Vallambrosa Plantation, LLC v. CSX Transportation, Inc et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Remand to State Court. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and other costs is denied. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 11/13/15. (bcw)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURpQR 1
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

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VALLAMEROSA PLANTATION, LLC,

GA.

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Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV415-254

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CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. and
TIC - THE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
SOUTHEAST, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
(Doc. 9) to which Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc.
('CSXT") has filed a response (Doc. 10) . While Defendant
CSXT consents to a remand, it argues that the Plaintiff is
not entitled to attorney's fees. For the reasons that
follow, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 9) is

GRANTED

IN PART and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Superior
Court of Chatham County, Georgia for further proceedings.
However, Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and other
costs is DENIED.

Following remand, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to close this case.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the dismantling and removal of
steel beams on a retired railroad bridge by Defendant TIC

- The Industrial Company, Inc. ("TIC"). (Doc. 1 at 2.)
Defendant TIC was operating pursuant to a contract with
Defendant CSXT. (Id.) Vallambrosa Plantation, LLC asserted
ownership of a portion of the retired railroad bridge from
which the beams were removed. (Id.) On July 17, 2015 the
state court issued a temporary restraining order
prohibiting TIC and CSXT from removing or disposing of the
steel beams. (Id.) The Plaintiff simultaneously commenced
an action in state court. (Doc. 1 at 1.) The removed steel
beams are currently subject to a modified consent order
that permits TIC to store the removed beams at a facility
or return the beams to the property, and prohibits
Defendants CSXT or TIC from removing any further
structures from the bridge without approval. (Doc. 1 at
2.) Defendant CSXT removed the case to this Court, after
which Plaintiff filed its Motion to Remand.
ANALYSIS

I.

STANDARD OF LAW
Generally, federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction: they may only adjudicate cases over which
they have been granted jurisdiction by the Constitution or
Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375 (1994) . specifically, federal district courts
have jurisdiction over two types of civil actions: (1)

those that involve a federal question, meaning the claim
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States; and (2) those that invoke the court's
diversity jurisdiction, meaning they involve an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000 and are "between citizens
of different States, between U.S. citizens and foreign
citizens, or by foreign states against U.S. citizens."
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 552 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332). In cases
removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction,
removal is permissible only "if there is complete
diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named
defendants, and no defendant is a citizen of the forum
State." Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84
(2005)
The defendant, as the removing party, normally has
the burden of proving the existence of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d
1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) . Where removal is improper, a
party may move to remand the case back to state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). All doubts about federal jurisdiction
should be resolved in favor of a remand to state court.
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.
1994)
3

In this case, Defendant CSXT is a citizen of Virginia
and Florida (Doc. 10 at 3), Defendant TIC is a citizen of
Delaware and Colorado. Because Plaintiff is an LLC, it is
considered a citizen of all the states where its members
are citizens. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng'rs, LLC v.
Tuskegee Univ., 663 F.3d 1304, 13-5 (11th Cir. 2011). One
of Plaintiff's members, Mr. Freeman Napier Jeiks, III, is
a citizen of Virginia. (Doc. 9 at 2.) However, Defendant
CSXT was unable to determine this because Mr. Jeiks was
not publicly listed as a member of the Plaintiff LLC.
Plaintiff's attorney revealed the existence of Mr. Jelks
and his citizenship on October 12, 2015. (Doc. 10, Attach.
1 at 2.) Because Mr. Jelks shares citizenship with
Defendant CSXT, there is not sufficient diversity between
the parties to retain jurisdiction, and this Court must
remand this case back to state court.
However, Plaintiff has also asked for attorney's
fees, citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 presumably on the basis
that Defendant lacked "an objectively reasonable basis for
seeking removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546
U.S. 132, 141 (2005) . However, Plaintiff has proffered no
evidence that Defendant CSXT lacked an objectively
reasonable basis in seeking removal. Defendant CSXT
believed, after a diligent search, that all parties in the
4

case were diverse. In fact, it appears that even Plaintiff
was unaware of Mr. Jeiks's citizenship as it was not until
October, 12, 2015—nearly a full month after this case was
removed to this Court—that Plaintiff's attorney informed
Defendant of Mr. Jeiks's citizenship. (Doc. 10, Attach. 1
at 2.) Defendant CSXT also filed sufficient documentary
evidence in the form of the declaration of Carl G. Kleeman
III to prove that it reasonably believed that the amount
in controversy exceeded $75,000. (Doc. 1, Attach. 4; Doc.
10 at 5-6.) Plaintiff's counsel admits he "overlooked"
this document as well.' (Doc. 11 at 2.) Furthermore,
Defendant did not unduly delay agreeing to a remand when
presented with the evidence that the parties were nondiverse. While Plaintiff's behavior is certainly
questionable—particularly in light of Plaintiff attorney's
failure to read all the information provided by Defendant
and decision to waste this Court's time adjudicating
meritless requests for attorney's fees—Defendant CSXT's
behavior has been "objectively reasonable." As a result,
Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is DENIED.

1

Plaintiff had initially argued that the motion to remand
should also be granted on the basis that Defendant CSXT
failed to provide sufficient evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000. (Doc. 9 at 2.)
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand (Doc. 9) is GRANTED IN PART and this case is hereby
REMANDED to the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia
for further proceedings. However, Plaintiff's request for
attorney's fees and other costs is

DENIED.

Following

remand, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED this

/3

Vz
day of November 2015.

WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA