Storey v. Effingham County et al

Filing 254

ORDER granting Defendants' 159 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants Effingham County, the Effingham County Board of Commissioners, and Jimmy McDuffie are Dismissed from this action. The Clerk of Court is Directed to amend the caption accordingly. Plaintiff punitive damages claims are likewise Dismissed. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 1/31/2022. (csr)

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 1 of 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

KEITH STOREY, as Executor of
the Estate of Valerie Storey
and Executor of the Estate of

Kenneth Cartee,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV415-149

V.

EFFINGHAM COUNTY; JIMMY

MCDUFFIE, individually and in
his official capacity as
Effingham County Sheriff;
TRANSFORMHEALTHRX, INC.;
EFFINGHAM COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS; ASHBY LEE

ZYDONYK, Deputy; BRYAN

SHEAROUSE, Corporal; CORA MAE
GAINES, Jailer; DOROTHY HOPE,
Jailer; GARETT BUCKLES,
Jailer; JOHNNY REINHART,
Jailer; LATONYA COOPER,

Sergeant; LESLIE MINOR, Jail
Corporal; PAUL DAVIS,
Officer; ROBERT L. BROWN,

Jail Captain; TIFFANY TISBY,
Jail Officer; JOHN DOES 1-20;
ANISA GRANTHAM, LPC, NCAC;
REBECCA RANSOM, LPN; JANE
DOES 1-10; JOHN DOES
PHYSICIANS 1-5; and ALl
RAHIMI, M.D.;
Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of

Defendants Effingham County, the Effingham County Board of

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 2 of 35

Commissioners,
McDuffie,
Sheriff

(collectively

individually

of

Effingham

and

''the
in

County.

County"),^

his

official

(Doc.

159.)

and

Jimmy

capacity

Plaintiff

as
has

opposed this motion. (Doc. 219.) For the following reasons.
Defendants'

motion

for

summary

judgment

(Doc.

159)

is

incarceration

of

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND^
I.

INITIAL ARREST

This

case

arises

out

of

the

2012

Kenneth Cartee at the Effingham County Jail. Early in the
morning on September 9, 2012, Cartee called his daughter

^ As the parties have done in their respective briefs, the
Court

will

refer to

Defendants

Effingham

County

and

the

Effingham County Board of Commissioners jointly as "the
County." (Doc. 159, Attach. 1 at 1; Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at
3.) However, the Court's analysis and conclusions would not
change even if the Defendants were treated as distinct
entities.

2 The relevant facts are taken principally from the parties'
statements of undisputed material facts. (Doc. 159, Attach.
2; Doc. 219, Attach. 1.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e) and Southern District of Georgia Local Rule
56.1, all material facts not controverted by specific
citation

to

the

record

are

deemed

admitted,

unless

otherwise inappropriate. The Court notes that Plaintiff
fails to respond to many of the facts included in the
Defendants' statement of material facts. Accordingly, the
Court deems the facts included in Defendants' statement of

material facts admitted except where Plaintiff clearly
disputes
these
facts.
Where
Plaintiff
does
offer
conflicting accounts of the events in question, this Court
draws all inferences and reviews all evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party—Plaintiff. See
Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316,

1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011)).

Moton

v. Cowart, 631 F.3d

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 3 of 35

Valerie

Storey

and

told

her

that

he

planned

to

commit

suicide.3 (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at SI 1; Doc. 219, Attach. 1

at SI 6; Doc. 159, Attach. 3 at 55.) Ms. Storey called 911
and

drove

to

her

father's

home.

(Doc.

159,

Attach.

2 at

SI 2; Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SI 7.) Two police officers and

Jonathan Williams, a family friend, were with Cartee when

Ms.

Storey

officers

arrived.

attempted

to

(Doc.

159,

persuade

Attach.
Cartee

3

to

at

be

56.)

The

sent for

a

mental evaluation, which Cartee refused. (Id. at 58.) The

police officers spoke to Cartee ^'for a very long time," but

eventually, the officers left the scene for their shift
change.

(Id.

at

56-57.)

Ms.

Storey

and

Mr.

Williams

remained with Cartee after the officers left. (Id. at 59.)

Ms.

Storey

attempted

to

calm

her

father,

but

Cartee

responded by putting a knife to her throat and saying, ^'If
I'm going to go, you're going to go." (Doc. 159, Attach. 2
at SI 3; Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SI 7.) Mr. Williams was able

to separate Ms. Storey from Cartee, and the two drove to a

neighbor's house to call 911. (Doc. 159, Attach. 3 at 60.)

3 In their respective statements of material facts, both
parties claim that the call took place ^'[e]arly in the
morning of Sunday September 9, 2012." (Doc. 159, Attach. 2
at SI 1; Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at SI 6.) However, in Valerie
Storey's deposition, cited by both parties, Ms. Storey
states
that
the
call
took
place
"late
at
night,
approximately 10:00." (Doc. 159, Attach. 3 at 55.) This
discrepancy does not affect the Court's analysis.

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 4 of 35

An officer of the

Effingham County Sheriff's Office

(^^ECSO"), Sergeant Bryan Shearouse, responded to the scene
at approximately 5:00 a.m. and was apprised that Cartee

appeared to be suicidal. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at SI 4; Doc.
219, Attach. 1 at SI 8; Doc. 159, Attach. 4 at 41-42.) Sgt.

Shearouse and Deputy Heather Shaffer made conversation with
Cartee. (Doc. 159, Attach. 4 at 34, 45.) When asked if he
was suicidal, Cartee

would

respond, ^^It doesn't matter."

(Id. at 45.) At some point, Cartee handed Sgt. Shearouse a
bottle
whether

containing
he

had

different

taken

any

Cartee's behavior and the

pills
pills.

but
(Id.

refused
at

concern that he

47.)

to

answer

Based

on

was at risk of

harming himself or others, Sgt. Shearouse decided to call
an ambulance and have Cartee checked out by EMT. (Doc. 159,

Attach. 4 at 85-86.) Eventually, Cartee agreed to have EMT

transport him to Effingham Hospital for a voluntary mental
health evaluation. (Id. at 85.)

Cartee was transported to the hospital by ambulance,

with Sgt. Shearouse following in his police cruiser. (Doc.
159, Attach. 2 at SI 7; Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SI 11.) While
in transit, Cartee attempted to escape from the ambulance.
(Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at SI 8; Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SI 12.)

