Days v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Company

Filing 26

ORDER deferring ruling on 6 Motion to Dismiss; denying 7 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 9/14/15. (bcw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

L

JEANNETTE H. DAYS,
Plaintiff,
Is,

CASE NO. CV414-214
STONEBRIDGE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doe.
7), to which Defendant has filed a response (Doe. 12) . In
addition, Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doe. 6)
to which Plaintiff has filed a response (Doe. 8) . For the
following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is

DENIED.

However, the Court DEFERS ruling on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. The parties are hereby ordered to each file a
single supplemental brief addressing whether Illinois law
should be applied in this case.' Both parties are directed
to file their briefs within forty-five days from the date
of this order. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED

to

' The parties should be aware that the Court will not accept
any supplemental briefing that incorporates by reference
factual allegations or arguments contained in an earlier
filing. The supplemental briefs should be stand-alone
filings that independently contain all the factual
allegations and arguments that the parties wish the Court
to consider.

administratively terminate Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 6) for statistical purposes. Following the
supplemental briefing, the Court will revisit Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND

This case arises from the death of Plaintiff's
husband, Benjamin Days Sr., in a bicycle accident that
occurred on April 21,

2008.2 (Doc. 1, Attach. 1 at 2.)

According to Plaintiff's complaint, Mr. Days was covered at
the time of his death by life insurance policies

issued by

Defendant. 4 (Doc. 1, Attach. 1 at 2.) Both policies included
three possible schedules for recovery—identified in the
2 Plaintiff's complaint states merely that Mr. Days "died as
a result of a bicycle accident," but fails to allege that a
motorized vehicle was involved. (Doc. 1, Attach. 1 at 2.)
Furthermore, Plaintiff's demand letter stated that "there
is no evidence that another vehicle was involved in the
demise of Mr. Benjamin N. Days, Sr." (Doc. 1, Attach. 1 at
6.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges in his Motion to Remand
that "Benjamin N. Days, Sr. died as a result of an accident
involving an unidentified motor vehicle while riding a
bicycle." (Doc. 7, Attach. 1 at 2.)
Plaintiff alleges that there are three life insurance
policies—numbered 25292, 25451, and GC346. (Doc. 1, Attach.
1 at 2.) However, Defendant has stated in its Motion to
Dismiss, and attached supporting documentation indicating,
that there are only two policies—numbered 25292 and 25451
GC346. (Doc. 6, Attach. 6 at 1; Doc. 6, Attachs. 2-5.)
The insurance policies are evidenced by two types of
documentation: (1) group policies and (2) certificates of
insurance. The group policies were issued under Defendant's
former name, J.C. Penney Life Insurance Company, while the
certificates of insurance were issued under the name of
Stonebridge Life Insurance Company. (Doc. 6, Attach. 1
11 2-11; Id. Attach. 3; Id. Attach 5.)

relevant documents as "Part [s]." (Doc. 6, Attachs.

2-5.)

Part I provided coverage for injuries incurred by reason of
travel by common carrier, Part II provided coverage for
injuries occurring during travel by passenger automobile
and land motor vehicle accidents, and Part III provided
coverage for all other injuries. Id. Following her
husband's death, Plaintiff sought recovery of benefits
under the life insurance policies. (Doc. 1, Attach. 1 at
2.)
Defendant paid benefits to Plaintiff under Part III of
both policies. Id. However, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant declined to pay benefits under Part II of the
policies. Id. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant acted
in bad faith when it wrongfully withheld the benefits to
which Plaintiff was entitled under Part II. (Id. at 3.) As
a result, Plaintiff filed suit in the State Court of
Chatham County seeking payment under Part II, interest on
the unpaid benefits from the date of Mr. Days's death, and
all associated costs and fees incurred in prosecuting this
action. (Id. at 4.) Defendant subsequently invoked this
Court's diversity jurisdiction and removed the case to this
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1.)
On October 3, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim

3

for which relief may be granted and that Plaintiff's breach
of contract claim was contractually barred. (Doc. 6,
Attach. 6.) Plaintiff responded that Plaintiff had
sufficiently put Defendant on notice as to the claims
against it and that Plaintiff's claims are not time barred
because the contractual limitations in the insurance
policies were tolled. (Doc. 8.)
On October 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Remand contending that although there is diversity of
citizenship, Georgia's long arm statute subjects Defendant
to the jurisdiction of Georgia's courts and that the State
Court of Chatham County is "uniquely equipped to exercise
personal jurisdiction over this claim." (Doc. 7.) The Court
now addresses both motions.
ANALYSIS

I.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
In general terms, federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction: they may only adjudicate cases over which
they have been granted jurisdiction by the Constitution or
Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375 (1994) . Specifically, federal district courts
have jurisdiction over two types of civil actions: (1)
those that involve a federal question, meaning the claim
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

