Ingram v. State of Georgia et al

Filing 7

ORDER vacating 4 Report and Recommendations and dismissing this case without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 6/19/15. (bcw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
MICHAEL A. INGRAM, SR.,
Plaintiff,
V

4: 14-cv-266

.

STATE OF GEORGIA et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation
("R&R") recommending that the Court
dismiss Michael A. Ingram, Sr.'s, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action with prejudice, ECF No. 4.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court
VACATES the Magistrate Judge's R&R.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 20, 2015, the Magistrate
Judge issued an order granting Ingram leave
to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") on the
condition that he provide a Prisoner Trust
Fund Account Statement and a Consent to
Collection of Fees from Trust Account.
ECF No. 3. In closing, the Magistrate Judge
advised that "[i]f no response is timely
received from plaintiff, the Court will
presume that plaintiff desires to have this
case voluntarily dismissed and will dismiss
this action without prejudice." Id. at 4-5
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, on April 3,
2015, after Ingram failed to timely respond
to the Magistrate Judge's order conditionally
granting him IFP status, the Magistrate
Judge recommended that Ingram's case be

dismissed witb.ru
Rule
Rule 4r(bs,E}l
III. ST

pursuant to Federal
URfll (b) and Local

A.
$1 REVIEW

The Court rev A's de novo any portions
of a which
objection is niade. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Where neither pai :y files objections, the
See
Court's review is for clear error.
Diamond v. Colon 21 Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 31 , 315 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stating that "in the absence of a timely filed
objection, a distric court . . . must 'only
satisfy itself that t] ere is no clear error on
the face of the recc d in order to accept the
recommendation" quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
72 advisory comn iftee's note)); see also
Butler v. Emory U v., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1374,
1382 (N.D. Ga. 2 14) ("[P]ortions of the
R&R to which no c )jection is made need be
reviewed only ft clear error." (citing
Macort v. Prem, mi 208 F. App'x 781, 784
(11th Cir. 2006)). n conducting its review,
the Court "may ac pt, reject, or modify, in
whole or in r irt, the findings or
recommendations 'ade by the magistrate
judge." 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).
IV. ANAL
Although Ingrari has not objected to the
Magistrate Judge's R&R, the Court finds
clear error in th recommendation and
therefore substitutes this order in its stead.
A. Rule 41(b)
The Magistrate Judge recommended that
the Court dismiss Irgram's case pursuant to
Federal Rule of Cii1 Procedure and Local
Rule 41(b). ECF No. 4. Dismissal of a
complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b) "is an

I'

dismissing Ingran's Complaint with
prejudice.

extreme sanction that may be properly
imposed only when: '(1) a party engages in a
clear pattern of delay or willful contempt.
and (2) the district court specifically finds
that lesser sanctions would not suffice."
Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432
F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis in original) (quoting World
Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int'l Family Entm 't,
Inc., 41 F.3d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1995)).
The Eleventh Circuit "rigidly require[s] the
district courts to make these findings
precisely '[b]ecause the sanction of
dismissal with prejudice is so unsparing' and
[the Court of Appeals] strive[s] to afford a
litigant his or her day in court, if possible."
Id. at 1339 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 103 (11th Cir.
1989)). Indeed, failure to make such
specific findings generally warrants reversal.
See Mingo, 864 F.2d at 102 ("Although [the
Eleventh Circuit] occasionally ha[s] found
implicit in an order the conclusion that
lesser sanctions would not suffice, [it] ha[s]
never suggested that the district court need
not make that finding, which is essential
before a party can be penalized for his
attorney's misconduct." (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

The Court finds that the Magistrate
Judge's recommendation is clearly
erroneous. At worst, Ingram's failure to
comply with the Mgistrate Judge's order to
furnish a Prisoner Trust Fund Account
Statement and a Consent to Collection of
Fees from Trust Account was attributable
either to neglect or to confusion. But
"[m]ere negligenc or confusion is not
sufficient to justify a finding of delay or
willful misconduct" necessary to support the
sanction of dismisal with prejudice. See
Bettis v. Toys "R " US—Del., Inc., 273 F.
App'x 814, 818 (1 ith Cir. 2008) (citing
McKelvey v. AT, T/P Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d
1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). The more
reasonable interpre1ation of Ingram's failure
to timely furnish the requested documents is
that Ingram accepted the Magistrate Judge's
invitation "to vluntari1y dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)." See ECF No. 3 at 3, 4-5 ("If no
response is timely received from plaintiff,
the Court will presume that plaintiff desires
to have this case voluntarily dismissed and
will dismiss this action without prejudice.").
Thus, the Couitt finds that the record
does not support dimissa1 of Ingram's case
with prejudice undr Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b). ather, the Court finds
Ingram's failure to comply with the Court's
order conditionally granting him IFP status
is best construed as a voluntary dismissal of
his case. See ECF No. 3 at 4-5.

B. Application
Here, the Magistrate Judge failed to
make specific findings as to both whether
Ingram engaged in a clear pattern of delay or
willful contempt and whether lesser
sanctions would sufficiently address any
purported misconduct. The Magistrate
Judge instead summarily recommended

V. CONCLUSION
The Court
Judges recomii
2

ci that the Magistrate
ion that Ingram's case

be dismissed with prejudice was clearly
erroneous and therefore VACATED the
Magistrate Judge's R&R, ECF No. 4. The
Court's review of the record made clear that
Ingram's failure to timely comply with the
Court's order to furnish a Prisoner Trust
Fund Account Statement and a Consent to
Collection of Fees from Trust Account is
best construed as Ingram's voluntary
dismissal of his case, see ECF No. 3 at 4-5.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
Ingram's Complaint, ECF No. 1,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Pursuant to the order conditionally
granting Ingram IFP status, Ingram is not
required "to pay the filing fee" and this
dismissal does not "count as a dismissal
which may later subject plaintiff to the
three-dismissal rule under section 1915(g)."
See ECF No. 3 at 3.

This

daçofM2O15.

LISAGQDBEY WOOD
CHIEF'- JUDGE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

3