The ambulance stopped, and Sgt. Shearouse took Cartee into
custody because he determined that Cartee was a danger to

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 5 of 35

himself

and

others

and

needed

to

be

taken

for

an

involuntary evaluation. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at SI 9; Doc.
219, Attach. 1 at SI 13; Doc. 159, Attach. 4 at 88.) Sgt.

Shearouse then transported Cartee to Effingham Hospital in

his police cruiser. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at SI 9; Doc. 219,
Attach. 1 at SI 13.)

Upon

their

arrival

at

Effingham

Hospital,

a

nurse

informed Sgt. Shearouse that she would need a urine sample
from

Cartee

and

removed so that

asked

that

one

of

Cartee's

handcuffs

be

he could provide the sample. (Doc. 159,

Attach. 2 at SI 10.) Sgt. Shearouse removed Cartee's left
handcuff. (Id. at SI 11.) Cartee then began walking towards

Sgt. Shearouse while pulling on his zipper in a manner that
caused Sgt. Shearouse to believe Cartee intended to urinate
on him. (Id. at SI 12.) Sgt. Shearouse instructed Cartee not

to come any closer, but Cartee ignored the directive and
raised a closed fist at Sgt. Shearouse. (Id. at SISI 13-15.)
Fearing that Cartee

would hit him, Sgt. Shearouse pushed

Cartee against the wall to immobilize him. (Id. at SI 16.)
Cartee then tried to hit Sgt. Shearouse with his left arm,
and

Sgt.

Shearouse

loudly

commanded

Cartee

to

stop

fighting. (Id. at SI 17.) Sgt. Shearouse was eventually able
to

force

Cartee

to

the

ground.

(Id.

at

SI

18.)

Cartee

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 6 of 35

continued to resist despite Sgt. Shearouse's instructions
and attempts to restrain Cartee. (Id. at SI 19.)
Because

Cartee

refused

to

comply,

Sgt.

Shearouse

pulled out his Taser and threatened to tase Cartee. (Doc.
159, Attach. 2 at SI 20; Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SI 15.) The
threat

of

the

momentarily;

Taser

however,

caused

when

Cartee

Sgt.

to

cease

Shearouse

resisting

attempted

to

handcuff him, Cartee resumed resisting. (Doc. 159, Attach.
2 at SISI 21-22.) Sgt. Shearouse then placed his knee between

Cartee's shoulder and neck to ^^garner a pain response" in

order to get both of Cartee's hands behind his back and
cuffed. (Id. at SI 23.) At this point, Sgt. Shearouse was

able to stand Cartee up, and he generally ceased resisting.
(Id. at SI 24.) Cartee suffered a minor skin tear to his

right

wrist

during

the

altercation,

and

the

wound

was

checked and cleaned by a doctor at the hospital. (Id. at
SI 25.)

Following

the

altercation,

the

hospital

staff

medically cleared Cartee for release. (Id. at SI 27.) Sgt.
Shearouse

transported

arrested

him

Cartee

to

the

for

felony

Effingham

obstruction

County

Jail

and

at

approximately 11:45 a.m. on September 9, 2012. (Doc. 159,
Attach. 2 at SI 27; Doc. 159, Attach. 6 at 24.)

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 7 of 35

II.

CARTEE^S FIRST STAY AT EFFINGHAM COUNTY JAIL

At

the

jail.

^^hollering and

Sergeant

Leslie

cussing" over

the

Minor

dispatch

heard
radio

Cartee
as Sgt.

Shearouse transported him to the jail. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2
at SI 28.) Sgt. Minor notified Officers Dorothy Hopf, Paul
Davis,

and

John

Reinhart that

Cartee

had

been

^^fighting

deputies" and instructed them to assist Sgt. Shearouse with
bringing Cartee into the jail. (Id. at SI 29.) Based on her
knowledge

that

Cartee

had

Minor instructed Officer

already

been

combative,

Sgt.

Davis to get the Taser. (Id. at

SI 30.)

Cartee was reportedly "out of control" when he entered
the jail's booking area, screaming and referring to Sgt.
Minor with a racial slur. (Id. at SI 31.) Officers Reinhart

and Hopf removed Sgt. Shearouse's handcuffs from Cartee and
instructed him to place his hands flat down on the booking
desk. (Id. at

SI

32.) At this

point, Shearouse left the

booking area to disinfect his handcuffs but was able to
observe

Cartee

failing

to

follow

the

jail

officers'

commands from the doorway of the adjacent room. (Id. at
SISI 33-34.) Cartee refused the officers' commands to spread
his feet. (Id. at SI 35.) When the officers attempted to put
Cartee's hands on the table and told Cartee to

keep them

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 8 of 35

there, Cartee ''snatched them away" and told the officers,
"I know what I'm doing." (Id. at 5 37.)

Plaintiff

claims

that

at

no

point

during

this

altercation did Cartee attempt to assault an officer. (Doc.

219, Attach. 1 at 5 25.) According to Sgt. Minor, however,

whenever an officer attempted to restrain Cartee, he would

swing his arms wildly and almost hit Officer Reinhart in
the face at one point. (Doc. 159, Attach. 5 at 234-35.)
Because the other officers were unable to restrain Cartee,

Cartee was refusing the officers' commands, and Cartee had
already

Davis

fought

deployed

attached

to

his

Sgt.

Shearouse

his laser's
abdominal

at

the

prongs
area.

hospital.

towards

(Doc.

159,

Officer

Cartee,
Attach.

which
2

at

SI 41; Doc. 159, Attach. 7 at 10.) The shock from the Taser

caused Cartee to fall onto Officer

Reinhart, and they in

turn fell together onto a row of plastic chairs. (Doc. 159,
Attach. 2 at SISI 42-43.)

The officers then gained control over Cartee, removed
the Taser prongs, and placed Cartee in a restraint chair in
a

holding

cell to

give

him

time

to

calm

down.

(Id.

at

SI 44.) Sgt. Minor called the on-call telephone number for
the jail's contracted medical provider TransformHealthRX's

("THRX") and requested that a nurse come to the jail to
examine

Mr.

Cartee.

(Id.

at

SI

8

46.)

