Cobb v. Georgia Ports Authority et al

Filing 30

ORDER denying 10 Motion to Remand; granting 14 Motion to Remand. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant GPA, as well as all claims against defendants other Defendant ILA, are hereby severed from this case and remanded to the State Court of Chatham County, Georgia. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant ILA will remain in this case for further proceedings. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 8/21/15. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

RYAN COBB, individually and
as child of Dianne Cobb,
deceased; and ROMMIE COBB, as
surviving spouse of Dianne
Cobb, deceased, and Personal
Representative of Dianne
Cobb;
Plaintiffs,
V

.

GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY;
CURTIS J. FOLZ; JOHN D.
TRENT; MARINE TERMINALS
CORPORATION-EAST, d/b/a/
Ports America; INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION
LOCAL NUMBER 1414 SAVANNAH,
GEORGIA; DONGKUK
INTERNATIONAL, INC.; DUFERCO
STEEL, INC.; NEW PROCESS
STEEL, INC; PAN OCEAN
SHIPPING CO., LTD.; ALLOCEANS
SHIPPING CO., LTD.; JOHN DOE
CORPORATION #1; JOHN DOE
CORPORATION 2; JOHN DOE
CORPORATION #3; JOHN DOE
CORPORATION #4; and MARION
WILLIAMS;

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CASE NO. CV414-182

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Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Doc. 10)
and Defendant Georgia Ports Authority's Motion to Remand (Doc.
14). Defendant International Longshoremen's Association Local
Number 1414 Savannah, Georgia ('ILA") has responded in

opposition to Plaintiffs' motion.

(Doc. 15.) No party has

objected to Defendant Georgia Ports Authority's ('GPA") motion.
For the reasons that follow, Defendant GPA's Motion to Remand
(Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant GPA,

as well as all claims against defendants other than Defendant
ILA, are hereby SEVERED from this case and REMANDED to the State
Court of Chatham County, Georgia. However, Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand (Doc. 10) is

DENIED.

As a result, Plaintiffs' claims

against Defendant ILA will remain in this Court for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND

This case stems from a workplace accident at the Port of
Savannah that resulted in the death of Dianne Cobb. On March 28,
2012, Dianne Cobb was struck and killed by a forklift operated
by Marion Williams.' (Doc. 1, Attach. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff Ryan
Cobb, Dianne Cobb's son, witnessed the incident. Id. Plaintiffs
filed separate actions—alleging identical facts and involving
identical parties—that were both eventually removed to this
Court on August 22, 2014. (Doc. 1; CV414-183, Doc. 1.) On
November 25, 2014, this Court consolidated both actions into
this case. (Doc. 22.) The parties' motions to remand followed.

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Marion Williams was originally a codefendant in this case, but
has since been voluntarily dismissed. (Doc. 1 at 3.)
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ANALYSIS
In general terms, federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction: they may only adjudicate cases over which they
have been granted jurisdiction by the Constitution or Congress.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375
(1994). For cases removed from state court, the defendant
normally has the burden of proving the existence of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d
1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) . Where removal is improper, a party
may move to remand the case back to state court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447 (c) . All doubts about federal jurisdiction should be
resolved in favor of a remand to state court. Burns v. Windsor
Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
With regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Defendant ILA
bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists
because it removed this case to federal court. See Kirkland v.
Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001). In
support of removal, Defendant

ILA

notes that Plaintiffs

referenced the collective bargaining agreement made between
Defendant ILA and the Georgia Stevedore Association in response
to Defendant

ILA's

interrogatories as to what documents

Plaintiffs allege "tend to show liability and/or fault for the
injuries complained of on the part of Defendant

