Storey v. Effingham County et al

Filing 259

ORDER granting 161 Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims against the ECSO Officers in their individual capacity. Plaintiff's wrongful death claims brought in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Valerie S torey are Dismissed. As a result Defendants Ashby Lee Zydonyk, Bryan Shearouse, Cora Mae Gaines, Dorothy Hopf, Garett Buckles, Johnny Reinhart, Latonya Cooper, Leslie Minor, Paul Davis, Robert L. Brown, and Tiffany Tisby are Dismissed from this action. ORDER denying as moot Plaintiff's 158 Motion to exclude the ESCO Officers' expert testimony. Because the Court has concluded that the ECSO Officers are entitled to summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff's substantive claims, Plaintiff's punitive damages claims are likewise Dismissed. Plaintiff's 167 motion to exclude the ECSO Officers' testimony are Denied as moot. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 8/31/2022. (csr) Modified on 9/1/2022 (csr).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

KEITH STOREY, as Executor of
the Estate of Valerie Storey
and Executor of the Estate of

Kenneth Cartee,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV415-149

V.

TRANSFORMHEALTHRX, INC.; ASHBY

LEE ZYDONYK, Deputy; BRYAN
SHEAROUSE, Corporal; CORA iyiAE
GAINES, Jailer; DOROTHY HOPE,
Jailer; GARETT BUCKLES, Jailer;
JOHNNY REINHART, Jailer;
LATONYA COOPER, Sergeant;

LESLIE MINOR, Jail Corporal;
PAUL DAVIS, Officer; ROBERT L.
BROWN, Jail Captain; TIFFANY
TISBY, Jail Officer; JOHN DOES
1-20; ANISA GRANTHAM, LPC,
NCAC; REBECCA RANSOM, LPN; JANE
DOES 1-10; JOHN DOES PHYSICIANS
1-5; and ALl RAHIMI, M.D.;
Defendants.

ORDER

Before

the

Court

is

Defendants

Ashby

Lee

Zydonyk,

Bryan

Shearouse, Cora Mae Gaines, Dorothy Hopf, Garett Buckles, Johnny
Reinhart, Latonya Cooper, Leslie Minor, Paul Davis, Robert L.

Brown,

and

Tiffany

Tisby's,

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

^

Plaintiff

sued

the

ECSO

(collectively ''ECSO
(Doc.

161),

Officers

official capacities. (Doc. 72 at St 10.)

in

which

their

Officers"),^

Plaintiff

has

individual

and

opposed (Doc. 218). For the following reasons the ECSO Officers'
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 161) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND^
I.

INITIAL ARREST

This

case

arises

out of the

2012 incarceration

of Kenneth

Cartee at the Effingham County Jail. Early in the morning on
September 9, 2012, Cartee called his daughter, Valerie Storey,
and

told

her that

he

planned to commit suicide.^ (Doc. 161,

Attach. 2 at ^ 1; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at 5 6; Doc. 161, Attach.

3 at 55.) Ms. Storey called 911 and drove to her father's home.
(Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 2; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SI 7.) Two

2 The relevant facts are taken principally from the parties'
statements of undisputed material facts. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2;
Doc. 218, Attach. 1.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e) and Southern District of Georgia Local Rule
56.1, all material facts not controverted by specific citation
to
the
record
are
deemed
admitted,
unless
otherwise

inappropriate. The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to respond
to many of the facts included in the ECSO Officers' statement of
material facts. Accordingly, the Court deems the facts included
in

the

ECSO

Officers'

statement

of

material

facts

admitted

except where Plaintiff dlearly disputes these facts. Where
Plaintiff does offer conflicting accounts of the events in
question, this Court draws all inferences and presents all
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving partyPlaintiff. See Hamilton

v. Southland Christian

Sch., Inc., 680

F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Moton v. Cowart, 631
F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011)).

3 In their respective statements of material facts, both parties
claim that the call took place

in the morning on Sunday

September 9, 2012." (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at ^ 1; Doc. 218,
Attach. 1 at ^ 6.) However, in Valerie Storey's deposition that
both parties cite, Ms. Storey states that the call took place
^^late at night, approximately 10:00." (Doc. 161, Attach. 3 at
55.) This discrepancy does not affect the Court's analysis.

police officers and Jonathan

Williams, a family friend,

were

with Cartee when Ms. Storey arrived. (Doc. 161, Attach. 3 at
56.) The officers attempted to persuade Cartee to be sent for a
mental evaluation, but Cartee refused. (Id. at 58.) The police

officers spoke to Cartee ""for a very long time," but eventually
the officers left the scene for their shift change. (Id. at 56-

57.) Ms. Storey and Mr. Williams remained with Cartee after the
officers left. (Id. at 58-59.) While Ms. Storey was attempting
to calm her father, Cartee put a knife to her throat and said,

""if I'm going to go, you're going to go." (Doc. 161, Attach. 2
at 1 3; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at f 7.) Mr. Williams was able to

get

Ms.

Storey

away

from

Cartee,

and

the

two

drove

to

a

neighbor's house to call 911 again. (Doc. 161, Attach. 3 at 60.)
An

officer

of

the

Effingham

County

Sheriff's

Office

("ECSO"), Sergeant Bryan Shearouse, responded to the scene at

approximately 5:00 a.m. and was apprised that Cartee appeared to
be suicidal. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 4; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at

SI 8; Doc. 161, Attach. 4 at 41-42.) Sgt. Shearouse and a Deputy
Shaffer made conversation with Cartee. (Doc. 161, Attach. 4 at

45.) When asked if he was suicidal, Cartee

doesn't
Shearouse

matter."
a

bottle

(Id.)

At

some

containing

point,

different

would respond, ""It

Cartee
pills

but

handed

Sgt.

refused

to

answer whether he had taken any pills. (Id. at 47.) Based on
Cartee's behavior and the concern that he would harm himself or

others,

Sgt.

Shearouse

decided

to

call

an

ambulance

and

have

Cartee checked out by EMT. (Id. at 85-86.) Eventually, Cartee

agreed to

have EMT transport him to Effingham Hospital for a

voluntary mental health evaluation. (Id. at 86.)

Cartee was transported to the hospital by ambulance, with
Sgt.

Shearouse

Attach.

2

at

following
1

7;

Doc.

in

his

218,

police

Attach.

1

cruiser.
at

SI

(Doc.

11.)

161,

While

in

transit, Cartee

attempted to escape from the ambulance. (Doc.

161,

at

Attach.

2

SI

8;

Doc.

218,

Attach.

1

at

SI

12.)

The

ambulance stopped, and Sgt. Shearouse took Cartee into custody
as he had determined that Cartee
others

and

needed

to

be

taken

was a danger to himself and

for

an

involuntary

evaluation.

(Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 9; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SI 13; Doc.

161, Attach. 4 at 88.) Sgt. Shearouse then transported Cartee to

Effingham Hospital in his police cruiser. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2
at SI 9; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SI 13).