Nurse

Marilyn

Spikes

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 9 of 35

arrived soon thereafter, but Cartee refused to allow her to

examine him. (Id. at SI 47.) Officer Reinhart and Sgt. Minor
removed

Cartee

from

the

restraint

chair

later

that

day,

around 1:45 p.m. (Doc. 159, Attach. 6 at 59.) According to
Officer

Reinhart,

Cartee

appeared

normal

and

did

not

complain of injuries at this time. (Id. at 60.) Cartee's
combative behavior continued through Monday, September 10,

2012, and as a result, jail staff were unable to fully book
him into the jail.''

At approximately 6:00 p.m. Monday, September 10, 2012,
Nurse

Rebecca

Ransom,

THRX's

weekday

nurse,

assessed

Cartee. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at SI 51.) Cartee indicated

that

he

Ransom

had

previously

concluded

that

taken
his

illicit

behavior

drugs,

was

and

Nurse

possibly

drug-

induced as opposed to the result of a mental illness. (Id.

4 Plaintiff alleges that Cartee was left strapped naked to
the restraint chair from when he was first placed in the

holding cell on September 9, 2012, until 6:00 p.m. Monday,
September 10, 2012, when he was examined by Nurse Rebecca
Ransom. (Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SI 28.) In support of this
allegation. Plaintiff cites to a message sent by Megan
Miley, a THRX nurse, on September 10, 2012. (Doc. 159,
Attach. 10 at 314.) The message states that ''[Cartee] has
been combative all day with officers and they have been
unable to book. Inmate was placed in the restraint chair[,]
and

Nurse

Rebecca

was

sent

back

to

evaluate[]

inmate."

(Id.) This message does not rebut Reinhart's testimony that
Cartee was removed from the restraint chair on September 9,

2012, rather it merely shows that officers were forced to

place Cartee back in the restraint chair on September 10,
2012, due to Cartee's aggressive behavior.

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 10 of 35

at 1 52.) After consulting with a supervisor. Nurse Ransom

obtained an order to send Cartee back to Effingham Hospital
for a mental health evaluation. (Id. at SI 53.)

Patrol

Officer

Ashby

Zydonyk

was

instructed

to

transport Cartee back to Effingham Hospital. (Id. at SI 55.)
Officer

Zydonyk

Cartee

alone

and

SI 56.)

Officers

arrived

at

secured

Zydonyk

the

holding

a

restraint

in

and

Reinhart

cell

and

chair.

entered

found

(Id.

the

at

cell

together to remove Cartee from the chair. (Id. at SI 57)
Officer Zydonyk removed the nylon straps that were securing
Cartee to the chair and asked Cartee to stand up several
times.

(Id.

at

SI 60.)

Cartee

refused

to

stand

up

voluntarily, so Officer Zydonyk took hold of Cartee's arm
to lift him to his feet. (Id. at SI 61.) Cartee then became

combative, pulling away and flailing his arms in a manner
consistent

with

the

previous

incidents.

(Id.

at

SI

62.)

Officer Zydonyk immediately took Cartee to the ground to

gain

control

of

the

situation,

but

Cartee

continued

to

resist. (Id. at SISI 63-64.) With the help of Officer Garrett

Buckles, the officers were able to secure handcuffs and leg
irons

on

Cartee

and

lift

him

to

his

feet,

but

Cartee

continued to struggle and resist the officers' efforts to
remove

him

from

the

holding

cell.

(Id.

at

SISI

65-69.)

According to Officer Reinhart, ^'[t]he officers had [Cartee]

10

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 11 of 35

by each arm, and he'd pick his legs up and try to push us
away

or

push

against

a

wall,

actually

resisting[,]

not

trying to get out of the holding cell." (Doc. 159, Attach.

6 at 74.) To get Cartee to stop resisting. Officer Reinhart

applied the Taser in drive-stun^ mode to Cartee's hip.® (Id.
at 75.)

The officers were then able to get Cartee out of the

holding cell and into the booking area. (Doc. 159, Attach.
2 at 5 71.) Cartee began resisting again and refused to
walk, so the Officers carried him out of the jail to the

jail's

transport

vehicle.

(Id.

at

SlU

72,

74.)

Officer

Zydonyk then placed Cartee in the transport vehicle and
drove him to the hospital along with Officer Reinhart. (Id.
at 5 74.)
III. CARTEE

IS

TREATED

AT

GEORGIA

REGIONAL

FOR

MENTAL

ILLNESS

At
officers

approximately
carried

7:00

Cartee

p.m.
into

on
the

September
emergency

10,

2012,

room

of

® Drive-stun mode allows a Taser to be used like a stun gun-

meaning the Taser is pressed directly against the skin and
produces a burning sensation. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at 5 70
n.l (citing Mingo v. City of Mobile, 592 F. App'x 793, 796
n.l (11th Cir. 2014)).)
® The officers' accounts differ on whether Officer Reinhart
used the Taser on Cartee while Cartee was still on the

ground or after he had been lifted to his feet. (Doc. 159,
Attach. 2 at 5 70 n.2; Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at 5 39.) The
Court will construe this fact in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff and assume Cartee was still on the ground at
the time Officer Reinhart tased him.

11

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 12 of 35

Effingham
multiple

Hospital,
sedative

behavior.

(Id.

where

hospital

injections

at

5

77.)

to

staff

control

Cartee

gave

his

remained

Cartee

disorderly

at

Effingham

Hospital until 3:00 a.m. on September 11, 2012, when, in
accordance

with

a

physician's

orders.

Officer

Zydonyk

transported Cartee to Georgia Regional Hospital to receive
mental health care, (Id. at 5 78.)

Cartee
September

was

11,

hospitalized

2012,

until

at

Georgia

September

17,

Regional
2012.

from

(Id.

at

^ 79.) At Georgia Regional, Cartee began to display signs
that he was suffering from at least partial paralysis. (Id.

at f 81.)

For

worker met with
because,

example, on

September 13,

Cartee and found

according

to

Cartee,

he

2012,

him using a
could

not

a

social

wheelchair

walk.

(Id.)

According to Cartee's Georgia Regional records, Cartee was

initially disorderly, but ^Mo]ver the course of his stay[,]
he

did

not present as

an

imminent danger

to

himself or

others." (Doc. 159, Attach. 14 at 57.) ^'By [September 17,

2012,] he

was felt appropriate to

discharge

back to the

jail." (Id.)
IV.

