Storey v. Effingham County et al

Filing 262

ORDER denying 155 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 156 Motion to exclude ; granting in part and denying in part 157 Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on these findings, the Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Dr. Rahimi as a party to this action. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 2/20/24. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

KEITH STOREY, as Executor of
the Estate of Valerie Storey
and Executor of the Estate of

Kenneth Cartee,

Plaintiff,
V

CV 415-149

TRANSFORMHEALTHRX, INC; JOHN
DOES 1-20; ANISA GRANTHAM,
LPC, NCAC; REBECCA RANSOM,
LPN; JANE DOES 1-10; JOHN DOES
PHYISICIANS 1-5; and ALl

RAHIMI, M.D.,
Defendants.

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court are:

Defendant Dr. Ali

Rahimi's (""Dr. Rahimi") motion to dismiss (Doc. 155); Dr. Rahimi's

motion to exclude
judgment
Marilyn

(Doc.
Spikes,

(Doc.

157);

156); Dr.

Defendants

Rebecca

Ransom,

Rahimi's

Anisa
and

motion for summary

Grantham,

Laura

Busbin,

Transformhealthrx,

Inc's

C'THRX") (collectively, the ''THRX Defendants") motion to exclude
(Doc. 163); Plaintiff's motion in limine (Doc. 165); Plaintiff's
motion to exclude (Doc. 168); and the THRX Defendants' motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 171).
pending motions.

This Order addresses Dr. Rahimi's

I. BACKGROUND

The Court summarizes the relevant facts and the procedural
background thus far.
A. Procedural Background

On September 8, 2014, Valerie Storey,^ individually and as
executrix of Kenneth Cartee's

{^'Cartee") estate (the ''Estate"),

filed a civil rights and tort action against Effingham County Jail,
Jimmy

McDuffie,

Effingham

County

Sheriff's

Department,

THRX,

Effingham County Board of Commissioners, and 35 John and Jane Does.
Storey v. Effingham Cnty. Jail, No. 4:14-cv-194, (Doc. 1, at 1)

(S.D.

Ga.

Sept.

8,

2014).

On

November

25,

2014,

the

Court

dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

Id. (Doc. 32, at 1).

On May 20, 2015, Ms. Storey, individually and as executrix of
Cartee's

Estate,

filed

this

renewal

action

alleging

multiple

federal and state law causes of action against several individuals
and

entities

treatment.

involved

(Doc. 1.)

Amended Complaint.

in

Cartee's

incarceration

and

medical

On June 22, 2015, Ms. Storey filed her First

(Doc. 37.)

On August 30, 2015, Ms. Storey

filed her Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter, the "Complaint")
— the operative complaint.

(Doc. 72.)

Following Ms. Storey's

1 Ms. storey is Cartee's biological daughter. (Doc. 202-1, at 3.) Even so,
William Lamar Newman adopted Ms. Storey in 1981 after marrying Estella Nelson,
Ms. Storey's mother.
(Id.)
Cartee's parental rights over Ms. Storey were
terminated during this adoption. (Doc. 157-1, at 5.)

death, her husband, Keith Storey, was substituted as the party

plaintiff (hereinafter, "Plaintiff").

(Doc. 137).

The Court previously ruled on several motions for summary

judgment.

On

February 1, 2022, the

Court granted

Defendants

Effingham County, Effingham County Board of Commissioners, and
Jimmy McDuffie's motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 254.)

On

August 31, 2022, the Court granted Defendants Ashby Lee Zydonyk,
Bryan Shearouse, Cora Mae Gaines, Dorothy Hopf, Garett Buckles,

Johnny Reinhart, Latonya Cooper, Leslie Minor, Paul Davis, Robert
L. Brown, and Tiffany Tisby's (collectively, the "ECSO Officers")
motion for summary judgment.

several

stipulations

remaining

Defendants

Additionally,

the

of

dismissal

are

Court

(Doc. 259.)

Dr.

in

Rahimi

the
and

previously

There have also been

case,

the

found

so

THRX

Ms.

the

only

Defendants.

Storey

lacked

standing to bring a wrongful death claim in her individual capacity
because she was adopted before Cartee's death, so Plaintiff lacks
standing

to

bring

a

wrongful

death

executor of Ms. Storey's estate.

claim

in

(Id. at 24.)

his

capacity

as

The Court also

found Plaintiff has standing to pursue a wrongful death claim in
his capacity as executor of Cartee's Estate.

(Id.)

B. Factual Background
The

resided

facts

at

relevant

Woodlands

to

this

Health

Order

and

are

as

follows.

Rehabilitation

Cartee

facility

("Woodlands") in Midway, Georgia from October 22, 2012 until April

23, 2013.2

(Doc. 157-1, at 1.)^

Dr. Rahimi treated Cartee while

he was a resident at Woodlands.

(Id.)

When Cartee arrived at

Woodlands, he had "an infected left elbow or bursitis, herniation
of

his

C6/C7

paraplegia,

discs,

a

pressure sores,

incontinence

of

methicillin-resistant
a

his

staph

bowel

(MRSA)

Stage I to II sacral ulcer,

elbows, and ulcers on his heels."

and

(Id. at 1-2.)

bladder,

infection,

ulcers on

both

Upon admission,

his sacral ulcer was staged but the other ulcers were not described
or staged.

(Doc. 202-1, at 8.)

Inna Sheyner's ("Dr. Sheyner")

opinion is that Cartee's ulcers at the time of admission would
have been expected to heal within six to eight weeks.

(Id. at 9.)

During his stay at Woodlands, Cartee's ulcers progressively
worsened and new ulcers developed.

(Doc. 157-1, at 2.)

From his

admission until January 10, 2013, Cartee's sacral ulcer went from
Stage I or II to Stage IV with tunneling.