Upon their arrival at Effingham Hospital, a nurse informed
Sgt. Shearouse that she
and

asked that one

would need a urine sample from Cartee

of Cartee's

handcuffs be

removed so that

he

could provide the sample. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 10.) Sgt.
Shearouse removed Cartee's left handcuff. (Id. at SI 11.) Cartee

then began walking towards Sgt. Shearouse while pulling on his
zipper in a manner that caused Sgt. Shearouse to believe Cartee
intended

to

urinate

on

him.

(Id.

at

SI

12.)

Sgt.

Shearouse

instructed Cartee not to come any closer, but Cartee ignored the
directive and raised a closed fist at Sgt. Shearouse. (Id. at

S[S[ 13-15.)

Fearing that

Cartee

would

hit

him,

Sgt.

Shearouse

pushed Cartee against the wall to immobilize him. (Id. at SI 16.)
Cartee then tried to hit Sgt. Shearouse with his left arm, and

Sgt. Shearouse loudly commanded Cartee to stop resisting. (Id.
SI 17.) Sgt. Shearouse was eventually able to force Cartee to the
ground. (Id. at SI 18.) Cartee continued to resist despite Sgt.
Shearouse's instructions and attempts to restrain Cartee. (Id.
at SI 19.)

Because Cartee refused to comply, Sgt. Shearouse pulled out
his Taser and threatened to tase Cartee. (Doc. 161, Attach. 1 at

SI 20; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SI

15.) The threat of the Taser

caused Cartee to cease resisting momentarily; however, when Sgt.

Shearouse attempted to handcuff him, Cartee once again resisted.
(Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SISI 21-22.) Sgt. Shearouse then placed
his knee between Cartee's shoulder and neck to ^^garner a pain

response" in order to get both of Cartee's hands behind his back
and cuffed. (Id. at SI 23.) At this point, Sgt. Shearouse was

able to stand up Cartee, and Cartee generally ceased resisting.
(Id. at SI 24.) Cartee suffered a minor skin tear to his right

wrist

during

the

altercation,

and

the

wound

was

checked

and

cleaned by a doctor at the hospital. (Id. at SI 25.) Following
the altercation, the hospital staff medically cleared Cartee for

release.

(Id.

at

SI

27.)

Sgt.

Shearouse

arrested

Cartee

for

felony obstruction and transported him to Effingham County Jail
at approximately 11:45 a.m. on September 9, 2012. (Id.)
II.

CARTEE^S FIRST STAY AT EFFINGHAM COUNTY JAIL

At the jail. Sergeant Leslie Minor heard Cartee ^'hollering
and

cussing"

over

the

dispatch

radio

as

Sgt.

Shearouse

transported him to the jail. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 28.) Sgt.
Minor

notified

Officers

Dorothy

Hopf,

Paul

Davis,

and

John

Reinhart that Cartee had been ''fighting deputies" and instructed

them to assist Sgt. Shearouse

with

bringing Cartee into the

jail. (Id. at SI 29.) Based on her knowledge that Cartee had
already been combative, Sgt. Minor instructed Officer Davis to
get a Taser. (Id. at SI 30.)

Cartee was reportedly "out of control" when he entered the

jail's booking area, screaming and referring to Sgt. Minor with
a racial epithet. (Id. at SI 31.) Officers Reinhart and Hopf
removed

the

handcuffs from Cartee

and

instructed

him to

place

his hands flat down on the booking desk. (Id. at SI 32.) At this

point, Sgt. Shearouse left the booking area to disinfect his
handcuffs but was able to observe Cartee failing to follow the

jail officers' commands from the doorway of the adjacent room.
(Id.

at

SISI 33-34.)

Cartee

refused

jail

officers'

commands

to

spread his feet; and when the officers attempted to put Cartee's
hands on the table and told Cartee to keep them there, Cartee

"snatched them away" and told the officers, "I know
doing." (Id. at

what I'm

35, 37.)

Plaintiff claims that at no point during this altercation

did Cartee attempt to assault an officer. (Doc. 218, Attach. 1
at ^ 25.) According to Sgt. Minor, however, whenever an officer
attempted to restrain Cartee, he would swing his arms wildly and

at one point almost hit Officer Reinhart in the face. (Doc. 161,
Attach.

5

at

233-34.)

Because

other

officers

were

unable

to

restrain Cartee, Cartee was refusing the officers' commands, and
Cartee

had

already

fought

Sgt.

Shearouse

at

the

hospital.

Officer Davis deployed his laser's prongs towards Cartee, which
attached to his abdominal area. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 41;

Doc.

161,

Cartee

to

Attach.
fall

7

onto

at

10.)

Officer

The

shock

Reinhart,

from
and

the

taser

they

in

caused

turn

fell

together onto a row of plastic chairs. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at
SISI 42-43.)

The officers then gained control over Cartee, removed the

Taser

prongs,

and

placed

Cartee

in

a

restraint

chair

in

a

holding cell to give him time to calm down. (Id. at SI 44.) Sgt.
Minor

called

contracted

the

medical

on-call

telephone

provider,

number

for

TransformHealthRX

the

jail's

("THRX"),

and

requested that a nurse come to the jail to examine Mr. Cartee.
(Id. at SI 46.) Nurse Marilyn Spikes arrived soon thereafter, but
Cartee

refused

to

allow

her

to

examine

him.

(Id.

at

SI

47.)

Officer

Reinhart

and

Sgt.

Minor

removed

restraint chair later that day, around

Cartee

1:45 p.m.'^

from

the

(Doc.

161,

Attach. 6 at 59.) According to Officer Reinhart, Cartee appeared
normal and did not complain of injuries at this time. (Id. at
60.)

Cartee's

combative

behavior

continued

through

Monday,

September 10, 2012, and, as a result, jail staff were unable to
fully book him into the jail. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 49.)

At

approximately

Nurse

Rebecca

Ransom,

(Doc.

161, Attach.

6:00

p.m.

THRX's

2 at

SI

Monday,

weekday

51.)

September

nurse,

Cartee

10,

assessed

indicated

2012,

Cartee.

that he

had

previously taken illicit drugs, and Nurse Ransom concluded that
his behavior was possibly drug-induced as opposed to the product
of

mental

illness.

(Id.

at

SI

52.)

After

consulting

with

a

supervisor. Nurse Ransom obtained an order to send Cartee back
to Effingham Hospital for a mental health evaluation. (Id. at
SI 53.)

^ Plaintiff alleges that Cartee was left strapped naked to the
restraint chair from when he was first placed in the holding
cell on September 9, 2012, until 6:00 p.m. Monday, September 10,
2012, when he was examined by Nurse Rebecca Ransom. (Doc. 218,
Attach. 1 at SI 28.) In support of this allegation. Plaintiff
cites to a message sent by Megan Miley, a THRX nurse, on
September 10, 2012. (Doc. 161, Attach. 10 at 314.) The message
states that '"[Cartee] has been combative all day with officers
and they have been unable to book. Inmate was placed in the
restraint chair[,] and Nurse Rebecca was sent back to evaluate[]
inmate." (Id.) This message does not rebut Reinhart's testimony
that Cartee was removed from the restraint chair on September 9,
2012. Rather, it merely shows that officers were forced to place
Cartee back in the restraint chair on September 10, 2012, due to
Cartee's continued aggressive behavior.

Patrol

Cartee

Officer

back

to

Ashby

Zydonyk

Effingham

was

Hospital.

instructed to transport

(Id.

at

f

55.)