CARTER'S SECOND STAY AT EFFINGHAM COUNTY JAIL

When Deputy Robert Plank arrived at Georgia Regional
to

transport

Cartee

back

to

the

jail

at

11:00

a.m.

on

September 17, 2012, a nurse informed him that Cartee had

12

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 13 of 35

been

unable

wheelchair.

to

walk

(Doc.

at

159,

times,

Attach.

so

he

sometimes

2 at f 83.)

used

Deputy

a

Plank

asked the nurse whether a wheelchair was necessary to move

Cartee to the

transport vehicle,

and the

nurse

replied,

^^No. He's walking." (Id. at 5 84.) With handcuffs and leg
irons applied, Cartee walked approximately 35-40 feet from

the Georgia Regional facility to Deputy Plank's vehicle in
the parking lot. (Id. at St 85.) On the ride back to the

jail, Cartee informed Deputy Plank that he was ^'not getting
out of this car." (Id. at SI 86.) Deputy Plank radioed the

jail for assistance, and with the help of Officers Davis
and Reinhart, the officers were able to get Cartee out of

the car and into the jail. (Id. at SISI 87-89.)

Later that same day. Nurse Ransom conducted an intake
exam of Cartee but did not roll up the sleeves of Cartee's

jail

uniform."'

approximately

The

(Id.

10:00

note from

at

a.m.,

Nurse

SI

90-91.)

Cartee

was

The

next

examined

Ransom's September

17,

day
by

THRX's

2012, exam

describes Nurse Ransom's observations as follows:

^'[Cartee] was ambulatory upon leaving [the jail]
and returned stating he could not walk. No
obvious trauma to legs. Observed inmate bending
and moving both legs. Also witnessed [Cartee]
standing at door in booking area upon return from
GA
regional.
Deputy
Plank,
who
transported
[Cartee]
from
GA
regional,
states
that
he
observed inmate walking at GA regional before
pick up."
(Doc. 159, Attach. 9 at 7.)

13

at

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 14 of 35

Licensed Professional Counselor, Anisa Grantham. (Id. at f

92.)

Although

Cartee

told

Grantham,

can't

walk,"

Grantham observed Cartee bending his knees to sit on the
side of the bunk and was ^""not convinced [Cartee could] not
walk." (Doc. 159, Attach. 9 at 8.)

Later in the day on September 18, 2012, Officer Davis
was instructed to escort Cartee from the isolation cell to

the booking area for his bond hearing. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2
at 1 94.)

needed
Officer

Officer

When Officer

in

the

Davis informed Cartee that he

booking

area,

Davis that he could

Davis

unsuccessfully

spent

Cartee

stood

not walk. (Id.

Cartee

to

but

told

at

96-97.)

five

approximately

instructing

up

was

minutes

and

reminding

walk

Cartee that he had seen Cartee walk the previous day. (Id.
at f 98.) Officer Davis then went to the booking area to

inform
Captain

Captain
Brown

Robert

Brown

instructed

of

Officer

Cartee's
Davis

to

refusal,
use

the

and
tools

available to him. (Id. at 5 99.)
Officer Davis returned to Cartee's isolation cell with

a Taser and announced, ^'Mr. Cartee, we need to escort you

to

booking,

SI 100;

Doc.

or

I'm

159,

going to

Attach.

7

have
at

to tase
21.)

When

you." (Id. at
Cartee

still

refused to walk. Officer Davis applied the Taser in drivestun mode onto Cartee's lower thigh. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2

14

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 15 of 35

at 1 102.) Officer Reinhart was standing just inside the
door

of

Taser

the

on

isolation

Cartee.

cell

(Id.

at

when

f

Officer

101.)

Davis

According

used

to

the

Officer

Reinhart, when Officer Davis used the Taser on Cartee, his

^'legs would move, he would squirm," making Officer Reinhart
believe Cartee's legs were operable. (Doc. 159, Attach. 6
at 106.) After Cartee was initially stunned, he pulled away

and attempted to grab the Taser. (Doc. 159, Attach. 2 at
SI 103.) Officer
additional

Davis attempted to drive

times

but

remains

unsure

stun

whether

Cartee

he

two

contacted

Cartee's thigh. (Id. at SI 104.) Officer Tiffany Tisby then
retrieved

a

wheelchair

which

was

used

to

escort

Cartee

to

the booking area without further incident. (Id. at SI 106.)
On September 20, 2012, jail officers informed Sergeant

Latonya Cooper that they were having to assist Cartee in
using the toilet because Cartee

was complaining that he

could not walk. (Id. at SI 107.) Sgt. Cooper went to check
on

Cartee

could

not

herself,
walk.

and

(Id.

Cartee

at

SISI

told

Sgt.

108-109.)

Cooper

After

that

Sgt.

he

Cooper

discussed the situation with Nurse Ransom, the decision was

made to transport Cartee back to Effingham Hospital. (Id.

at

SI

110.)

Sgt.

Cooper

transported

Cartee

to

Effingham

Hospital at approximately 10:00 a.m. on September 20, 2012.
(Id. at SI 111.)

15

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 16 of 35

While at Effingham Hospital, Sgt. Cooper learned that
Cartee

had

5 112.)

been

Cartee

diagnosed
was

with

released

renal

from

failure.

custody

on

(Id.
his

at
own

recognizance later that day. (Id. at ^ 113.) After his
release

from

custody,

Hospital, where he

Cartee

was diagnosed

was

taken

to

Memorial

with a cervical spinal

cord injury and Til vertebral fracture which caused partial
paralysis. (Id. at 5 115.) Cartee was also diagnosed with
several broken ribs, sepsis; and severe dehydration.® (Doc.
219,

Attach.

1

at

5

58.)

Cartee

remained

at

Memorial

Hospital until October 22, 2012, when he was transferred to
Woodlands

Healthcare

and

Rehabilitation

Center

(^^Woodlands"), an extended care facility. (Doc. 72 at 21.)

Cartee

was discharged from

Woodlands on April 23, 2013,

with hospice services. (Id. at 33.) Cartee died on June 25,

® The Court notes that the parties have not provided
Cartee's medical records from Memorial Hospital that would
show

when

and

where

Cartee

received

his exact diagnosis.