[ILA.]" (Doc. 1

at 2.) According to Defendant ILA, Plaintiff's reliance on this
agreement implicates Section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act ('LMRA"), which provides federal preemption to
claims involving analysis of collective bargaining agreements.
29 U.S.C. § 15(a).
In their Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs insist that their
claims do not arise pursuant to any collective bargaining
agreement, but that they disclosed the agreement during
discovery merely because Plaintiffs potentially may use or refer
to the document in "pursuit of the underlying action against
Defendant ILA." (Doc. 10 at 2.) Plaintiffs admit that the
agreements are "relevant" to this case, but fail to offer any
further explanation. (Id.) Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant
ILA has not met its pleading requirement to remove this case
because the notice of removal does not address exactly how
Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the LMRA. (Id. at 5.)
Finally, Plaintiffs alternatively argue that removal is untimely
because Defendant ILA was aware of the collective bargaining
agreement and its relevant terms prior to Plaintiffs' disclosure
of the document. Id.
In response, Defendant ILA reasserts its position that
Plaintiffs' reference of the agreement establishes that their
state tort claims will ultimately require an interpretation of
the agreement's terms. (Doc. 15 at 4.) As a result, the LMRA's
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preemption power—and thus, this Court's jurisdiction—is properly
invoked in this case. Furthermore, Defendant ILA responds that
removal was timely as it removed this case within thirty days of
receiving Plaintiffs' responses that referenced the agreements.
(Id. at 9.)
Quite simply, the Court finds Plaintiffs'

arguments

confusing and unpersuasive. Admittedly, proper jurisdictional
analysis of Plaintiffs' claims is complicated due to Plaintiff's
largely conclusory pleading and their failure to illustrate the
precise nature of their claims. For instance, it is difficult to
ascertain from the complaint the grounds upon which Plaintiffs
believe Defendant ILA owed any duty of care in this case. As a
result, it is also unclear how the collective bargaining
agreement at issue in this case could be "'relevant" to
demonstrating Defendant ILA's liability, yet not a basis for
Plaintiffs' cause of action. Regardless, the Supreme Court has
held that

w[s]ection 301 governs claims founded directly on

rights created by collective-bargaining agreements and claims
substantially dependent on analysis of such agreements."
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 387 (1987) . While
the extent to which Plaintiffs claims rely on the agreement
remains uncertain, it is highly likely that this case will
require more than a passing reference to the document.

Accordingly, the Court's continued exercise of jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's claims is appropriate.
With regard to the timeliness of Defendant ILA's removal,
the Court again finds Plaintiffs' contentions wholly
unpersuasive. As stated above, Plaintiffs' complaint provides
little enlightenment of the alleged basis for Defendant ILA's
liability. As a result, the Court finds no fault in Defendant
ILA's inability to ascertain whether Plaintiff's claims arose
under federal law until Plaintiffs' responses implicated the
collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, Defendant ILA
timely removed this case because it filed its notice of removal
within thirty days of receiving Plaintiffs' response implicating
the collective bargaining agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (3)
(notice of removal may be filed within thirty days of
defendant's receipt of document indicating that case is or has
become removable)
The Court now directs its attention to Defendant GPA's
Motion to Remand. (Doc. 14.) In that motion, GPA correctly
asserts that it is immune from suit in this Court pursuant to
the Eleventh Amendment. Misener Marine Constr., Inc. vs. Norfolk
Dredging Co., 2008 WL 2278132, at *2 (S.D. Ga. March 28, 2008)
For this reason alone, Defendant GPA's motion should be granted.
However, Defendant GPA also points out that it has not consented
to removal as required by U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2) (A). In such cases,

the Court "shall sever from the action all claims [not falling
under federal jurisdiction] and shall remand the severed claims
to the State court from which the action was removed." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (2).
While Defendant GPA is the only defendant to have moved to
remand the claims against it to state court, no defendant other
than Defendant ILA has explicitly consented to the removal of
this action. The notice of removal references only Plaintiffs'
claims against Defendant ILA and asserts that the other
defendants' consent to removal is unnecessary as Plaintiffs'
claims against Defendant ILA are independent and separate from
those brought against the other defendants. (Doc. 1 at 3.) As a
result, Defendant ILA goes on to state in its response that
Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants should be
severed from this action and remanded to state court. (Doc. 15
at 13.) No party has filed an objection or otherwise opposed
Defendant ILA's position. Furthermore, the Court can discern no
likelihood that Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants
would involve analysis of the collective bargaining agreement or
potentially implicate any other trigger for federal
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court finds that all claims
against defendants apart from Defendant ILA must be severed from
this case and remanded to state court for further proceedings.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant GPA's Motion to
Remand (Doc. 14) is

GRANTED.

Plaintiffs' claims against

Defendant GPA, as well as all claims against defendants other
than Defendant ILA, are hereby

SEVERED

from this case and

REMANDED to the State Court of Chatham County, Georgia. However,

Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Doc. 10) is DENIED. As a result,
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant ILA will remain in this
Court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED this 2/day of August 2015.

WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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