Officer

Zydonyk arrived at the holding cell and found Cartee alone and
secured in a restraint chair. (Id. at 5 56.) Officers Zydonyk

and Reinhart entered the cell together to remove Cartee from the
chair. (Id. at 1 57.) Officer Zydonyk removed the nylon straps
that secured Cartee to the chair and asked Cartee to stand up

several

times.

(Id.

at

^

60.)

Cartee

voluntarily, so Officer Zydonyk took

refused

to

stand

up

hold of Cartee's arm to

lift him to his feet. (Id. at SI 61.) At this time, Cartee became

combative,

pulling

away

and

failing

his

arms

in

a

manner

consistent with the previous incidents. (Id. at SI 62.) Officer
Zydonyk immediately took Cartee to the ground to gain control of
the situation, but Cartee continued to resist. (Id. at SISI 63-

64.) With the help of Officer Garett Buckles, the officers were
able to secure handcuffs and leg irons on Cartee and lift him to
his

feet,

but

Cartee

continued

to

struggle

and

resist

the

officers' efforts to remove him from the holding cell. (Id. at

SISI 65-69.) According to Officer Reinhart, ''[t]he officers had
[Cartee] by each arm, and he'd pick his legs up and try to push
us away or push against a wall, actually resisting [sic] not
trying to get out of the holding cell." (Doc. 161, Attach. 6 at
74.) In order get Cartee to stop resisting.

Officer Reinhart

applied the Taser in drive-stun^ mode to Cartee's hip.® (Id. at
74.)

The

officers

were

then

able

to

get

Cartee

out

of

the

holding cell and into the booking area. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at
SI 72.) Cartee began resisting again and refused to walk, so the
officers carried

him out of the

jail to the

jail's transport

vehicle. (Id. at SISI 72, 74.) Officer Zydonyk then placed Cartee

in the transport vehicle and drove him to the hospital along
with Officer Reinhart. (Id. at SI 74.)
III. CARTEE IS TREATED AT GEORGIA REGIONAL FOR MENTAL ILLNESS

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 10, 2012, officers
carried Cartee into the emergency room of Effingham Hospital,

where hospital staff gave Cartee multiple sedative injections to
control his disorderly behavior. (Id. at SI 77.) Cartee remained

at Effingham Hospital until 3:00 a.m. on September 11, 2012,
when, in accordance with a physician's orders. Officer Zydonyk

®

Drive-stun

mode

allows

a

Taser to

be

used

like

a

stun

gun-

meaning the Taser is pressed directly against the skin and
produces a burning sensation. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 70 n.l
(citing Mingo v. City of Mobile, Ala., 592 F. App'x 793, 796 n.l
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)).)
® The officers' accounts differ on whether Officer Reinhart used

the Taser on Cartee while Cartee was still on the ground or
after he had been lifted to his feet. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at
SI 70 n.2; Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SI 39.) As Plaintiff asserted,
the Court will construe this fact in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff and assume Cartee was still on the ground at the time
Officer Reinhart used the Taser on him.

10

transported

Cartee

to

Georgia

Regional

Hospital

to

receive

mental health care. (Id. at 1 78.)

Cartee was hospitalized at Georgia Regional from September
11, 2012, until September 17, 2012. (Id. at SI 79.) At Georgia

Regional, Cartee began to display signs that he was suffering
from at least partial paralysis. (Id. at SI 81.) For example, on

September 13, 2012, a social worker met with Cartee and found
him using a wheelchair because, according to Cartee, he could
not walk. (Id. at SI 81.) According to Cartee's Georgia Regional
records, Cartee was initially disorderly but ^Mojver the course

of his stay he did not present as an imminent danger to himself
or others." (Doc.

161, Attach.

14

at 57.)

^^By [September

17,

2012,] he was felt appropriate to discharge back to the jail."
(Id.)
IV.

CARTEE'S SECOND STAY AT EFFINGHAM COUNTY JAIL

When

Deputy

Robert

Plank

arrived

at

Georgia

Regional

to

transport Cartee back to the jail at 11:00 a.m. on September 17,
2012, a nurse informed Deputy Plank that Cartee had times where
he

could

Attach.

not

2

at

wheelchair
vehicle,
SI 84.)

SI

was

and

With

walk

and

83.)

times

Deputy

necessary

the

nurse

handcuffs

that

Plank

to

move

he

asked

leg

irons

walk.

the

Cartee

replied, '"No.
and

would

He's

nurse

to

the

(Doc.

161,

whether

transport

walking." (Id.

applied,

a

Cartee

at

walked

approximately 35-40 feet from the Georgia Regional facility to

11

Deputy Plank's vehicle in the parking lot. (Id. at 5 85.) On the
ride back to the jail, Cartee informed Deputy Plank that he was

^'not

getting

out

of

this

car." (Id.

at

5 86.)

Deputy

Plank

radioed the jail for assistance and with the help of Officers
Davis and Reinhart, the officers were able to get Cartee out of
the car and into the jail. (Id. at 55 87-89.)

Later
intake

on

exam

Cartee's

September

of

jail

Cartee

17,

2012,

but

uniform."^

did

(Id.

Nurse

not

at

SISI

roll

Ransom
up

90-91.)

conducted

the

The

sleeves

next

day

an
of

at

approximately 10:00 a.m., Cartee was examined by THRX's Licensed
Professional Counselor, Anisa Grantham. (Id. at f 92.) Although
Cartee told Grantham, ""I can't walk," Grantham observed Cartee

bending his knees to sit on the side of the bunk and was ^'not
convinced [Cartee could] not walk." (Doc. 161, Attach. 9 at 8.)

Later in the day on September 18, 2012, Officer Davis was
instructed

booking

to

area

escort

for

his

Cartee

bond

from

the

hearing.

isolation

(Doc.

161,

cell

to

Attach.

the

2

at

^ 94.) When Officer Davis informed Cartee that he was needed in

The note from Nurse Ransom's September 17, 2012, exam describes
Nurse Ransom's observations as follows:

[Cartee] was ambulatory upon leaving [the jail] and
returned stating he could not walk. No obvious trauma
to legs. Observed inmate bending and moving both legs.
Also witnessed [Cartee] standing at door in booking
area upon return from GA regional. Deputy Plank, who
transported [Cartee] from GA regional, states that he
observed inmate walking at GA regional before pick up.
(Doc. 161, Attach. 9 at 7.)

12

the booking area, Cartee stood up, but told Officer Davis that
he

could

not

walk.

(Id.

at

96-97.)

Officer

Davis

spent

approximately five minutes unsuccessfully instructing Cartee to
walk

and

reminding Cartee that

he

had seen

Cartee

walk the

previous day. (Id. at 1 98.) Officer Davis then went to the
booking area to inform Captain Robert Brown of Cartee's refusal,
and Captain Brown instructed Officer

Davis to use the tools

available to him. (Id. at 1 99.)
Officer

Taser

and

Davis

returned

announced,

""Mr.

to

Cartee's

Cartee,

we

isolation

need

to

cell

with

escort

you

a

to

booking, or I'm going to have to tase you." (Doc. 161, Attach. 2
at 1 100; Doc. 161, Attach. 7 at 21.) When Cartee still would
not walk. Officer
onto

Cartee's

Officer

Davis applied the Taser in drive-stun mode

lower

Reinhart

thigh.

was

(Doc.

standing

161,

just

Attach.

inside

2

the

at

door

SI 102.)
of

the

isolation cell when Officer Davis used the Taser on Cartee. (Id.

at SI 101.) According to Officer Reinhart, when Officer Davis
used

the

squirm,"

Taser
making

on

Carter,

Officer

operable.