Instead, Plaintiff cites to the deposition of his expert
witness, Inna Sheyner, M.D. (Doc. 219, Attach. 1 at SISl 8890 (citing Doc. 219, Attach. 25 at 25).) Dr. Sheyner
testified to his review of Cartee's medical history prior
to his transfer from Memorial Hospital but did not state

when Cartee's conditions were diagnosed. (Doc. 219, Attach.
25 at 25.) However, because Defendants have not objected to
this fact, the Court will assume for purposes of this order
that Cartee was diagnosed with a cervical spinal cord

injury, a Til vertebral fracture, broken ribs, sepsis, and
severe dehydration at Memorial Hospital on September 20,
2012.

16

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 17 of 35

2013,

at

home

from

cardiopulmonary

arrest,

respiratory

failure, and adult failure to thrive. (Id.)
V.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Valerie

Storey,

individually

and

as

executrix

of

Cartee's estate, filed this renewal action on May 20, 2015,

alleging multiple federal and state law causes of actions
against

individuals

incarceration

Ms.

Storey's

substituted
137.)

and

and

medical

death,

as

Relevant

entities

the
to

treatment.

her

(Doc.

husband,

party
this

involved

plaintiff
motion,

in
1.)

Keith
in

in

Following

Storey,

this

the

Cartee's

case.

Second

was
(Doc.

Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against
the

County

individual

and

Sheriff

capacities.

McDuffie

(Doc.

72.)

in

his

Count

official

1

alleges

and

a

42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendants for their alleged
deliberate

indifference

to

Cartee's

medical

needs

while

incarcerated.® (Id. at 22-25.) Count 2 alleges a claim under

Georgia tort law that appears to be based on Defendants'

supervisory

liability

for

the

conduct

of

its

employees

which led to Cartee's injuries and death. (Id. at 25-30.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for both

® To the extent that the Second Amended Complaint could be
construed to assert a claim for excessive force. Plaintiff

concedes in his responsive brief that he is not asserting
such a claim in this action. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 1.)

17

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 18 of 35

causes of action. Now, the County and Sheriff McDuffie move

jointly for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against
them. (Doc. 159.)
STMUDABD OF REVIEW

According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 'Ma] party may

move

for

defense—or

summary

the

judgment,

part

of

identifying

each

claim

or

each

claim

defense—on

or

which

summary judgment is sought." Such a motion must be granted
"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." Id. The "purpose of summary judgment is

to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order
to see

whether there

is a

genuine

need for trial[.]' "

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note to
1963 amendment). Summary judgment is appropriate when the

nonmoving

party "fails

establish

the

existence

to
of

make
an

a

showing

element

sufficient

essential

to

to

that

party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The
substantive law governing the action determines which facts
are

material.

DeLong

Equip.

Co.

18

v.

Wash.

Mills

Abrasive

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 19 of 35

Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson
V. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

As the Supreme Court explained:

[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears
the
initial
responsibility
of
informing
the
district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex,

477

quotation

U.S.

marks

nonmoving

at

323,

106

omitted). The

party

to

S.

Ct.

at

2553

burden then

establish,

by

(internal

shifts to the

going

beyond

the

pleadings, that there is a genuine issue concerning facts
material

to

its

case.

Clark

v.

Coats

&

Clark,

Inc.,

929

F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court must review the
evidence and all reasonable factual inferences arising from

it

in

the

light most favorable

to

the

nonmoving

party.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting
United

Ct.

States

993,

v.

994,

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.

8

L.

Ed.

2d

176

(1962)).

However,

the

nonmoving party ^'must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id.
at

586,

106

S.

^^scintilla" of

Ct.

at

evidence

1356

or

(citations

simply

19

omitted). A

conclusory

mere

allegations

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 20 of 35

will not suffice. See^
F.3d

1422,

1425

e«g«/ Tidwell v. Carter Prods.^ 135

(llth

Cir.

1998).

reasonable fact finder may "draw

Nevertheless,

where

a

more than one inference

from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue
of

material

fact,

then

the

court

should

refuse

to

grant

summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-

34 (llth Cir. 1989) (citing Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (llth Cir. 1988)).
ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary

judgment

on

all

of

Plaintiff's

claims

against

them.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the
County and Sheriff McDuffie in his official capacity fails
because

there

is

no

evidence

that

Cartee

suffered

a

constitutional injury or that a policy of the County or the
ECSO caused a constitutional violation. (Doc. 159, Attach.

1

at

2.)

Defendants

also

argue

that

Plaintiff's

§

1983

claim against Sheriff McDuffie in his individual capacity
fails because there is no basis to hold him liable under a

supervisory

liability

theory.

(Id.)

Further,

Defendants

argue that Plaintiff's state law claims against the County
and Sheriff McDuffie in his official capacity are barred by

sovereign immunity and that the

20

state law

claims against

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 21 of 35

Sheriff McDuffie in his individual capacity are barred by
official immunity. (Id.)

In response. Plaintiff states that he is no longer

asserting state law claims against the County or Sheriff
McDuffie in his official capacity. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at
3.)

Accordingly,

the

Court

GRANTS

Defendants

summary

judgment on these claims. See Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar
Corp.,

43

F.3d

587,

599

(11th

Cir.

1995)

('MGJrounds

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary
judgment

are

deemed

abandoned."

(citation

omitted)).

Plaintiff, however, opposes summary judgment for his § 1983

claims and his state law claims against Sheriff McDuffie in
his individual capacity. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 3.) As
discussed

below,

the

Court

finds

that

Defendants

are

entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.
I.

PLAINTIFF'S

§

1983

CLAIMS

AGAINST

THE

COUNTY

AND

SHERIFF MCDUFFIE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

The Court will first address Plaintiff's § 1983 claims

against the County and Sherriff McDuffie in his official
capacity. As an initial matter, the Court must discuss an
issue not raised by the parties. When a plaintiff brings a
§ 1983 action against a local government official in his or
her official capacity, ^'the suit is simply another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is

21

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 22 of 35

an agent." Busby v. City of Orlando ^
(11th

Cir.