(Id.)

Cartee was

transferred to the hospital on January 10, 2013 and saw infectious

disease Dr. Demicco Barbour who determined Cartee had two potential
sources of infection - left side pneumonia or infected ulcers.

2 An outline of the events leading to Cartee's stay at Woodlands can be found
in the Court's prior Orders. (See Docs. 254, 259.)
3 Dr. Rahimi continually cites to the Complaint in his statement of material
facts. (Doc. 157-1.) At the motion for summary judgment stage, the Court is
not loolcing at the allegations of the complaint, instead, it looks at "whether
the non-moving party has presented sufficient evidence on the claim to get to
a jury." Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1340 (11th
Cir. 2022). The Court cites to facts agreed to by both Parties; thus, citation
to the Complaint is irrelevant to the undisputed facts.
^ There is a discrepancy as to whether Cartee went to Memorial Medical Center

("Memorial") or St. Joseph's; nevertheless, the Parties agree he was treated in

(Id. at 2-3; Doc. 202-1, at 9.)

On January 11, 2013, Cartee was

diagnosed with sepsis^; polymicrobial bacteremia; and a large,
infected Stage III decubitus ulcer with devitalized tissue, a foul
odor, and tunneling.

(Doc. 157-1, at 3.)

Cartee stayed in the

hospital until January 22, 2013 and then returned to Woodlands.
(Doc. 202-1, at 9.)

On April 11, 2013, Cartee was admitted to the

hospital again with pressure ulcers, exposed bone in his left heel,
and a gigantic ulcer from buttocks to sacral full of necrotic
tissue and foul odor and tender on palpation.
13.)

(Id. at 9-10, 12-

During the second hospital stay. Dr. Ana Concepcion performed

an infectious disease consult and determined the source of Cartee's

sepsis was his gigantic ulcer.

(Id. at 9-10.)

Dr. Sheyner's expert report states Dr. Rahimi violated the

applicable standard of care by not preventing new pressure ulcers

from developing on Cartee and failing to provide appropriate wound
care on existing pressure ulcers.

(Id. at 10.)

She believes Dr.

Rahimi failed to prevent the ulcers from worsening due to his lack
of supervision, failure to estimate risk factors, lack of review

of his care plan, lack of ordering a higher level of pressure
relieving mattress, and failure to order pressure relieving boots.

the hospital and diagnosed with sepsis in January 2013.

(Doc. 202-1, at 9-10;

Doc. 157-1, at 2-3.)

^ Sepsis is a serious medical condition that occurs when there is bacteria in

the blood stream.
(Doc. 156-1, at 40-41.)
It can cause complications that
lead to death, as well as make other disease processes or co-morbidities more
complicated.

(Doc. 202-1, at 10.)

which are for a patient who cannot move his legs.

(Id. at 11.)

Cartee was scheduled to visit the wound center at St. Joseph's

once a month, but Dr. Sheyner believes if he had been taken to the

hospital when his ulcers started to get worse, then the outcome
would have been different.

(Id.)

Ultimately, she believes Dr.

Rahimi should have ordered outpatient care sooner.

(Id. at 13.)

Cartee was discharged from Woodlands on April 23, 2013, went

to Riverview nursing home until June, and then opted for hospice
care at home.

on

June

(Doc. 157-1, at 3; Doc. 202-1, at 13.)

25,

2013

because

of

acute

Cartee died

respiratory

cardiopulmonary arrest, and adult failure to thrive.

failure,
(Doc. 202-

1, at 2, 13-14.)

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

On April 26, 2017,

Dr.

Rahimi filed a motion to dismiss,

moving the Court to dismiss the state law malpractice claim against
him because it does not arise out of the same case or controversy

as the federal claims.

(Doc. 155, at 1.)

Dr. Rahimi requests the

Court decline to exercise supplemental or

over the state law claim.

(Id.)

pendent jurisdiction

In response. Plaintiff argues

"the allegations of medical malpractice against [Dr.] Rahimi for
failure to properly treat ulcers, and the allegations of failure

to provide medical care to Cartee, also with regard to Cartee's
ulcers,

among

other

conditions,

certainly

involve

similar

occurrences and facts."

(Doc. 200, at 5.)

Dr. Rahimi replied in

support of his motion, again arguing there is no common nucleus of
operative

fact.

(Doc.

226,

at

1.)

The

Court

addresses

the

Parties' arguments below.
A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), district courts ""have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the

United

States

Constitution."

Supplemental

jurisdiction ''is

a

doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with

cases involving pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly
accommodates a range of concerns and values."®

Ameritox, Ltd. v.

Millennium

(11th

(quoting

Lab'ys,

Inc.,

803

Carnegie-Mellon

(1988)).

F.3d

Univ.

v.

518,

530

Cohill,

484

Cir.

U.S.

2015)

343,

350

"[A] federal court's power to hear pendent state-law

claims exists wherever a distinct claim arises under federal law,
and 'the relationship between that [distinct] claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the
court

comprises

but

one

constitutional

'case.'"

Id.

at

531

(alterations in original) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs,

383

U.S.

715,

725

(1966)).

However,

® Supplemental jurisdiction is also called pendent jurisdiction.
F.3d at 530 (citation omitted).

supplemental

Ameritox, 803

jurisdiction ''is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's
right, and should be exercised only when doing so would promote
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."

Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court must determine

whether the state law

claim is so

related to the federal claims "that they form part of the same
case or controversy."

Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d

451, 455 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).

To make

this determination, the Court looks "to whether the claims arise

from the same facts, or involve similar occurrences, witnesses or
evidence."

Id. (citation

omitted).

This is

common nucleus of operative fact standard.

often

called

the

Reqenicin, Inc. v.