(Doc.

161,

initially

stunned,

he

his

"legs

Reinhart

Attach.

pulled

6

away

would

believe
at

106.)

and

move,

he

Cartee's

legs

After

Cartee

attempted

to

would

grab

were
was

the

Taser. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at SI 103.) Officer Davis attempted
to drive stun Cartee two additional times but was unsure whether

he made contact with

Cartee's thigh. (Id. at SI 104.) Officer

13

Tiffany

Tisby

then

retrieved

a

wheelchair

which

was

used

to

escort Cartee to the booking area without further incident. (Id.
at 5 106.)

On

September

20,

2012,

jail

officers

informed

Sergeant

Latonya Cooper that they were having to assist Cartee in using
the

toilet

walk.

(Id.

because
at

5

Cartee

107.)

was

Sgt.

complaining

Cooper

went

that
to

he

check

could
on

not

Cartee

herself, and Cartee told Sgt. Cooper that he was unable to walk.

(Id. at SISI 108-109.) After Sgt. Cooper discussed the situation
with

Nurse

back

to

Ransom,

the

Effingham

decision

Hospital.

was

made

(Id.

at

5

to

transport

110.)

Sgt.

Cartee

Cooper

transported Cartee to Effingham Hospital at approximately 10:00
a.m. on September 20, 2012. (Id. at ^ 111.)

While

at

Effingham

Hospital,

Sgt.

Cooper

learned

that

Cartee had been diagnosed with renal failure. (Id. at 5 112.)
Cartee was released from custody on his own recognizance later
that day. (Id. at SI 113.) After his release from custody, Cartee

was taken to Memorial Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a
cervical
caused

spinal

partial

diagnosed

with

cord

injury

and

paralysis.

(Id.

several

broken

Til
at

vertebral fracture
SI

ribs,

115.)

Cartee

sepsis,

which

was

and

also

severe

dehydration.s (Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SI 58.) Cartee remained at

® The Court notes that the parties have not provided Cartee's
medical records from Memorial Hospital that would show his exact

14

Memorial

Hospital

transferred

to

("Woodlands"),

until

Woodlands

an

October

22,

Healthcare

extended

care

and

2012,

when

he

Rehabilitation

facility.

(Doc.

72

was

Center

at

21.)

Cartee was discharged from Woodlands on April 23, 2013, with

hospice services. (Id. at 33.) Cartee died at home on June 25,
2013,

from

cardiopulmonary

arrest,

respiratory

failure,

and

adult failure to thrive. (Id.)
V.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 8, 2014, Valerie Storey,^ individually and as
executrix

of

Cartee's

estate,

filed

a

civil

rights

and

tort

action against Effingham County Jail, Jimmy McDuffie, Effingham
County Sheriff's Department, TransformHealthRX, Inc., Effingham
County Board of Commissioners, and 35 John and Jane Does. Storey
V. Effingham Cnty.

(S.D.

Ga.

Sept.

Jail,

8,

No. 4:14-cv-194-WTM,

2014).

On

November

26,

(Doc. 1 at 1),

2014,

the

Court

dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule

diagnosis. Instead, Plaintiff cites to the deposition of their
expert witness, Inna Sheyner, M.D., who testified to his review
of Cartee's medical history prior to his transfer from Memorial
Hospital but does not state when Cartee's conditions were
diagnosed. (Doc. 218, Attach. 1 at SISI 88-90; citing Doc. 218,
Attach. 22 at 25.) However, because the ECSO Officers have not

objected to this fact, the Court will assume for purposes of
this order that Cartee was diagnosed with these conditions at
Memorial Hospital on September 20, 2012.
® Valerie Storey is Cartee's biological daughter. However,

William Lamar Newman adopted Ms. Storey in 1981 after marrying
Estella Nelson, Ms. Storey's mother. (Doc. 157, Attach. 1 at 5;
Doc.

202, Attach.

1 at 3.) Cartee's

parental rights over

Ms.

Storey were terminated during this adoption. (Doc. 157, Attach.
1 at 5.)

15

of

civil

Procedure

41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

Storey

v.

Effingham

Cnty.

Jail, (Doc. 32 at 1), (S.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2014).

On May 20, 2015, Ms. Storey, individually and as executrix
of Cartee's estate, filed this renewal action alleging multiple
federal

and

state

law

causes

of

actions

against

several

individuals and entities involved in Cartee's incarceration and

medical

treatment.

Officers

as

(Doc.

defendants

1.)

for

This

the

complaint

first

time.

named

(Id.)

the

ECSO

Relevant

to

this motion, in the Second Amended Complaint, Ms. Storey alleged

two causes of action against the ECSO Officers in their official
and

individual

capacities.

(Doc.

72.)

Count

1

alleged

a

42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the ECSO Officers for their alleged
deliberate

indifference

incarcerated.^®

(Id.

to

Cartee's

at 22-25.)

medical

needs

while

Count 2 alleged that the

ECSO

Officers violated Georgia law through their failure to provide
Cartee
(Id.

with

at

adequate medical care and tortious

25-30.)

Based

alleged damages in

on

these

causes

of

use

action,

of force.
Ms.

Storey

her capacity as the executrix of Cartee's

estate for Cartee's pain and suffering during life. (Id. at 2930,

45.)

Ms.

Storey

also

brought

wrongful

death

claims

for

damages. (Id. at 45.) Following Ms. Storey's death, her husband.

To

the

construed

extent
to

that

assert

a

the
claim

Second
for

Amended

excessive

Complaint
force

could

be

under § 1983,

Plaintiff concedes in his responsive brief that he is not
asserting such a claim in this action. (Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at
1.)

16

Keith Storey, was substituted as the party plaintiff in this
case.

(Doc.

137.)

Now,

the

ECSO

Officers

move

jointly

for

summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against them. (Doc. 161.)
STMSIDRBD OF REVIEW

According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), ''[a] party may move for

summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part
of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought."
Such a motion must be granted ^'if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The ^'purpose of
summary judgment is to ^pierce the pleadings and to assess the

proof

in

order

to

see

whether

there

is

a

genuine

need

for

trial[.]' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475

U.S.

574,

587,

106

S.

Ct.

1348,

1356,

89 L.

Ed.

2d

538

(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note

to

1963 amendment). Summary

judgment is

appropriate

when

the

nonmoving party ^^fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The substantive law governing the
action determines which facts are material. DeLong Equip. Co. v.

Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989)

17

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106
S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

As the Supreme Court explained:

[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to

establish,

by

going

beyond

the

pleadings,

that

there

is

a

genuine issue concerning facts material to its case. Clark v.
Coats
Court

&

Clark,

must

Inc., 929 F.2d

review

the

604, 608 (11th

evidence

and

all

Cir. 1991). The

reasonable

factual

inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S. Ct. at
1356 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655,
82

S.