1991)

(internal

931 F.2d 764, 776

quotation

marks

omitted)

(quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct.
3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)). In this case, the

parties

appear

to

believe

that

Plaintiff s

official

capacity claim against Sheriff McDuffie is the functional
equivalent of his § 1983 claim against the County. (Doc.
159,

Attach.

1

at

14;

Doc.

219,

Attach.

2

at

4.)

The

parties' shared belief appears to be contrary to binding
precedent. In Georgia, courts have held that sheriffs act
as an agent for the state, rather than the county, when
conducting

law

enforcement

activities,

including

the

administration of correctional facilities. Purcell ex. rel.

Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th

Cir.

2005)

(^^Sheriff

Kight

functions

as

an

arm

of

the

State—not of Toombs County—when promulgating policies and

procedures

governing

conditions

of

confinement

at

the

Toombs County Jail.");^° see also Bell v. Houston Cnty., No.

It is worth noting that Georgia courts have made
compelling arguments that sheriffs act as agents of the
county, not the State, when providing medical care in
correctional facilities. See Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F. Supp.

2d 1298, 1319-22 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (finding sheriff was not

acting

as an

arm of the

State

when

caring for

inmate's

medical needs); Hamm v. Spaldinq Cnty., No. 3:10-cv-192TCB, 2012 WL 13085215, at *5-7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2012)
(same). Yet, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that
Purcell, despite its flaws, has not been overruled and

22

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 23 of 35

5:04-CV-390 (DF), 2006 WL 1804582 (M.D. Ga. June 27, 2006)

{''[U]nder Georgia law, Houston County ha[d] no authority to

promulgate or administer the jail policy." (citing Manders
V.

Lee,

338

F.3d

1304,

1310-11

(11th

Cir.

2003)). This

would imply that Plaintiff's official capacity suit against
Sheriff

McDuffie

is

really

a

suit

against

the

State

of

Georgia, rather than the County. Busby, 931 F.2d at 776.
However,

agent

whether

of

the

the

State

Court treats

or

of

the

Sheriff McDuffie

County,

as

Defendants

an

are

entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed
point

to

any

unconstitutional

policy

or

custom

of

the

County or the State that caused his injuries.

A local government entity cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 611 (1978); see also Scala v. City of Winter Park,

116 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997). Instead, ''[a] local

government may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts
for which it is actually responsible, acts which the local
government has officially sanctioned or ordered." Turquitt
V.

Jefferson

Cnty.,

137

F.3d

1285, 1287 (11th

Cir. 1998)

(citations omitted). Therefore, ^Mt]o state a Monell claim.

remains

binding

precedent.

Andrews

v.

Riggers,

996

1235, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2021) (Rosenbaum, concurring).

23

F.3d

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 24 of 35

a

plaintiff

must

allege

facts

showing:

Ml)

that

his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the [county]
had

a

custom

or

policy

that

constituted

deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the
policy

or

custom

Miami-Dade Cnty.^
(per

curiam)

1289

(11th

caused

the

violation.' " Marantes

v.

649 F. App'x 665, 672 (11th Cir. 2016)

(quoting
Cir.

McDowell

2004)).

v.

Here,

Brown,

even

392

F.3d 1283,

assuming

Plaintiff

suffered a constitutional injury. Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy the last two prongs of a Monell-claim—namely, that
an

unconstitutional

policy

existed

that

caused

his

injuries.
To

establish

the

existence

of

an

unconstitutional

policy. Plaintiff must identify either ^Ml) an officially
promulgated [government] policy or (2) an unofficial custom
or practice of the [government entity]." Grech v. Clayton
Cnty.,

335

F.3d

1326,

1329

(11th

Cir.

2003)

(citations

omitted). Plaintiff has failed to identify any officially

promulgated policy that led to a constitutional violation
in

this

case.

constitutional

Notably,
violation

to

support

occurred.

his

claim

Plaintiff

that

alleges

a

that

^Mt]he Defendants' failure to provide adequate medical care
for Cartee

Effingham

was [] in

County

Jail

violation

of

Operations

24

JSOP 17.3 and

17.6 of

Manual,

mandate

which

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 25 of 35

providing

emergency

medications

arguing

to

medical

inmates." (Doc.

that

a

violation

unconstitutional.

services
219,

Attach.

the

jail's

of

Plaintiff

is

and

necessarily

prescribed
2

at

7.)

By

policies

conceding

is
that

the official policies are constitutional if followed. See
McRae v. Telfair Cnty., No. CV 318-077, 2020 WL 5608537, at

*6 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2020) (^'[I]t was not the policy that

caused

[the

plaintiff's]

injury,

but

the

violation

of

it.").
Plaintiff has also failed to show the existence of an

unofficial custom or practice that led to his injuries. To
make

this

existence

showing,
of

''a

a

plaintiff

widespread

must

practice

demonstrate

that,

although

the
not

authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is
so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or

usage

with

the

force

of

law[.]" Brown

v.

City

of

Fort

Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 {11th Cir. 1991) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff, without
citation

to

the

record,

asserts

that

the

County

had

a

custom of neglecting the medical needs of inmates at the

jail. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 7.)

Nevertheless, besides

Cartee's alleged injuries. Plaintiff has not identified a
single other occurrence of deliberate indifference at the
Effingham

County

Jail.

Torres-Bonilla

25

v.

City

of

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 26 of 35

Sweetwater, 805

curiam)

F.

(finding

App'x

839, 841

evidence

that

(11th

a

Cir.

plaintiff

2020)

(per

suffered

a

constitutional violation ''is not enough to create a genuine
dispute

that

practice

.

constitute

this

.

a

.

kind

so

custom

of

activity

permanent

or

usage

and

with

'was

well

a

widespread

settled

the force

as

to

of law.' "

(quoting Brown, 923 F.2d at 1481)).

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the County may be held
liable

under

§

1983

because

Sheriff

McDuffie

acted

as

a

final policymaker as to all matters concerning the care of
inmates and detainees in the Effingham County Jail. (Doc.
219,

Attach.

2

at

5.)

government entity may be
individual

it

decision-making

vested

authority

Plaintiff

is

held liable
with

for

under

"ultimate,

the

correct

that

a

Monell if an
non-reviewable

challenged

action

or

policy" approved or implemented the unconstitutional action
in question. See Williams v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 181
F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1124 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (citing Scala, 116
F.3d

at

1398-1403).