Lonza Walkersville, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1309 (N.D. Ga.

2014) (citing Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 597 (11th Cir. 1997).
B. Discussion

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this Court based on 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1343, 1367; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the Fourteenth Amendment of

the Constitution.

(Doc. 72, at 5.)

The Complaint states "[t]his

case is brought to vindicate . . . Cartee's federal constitutional
rights and to redress tortious conduct by the Defendants under

Georgia law."

(Id.)

The Parties agree the above-stated case law

on supplemental jurisdiction controls this analysis.
at 4.)

(Doc. 200,

However, the Parties disagree as to the application of the

law to the facts.

Dr. Rahimi moves to dismiss the state law medical malpractice
claim because it does not arise from the same facts and does not

involve similar occurrences, witnesses, or evidence as the claims

against the THRX Defendants.

(Doc. 155, at 9.)

The federal claims

that serve as the basis of Plaintiff s Complaint are brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege deliberate indifference to Cartee's
medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

72, at 22.)

(Doc.

Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to provide Cartee

adequate medical care; prevented him from getting needed medical
treatment; provided grossly deficient medical care that endangered

Cartee's health and well-being; failed to train, supervise, or
implement policies at the Effingham County Jail to assure Cartee
received medical care; and the lack of care demonstrated a lack of

regard to Cartee's right to be free from unnecessary and unlawful

bodily harm or threats.

(Id. at 22-25.)

Plaintiff alleges these

actions and/or omissions were negligent and/or reckless and/or
intentional and demonstrated a deliberate indifference to Cartee's

rights.

(Id. at 25.)

Plaintiff brings state law claims against

both the THRX Defendants and Dr. Rahimi.

(Id. at 25-45.)

Relevant

to the motion to dismiss is the medical malpractice claim against

Dr. Rahimi, Count III."^

(Id. at 30-45.)

Plaintiff alleges Dr.

Rahimi was the physician directly responsible for Cartee's care

Originally, Plaintiff brought Count III against Dr. Rahimi and Woodlands;
however, based on a stipulation of dismissal. Woodlands is no longer a party to
this suit.

(Doc. 252.)

during his stay at Woodlands from October 22, 2012 to April 23,
2013.

(Id.

at

30.)

Cartee's

open

pressure

ulcers

were

not

assessed upon his admission to Woodlands or during his stay despite
Dr.

Rahimi

knowing

about

the

preexisting

conditions.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges Dr. Rahimi, charged with care and treatment of
Cartee during his stay at Woodlands, breached the standard of care
exercised by members of the medical profession generally by failing
to properly treat Cartee, failing to prevent additional ulcers,
and allowing his ulcers to worsen.
Plaintiff

alleges

Dr.

Rahimi

(Id. at 34-42.)

caused

Based on this.

progression

of

Cartee's

conditions to the point of no recovery, directly contributing to
his premature and wrongful death, which could have been avoided if
Dr. Rahimi exercised the appropriate standard of care.

(Id. at

42-44.)
Dr.

Rahimi moves to dismiss this claim

because it involves

different elements of proof and does not stem from the common

nucleus of operative fact as the federal claims, thus requiring
different witnesses and evidence.

(Doc. 155, at 13.)

Dr. Rahimi

argues there may be overlapping evidence on causation and damages,
but this alone is not enough to confer supplemental jurisdiction.
(Id. at 18 (citations omitted).)

Dr. Rahimi asserts the Court

should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because there
was a substantial temporal and

geographical break between the

claims asserted against the THRX Defendants and the claim against

10

him.

(Id.)

He also argues the state law medical malpractice claim

will require expert testimony and an analysis of the care and
treatment Cartee received at Woodlands, leading to a complex trial.
(Id. at 19-20.)

Dr. Rahimi believes these complexities, along

with the danger of confusion and prejudice trying the state and
federal claims together, should lead the Court to dismiss the claim
against him.

(Id. at 20-21.)

In response to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argues the

allegations

against

Dr.

Rahimi

arise

out of the

same

case

or

controversy as the federal claims against the Effingham County and

THRX

Defendants.®

(Doc.

200,

at 4.)

He

argues

the medical

malpractice allegations were only several weeks after the events

involving the THRX Defendants, and the "sequence of events led to,
and was the legal cause of, the death of [Cartee] due to a condition
[Defendants] failed to address."

(Id. at 5, 8.)

Furthermore,

Plaintiff argues the THRX Defendants are original tortfeasors,
making them potentially liable for damages resulting from injuries
caused by them but also by treatment provided by Dr. Rahimi.

at 8.)

(Id.

Dr. Rahimi replied to Plaintiff, arguing the claims against

the THRX Defendants pertain to "access to medical care" rather

than "treatment and prevention of ulcers," illustrating the claims
do not arise form a common nucleus of operative fact.

(Doc. 226,

® The Court previously granted the Effingham County Defendants' motion for
summary judgment; thus, they are no longer Parties to the suit.

11

{Doc. 254.)

at

3.)

He

again

argues

the

overlap

of

damages

does

not

automatically confer supplemental jurisdiction, separate trials
would not result in the duplication of efforts by the Parties, and
the danger of jury confusion is a legitimate concern.

(Id. at 4-

6.)

The Court finds the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claim against Dr.
Rahimi

is

warranted.

While

recognizing

the

distinguishable

characteristics between Cartee's treatment while incarcerated and

his treatment living at Woodlands after incarceration, the series

of events is so closely intertwined it falls into the category of
a common nucleus of operative fact.

It is hard to tell the story

of Cartee's medical decline without including both portions of the
story,

and

the

Court

knows

careful

jury

instructions

and

explanation can eliminate any potential jury confusion regarding
liability and responsibility.