Ct.

993,

994,

8

L.

Ed.

2d

176

(1962)).

However,

the

nonmoving party ""must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586,
106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted). A mere '"scintilla" of

evidence or simply conclusory allegations will not suffice. See,
e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d 1422, 1425 (11th Cir.
1998). Nevertheless,
more

than

one

where

inference

a

reasonable

from

the

18

fact finder

facts,

and

that

may "draw
inference

creates a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should

refuse to grant summary judgment." Barfield
F.2d

923,

933-34

(11th

Cir.

1989) (citing

v. Brierton, 883

Samples

v. City of

Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988)).
ANALYSIS

The

ECSO

Officers

contend

they

are

entitled

to

summary

judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims against them. (Doc. 161.)
First,

the

judgment

ECSO

on

Officers

Plaintiff's

argue

they

wrongful

are

death

entitled

claims

to

summary

because

Ms.

Storey, whom Plaintiff replaced, had no right to bring wrongful
death

claims

in

her

individual

capacity

since

she

was

not

Cartee's legal daughter. (Doc. 161, Attach. 1 at 1 n.l.)^^ Next,
the

ECSO

claims

Officers

alleged

argue

against

the

statute

of limitations

bars

them

because

they

named

were

not

all
as

defendants in the original action. (Id. at 2.) Finally, the ECSO

Officers argue they are entitled summary judgment on the merits
of each

of Plaintiff's

claims

because

(1)

qualified

immunity

bars Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the ECSO Officers in their

individual
necessary
against

capacities,
elements

the

ECSO

of

(2)
his

Plaintiff
§

Officers,

has

not

1983

official

(3)

sovereign

established
capacity
immunity

the

claims
bars

In making this argument, the ECSO Officers adopt and
incorporate the argument Dr. Ali Rahimi makes in his brief in
support of his summary judgment motion. (Doc. 157, Attach. 2 at
4-7.)

19

Plaintiff s state law claims against the ECSO Officers in their

official capacities, and (4) official immunity bars Plaintiffs
state law claims against the ECSO officers in their individual
capacities. (Id. at 2-3.)

In

response.

Plaintiff

states

that

he

is

no

longer

asserting state law claims against the ECSO Officers in their
official capacities.

{Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 3.) Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS summary judgment for the ECSO Officers on these
claims. See Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599
(11th Cir. 1995) (^'[G] rounds alleged in the complaint but not

relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned." (citation
omitted)).

However,

Plaintiff

disputes

that

the

statute

of

limitations bars his § 1983 claims. (Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 4.)

Plaintiff also opposes summary judgment on the merits of his
§ 1983 and state law claims against the ECSO Officers. (Id.) As
discussed

below,

the

Court

finds

that

the

ECSO

Officers

are

entitled to summary judgment on the merits of all of Plaintiffs
claims.

I.

PLAINTIFF^S WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS

The

Court

will first address

whether

Plaintiffs

wrongful

death claims are invalid because Ms. Storey lacked authority to

pursue the claims in her individual capacity. The ECSO Officers
^2 For the purposes of this order, the Court does not reach the
issues of whether Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute
of limitations.

20

argue that Ms. Storey, and Plaintiff by proxy, lacked standing
to

bring

wrongful

death

claims

in

her

individual

capacity

because she was adopted by her stepfather and was therefore no

longer Cartee's legal kin. (Doc. 161, Attach. 1 at 1 n.l; Doc.
157,

Attach.

2

at

3-6.)

The

ECSO

Officers

also

argue

that

although Ms. Storey could have brought the wrongful death claims
in her capacity as executrix of Cartee's estate, she did not.
(Doc. 157, Attach. 2 at 6.) Plaintiff did not discuss this issue

in

his

brief

judgment.

opposing

Yet,

in

the

ruling

ECSO

on

Officers'

this

motion

issue,

the

for

summary

Court

has

considered Plaintiff's response to Dr. Ali Rahimi's motion for
summary

judgment,

in

which

Plaintiff

argues

that

stepparent

adoptions do not sever a child's right to bring a wrongful death
claim. (Doc. 202, Attach. 2 at 14-20.)

Plaintiff failed to respond directly to several of the
arguments the ECSO Officers raised in support of summary
judgment. It is not the Court's responsibility to invent
arguments on Plaintiff's behalf or to address every potential
argument Plaintiff could have, but did not, make based on the
evidence in the record. See Resol. Tr. Corp., 43 F.3d at 599
(11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (^'There is no burden upon the

district court to distill every potential argument that could be
made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment[ ]
. . . . Rather, the onus is upon the parties to formulate
arguments[.]" (citations omitted)); see also A.L. v. Jackson
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 635 F. App'x 774, 786 (11th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (^MD]istrict courts are not required to ^mine' the
record looking for evidence not presented by the parties."
(citing Chaves v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061
(11th Cir. 2011)).

21

In Georgia, wrongful death claims did not exist at common

law but were statutorily created through the enactment of the

Wrongful Death Act. Tolbert v. Maner, 271 Ga. 207, 208, 518
S.E.2d

423,

425

(1999)

(citing

O.C.G.A.

§

51-4-1

et

seq.).

^'Being in derogation of common law, the scope of the Wrongful
Death

Act

must

be

limited

in

strict

accordance

with

the

statutory language used therein, and such language can never be

extended beyond its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. (citation
omitted). Additionally,

the

Eleventh

Circuit

has

held

that

a

Plaintiff's ability to bring a § 1983 claim for wrongful death
is

governed

Rodgers,

by

331

the

F.3d

Georgia
844,

Wrongful

850

(11th

Death
Cir.

Act.
2003)

Carrinqer
(per

v.

curiam)

(^'Georgia's wrongful death statute is incorporated into federal
law under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988." (citations omitted)); Brazier v.
Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1961)

governed
Georgia
wrongful

Georgia
law

plaintiff's

governs

death

whether

damages

based

civil

rights

Plaintiff
on

his

has

(holding state law

tort).

Therefore,

standing

federal

and

to

state

seek
law

claims.

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.

22

The

Wrongful

Death

Act

outlines

the

potential

persons

entitled to bring an action for wrongful death. O.C.G.A. § 51-42(a) provides:

The surviving spouse or, if there is no surviving
spouse, a child or children, either minor or sui
juris, may recover for the homicide^^ of the
spouse or parent the full value of the life of
the decedent, as shown by the evidence.

In cases

when there is no other person entitled to bring an

action for the wrongful death, ^'the administrator or executor of
the decedent may bring an action for and may recover and hold
the

amount

recovered

for

the

benefit

of

the

next

of

kin."

O.C.G.A. § 51-4-5(a).