Yet,

Plaintiff's

contention

that

the

County can be held liable for Sheriff McDuffie's actions is
unavailing.

Importantly,

as

stated

previously,

the

record

is

devoid of any evidence that Sheriff McDuffie or the County

had an unconstitutional policy or custom of denying medical

26

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 27 of 35

care

for

inmates

at

the

Effingham

County

Jail.

As

Defendants highlight. Plaintiff has not shown that Sheriff
McDuffie personally participated in or approved any of the
alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 159, Attach. 1 at
18.)

Thus,

McDuffie's

the

Court

conduct

declines

created

to

a

find

basis

that

for

Sheriff

Defendants'

liability under a final policymaker theory. Cf. Cooper v.
Dillon,

city

403 F.Sd 1208, 1222-23 (11th

liable

for

unconstitutional

police

chief's

statute).

Based

Cir. 2005)

decision
on

the

(finding

to

enforce

foregoing,

the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a basis

for entity liability under Monell. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment on

Plaintiff's § 1983 deliberate

indifference claims against the County and Sheriff McDuffie
in his official capacity.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S § 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST SHERIFF MCDUFFIE IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

The

against
prison

Court

Sheriff

will

now

McDuffie

official's

turn

to

in

his

deliberate

Plaintiff's §

individual

indifference

1983 claim

capacity.
to

a

"""A

known,

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the

[Fourteenth]

Amendment." Marsh

27

v.

Butler

Cnty.,

268

F.3d

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 28 of 35

1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted).
^'However,

Mi]t is

well established in this Circuit that

supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat

superior

or

vicarious

liability.' " Keith

v.

Dekalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Cottone

V.

Jenne,

326

F.3d

1352,

1360

(11th

Cir.

2003),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010)). Instead, a plaintiff must show

that

the

prison

official

personally

engaged

in

f

unconstitutional conduct or that the supervisor's actions

are

causally

connected

to

the

alleged

constitutional

violation. Keith, 749 F.3d at 1047-48 (citing Cottone, 326
F.3d at 1360).

As discussed in the preceding section. Plaintiff has
not

adduced

participated
towards

any

in

Cartee.^^

instance

the

in

alleged

However,

which

Sheriff

unconstitutional

Plaintiff

argues

McDuffie

conduct
that

his

See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir.

2007)

(explaining

detainee
standards

Fourteenth

Amendment

governs

pretrial

deliberate
indifference
claims
but
that
the
under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to

those under the Eighth).
^2 In in his brief in response to this summary judgment
motion. Plaintiff states that he "has alleged, and the

evidence shows, not merely questionable, negligent medical
decisions by these Defendants but, rather, the complete
denial

of

medical

care

to

Kenneth

28

Cartee

. . . ." (Doc.

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 29 of 35

individual capacity claim against Sheriff McDuffie should

survive summary judgment based on a theory of supervisory
liability. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 11-12.) Specifically,
Plaintiff

argues

that

Sheriff

McDuffie

breached

a

duty

imposed by Georgia law, in O.C.G.A. §§ 15-13-1^^ and 42-52(a),

and

this

breach

led

to

Cartee's

injuries.

(Id.

at

11.)

Although

Plaintiff

does

not

explain

how

Sheriff

McDuffie violated Georgia law, it appears that his argument
is that Sheriff Mcduffie violated O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) by

failing

to

provide

appropriate

medical

care

to

Cartee.

However Georgia courts have interpreted O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2
as

requiring

inmates

with

sheriff
access

to

defendants
medical

to

^^merely

care" but

not

to

provide

addressing

^^[w]hat is considered proper medical care . . . ." Epps v.

Gwinnett Cnty., 231 Ga. App. 664, 670, 499 S.E.2d 657, 663
(1998).

As

Defendants

highlight,

it

is

undisputed

that

219, Attach. 2 at 7.) It appears Plaintiff simply copied
and pasted this portion of his brief from his response in
opposition to the summary judgment motion of the ECSO
Officers,
against
whom
Plaintiff
did
allege
unconstitutional

actions. Compare

(Doc.

219, Attach. 2 at

7), with (Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 11-12). Accordingly, the
Court finds Plaintiff failed to point to any evidence
supporting a finding that Sheriff McDuffie personally

participated

in

the

alleged

constitutional

violations in

this case.

As Defendants note, it appears that Plaintiff mistakenly
cited to

O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1,

when

O.C.G.A. § 15-13-1.

29

he

intended to

cite

to

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 30 of 35

Sheriff

care

McDuffie

for

contracted

inmates

at the

with

jail.

THRX to provide

medical

(Doc. 243 at 8.)

To

the

extent that Plaintiff is arguing that Cartee was provided

improper

medical

care,

implicated. Lynch

v.

O.C.G.A.

Fulton

§

Cnty.,

42-5-2(a)

is

not

No. 1:09-CV-3306-CAP,

2010 WL 11508021, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2010) (finding

O.C.G.A.

§

42-5-2

^'uncontested

that

was

not

implicated

Plaintiff

was

because

was

access

provided

it

to

dental/medical care"). To hold otherwise would implicate a

sheriff's individual liability anytime a plaintiff received

inadequate

medical

care, essentially

abrogating

the

rule

against respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions.
Unable

to

Cartee's

show

Sheriff

constitutional

demonstrate

that

Sheriff

McDuffie

McDuffie

caused

Plaintiff

injuries.

directly

must

failed

to

correct

a

widespread pattern of constitutional violations or adopted
a

custom

or

policy

constitutional

rights.

(11th

Cir. 2010). As

Plaintiff

failed

constitutional

to

that

deprived

Cottone,
discussed
produce

violations

or

326
in

Cartee

F.3d
the

at

his

1360,

1360

previous section.

evidence

that

of

Sheriff

of

previous

McDuffie

had

adopted a custom or policy that caused Cartee's injuries.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
establish

Sheriff

McDuffie's

30

individual

liability

under

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 31 of 35

§ 1983 for his alleged denial of medical care. As a result,
the Court GRANTS summary judgment to Sheriff McDuffie on
Plaintiff's individual capacity § 1983 claim.
III. PLAINTIFF'S

STATE

LAW

CLAIMS

AGAINST

SHERIFF

MCDUFFIE

IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Lastly,

the

Court

will

address

whether

Plaintiff's

state law claims against Sheriff McDuffie in his individual
capacity

are

barred

by

official

immunity.