See Eghnayem v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,

873 F.3d 1304, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he risks of prejudice

and confusion . . . can be alleviated by utilizing cautionary
instructions to the jury during the trial and controlling the
manner in which the plaintiffs' claims . . . are submitted to the
jury for deliberation." (citation omitted)).

The Court finds that

keeping the medical malpractice claim against Dr. Rahimi a part of

this

litigation

will

promote

judicial

12

economy

and

ensure

a

consolidated and final outcome for all Parties.

For these reasons,

Dr. Rahimi's motion to dismiss (Doc. 155) is DENIED.

III. DR. RAHIMI'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE

The

Court

now

turns

to

Dr.

Rahimi's

Sheyner's sepsis and causation opinions.

motion

to

exclude

(Doc. 156.)

Dr.

Dr. Rahimi

moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to exclude

Sheyner's

opinions

because

she

used

a

differential

Dr.

diagnosis

analysis and failed to rule out other possible causes of Cartee's
sepsis, worsening ulcers, and decline.

(Id. at 7-10.)

Thus, Dr.

Rahimi argues Dr. Sheyner's causation opinions should be excluded,

and

she

should

be

precluded

from

testifying

that

Dr.

Rahimi

proximately caused or contributed to Cartee's worsening ulcers,
declining health, and death.
In

response.

generally

several

Plaintiff
conditions

(Id. at 21.)
argues
can

Dr.
cause

Sheyner

testified

worsening

in

that

pressure

ulcers; however, she ruled those out and determined none of those

applied.

(Doc. 176, at 6-7, 16.)

Plaintiff asserts ^'Dr. Sheyner

explained how it was impossible for there to be another cause to
Cartee's worsening pressure sores without [Dr.] Rahimi's failure

to meet the standard of care by failing to provide adequate wound

care to Cartee."^

(Id. at 15.)

Dr. Rahimi replied, arguing Dr.

® The Court notes Plaintiff makes many conclusory arguments in his response to
Dr. Rahimi's motion to exclude and fails to cite to any place in the record to
tie his arguments to the testimony of Dr. Sheyner. (See Doc. 176, at 15.)

13

Sheyner cannot assume he was negligent simply because Cartee's
wounds did not heal.
are

not

valid

(Doc. 194, at 4.)

because

potential causes with

she

did

not

He believes her opinions

"rule

out"

the

alterative

valid scientific methods and procedures.

(Id. at 4-5 (citation omitted).)

Dr. Rahimi is moving to exclude

Dr. Sheyner's causation testimony on the basis of reliability.
(Id. at 6-7.)

Dr. Sheyner's expert report states she reviewed records from

Woodlands, partial records from Memorial, partial records from St.
Joseph's hospital, and Cartee's death certificate.

2.)

(Doc. 94-1, at

Dr. Sheyner's opinion is that Dr. Rahimi breached the standard

of care "by failing to recognize risk factors for pressure ulcer

development and progression" in Cartee, as an immobile patient.
(Id. at 8.)

new

She believes Dr. Rahimi's failure to assess Cartee's

pressure

ulcers

and

take

action

caused

progression

and

infection in Cartee's ulcers and led to "no hope for recovery."

(Id.)

It is Dr. Sheyner's causation opinion that:

more likely than not, [Cartee] would not have developed
progression of his pressure ulcers to terminal stage IV
pressure ulcers with exposed bones and complications
from his pressure ulcers, such as sepsis, severe pain
and emotional distress and suffering, which directly
contributed to his death[,] if the reasonable standards

of care applicable to . . . Dr. Rahimi had been complied
with.

(Id. at 9-10.)

The Court addresses the Parties' arguments below.

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:

14

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than
not that:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and

(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application
of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
''As the Supreme Court recognized in [Daubert], Rule 702 plainly
contemplates that the district court will serve as a gatekeeper to
the admission of [expert] testimony."
Hurel-Dubois

UK

Ltd.,

(citation omitted).

326

F.3d

Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v.

1333,

1340

(llth

Cir.

2003)

"The burden of laying the proper foundation

for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering
the expert, and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence."

Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306

(llth Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that district courts are
to engage in a three-part inquiry to determine the admissibility

of expert testimony under Rule 702.

Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1340.

Specifically, the Court must consider whether:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently
regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the
methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions

15

is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of
inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony
assists the trier of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Id. at 1340-41 (citations omitted).

Here,

moving to exclude based on reliability.
The

testifying

expert's

opinions

Dr. Rahimi is only

(See Doc. 156.)
must

be

reliable.

In

Daubert, the Supreme Court directed district courts faced with the
proffer of expert testimony to conduct a ''preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony

is

scientifically

valid

and

of

whether

that

reasoning

methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."
U.S. at 592-93.

or
509

Courts should consider four factors: (1) whether

the theory or technique can be tested, (2) whether it has been
subject to peer review, (3) whether the technique has a known or
potential rate of error, and (4) whether the theory has attained
general acceptance in the

relevant community.

Id.

at 593-94.

"These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive; not all of them

will apply in every case, and in some cases other factors will be
equally

important

expert opinion."

in

evaluating

the

reliability

of

proffered

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1262

(11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

For example, experience-

based experts need not satisfy the factors set forth in Daubert.

See United States v. Valdes, 681 F. App'x 874, 881 (11th Cir. 2017)
(affirming admission of testimony from expert identifying firearms

16

based on years of experience working with firearms).

However,

"[t]he inquiry is no less exacting where the expert ^witness is
relying solely on experience' rather than scientific methodology."
Summit at

Paces,

LLC

v.

RBC

Bank,

No.

1:09-cv-03504,

2012

WL

13076793, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 22, 2012) {quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702

advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment).