Because no one contends that Cartee had a surviving spouse

at the time of his death, the first person

with

priority to

bring a wrongful death claim on his behalf would be a surviving
child. O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2(a). However, Georgia courts have held

that adoption severs the right of a natural child to bring a
wrongful death action on behalf of their natural parent. See Eig
V. Savage, 177 Ga. App. 514, 514-15, 339 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1986);
Johnson v. Parrish, 159 Ga. App. 613, 613, 284 S.E.2d 111, 113
(1981)

(finding

plaintiff

lacked

standing

to

bring

wrongful

death action because "[t]he adopted individual is no longer the

In the context of the Wrongful Death Act,
^Homicide'
includes all cases in which the death of a human being results
from a crime, from criminal or other negligence, or from
property which has been defectively manufactured, whether or not
as a the result of negligence." O.C.G.A. § 51-4-1(2).

23

decedent's

adoption

Court

legal

by

finds

Because

Ms.

a

child.").

stepparent

no

support

Storey

Although

should

for

be

this

was adopted

Plaintiff

treated

position

prior to

argues

that

differently,

in

Georgia

the

law.^®

Cartee's death, the

Court agrees that she lacked standing to bring a wrongful death
claim in her individual capacity as his child, and therefore.

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a wrongful death claim in his
capacity as administrator of her estate. See Johnson, 159 Ga.
App. at 613, 284 S.E.2d at 113.

Nevertheless,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff

still

has

standing to pursue a wrongful death claim in his capacity as
administrator

of

Cartee's

estate.

O.C.G.A.

§ 51-4-5(a)

makes

clear that if the decedent has no surviving spouse or children,

the

correct

party

administrator

or

to

bring

executor

of

a

wrongful
the

death

decedent's

claim
estate,

is

the

which

initially was Ms. Storey and is now Plaintiff. In this case, Ms.

Storey brought her claims individually and as executrix of the
estate of Cartee, and she did not state explicitly whether her

wrongful

death

claims

were

brought

only

in

one

of

those

capacities. (Doc. 72 at 1-2) Therefore, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff argues that O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(1) excepts
stepparent adoption from the general rule that adoption severs
the legal relationship between a child and their natural parent.
(Doc. 202, Attach. 2 at 15-17.) On the contrary, O.C.G.A. § 198-19(a)(1) only excepts the ""spouse of the petitioner and
relatives of the spouse," which would not include a natural
parent not married to the adopting parent.

24

appropriate aGtion is to DISMISS the wrongful death claims Ms.

Storey brought in her individual capacity, which Plaintiff now
brings in his capacity as executor of Ms. Storey's estate. The
Court

finds,

however,

that

Plaintiff

does

have

standing

to

pursue the wrongful death claims in his capacity as executor of
Cartee's estate, and the Court will address the merits of those

claims along with Plaintiff's survival claims below.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S OFFICIAL CAPACITY § 1983 CLAIMS

When a

plaintiff brings a § 1983 action

against a local

government official in his or her official capacity, ""the suit
is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent." Busby v. City of Orlando, 931
F.2d

764,

776

(11th

Cir.

1991)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 161, 165, 105 S.
Ct.

3099,

3105,

87

L.

Ed.

2d

114

(1985)).

In

this

case.

Plaintiff's official capacity claims against the ECSO Officers
are essentially the same as his official capacity claims against
Defendants Jimmy McDuffie

and Effingham County. Id. The Court

previously granted summary judgment to those Defendants because
Plaintiff failed to establish a basis for entity liability under
Monell

V.

Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691,

98 S. Ct.

2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). (Doc. 254 at 27.) For the

same

reasons

set

forth

in

that

order,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the ECSO Officers in their

25

official capacities fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff
failed to establish the existence of an unconstitutional policy

on

the

part

of

the

sheriff's

office

or

Effingham

County.

Accordingly, the ECSO Officers' motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED

to

the

extent

they

request

dismissal

of

Plaintiff's

official capacity § 1983 claims.
III. PLAINTIFF'S INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY § 1983 CLAIMS

The

against

Court

the

will

ECSO

now

Officers

turn

to

based

Plaintiff's

on

their

§

1983

alleged

claims

deliberate

indifference to Cartee's medical care. The ECSO Officers contend

that they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.
{Doc.

161,

government

Attach.

officials

1

at

18-19.)

breathing

Qualified

room

to

make

immunity

^'gives

reasonable

but

mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L. Ed. 2d

1149 (2011). ''^When properly applied, it protects

^all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' "
Id. (quotations omitted). If a government official is sued in
his individual capacity for performing a discretionary function,
qualified immunity protects the

official from

civil liability

As the Court explained in its previous order, the ECSO
Officers
are
entitled
to summary judgment on
Plaintiff's
official capacity claims whether they are treated as agents of
the State or Effingham County because Plaintiff ^'has failed to
point to any unconstitutional policy or custom of the County or
the State that caused his injuries." (Doc. 254 at 23.)

26

unless his actions violated clearly established law. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed.
2d 396 (1982).

Because

it

is

undisputed

that

the

within their discretionary authority,
burden

^to

establish

that

[the

ECSO

ECSO

Officers

acted

Plaintiff ^^bear[s] the
Officers]

violated

[his]

constitutional rights[] . . . and that the right involved was

^^clearly established" at the time of the time of the putative
misconduct.' " Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d

1338, 1345 {11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d
1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, the Court will first
consider

whether

Plaintiff

has

established

that

the

ECSO

As the ECSO Officers highlighted in their brief, well
established precedent supports a finding that the ECSO Officers
acted
within their discretionary authority when
providing
medical

services

(collecting

to

cases)).

Cartee.

While

(Doc.

Plaintiff

161,

Attach.

argues

that

1

at

the

19

ECSO

Officers' actions should be considered non-discretionary for the

purposes of their official immunity defense to his state law
claims. Plaintiff fails to address the discretionary authority
issue when responding to the ECSO Officers' qualified immunity
defense. (See generally Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 9-11, 18-19.) The
question of whether the nature of an official's actions entitle
them to raise the defense of qualified immunity is fundamentally
distinct from the official immunity analysis. See McDaniel v.
Yearwood, No. 2:11-CV-00165-RWS, 2012 WL 526078, at *13 n.l3
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2012) (explaining qualified immunity inquiry
^'is separate and distinct from the question of whether an act is
classified as Miscretionary' or ^ministerial' for purposes of
official immunity under state law"). Therefore, the Court does
not find that Plaintiff has meaningfully disputed whether the
ECSO Officers acted within their discretionary authority and are
entitled to raise a qualified immunity defense.

27

Officers'

conduct

constituted

a

violation

of

Cartee's

constitutional rights.

A

pretrial

adequate

detainee,

medical

care

like

under

Cartee

the

due

was,

has

process

a

right

clause

of

to

the

Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th

Cir. 2015).

prison official's deliberate indifference to a

known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates
the [Fourteenth] Amendment.
1014,

1028

abrogated

(11th

in

part

Cir.
on

Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d

2001)
other

(en

banc)

grounds

by

(citation
Bell

Atl.

omitted),
Corp.

v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63, 127 3. Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 167 L.
Ed.

2d

929

(2007).

To

show

a

constitutional

violation

and

prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to a medical need,
a pretrial detainee must be able to show: ^'(1) a serious medical
need; (2) the defendant's deliberate indifference to that need;

and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's

injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). At issue in this case is whether
Plaintiff

Officers

has

were

satisfied

the

deliberately

second

indifferent

element—that

to

the

Plaintiff s

ECSO

serious

See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)

(explaining

Fourteenth

Amendment

governs

pretrial

detainee

deliberate indifference claims but that the standards under the

Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth).