In

official, or qualified, immunity protects law

officers
taken

from

within

personal
the

liability

scope

of

for

their

Georgia,

enforcement

discretionary

official

acts

authority

and

performed without malice. Gish v. Thomas, 302 Ga. App. 854,
857, 691 S.E.2d 900, 904
274

Ga.

122,

immunity

123,

does

negligently

not

549 S.E.2d

protect

performing

discretionary

acts

(2010) (citing Cameron v, Lang,
341,

344

officers

ministerial

with

malice

or

(2001)). Official

from
acts

an

liability
or

intent

for

performing
to

injure.

Cameron, 274 Ga. at 123, 549 S.E.2d at 344.

In his response brief. Plaintiff alleges for the first
time

that

Sheriff

McDuffie

should

be

held

liable

on

a

negligent hiring and supervision theory. (Doc. 219, Attach.
2 at 11-12.) This claim was not raised in the Second
Amended Complaint and is not properly before the Court.
Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2004). Even if it were. Plaintiff has produced no

evidence

to

decisions
risk

that

Griffin

v.

show

that
a

Sheriff

reflect

a

McDuffie

deliberate

constitutional

City

of

Opa-Locka,

Cir. 2001)

31

engaged

violation

261

in

indifference

F.3d

will

1295,

hiring
to

occur.

the
See

1313 (11th

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 32 of 35

The Georgia Supreme Court has described the difference
between ministerial and discretionary acts as follows:

A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple,
absolute, and definite, arising under conditions
admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely
the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary
act, however, calls for the exercise of personal
deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails
examining
the
facts,
reaching
reasoned
conclusions, and acting on them in a way not
specifically directed.
McDowell V. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593, 678 S.E.2d 922, 924

(2009) (quoting Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199, 647
S.E.2d

54,

57

(2007)).

Further,

^'[t]he

determination

of

whether an action is discretionary or ministerial depends
on the character of the specific actions complained of, not
the general nature of the job, and is to be made on a case-

by-case basis." McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 594-95, 678
S.E.2d 922, 925 (2009) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga.
App. 282, 285, 643 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2007)).
Plaintiff

inmates

is

contends

a

duty

that

imposed

providing

on

sheriffs

medical

by

care

for

and

is,

law

therefore, a ministerial act. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 1315.) Plaintiff is correct that simply providing access to
medical

care

for

an

inmate

is

a

ministerial

act

by

the

sheriff. (Id. at 13 (citing Howard v. City of Columbus, 239
Ga.

App.

399,

411,

521

S.E.2d

51,

66

(1999)). However,

^^[t]he determination of what medical treatment to provide

32

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 33 of 35

is

an

act

of

discretion

subject

to

official

iininunity."

Howard, 39 Ga. App. at 411, 521 S.E.2d 51, at 66 (emphasis

in original) (quotation omitted). In this case. Plaintiff
does not dispute that Sheriff McDuffie contracted with THRX
to provide health care for inmates at the jail. Rather,
Plaintiff takes issue with how Sheriff McDuffie supervised

and

trained

prison

employees

to

provide

medical

care.^^

(Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 15.)

Georgia courts have consistently held that a sheriff's
decision

on

how

to

provide

medical

care

to

inmates

is

discretionary under Georgia law. Keele v. Glynn Cnty., 938
F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (collecting cases);
see also Graham v. Cobb Cnty., 316 Ga. App. 738, 743, 730
S.E.2d 439, 444 (2012) (finding ''the determination of how

to provide adequate medical care to the prisoners at the

jail involved the use of discretion

by [the sheriff]");

Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 191, 581 S.E.2d 272,
276 (2003) (finding that sheriff engaged in discretionary
function

with

supervision

of

respect

its

to

"operation

officers

and

of

the

employees,

jail,

the

and

the

establishment of policies and procedures"), disapproved of
Although the decision to provide medical care and train
officers to provide that care is ministerial, the decision
on how
to train officers to provide that care is
discretionary. See Keele v. Glynn Cnty., 938 F. Supp. 2d
1270, 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2013).

33

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 34 of 35

on other grounds by City of Richmond Hill v»

Maia, 301 Ga.

257, 261, 800 S.E.2d 573, 578 (2017). The Court will not

depart

from

the

holding

Sheriff McDuffie

of

these

cases

and

finds

that

was engaged in discretionary conduct in

determining how to provide medical care for inmates at the
jail.

Additionally,

despite

Plaintiff s

assertion

to

the

contrary (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 15), the record is devoid
of

evidence

showing

that

Sheriff

McDuffie

acted

with

malice. To show actual malice, a plaintiff needs to show
that

a

defendant

acted

with

^^a

deliberate

intention to do

wrong." Keele, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (quoting Peterson v.
Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007)). As discussed

throughout this order. Plaintiff has not shown that Sheriff
McDuffie

made

any

decisions

regarding

Cartee's

incarceration, much less that Sheriff McDuffie acted with
malice

towards

him.

Id.

at

1310.

Because

the

Court

finds

that Sheriff McDuffie was engaged in discretionary conduct
and did not act with malice. Sheriff McDuffie is entitled

to

official

granted

on

immunity.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's

state

law

summary

claims

judgment

against

is

Sheriff

McDuffie in his individual capacity.^®

Because

entitled

the

to

Court

summary

has

concluded

judgment

34

with

that

Defendants

respect

to

all

are

of

Case 4:15-cv-00149-WTM-BKE Document 254 Filed 02/01/22 Page 35 of 35

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing. Defendants' motion for summary

judgment

(Doc.

Effingham

159)

County,

Commissioners, and

is
the

GRANTED.

As

Effingham

a

result.
County

Defendants
Board

of

Jimmy McDuffie are DISMISSED from this

action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to amend the caption
accordingly.

SO ORDERED this 5^day of January 2022.
WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
Tzr c
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

Plaintiff's substantive claims. Plaintiff punitive damages
claims are likewise DISMISSED. See Mann v. Taser
Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1304-1305 (11th Cir. 2009).

35

Int'l,