Bearing in mind

the diversity of expert testimony, ''the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go
about

determining

reliable."

whether

particular

expert

testimony

is

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).

"[W]hether the proposed testimony is scientifically correct is not
a

consideration

expert's

for

this

testimony,

court,

based

methodology, is reliable."

on

but

only

whether

scientific

or

not

principles

the

and

In re Chantix Prods. Liab. Litig., 889

F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (citing Allison v. McGhan
Med. Corp., 184

F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999)).

"Vigorous

cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction

on

the

burden

of

proof

are

the

traditional

and

appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
Id. at 1282 (citation omitted).

Regardless of the specific factors considered, "[p]roposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation - i.e., 'good
grounds,' based on what is known."

most

cases, "[t]he

expert's

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.

testimony

17

must

be

grounded

in

In

an

accepted body of learning or experience in the expert's field, and
the expert must explain how the conclusion is so grounded."
R.

Evid.

702

advisory

committee's

notes

to

2000

Fed.

amendment.

"'Presenting a summary of a proffered expert's testimony in the
form of conclusory statements devoid of factual or analytical
support is simply not enough" to carry the proponent's burden.
Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d

1092, 1113 (11th Cir. 2005).

Thus, "if the witness is relying

solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain
how that experience leads to the conclusion reached,

why that

experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that

experience is reliably applied to the facts."

Frazier, 387 F.3d

at 1261 (citation omitted) (alterations adopted).
B. Discussion

Dr. Rahimi argues Dr. Sheyner's causation testimony should be
excluded based on reliability because the "differential diagnosis"

used was improperly done since Dr. Sheyner did not "rule out" other
potential causes of Cartee's death.

(Doc. 156, at 7-10.)

In a

conclusory fashion. Plaintiff argues Dr. Sheyner did in fact rule
out other possible sources of sepsis and determined Dr. Rahimi's

failure to meet the standard of care caused Cartee's worsening
pressure sores.

(Doc. 176, at 15.)

"Differential diagnosis "is accomplished by determining the
possible causes for the patient's symptoms and then eliminating

18

each of these potential causes until reaching one that cannot be
ruled out or determining which of those that cannot be excluded is
the most likely.'" Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 602 F.3d 1245,
1253 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

To be reliable, the

process does not have to rule out all possible alternative causes,
but '"it must at least consider other factors that could have been

the sole cause of the plaintiff's injury."

Id.

"[A]n expert does

not establish the reliability of his techniques or the validity of

his conclusions simply by claiming that he performed a differential

diagnosis on a patient."

McClain v. Metabolite Int'l, Inc., 401

F.3d 1233, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005).

''[A] differential diagnosis

that fails to take serious account of other potential causes may
be so lacking that it cannot
opinion on causation."

provide

a

reliable

basis for an

Guinn, 602 F.3d at 1253 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

'MA]n expert must provide a

reasonable explanation as to why he or she has concluded that any
alternative cause suggested by the defense was not the sole cause
of the plaintiff's injury."

Id. (citations and quotation marks

omitted and alterations adopted).

In other words, "'an expert must

provide

alternative

reasons

for

rejecting

hypotheses

using

scientific methods and procedures and the elimination of those

hypotheses must be founded on
unsupported speculation."

more than subjective

beliefs or

Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co.,

609 F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

"A district court is justified in excluding evidence if

19

an expert utterly fails . . . to offer an explanation for why the
proffered alternative cause was ruled out.''

Id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted and alteration in original).
Based on these principles, the Court finds
causation opinion should be excluded.

Dr. Sheyner's

First, in her deposition.

Dr. Sheyner admits she only reviewed ""partial documents."
156-1, at 120.)

(Doc.

The Court is unaware which documents were missing

from her review, but this is concerning to the Court as it is hard
to develop a reliable medical opinion without all the information.
Furthermore,

in

her

deposition.

Dr.

Sheyner

named

several

conditions that could affect a patient's ability to heal pressure
ulcers.

(Id.

at

41-54.)

Despite

her

recognition

of

these

possibilities, she at no point ruled out other potential causes to
reach her conclusion that Dr. Rahimi's negligence caused Cartee's
demise.

In fact. Dr. Sheyner admitted she could not rule out other

sources

of

Cartee's

sepsis

information to do so.

out

other

sources

because

(Id. at 120.)

of

sepsis.

Dr.

she

did

not

have

enough

When asked if she could rule

Sheyner

replied:

""Based

on

documents that I reviewed, and I have mentioned to you I was able

to review partial documents, I did not see any other sources . . .
I was able to

rule out or rule in.

information to say that."

(Id.)

No, I don't

have enough

When asked to clarify, she stated

she had enough information from consultants to rule in Dr. Rahimi's
actions but based on the information she had, she could not rule

out other sources.

(Id.)

As explained above, ""an expert must

20

provide a reasonable explanation as to why he or she has concluded
that any alternative cause suggested by the defense was not the
sole cause of the plaintiff's injury."

Guinn, 602 F.3d at 1253

{citations and quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
Dr. Sheyner explicitly stated she could not rule out other sources

and provides no justification aside from the fact she did not have
enough information.

(Doc. 156-1, at 120.)

Based on this, the

Court finds Dr. Sheyner's differential diagnosis is not reliable.

Dr. Sheyner's expert report states: ^^Dr. Rahimi's negligence
. . . resulted in ischemic pressure, wound infection and sepsis,
which

caused

ulcers."

the

development

(Doc. 94-1, at 9.)

and

progression

of

the

pressure

She then concludes that if the proper

precautions were taken by Dr. Rahimi, it is more likely than not

that progression from the ulcers to the terminal infection with
sepsis could have been avoided.

(Id.)

