Cobb v. Georgia Ports Authority et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting 24 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are hereby dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 9/21/15. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

79

C)

RYAN COBB, individually and
as child of Dianne Cobb,
deceased; and RONNIE COBB, as
surviving spouse of Dianne
Cobb, deceased, and Personal
Representative of Dianne
Cobb;

1

Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. CV414-182

v.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION LOCAL NUMBER 1414
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA
Defendant.

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
24), to which Plaintiffs have filed a response (Doc. 27). For
the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is

GRANTED

and

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are hereby DISMISSED.

The

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
BACKGROUND

This case stems from a workplace accident at the Port of
Savannah that resulted in the death of Dianne Cobb.' Defendant is
the collective bargaining entity for longshoremen at the Port of
1

For the purposes of Defendant's motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs'
allegations set forth in their complaint will be taken as true.
See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2009)

Savannah ("Port") . (Doc. 42, Attach. 1 at 2.) As the collective
bargaining representative for longshoremen, Defendant entered
into a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") with a group
of Port employers known as the Georgia Stevedore Association.
(Id., Attach. 1 at 3.) It was the purpose of the CBA to ensure
that no unfair labor hiring practices occurred when employers in
the Georgia Stevedore Association hired Defendant's union
members. Id. Mrs. Cobb was a member of a different union for
clerks and checkers at the Port called the International
Longshoremen's Association Local Number 1475. (Id., Attach. 1 at
2.)
On March 2, 2012, a Port employer named MTC East hired
Marion Williams—a union member of Defendant—through the hiring
hall operated by Defendant, (Id., Attach. 1 at 3.) Marion
Williams was hired to operate a forklift for the unloading of a
vessel docked at the Port. Id. While in MTC East's employ,
Marion Williams inadvertently struck Mrs. Cobb with his
forklift, killing her. Id. Plaintiff Ryan Cobb, Dianne Cobb's
son, witnessed the incident. Id.
Plaintiff Rommie Cobb, Mrs. Cobb's husband, and Plaintiff
Ryan Cobb each filed separate actions—alleging identical facts
and involving identical parties—that were both eventually
removed to this Court on August 22, 2014. (Doc. 1; CV414-183,
Doc. 1.) Thereafter, this Court consolidated both actions into

this case. (Doc. 22.) On September 24, 2014, Plaintiffs moved to
remand this case to state court, arguing that they asserted only
state-law tort claims against Defendant. (Doc. 14.) However, the
Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, finding that
Plaintiffs' state law tort claims were preempted by 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a), which provides federal preemption to claims involving
analysis of collective bargaining agreements. (Doc. 30.) The
Court now addresses Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
ANALYSIS
I.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a) (2)

requires a

complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "[T]he pleading
standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual
allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Aschroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 'A pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotations omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id.
When the Court considers a motion to dismiss, it accepts
the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Sinaltrainalv.
3

Coca-Cola _Co. , 578 F. 3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). However,
this Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Moreover, "unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint are not
admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of
plaintiff's allegations." Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268. That
is,

"[t]he rule does not impose a probability requirement at

the pleading stage,' but instead simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element." Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 545).
II. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS UNDER THE CBA
In their complaint, Plaintiffs bring state-law tort claims
against Defendant for negligence, negligent entrustment, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Each of these claims
is premised on Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendant breached its
"duty to exercise ordinary care in the presentation of laborers"
when it referred Mr. Williams to work for MTC East. (Doc. 1,
Attach. 1. at 19.) However, Plaintiffs have offered nothing to
suggest Defendants have such a duty. To the contrary, Georgia
law actually ascribes the duty to ensure workplace safety by
statute to employers, not labor unions. See O.C.G.A. § 34-210(a) ("Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be
4

reasonably safe for the employees therein."); Clarke v.
Laborers' Int'l Union of N.

Am.,

AFL-CIO, 916 F.2d 1539, 1542

(11th Cir. 1990) ("Unquestionably, the common law duty to
provide a safe workplace falls on the employer, not on a labor
union.")
In an effort to save their claims, Plaintiffs assert that
while no common law duties apply to Defendant, Defendant
nonetheless assumed a duty to provide a safe workplace under the
terms of the CBA. (Doc. 27, Attach. 1 at 4.) This argument,
however, must fail. In the types of claims made by the
Plaintiffs "it is well established that § 301 [of the Labor
Management Relations Act] governs, and, hence, preempts claims
that are either founded directly on rights created by a
collective bargaining agreement or substantially dependent upon
an analysis of a collective bargaining agreement." Darden v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116, 1119 (1987) . Put another way,
if a state tort claim relies on the violation of a duty created
solely by a collective bargaining agreement, and which does not
exist absent that agreement, the state tort claim is preempted
by § 301. Atwater v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 626
F.3d 1170, 1174 (2010). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims of
negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress hinge on whatever duties the CBA assigns to
Defendant as they relate to Plaintiffs. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
5

Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851. 862 (1987) ("In order
to determine [a defendant's] tort liability . . . a court would
have to ascertain, first, whether the collective-bargaining
agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care on [the
defendant] to ensure that [the plaintiff] was provided a safe
workplace, and, second, the nature and scope of that duty, that
is, whether, and to what extent, the [defendant's] duty extended
to the particular responsibilities alleged [in the]
complaint.")
Here, Plaintiffs allege in their response that the CBA
created an express duty upon Defendant to provide a safe
workplace. In support of this contention, Plaintiffs point out
that the CBA includes the following provision under the heading,
"Container Operations General. Safety Rules": "Permit only those
persons considered by the employer by reason of training or
experience and who understand the signs, notices and operating
instructions to operate any powered equipment." (Doc. 24,
Attach. 2 at 61.) However, the Court fails to see how this
bizarrely-worded provision could establish the duty Plaintiff
alleges.
First, the provision is listed in general safety rules, and
Plaintiff has failed to point to any language in this or any
other section of the CBA indicating that the provisions listed

are intended to ascribe affirmative duties to Defendant. 2 Second,
the operative language of the provision requires, at most, that
union members operating power equipment must be "considered by
the employer by reason of training or experience" and
"understand the signs, notices and operating instructions." Id.
There is no mention of competence or ability in this section.
Finally, the Court finds it readily apparent that to the extent
the provision creates a duty in any party, that duty clearly
belongs to the employers and not Defendant. (Id., Attach. 2 at
61 (""[O]nly those persons considered by the employer . . . (may]
operate any powered equipment.") (emphasis added) .) Quite
simply, because the Court finds that no interpretation of the
CBA imparts upon the Defendant an express duty to ensure the
competence of the forklift operators, Plaintiffs' claims
necessarily fail. Ryan v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
675, 794 F.2d 641, 642 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The absence of any
regal duty owed to the employee to refer only competent people,
or to supervise them once on the job, is obviously fatal to the
supposed existence of a like duty to any third-party

2

Other provisions in the CBA do appear to ascribe certain duties
to the parties. For instance, a provision stating '[t]he
employer shall direct employees to stay clear of the area
beneath a suspended container" also appears in the previously
mentioned general safety rules subsection. (Doc. 24, Attach. 2
at 61.)
7

beneficiary."). Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss must
be granted.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion is GRANTED
and Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are hereby

DISMISSED.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.

Sr
SO ORDERED this Z/'day of September 2015.

WILLIAM T. MOORE,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

E.