randolph Cty.,
Ga., 573 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals faced almost the same exact factual
scenario presented by this case: a group of defendants
represented by the same counsel filed a single Notice of
Removal stating that "[a]ll defendants, by counsel, hereby
file a Notice of Removal." Id. at 1150 (internal quotations
omitted). The Eleventh Circuit noted that there is no
requirement that every defendant in a case actually sign a
Notice of Removal to establish unanimous consent. Id.
Absent some basis for believing that an individual
defendant did not want the case removed, a representation
by counsel for all the defendants that they consented to
removal was sufficient. Id. at 1150-51.
There is little difference in this case. Defendants
are all represented by the same counsel. The Notice of
Removal is signed by counsel and states that all Defendants
"by and through undersigned counsel, hereby file this
Notice of Removal." (Doc. 1 at 1-2.) Therefore, the Notice
of Removal establishes that all Defendants consented to the
removal of this case.
Plaintiff's argument concerning the requirement that a
majority of Defendant District's School Board vote to
consent to removal is unavailing. As an initial matter, the
decision to remove a case to the federal forum is a
strategic choice that rests within the discretion of
counsel. Second, Plaintiff has failed to point to any
statute or legal opinion that requires Defendant District's
5
School Board to vote as a body on litigation decisions. For
these reasons, remand is not appropriate in this case.'
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this
day of September 2015.
WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
1
Perhaps recognizing the lack of merit in her original
motion, Plaintiff's reply argues that this Court should
decline jurisdiction because state law concerns predominate
this case. (Doc. 17 ¶ 3.) The Court will not address
arguments raised for the first time in a reply to a
response to a motion. See Herring v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr.,
397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States
v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 632 n.7 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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