She believes it is more

likely than not that Cartee would not have developed such severe
ulcers and complications, such as sepsis, had Dr. Rahimi complied
with

the

standards of care.

(Id.

at 9-10.)

However, if

Dr.

Sheyner cannot determine the cause of the sepsis, it is unreliable
to take her opinion that Dr. Rahimi's negligence caused Cartee to
reach such a serious condition.

Dr. Sheyner, as an expert, was

required to explain why she rejected other theories or causes of
Cartee's

sepsis

using

scientific

methods

and

procedures

provide more than just subjective beliefs or speculation.
609 F.3d at 1197.

and

Hendrix,

She failed to do so, and thus the Court finds

21

Dr.

Sheyner's

unreliable.

causation

testimony

on

Cartee's

sepsis

to

be

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Dr. Rahimi's

motion to exclude the sepsis and causation opinions of Dr. Sheyner.
(Doc. 156.)
judgment.

The Court now turns to Dr. Rahimi's motion for summary
(Doc. 157.)

IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff asserts a medical malpractice claim against Dr.
Rahimi, Count III.

(Doc. 72, at 30-44.)

Plaintiff alleges Dr.

Rahimi breached the standard of care by: failing to properly treat
Cartee's

pressure

ulcers;

failing

to

prevent

new

ulcers

from

forming; allowing his ulcers to worsen; failing to recognize the

risk for ulcer development in the immobile paraplegic patient with
urinary and bowel incontinence; failing to provide appropriate
preventive measures; failing to reposition Cartee every two hours
to prevent pressure ulcer formation; failing to monitor the change
in Cartee's condition and provide directions to Woodlands on how

to treat him; failing to properly assess the pressure ulcers during
Cartee's

admission

or

re-admission;

failing

to

take

timely

interventions in wound care and pressure relieving measures; and
failing

to

examine

Cartee.

(Id.

at

38-43.)

Based

on

these

failures. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Rahimi caused: the progression of

Cartee's pressure ulcers to Stage IV infected ulcers with exposed

bones, osteomyelitis, and no hope for recovery; ischemic pressure,
wound infection,

and sepsis,

which

22

caused

the

development

and

progression of the pressure ulcers; and severe pain, emotional
distress,

and

suffering

from

Cartee's

pressure

ulcer

complications, which directly contributed to his premature and

wrongful death.

(Id. at 44-44.)

Dr. Rahimi moves for summary

judgment on this claim on six grounds: (1) Ms. Storey did not have
the

right to

capacity

bring

because

a

she

wrongful
had

been

death

claim in

adopted;

(2)

her

Keith

individual
Storey,

as

executor of the estate of Ms. Storey, is not a proper party to the
case; (3) Ms. Storey did not bring a wrongful death claim on behalf
of Cartee's next-of-kin; {4} Cartee's Estate's pain and suffering

claim is barred by the two-year medical malpractice statute of
limitations

('"SOL");

(5)

Plaintiff

cannot

recover

punitive

damages; and (6) Plaintiff cannot show proximate cause.
157,

at

grounds.

1-4.)

Plaintiff

opposes

Dr.

Rahimi's

motion

(Doc.
on

all

(Doc. 202.)

Preliminarily,

the

Court

already

found

Ms.

Storey

lacked

standing to bring a wrongful death claim in her individual capacity
because she was adopted before Cartee's death; thus. Plaintiff
lacks standing to bring a wrongful death claim in his capacity as
executor of Ms. Storey's estate.

(Doc. 259, at 24.)

Thus, Dr.

Rahimi's motion is GRISTED as it pertains to Ms. Storey's wrongful
death claim in her individual capacity.

Furthermore, Dr. Rahimi

argues Keith Storey cannot prosecute a claim Ms. Storey never had.

(Doc. 157-2, at 5.)

The Court agrees, and Dr. Rahimi shall be

granted summary judgment on any individual capacity claims for

23

wrongful

death

pending

against

him.

The

Court

addresses

the

remaining arguments below.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a motion for summary

judgment is granted ^'if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law."
fact is

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

^'An issue of

^material' if . . . it might affect the outcome of the

case . . . [and it] is ^genuine' if the record taken as a whole
could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party."

Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60

(11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

The Court must view factual

disputes in the light most favorable to the

non-moving

party,

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986), and must draw ''all justifiable inferences in [the nonmoving party's] favor."

United States v. Four Parcels of Real

Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal

punctuation and citations omitted).
the evidence or determine credibility.
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

The Court should not weigh
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

However, the nonmoving party "must

do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts."

omitted).

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations

A mere "scintilla" of evidence, or simply conclusory

allegations, will not suffice.

See e.g., Tidwell v. Carter Prods.,

135 F.3d 1422, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998).

24

Dr. Rahimi does not bear the burden of proof at trial, and

therefore may ''satisfy [his] initial burden on summary judgment in
either of two ways."

McQueen v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 955 F.

Supp. 2d 1256, 1262 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (citing Fitzpatrick v. City
of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 1993)).

First, he

"may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support
[Plaintiff's]
(citation

case

on

omitted).

the

particular

If this occurs.

issue

at

hand."

Id.

Plaintiff "must rebut by

either (1) showing that the record in fact contains supporting
evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2)

proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency."

Id.

(citation omitted). Or second. Dr. Rahimi may "provide affirmative
evidence demonstrating that [Plaintiff] will be unable to prove
[his] case at trial."

Id.

(citation omitted and emphasis in

original).

"Parties may not, by the simple expedient of dumping a mass
of evidentiary material into the record, shift to the Court the
burden

of

identifying

positions."

supporting

potential

V.

respective

Essentially, the Court has no duty "to distill
argument

that

could

be

materials before it on summary judgment."
Corp.

their

Preis v. Lexington Ins., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1068

(S.D. Ala. 2007).
every

evidence

Dunmar

Corp.,

43

F.3d

587,

made

based

upon

the

Id. (citing Resol. Tr.