28

medical

need.20 The

Eleventh

Circuit

has described

the inquiry

for the deliberate indifference element as follows;

The

second

element—the

indifference

to

that

defendant's

risk—has

two

deliberate

components:

subjective
and
one
objective.
To
subjective
component,
a
plaintiff
evidence that the defendant actually

one

satisfy
the
must
produce
(subjectively)

kn[ew] that an inmate [faced] a substantial risk of
serious harm. To satisfy the objective component, a

plaintiff must produce evidence that the defendant
disregard[ed] that known risk by failing to respond to
it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.

With regard to the subjective component of the second
element—i.e., the defendant's actual knowledge that an
inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm—the
defendant must both be aware of facts from which the

inference

serious

could

harm

be

drawn

exists,

that

and

he

a

substantial

must

also

risk

draw

of

the

inference. Whether a prison official had the requisite
knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including
inference from circumstantial evidence.

Caldwell
(11th

v.

Cir.

Warden,
2014)

FCI

Talladega,

(internal

748

F.3d

citations

1090,

and

1099-1000

quotation

marks

omitted) (alterations in original).
Here, the
establish

ECSO Officers contend that

deliberate

indifference

because

Plaintiff failed
there

is

no

to

evidence

that any ECSO Officer had knowledge of Cartee's serious medical
need.

(Doc.

161,

Attach.

1 at

20-21.)

Additionally,

the

ECSO

Officers argue that Cartee was under the care of THRX medical
providers during

20

In

their

his

brief,

period

the

ECSO

of incarceration

Officers

make

and there is

no

argument

about

whether Cartee's conditions constituted a serious medical need.

29

no

evidence that the ECSO Officers ever prevented or hindered THRX

providers

in

their

treatment

of

Cartee.

(Id.

at

20-21.)

In

response, Plaintiff fails to point to any specific facts which
show an ECSO Officer was aware of Cartee's serious medical need.

(See generally Doc. 218 at 11-16.) Instead, Plaintiff appears to

argue

that

treatment

the
for

ECSO

Officers'

Cartee

is

enough

complete
to

denial

of

demonstrate

medical

deliberate

indifference. (Id. at 13.) After careful review of the record,
the Court finds Plaintiff has not established that any of the

ECSO

Officers

were

subjectively

aware

of

Cartee's

serious

medical needs while he was incarcerated or that they responded

unreasonably to any medical need of which they were aware.

Notably,
custody

on

at

the

September

time
9,

Sgt.

2012,

Shearouse

medical

took

personnel

Cartee
at

into

Effingham

Hospital had just examined Cartee and cleared him for release.
(Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at 1 27.) Soon after Cartee arrived at the

jail,

Sgt.

Minor

requested

Nurse

Spikes

examine

Cartee,

but

Cartee refused the examination. (Id. at SIf 46-47.) Nurse Ransom

examined Cartee the following day and obtained an order to have
him

sent

back

evaluation.
Effingham

(Id.

to

Effingham
at

Hospital,

S

53.)

Cartee

Hospital
After

spent

six

for

being
days

a

mental

health

transported
under

the

from

care

of

medical providers at Georgia Regional Hospital. (Id. at SI 79.)

Georgia

Regional

providers'

impression

30

of

Cartee's

condition

during this period was that he was "appropriate to discharge
back to the jail." (Doc. 161, Attach. 14 at 57.) Furthermore,
when Cartee returned to the jail, he was examined first by Nurse

Ransom

on

September

17,

2012,

and

then

Nurse

Grantham

on

September 18, 2012. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at 55 90-92.)
As the ECSO Officers argue, nonmedical prison officials are

generally

entitled

to

trust

that

a

prisoner

is

receiving

adequate care from the prison's medical providers. Williams v.
Limestone

(holding

Cnty.,

prison

198

F.

App'x

officials "are

893,

897-98

entitled

(11th

to

Cir.

rely

on

2006)

medical

judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prison
care" (citations omitted)); Chambers v. Meeks, No. 2:18-CV-558SRW, 2021 WL 2926289, at *14 (M.D. Ala. July 12, 2021) (finding
no deliberate indifference when plaintiff "failed to present any
evidence that . . . defendants knew that the manner in which the

jail's medical personnel provided treatment to him created a
substantial

risk

to

his

health

and,

with

this

knowledge,

consciously disregarded such risk") (citations omitted). At no

point

during

the

time

Cartee

was

incarcerated

did

medical

personnel from the jail or a hospital inform any of the ECSO
Officers

that

Cartee

was

suffering

from

a

serious

medical

condition that required immediate treatment. Rather, Cartee was

examined
several

multiple
days

in

times
a

by

medical

hospital

without

31

professionals
any

medical

and

spent

professional

discovering the extent of Cartee's condition. Thus, the Court
cannot

conclude

that

the

ECSO

Officers,

who

are

not

trained

medical professionals, were aware or should have been aware of
facts

suggesting

that

a

substantial

risk

of

harm

existed,

especially since there is no evidence that the ECSO Officers
were unjustified in relying on the medical providers to capably
attend to Cartee's needs. Cf. Davies v. Israel, 342 F. Supp. 3d

1302, 1309 {S.D. Fla. 2018) (denying sheriff's motion to dismiss

because plaintiff plausibly alleged that sheriff unjustifiably
relied on medical provider whose care had caused multiple deaths
at the prison). At most, a few of the ECSO Officers^i were aware
of Cartee's complaints about struggling to walk, but this fact
alone does not show that the ECSO Officers understood the extent

of Cartee's injury. See Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.2d 164, 168
(4th

Cir.

itself,

1998)

is

not

Furthermore,

(explaining
enough

to

considering

that

knowledge

establish

Cartee's

of

deliberate

repeated

symptoms,

by

indifference).

physical

outbursts

towards the ECSO Officers, during which Cartee often showed use

21

The

Court

notes

that

Plaintiff

does

not

allege

subjective

knowledge on the part of any individual ECSO Officer and appears
to argue that they are all collectively liable for Cartee's
inadequate medical treatment. (Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 12-13.)
However, "imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the
basis

for

a

claim

of

deliberate

indifference."

Burnette

v.

Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (first citing Gray
V. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005); and then
citing Whiting v. Marathon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 382 F.3d 700,
704 (7th Cir. 2004)).

32

of

his

legs,

their

skepticism

about

Cartee's

complaints

is

understandable.

The only ECSO Officer who arguably knew that Cartee had a
serious medical need was Sgt. Cooper, who was informed by jail
officers on September 20, 2022, that Cartee needed assistance to
use the toilet. (Doc. 161, Attach. 2 at 5 107.) However, after

receiving

this

information,

Sgt.

Cooper

talked

to

Cartee,

discussed the situation with Nurse Ransom, and decided to send

Cartee

back to Effingham

Hospital that same

morning. (Id. at

108-111.) Based on this record, the Court concludes that Sgt.

Cooper responded reasonably to Cartee's medical needs once she
became aware of them.

