Campbell v. Martin

Filing 8

ORDER dismissing without prejudice Campbell's 1 Complaint and vacating the 4 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Complaint. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 6/15/2015. (ca)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
CRAIG J. CAMPBELL,

the Magistrate Judge recommended that
Campbell's case be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) and Local Rule 41(b). ECF No.4 at 1.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff,
4:15-cv-4

V.

TODD MARTIN, Deputy Chief Assistant,
Eastern Judicial Circuit,
Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation
("R&R") recommending that the Court
dismiss Craig J. Campbell's 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action with prejudice, ECF No. 4. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court
VA CA TES the Magistrate Judge's R&R.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 14, 2015, the Magistrate
Judge issued an order granting Campbell
leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP")
on the condition that he provide a Prisoner
Trust Fund Account Statement and a
Consent to Collection of Fees from Trust
Account. ECF No. 3. In closing, the
Magistrate Judge advised that "[i]f no
response is timely received from plaintiff,
the Court will presume that plaintiff desires
to have this case voluntarily dismissed and
will dismiss this action without prejudice."
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, on
April 3, 2015, after Campbell failed to
timely respond to the Magistrate Judge's
order conditionally granting him IFP status,

The Court reviews de novo any portions
of a magistrate judge's R&R "to which
objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Where neither party files objections, the
Court's review is for clear error.
See
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stating that "in the absence of a timely filed
objection, a district court . . . must 'only
satisfy itself that there is no clear error on
the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation" (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
72 advisory committee's note)); see also
Butler v. Emory Univ., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1374,
1382 (N.D. Ga. 2014) ("[P]ortions of the
R&R to which no objection is made need be
reviewed only for clear error." (citing
Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 784
(11th Cir. 2006)). In conducting its review,
the Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate
judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
IV. ANALYSIS
Although Campbell has not objected to
the Magistrate Judge's R&R, the Court finds
clear error in the recommendation and
therefore substitutes this order in its stead.
A. Rule 41(b)
The Magistrate Judge recommended that
the Court dismiss Campbell's case pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and
Local Rule 41(b). ECF No. 4. Dismissal of

a complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b) "is an
extreme sanction that may be properly
imposed only when: '(1) a party engages in a
clear pattern of delay or willful contempt...
and (2) the district court specifically finds
that lesser sanctions would not suffice."
Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432
F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis in original) (quoting World
Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int'l Family Entm 't,
Inc., 41 F.3d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1995)).
The Eleventh Circuit "rigidly require[s] the
district courts to make these findings
precisely '[b]ecause the sanction of
dismissal with prejudice is so unsparing' and
[the Court of Appeals] strive[s] to afford a
litigant his or her day in court, if possible."
Id. at 1339 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 103 (11th Cir.
1989)). Indeed, failure to make such
specific findings generally warrants reversal.
See Mingo, 864 F.2d at 102 ("Although [the
Eleventh Circuit] occasionally ha[s] found
implicit in an order the conclusion that
lesser sanctions would not suffice, [it] ha[s]
never suggested that the district court need
not make that finding, which is essential
before a party can be penalized for his
attorney's misconduct." (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
B. Application

Here, the Magistrate Judge failed to
make specific findings as to both whether
Campbell engaged in a clear pattern of delay
or willful contempt and as to whether lesser
sanctions would sufficiently address any
purported misconduct. The Magistrate
Judge instead summarily recommended

dismissing Campbell's Complaint with
prejudice.
The Court finds that the Magistrate
Judge's recommendation is clearly
erroneous. At worst, Campbell's failure to
comply with the Magistrate Judge's order to
furnish a Prisoner Trust Fund Account
Statement and a Consent to Collection of
Fees from Trust Account was attributable
either to neglect or to confusion. But
"[m]ere negligence or confusion is not
sufficient to justify a finding of delay or
willful misconduct" necessary to support the
sanction of dismissal with prejudice. See
Bettis v. Toys "R" US—Del., Inc., 273 F.
App'x 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
McKelvey v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d
1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). The more
reasonable interpretation of Campbell's
failure to timely furnish the requested
documents is that Campbell accepted the
Magistrate Judge's invitation "to voluntarily
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(l)." See ECF No. 3 at 3, 4 ("If
no response is timely received from
plaintiff, the Court will presume that
plaintiff desires to have this case voluntarily
dismissed and will dismiss this action
without prejudice.").
Thus, the Court finds that the record
does not support dismissal of Campbell's
case with prejudice under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b). Rather, the Court
finds Campbell's failure to comply with the
Court's order conditionally granting him IFP
status is best construed as a voluntary
dismissal of his case. See ECF No. 3 at 4-5.

V. CONCLUSION
The Court found that the Magistrate
Judge's recommendation that Campbell's
case be dismissed with prejudice was clearly
erroneous and therefore VACATED the
Magistrate Judge's R&R, ECF No. 4, The
Court's review of the record made clear that
Campbell's failure to timely comply with
the Court's order to furnish a Prisoner Trust
Fund Account Statement and a Consent to
Collection of Fees from Trust Account is
best construed as Campbell's voluntary
dismissal of his case, see ECF No. 3 at 4-5.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
Campbell's Complaint, ECF No. 1,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Pursuant to the order conditionally
granting Campbell IFP status, Campbell is
not required "to pay the filing fee" and this
dismissal does not "count as a dismissal
which may later subject plaintiff to the
three-dismissal rule under section 1915(g)."
See ECF No. 3 at 3.

This

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LIS4 GODEY WOOD
CH IF )tJDGE UNITED STATES
DIStI'RI9t COURT SOUTHERN
DISbIUtT OF GEORGIA

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