599

(11th

Cir.

1995)).

Accordingly, the Court will only review the materials the Parties

25

specifically cite and legal arguments they expressly advance.

See

id.

In this action, the Clerk of Court provided Plaintiff notice

of the summary judgment motion, the right to file affidavits or
other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default.
{Doc. 160.)

For that reason, the notice requirements of Griffith

V. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),
are satisfied.

Plaintiff responded to the motion (Doc. 202), and

Dr. Rahimi replied in support (Doc. 227).

The time for filing

materials has expired, the issues have been thoroughly briefed,
and the motion is now ripe for consideration.

In reaching its

conclusions, the Court has evaluated the Parties' briefs, other
submissions, and the evidentiary record in the case.
B. Discussion

The Court analyzes

Dr.

Rahimi's arguments using the same

points set forth in his motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 157.)

The Court resolved the first two points above.
1. Ms. Storey Did Not Bring a Wrongful Death Claim on Behalf
of Cartee's Next-of-Kin

Dr. Rahimi argues Ms. Storey could have brought a wrongful
death claim on behalf of Cartee's next-of kin, but she failed to

do so.

(Doc. 157-2, at 6-7.)

He argues she erroneously brought

a claim in her individual capacity instead of for the next-of-kin
and the SOL expired on June 25, 2015 so all wrongful death claims
against

Dr.

Rahimi should

be

dismissed.

26

(Id.)

In

response.

Plaintiff argues the

plaintiffs

were

originally identified

as

Valerie Storey, individually and as the Executrix of the Estate of
Cartee, thus indicating she brought a claim both individually and
for Cartee's next-of-kin.

(Doc. 202-2, at 20.)

The Court already

interpreted Ms. Storey's claims as brought both individually and
as executrix of Cartee's Estate.

(Doc. 259, at 16.)

Thus, Dr.

Rahimi's motion is DENIED on this ground.
2. The Estate's Pain and Suffering Claim is Barred by the SOL

Next, Dr. Rahimi argues Plaintiff failed to bring his pain
and suffering claim before the expiration of the two-year SOL.
(Doc. 157-2, at 7.)

Plaintiff contends Dr. Rahimi first breached

the standard of care on October 22, 2012 when

he misdiagnosed

Cartee's condition; breached the standard of care again on December

3, 2012 when Cartee developed a new ulcer on his right buttock;
and

Dr.

Rahimi's

progressively

negligence

worse,

January 10, 2013.

caused

resulting

in

(Id. at 8-9.)

Cartee's

Cartee's

ulcers

to

hospitalization

get

on

Cartee died on June 25, 2013,

and Ms. Storey was appointed Executrix of his Estate on November

20, 2013, 148 days later.

(Id. at 10.)

Under Georgia law, the

SOL was tolled between the time of Cartee's death and Ms. Storey

being appointed to represent the Estate.
9-3-32).)

(Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §

Even with the SOL tolling. Dr. Rahimi argues the SOL on

the Estate's pain and suffering claim against him ran on June 7,
2015, and Plaintiff did not add Dr. Rahimi as a Defendant until
June 22, 2015.

(Id. at 10-11.)

27

In response. Plaintiff argues the SOL did not run before he
filed

his claim

against

Dr.

Rahimi because 'Mt]he

statute

of

limitations for a wrongful death action emanating from medical
malpractice begins to run from the date of death, not from the
date of negligent act or omission of the practitioner."
202-2, at 21 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a)).)

(Doc.

He also argues that

even if Dr. Rahimi's medical malpractice did not cause Cartee's
death, the Estate's claim

was

still timely because

Dr.

Rahimi

committed medical malpractice as late as April 10, 2013, and with

the tolling of the SOL after Cartee's death, the June 22, 2015
claim was timely filed.

(Id. at 21-22.)

Dr. Rahimi replied,

arguing that Plaintiff believes the SOL was reset whenever Dr.
Rahimi committed an act of malpractice or did not start until Dr.
Rahimi

last

otherwise.

treated

Cartee;

however,

(Doc. 227, at 6-7.)

Georgia

law

provides

Dr. Rahimi asserts the SOL on an

Estate's pain and suffering claim commences the first day the
decedent suffers an injury rather than on the date of death.
at 7 (citations omitted).)

(Id.

He argues Plaintiff's attempt to use

the ''continuous treatment" doctrine
malpractice claims in Georgia.

does

not

(Id. at 9-10.)

apply to

medical

Thus, Plaintiff's

pain and suffering claim against Dr. Rahimi is barred by the twoyear SOL.

(Id.)

"Under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a), a medical malpractice action

must be brought within two years after the date on which an injury
or death arising from an alleged negligent or wrongful act or

28

omission occurred."

App.

2011).

''"In

Deen v. Pounds, 718 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga. Ct.

most

misdiagnosis

immediately upon the misdiagnosis."
S.E.2d

585,

586-87

(Ga.

alterations adopted).

Ct.

App.

cases,

the

injury

Kitchens v.

2006)

(citation

begins

Brusman, 633
omitted

and

If a patient experiences symptoms of the

same injury before and after the misdiagnosis, the date of the

misdiagnosis is the date of the injury.
omitted).

Id. at 587 (citation

However, if a misdiagnosis results in new or subsequent

injuries, the SOL runs from the date of the new injury or the date
the symptoms of the new injury manifest to the patient.

Id.