The cases Plaintiff cites in support of his position all

involve visible injuries which would obviously require immediate
attention or delays in treatment far greater than what occurred
in this case. See, e.g., Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108,

1116 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding delay in treatment was deliberate
indifference

when

officers

failed

to

treat

gunshot

wound

of

which they were subjectively aware); Duffey v. Bryant, 950 F.
Supp.

1168,

1177

(M.D.

Ga.

1997)

(ruling

officers

were

deliberately indifferent when they failed to check on prisoner
or contact doctor despite

knowing that prisoner stripped naked

in his cell and refused to eat for several days). These cases

are

clearly

distinguishable

from

33

the

facts

at

hand

because

Cartee's

condition

was

not,

at

least

to

a

lay

person,

immediately recognizable, and Cartee was given medical attention
several
has

times

not

throughout

established

that

his

incarceration.

the

ECSO

Officers

Because
were

Plaintiff

deliberately

indifferent to a serious medical need of which they were aware,

the

ECSO Officers'

motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 161) is

GRANTED on Plaintiff's individual capacity § 1983 claims.
IV.

PLAINTIFF'S

STATE

LAW

CLAIMS

AGAINST

the

ECSO

OFFICERS

IN

THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Lastly, the Court
law

claims

against

will address

the

ECSO

whether Plaintiff's

Officers

in

their

state

individual

capacities are barred by official immunity. In Georgia, official
or

qualified

immunity

protects

law

enforcement

officers

from

personal liability for discretionary acts taken within the scope

of their official authority and performed without malice. Gish
V. Thomas, 302 Ga. App. 854, 857, 691 S.E.2d

900, 904 (2010)

(citing Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 123, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344
(2001)).

Official

liability

for

performing

immunity

negligently

discretionary

does

not

performing

acts

with

protect

officers

ministerial

malice

or

an

from

acts
intent

or
to

injure. Cameron, 274 Ga. at 123, 549 S.E.2d at 344.

The

Georgia

Supreme

Court

has

described

the

between ministerial and discretionary acts as follows:

34

difference

A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple,
absolute,
and
definite,
arising
under
conditions
admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the
execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act,
however,
calls
for
the
exercise
of
personal
deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails
examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions,
and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.
McDowell V. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593, 678 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2009)

(quoting Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199, 647 S.E.2d 54, 57
(2007)). Further, 'Mt]he determination of whether an action is

discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the
specific actions complained of, not the general nature of the
job, and is to be made on a case-by-case basis." Id., 285 Ga. at
595, 678 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App.
282, 285, 643 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2007)).

Plaintiff contends that providing medical care for inmates
is a duty imposed on prison officers by law and is therefore a
ministerial act. (Doc. 219, Attach. 2 at 13-15.) Plaintiff is

correct
inmate

that
is

a

simply

providing

ministerial

act

access
by

the

to

medical

sheriff

care

and

his

for
or

an
her

deputies. (Id. at 19 (citing Howard v. City of Columbus, 239 Ga.
App.

399,

411,

521

S.E.2d

51,

66

(1999).)

However,

^Mt]he

determination of what medical treatment to provide is an act of

discretion subject to official immunity." Howard, 239 Ga. App.
at

411,

omitted).

521
In

S.E.2d
this

at

66

case.

(emphasis
Plaintiff

35

in

original)

contends

that

(quotation
the

ECSO

Officers'
their

conduct

choice

of

was

ministerial

treatment

for

because

Cartee

but

they
in

erred
their

not

in

complete

denial of medical care for him. (Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 19-20.)

Georgia

courts

have

consistently

held

that

a

prison

official's decision on how to provide medical care to inmates is

discretionary under Georgia law. Keele v. Glynn Cnty., 938 F.
Supp. 2d 1270, 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (collecting cases); see also
Graham v. Cobb Cnty., 316 Ga. App. 738, 743, 730 S.E.2d 439, 444

(2012) (finding ^""the determination of how to provide adequate
medical care to the prisoners at the jail involved the use of

discretion by [the sheriff]"); Brooks v. Wilkinson Cnty., 393 F.
Supp. 3d 1147, 1173 (M.D. Ga. 2019) (^'[T]he determination about
what care to provide is within the official's discretion[.]").

Although

Plaintiff

frames

the

ECSO

Officers'

conduct

as

completely denying Cartee's access to medical care, as the Court

previously

outlined,

professionals

several

Cartee
times

was

referred

throughout

his

to

medical

incarceration.

In

reality. Plaintiff takes issue with the manner and nature of the

care

provided.

Such

determinations

are

clearly

discretionary

under Georgia law and entitle the ECSO Officers to raise the
defense of official immunity.

Additionally, despite Plaintiff's cursory assertion to the

contrary (Doc. 218, Attach. 2 at 20), there is no evidence to

support

a

finding

that

any

ECSO

36

Officer

acted

with

malice

towards Cartee. To show
that

a

defendant

wrong." Keele,
Baker,

504

acted

938

F.3d

F.

was

1331,

aware

with

Supp.
1339

throughout this order.
Officer

actual malice,
^^a

2d

at

intention

1309 (quoting

(11th

Cartee

plaintiff must show

deliberate

Plaintiff

that

a

Cir.

has
was

2007)).

to

do

Peterson

v.

As

discussed

not shown that any ECSO
suffering

from

a

serious

medical need such that their actions or inactions were causing

him serious harm. See Bagwell v. Hall Cnty., No. 2:14-cv-00195,

2015 WL 1919956, at *6 (N.D.

Ga. Apr. 28, 2015)

(finding

no

actual malice where Plaintiff failed to allege officer intended

to injure in failing to provide medical treatment). Because the
Court finds that the ECSO Officers were engaged in discretionary
conduct

and

did

not

act

with

malice,

they

are

entitled

to

official immunity. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED on

Plaintiff's state law claims against the ECSO Officers in their
individual capacity.22
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing. Plaintiff s wrongful death claims

brought in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Valerie
Storey are DISMISSED. Additionally, the ECSO Officers' motion
for
22

summary

Because

judgment

the

Court

(Doc.
has

161)

concluded

is

GRANTED.

that

the

As

ECSO

a

result.

Officers

are

entitled to summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff's
substantive claims. Plaintiff's punitive damages claims are
likewise DISMISSED. See Mann, 588 F.3d at 1304-05 (11th Cir.
2009).

37

Defendants Ashby Lee Zydonyk, Bryan Shearouse, Cora Mae Gaines,
Dorothy Hopf, Garett Buckles, Johnny Reinhart, Latonya Cooper,

Leslie Minor, Paul Davis, Robert L. Brown, and Tiffany Tisby are
DISMISSED from this action. Finally, the ECSO Officers' motion
to

exclude

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's
motion

to

expert
exclude

testimony
the

ECSO

(Doc.

158)

Officers'

and

expert

testimony (Doc. 167) are DENIED AS MOOT.23 The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to amend the caption accordingly.

SO ORDERED this w/

day of August 2022.

WILLIAM T. MOOP(/, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

23 The Court notes that the challenged experts opined on the
relevant standard of care for prison officials. Because the
Court has decided as a threshold matter that the ECSO Officers

are entitled to qualified and official immunity from Plaintiff's
claims, the proffered experts' testimony would not affect the
Court's decision in this Order.

38