Williams v. Bryan County Jail

Filing 6

ORDERED that within 30 days of the date this Order is served, plaintiff must file an Amended 1 Complaint filed by Ra'kym Williams, specifying what legal claims he wishes to raise in this case. The Clerk is directed to send this Order to plaintiff's account custodian immediately. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 3/23/15. (wwp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
RA'KYM WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CV415-045

V.

BRYAN COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.

ORDER
Proceeding pro Se, inmate Ra'kym Williams brings this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 case against . . . he doesn't say. Doe. 1 at 1.1 The Clerk took an

As plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, docs. 3, 4 & 5, the Court is screening
his case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), to determine whether he has stated a
cognizable claim for relief. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (courts must identify
"cognizable claims" filed by prisoners or other detainees and dismiss claims which
are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2) (allowing dismissal
on the same four standards provided by § 1915A as to any prisoner suit brought
"with respect to prison conditions").
1

The Court applies Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards here. Leal v. Ga. Dept of
Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). Allegations in the complaint are
thus viewed as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Bumpus v. Watts, 448 F. App'x 3, 4 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2011). But conclusory allegations
fail. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (discussing a 12(b)(6) dismissal).
"[T]he pleading standard [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8 announces does not require 'detailed
factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (citations omitted); see also Hebbe v. Pliler,

educated guess and, on the docket page, inserted "Bryan County Jail" as
the defendant. Williams complains about: (a) being wrongly tasered by a
jail guard'; "not receiving my right medication for my mental issues"; an
inadequate law library at the jail; "filthy" jail cells and showers; and
inmates being charged money for things that used to be free. Id. at 5•3
This case faces dismissed for want of a named defendant. It is not
up to the Court or its Clerk to name one for him. The plaintiff, after all,
"is the master of the complaint." Pearson v. Augusta, 2015 WL 800206
at * 1 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2015); Hager v. Portfolio Recovery Associates,
LLC, 2015 WL 1003856 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2015). And a Georgia
jail cannot be sued in any event. Logue, Jr. v. Chatham Cnty. Det. Cntr.,
2010 WL 5769485 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2010) ("Chatham County
Detention Center . . . is not an entity that is subject to suit under §
1983."); Ansley v. Franks, 2010 WL 4007626 at *2 n. 2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30,
627 F.3d 338 ) 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (pro se pleadings are still construed liberally after
Iqbal).
That could be a claim. See, e.g., Lucier v. City of Ecorse, 2015 WL 542884 at * 6
(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2015) ("Where a police officer deploys a taser at an individual who
is not actively resisting arrest, courts tend to hold that a § 1983 excessive-force claim
is available, since the right to be free from physical force when one is not resisting
the police is a clearly established right.") (quotes and cite omitted).
2

See also id. at 2-3 (he claims he exhausted his administrative remedies -- the jail
does not respond to filed grievances).

2010) ("the jail has no independent legal existence and is therefore not
an entity that is subject to suit under § 1983."); Allen v. Brown, 2013 WL
1333175 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2013).
Too, plaintiff seeks no damages, only a request for "the Court to
help me with gettin[g] the correct people[,] meaning[,] the [Georgia
Bureau of Investigation,] to come and see what is going on here and
help with sending someone to talk to us inmates about what's going on
here with this system." Doe. 1 at 6. Hence, he seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief to remedy allegedly unconstitutional jail. conditions.

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) ("although
prisoners can't sue states for monetary relief, they can sue for
injunctions to correct unconstitutional prison conditions. See Will v.