[A] plaintiff's preexisting injury [is] not transformed
into a new injury simply because his underlying . . .
condition
remained
untreated
notwithstanding
the
increase in his symptoms . . . .
Where . . . the
patient's symptoms of his untreated condition worsen
over time, for statute of limitation(s) purposes, the
injury occurred at the time of the alleged misdiagnosis.
Deen, 718 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Kaminer v. Canas, 653 S.E.2d 691,
695 (Ga. 2007)).

Dr. Rahimi treated Cartee at Woodlands from October 22, 2012

through April 25, 2013.

(Doc. 202-1, at 3.)

When he arrived at

Woodlands, he had four pressure ulcers and a surgical wound.
at 8.)

(Id.

During his stay at Woodlands, Cartee's ulcers progressively

got worse and new ones developed.

(Id. at 9.)

Cartee was twice

transferred to the hospital for treatment of his ulcers and was
eventually
ulcers.

diagnosed

with

sepsis,

(Id.; Doc. 157-1, at 2-3.)

potentially

caused

by

the

Plaintiff asserts Dr. Rahimi

was responsible for Cartee's worsening condition because he did

29

not properly treat the ulcers; thus. Dr. Rahimi argues the statute
of limitations on this claim for pain and suffering commenced when
Dr. Rahimi first saw Cartee on October 22, 2012.

8-9, 11-12.)

(Doc. 157-2, at

The Parties agree new ulcers formed, but there does

not seem to be evidence on when the new ulcers developed or when

the old ulcers got worse.

(Id. at 9; Doc. 202-2, at 7.)

The

Georgia Court of Appeals explained in Deen that a worsening of
symptoms is legally different from the development of a new and
more deleterious condition.

omitted).

Deen, 718 S.E.2d at 73 (citations

Keeping this in mind, and without clarity as to when

each of Cartee's ulcers developed, or when the preexisting ulcers

got worse, the Court finds there is not enough information to grant
summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue.

Ultimately,

there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to when the statute
of limitations began to run based on Dr. Rahimi's treatment of
Cartee.

Thus, Dr. Rahimi's motion is DENIED on this ground.

3. Plaintiff Cannot Recover Punitive Damages

Next, Dr. Rahimi argues punitive damages are not recoverable

in a wrongful death action, notwithstanding the intentional or
willful acts of the defendant, and so the next-of-kin's wrongful
death claim should be dismissed.

(Doc. 157-2, at 17.)

Further,

he argues punitive damages would be permissible as part of the
Estate's pain and suffering claim, but since it is barred by the
SOL, this claim also fails.

(Id.)

30

In response. Plaintiff argues the Estate can recover punitive
damages as part of its claim for pain and suffering.
2, at 22.)

(Doc. 202-

However, Plaintiff offers no argument in opposition

regarding the next-of-kin's wrongful death claim.

Because the

Court already found there was a genuine dispute of material fact
as to the SOL on the Estate's claim. Dr. Rahimi's motion is denied

on that ground.

But as to the next-of-kin's claim, the Court

agrees with Dr. Rahimi that punitive damages are recoverable only
when the defendant's acts are willful, intentional, or done under
circumstances

that

show

a

conscious

indifference

to

the

consequences. (Doc. 157-2, at 17); Roseberry v. Brooks, 461 S.E.2d
262, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).

Since there is no proof of willful,

intentional, or conduct that evidences an entire want of care of

conscious

indifference

by

Dr.

Rahimi,

and

Plaintiff

does

not

dispute the motion on this basis. Dr. Rahimi's motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED on this ground.

Plaintiff shall be unable to

recover punitive damages.
4. Plaintiff Cannot Show Proximate Cause

Finally, Dr. Rahimi argues Plaintiff cannot prove proximate
cause because Dr. Sheyner, the only expert that offered causation
testimony against him, did not provide reliable opinions.
157-2, at 21-23.)

(Doc.

In response. Plaintiff puts forth the same

arguments he gave in opposition to the motion to exclude.
202-2, at 22-39.)

31

(Doc.

''To prove a medical malpractice claim in Georgia, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the duty inherent in the health care provider-

patient

relationship;

(2)

breach

of

that

duty

by

failing

to

exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and (3) that this

failure is the proximate cause of the injury sustained."

Knight

V. W. Paces Ferry Hosp., Inc., 585 S.E.2d 104, 105 (Ga. Ct. App.

2003) (citing Zwiren v. Thompson, 578 S.E.2d 862, 864 (Ga. 2003)).
"In order to establish proximate cause . . . the plaintiff must

use expert testimony because the question of whether the alleged
professional negligence caused the plaintiff's injury is generally
one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the average

layperson."

Zwiren, 578 S.E.2d at 865 (citations omitted).

the Court thoroughly explained

above.

As

Dr. Sheyner's causation

testimony on Cartee's sepsis is unreliable because she failed to
conduct a dependable differential diagnosis.
Court

granted

Dr.

Rahimi's

motion

causation opinions of Dr. Sheyner.

to

Because of this, the

exclude

the

sepsis

and

Without an expert's testimony

linking Dr. Rahimi's alleged actions to Cartee's death and illness.
Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against Dr. Rahimi fails
because he cannot prove causation.

Thus, Dr. Rahimi is entitled

to summary judgment, and his motion (Doc. 157) is GRANTED on this
ground.

32

V. CONCLUSION

For
Rahimi's

the foregoing reasons, IT IS

HEREBY

motion

is DENIED,

to dismiss

(Doc.

155)

ORDERED
Dr.

that

Dr.

Rahimi's

motion to exclude (Doc. 156) is GRANTED, and Dr. Rahimi's motion

for summary judgment (Doc. 157) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.

Based on these findings, the Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE

Dr. Rahimi as a party to this action.
ORDER

ENTERED

at

Augusta,

Georgia,

this

day

of

February, 2024.

J.

UNltsDi-S^^ES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

33