4

United States; and (2) those that invoke the Court's
diversity jurisdiction, meaning they involve an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000 and are "between citizens
of different States, between U.S. citizens and foreign
citizens, or by foreign states against U.S. citizens."
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 552 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332) . In cases removed
to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, removal
is permissible only "if there is complete diversity between
all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, and no
defendant is a citizen of the forum State." Lincoln Prop.
Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005).
Despite the presence of complete diversity, Plaintiff
contends that this case should be remanded because Georgia
state courts may properly exercise jurisdiction over
nonresidents who transact business in Georgia pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). The Court, however, finds
Plaintiff's argument wholly without merit. While O.C.G.A.
§ 9-10-91(1) does provide Georgia with the opportunity to
exert jurisdiction over entities like Defendant, it has
long been determined that such state statutes do not
preclude federal jurisdiction. Ordinarily, "[f]ederal
jurisdiction cannot be defeated by a state statute
prescribing the court in which the action is to be

5

brought." Akin v. La. Nat. Bank of Baton Rouge, 322 F.2d
749, 754 (5th Cir. 1963); see Roberts & Schaefer Co. v.
Hardaway Co., 945 F. Supp. 247, 250 (M.D. Fla. 1996)
(noting that state statutes granting jurisdiction to a
state court may not ordinarily "bar [] federal courts
sitting in diversity jurisdiction from possessing subject
matter jurisdiction" (citing Greyhound Lines, Inc.

V.

Lexington State Bank & Trust Co., 604 F.2d 1151 (8th Cir.
1979) )
In addition, Plaintiff's argument that Georgia courts
are "uniquely equipped" to handle this case (Doc. 7 at 1)
is similarly unavailing. Federal courts make determinations
based on state law in the exercise of their diversity
jurisdiction. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 495 (1946)
Therefore, the fact that federal courts are routinely
called upon to interpret state law cannot be a sufficient
reason to decline jurisdiction. Id.
Quite simply, the Court finds that this case meets the
appropriate standards for diversity jurisdiction because
there is complete diversity between the parties and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff has not

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc) the Eleventh Circuit adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

1.1

challenged either of these requirements, or put forth a
compelling reason why the Court should decline to exercise
its jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand is DENIED.
II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
As stated previously, this case centers on life
insurance policies executed between Plaintiff's husband and
Defendant. As Plaintiff points out, the group policies
governing the agreements contain choice-of-law provisions
that require the agreements be construed in accordance with
the laws of the state of Illinois. (Doc. 8 at 6.) With
respect to issues of state law, however, Plaintiff and
Defendant cite exclusively to Georgia law in their briefs.
Despite both parties' failure to sufficiently address
the choice of law provisions in the life insurance
agreements, the Court is compelled to determine which
state's law should govern this dispute. '[A] federal court
sitting in diversity should, whenever possible, reach the
same result as the state court would reach in deciding the
identical issue." Goodwin v. George Fischer Foundry Sys.,
Inc., 769 F.2d 708, 711 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal
citations omitted) . Pursuant to choice-of-law
jurisprudence, "Georgia will honor choice of law provisions
unless no reasonable basis exists for doing so or[]

7

application of the chosen state's law is contrary to a
fundamental policy of Georgia which has a materially
greater interest in the issue than the chosen state." Bryan
v. Hall Chem. Co., 993 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir. 1993) see
also Carr v. Kupfer, 250 Ga. 106, 107, 296 S.E.2d 560, 562
(1982) ("Absent a contrary public policy, this court will
normally enforce a contractual choice of law clause.")
The Court's review of the policies' express terms
indicates that the parties may have intended them to be
interpreted under Illinois law. It is also clear that
neither party completed more than a cursory review of that
body of law. As a result, the Court finds it appropriate to
defer ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss until both
parties have clarified this issue. Accordingly, both
Plaintiff and Defendant are directed to file supplemental
briefs addressing the issue of whether the Court should
apply Illinois law to this matter. If the Court determines
that choice-of-law principles dictate that Illinois law
governs this dispute, then the parties will be directed to
resubmit briefs citing supporting Illinois law. See S.D.
Ga. L.R. 7.1 (requiring parties to submit motions
"accompanied by a memorandum of law citing supporting
authorities.")

E:I

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is

DENIED.

However, the

Court DEFERS ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The
parties are hereby ordered to each file a single
supplemental brief addressing whether Illinois law should
be applied in this case. 6 Both parties are directed to file
their briefs within forty-five days of this order. The
Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED

to administratively terminate

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) for statistical
purposes. Upon the filing of supplemental briefs, the Court
will revisit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
SO ORDERED this

/41day of September 2015.

WILLIAM T.MOOE,J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

6

The Court again emphasizes that it will not accept any
supplemental briefing that incorporates by reference
factual allegations or arguments contained in an earlier
filing. The supplemental briefs should be stand-alone
filings that independently contain all the factual
allegations and arguments that the parties wish the Court
to consider.