Mich. Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 & n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105
L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); see also Brown v. Plata, U.S. -, 131 S.Ct.
1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011).").
As is the case with many pro se litigators, Williams forgets that
Congress restricted the power of federal courts to act. Citizens thus
cannot "make a federal case" out of life's daily travails. That's why

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plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing both jurisdiction' and an
actionable claim -- through factual pleadings governed by rules like
Fed., R. Civ. P. 8 & 10.
Williams has simply failed to do either here. See, e.g., Phillips v

Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir.' 1984) (naked assertion of
conspiracy between state judge and private defendants without
supporting operative facts provided insufficient state action nexus for
§ 1983 action); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135
(D.D.C. 2009) (pro se plaintiff's allegations failed to state claims
Because this is a court of limited jurisdiction, the burden is on Williams to plead
and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting jurisdiction.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (because
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction "{i]t is to be presumed that a cause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction. . . .") (quotes and cite omitted); McCormick v.
Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002). Those invoking diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), for example, bear the burden of establishing complete
diversity of citizenship -- that the plaintiff and defendant are domiciled in different
states -- and that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds § 1332's
$75,000 jurisdictional requirement. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353,
1357 (11th Cir. 1996), partially abrogated on other grounds, Cohen v. Office Depot,
Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 2000); Connally v. State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co., 2012 WL 2155110 at * 12 (S.D. Ala. May 22, 2012).
And those invoking federal question jurisdiction must allege a claim on which
that jurisdiction rests -- for prisoners this often is a § 1983 claim that meets specific
elements. See, e.g., Edler v. Hockley County Com'rs Court, 589 F. App'x 664, 668 (5th
Cir. 2014) ("In a conditions-of-confinement case, the plaintiff must prove (1) a rule or
restriction, an intended condition or practice, or a de facto policy as evidenced by
sufficiently extended or pervasive acts of jail officials, (2) not reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective, and (3) that violated his constitutional rights.").

El

against 22 named defendants, and thus would be dismissed; complaint
alleged facts by referring to documents not clearly identified or that
were not attached to complaint, plaintiff made no factual allegations
against any defendants she referred to as "All Plaintiffs Former
Lawyers," and complaint alleged no wrongdoing by one of named
defendants).
Nor can the Court research the law and develop supporting facts
for him. Boles v. Riva, 565 F. App'x 845, 846 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[E]ven
in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to
serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.") (quotes and cite omitted); Sec'y,

Fl. Dept. of Corr. v. Baker, 406 F. App'x 416, 422 (11th Cir. 2010); Swain
v. Colorado Tech. Univ., 2014 WL 3012693 at * 1 (S.D. Ga. June 12,
2014) ("While Congress has chosen to provide indigents with access to
the courts by way of its IFP statute, it has not funded a pro se support
function. Judges, then, at most can construe liberally what pro se

5

litigants say factually, but they cannot develop legal arguments or plug
the legal holes in their cases for them.").'
Within 30 days of the date this Order is served, plaintiff must file
an Amended Complaint specifying what legal claims he wishes to raise in
this case. Failure to comply with this Order will result in a
recommendation that his case be dismissed.
Finally, Williams must pay his filing fee. His furnished account
information shows that he has averaged $24.31 in his prison account
during the past six months. Doc. 4. He therefore owes a $4.86 partial

As another court recently explained:
Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without
limits. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of
some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See
Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988).
District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely
presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.
Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require ... [the courts] to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would
transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper
role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party." Id. at 1278. Moreover, plaintiffs failure to identify a
particular legal theory in his complaint places an unfair burden on the
defendants to speculate on the potential claims that plaintiff may be raising
against them and the defenses they might assert in response to each of these
possible causes of action. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d at 594.

Davis v. Frito-Lay, 2014 WL 3748622 at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2014).

me

filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring an initial fee assessment
"when funds exist," under a specific 20 percent formula). His custodian
(or designee) therefore shall remit that to the clerk of court (payable to
the "clerk of Court") plus 20 percent of all future deposits to his
account, forward those additional funds to the clerk each time the set
aside amount reaches $10.00, until the balance of the court's $350.00
filing fee has been paid in full.
Also, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send this Order to plaintiffs
account custodian immediately. In the event plaintiff is transferred to
another institution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this
Order and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee
and costs in this case to plaintiffs new custodian. The balance due from
the plaintiff shall be collected by the custodian at his next institution in
accordance with the terms of this Order.
SO ORDERED this 23rd day of March, 2015.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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