Lemley et al v. Red Bull North America, Inc.
Filing
26
ORDER granting 14 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, except for breach of implied warranties, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All pending motions in this case are DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 12/9/2016. (csr)
Sn i^t ?itttteb States; Btsitttct Court
for
^ontl^em Biotrict of 4leorgta
^aiianna$ Siibioton
ANN EDENFIELD LEMLEY,
Administrator of
as
the Estate
of WILLIAM JACOB WADE,
Deceased; and ANN EDENFIELD
LEMLEY,
Individually,
No.
4:16-CV-080
Plaintiffs,
V.
RED BULL NORTH AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court in this products liability and wrongful
death case
Bull,
is Defendant Red Bull North America,
Inc.")
Motion to Dismiss,
fully briefed,
dkt.
decision.
the
For
particular,
energy drink
the
3 72A
ev. 8/82)
the
the
nos.
14-1,
reasons
complaint
decedent
dkt.
20,
no.
22,
stated below,
fails
(^'Red
The Motion is
and is now ripe
it
is
GRANTED.
for
In
to allege how much Red Bull
consumed,
circumstances of his death.
14.
Inc.'s
when he
consumed it,
or
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint.
Fed.
R.
Civ.
Edenfield Lemley,
of
against Red Bull,
Inc.,
2016.
P.
12(b)(6).
Chatham County,
Plaintiff^
Georgia,
brought
a non-Georgia citizen,
Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.
Ann
suit
on March 28,
She alleged strict liability design
defect and failure to warn; negligent design, manufacture, and
sale;
negligent
failure
to
warn;
warranties; and wrongful death.
fraud;
breach of
See generally id.
She sought
$60,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
Lemley'3
arrhythmia,
son,
William
''aortic
Jacob
dissection,
Wade,
8,
2014."
Id.
doctors,
nil
32,
hospitals,
reasonably
Id.
He
nurses,
required
services."
47.
and
1| 95.
had
.
necessary
complaint
allegations
other
expenses
36.
and
for
other
supplies
At some earlier point,
further
and
pharmaceuticals,
medically
cardiac
[died] on August
"incur [red]
Id. 1I1I 1/ 24,
no
suffered
.
some quantity of Red Bull.
makes
Id. at 27.
hypertension,
cardiovascular problems, and ultimately .
implied
and
he had drunk
Crucially, the
regarding
Wade's
Red
Bull consumption or his death.
Red
Bull
is
an
energy
drink
designed,
manufactured,
tested, marketed, and distributed by Red Bull, Inc.
6,
24.
It
contains
caffeine and taurine.
Id.
Id. 1I1I 3,
H 14.
Red
^ Acting individually and as administrator of the estate of William Jacob
Wade.
The Court will refer to Ms. Lemley in the singular.
Bull,
Inc.
consumers
markets
in
Red
that
Bull
it
as
Ogives
''provid [ing]
[them]
increased physical and/or mental performance."
to
resulting
wings'
benefits
in
Id. H 25.
Red
Bull and similar energy drinks have been the subject of media,
legal, and medical scrutiny for their supposed role in heart
problems—some fatal.
Id.
7-23, 51.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A complaint must be ^'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
R.
Civ.
P.
8(a) (2) .
conclusipns,
cause
555
of
action."
theory."
678,
It
Bell Atl.
has
[the court]
necessary
684
to
harmed-me
beyond
v.
Twotnbly,
678.
and
550 U.S.
544,
from
a
recovery
under
some
for Choice,
viable
Inc.,
allegations must be enough to raise a
the
speculative
Iqbal,
more
than
legal
253 F.3d
2001).
556
an
accusation.").
U.S.
level
662,
.
.
678
unadorned,
They must
.
."
(2009)
Id. ;
right
to
see also
(holding Rule
8
the-defendant-unlawfully-
send
threshold from possibility to plausibility.
at
^^labels
can identify each of the material elements
(11th Cir.
Ashcroft V.
"demands
Corp.
Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.
above
go
^'contain inferential allegations
to
sustain
^'Factual
relief
must
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
(2007) .
which
It
Fed.
a
case
across
Iqbal,
the
556 U.S.
Although a
court must assume
the
truthfulness
of
the
complaint's factual allegations. It is ''not bound to accept as
true
a
legal
conclusion
couched
as
a
factual
allegation."
Papasan y. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will
.
.
.
be a
context-specific
task that requires the . . . court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not "show[h]"—"that
the pleader is entitled to relief."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The present motion to dismiss will be granted.
Lemley' s
causes
causation.
from
of
action
have
as
an
Most of
element
proximate
The complaint fails to advance proximate causation
mere
possibility
to
plausibility
because
it
does
not
allege how much Red Bull Wade consumed, or when he did so in
relation to his death.
See
Roe,
253
inferential
each
of
recovery")
F.3d
at
allegations
the
material
(emphasis
This shortcoming triggers dismissal.
684
(holding
from which
elements
added).
complaint
[the
court]
necessary
Nor are
must
the
to
"contain
can identify
sustain
complaint's
a
other
allegations adequate.
All of Lemley's
implied warranties,
claims,
with the exception of breach of
are dismissed WITHOUT
PREJUDICE,
because
more
Bank
carefully
v.
Pitt,
drafted
928
F.2d
complaint might
1108,
1112
state
(11th
Cir.
a
claim."
1991)
(per
curiam), overruled in part, Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am.
Corp. ,
314
F.3d 541
(11th Cir.
2002)
(en banc)
(unanimous
opinion).
I.
LESLEY'S DESIGN DEFECT CLAIM IS DISMISSED.
Lemley's
strict
liability design defect
claim must
be
dismissed because the complaint fails to allege enough facts
for
the
Court
possible,
to
find
it
plausible,
that "[Red Bull's]
caused [Lemley's] injury."^
as
opposed
to
merely
defective condition proximately
Henderson v. Sun Pharms. Indus.,
Ltd. , 809 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1378
(N.D. Ga. 2011)
(citing Chi.
^ The Court is not convinced, however, that the complaint fails to allege a
product defect.
Red Bull, Inc. characterizes as insufficient the
complaint's allegation that Red Bull contains a dangerous combination of
"exorbitant
levels
dkt.
H 31.
no.
1
of
caffeine,
Red Bull,
legal, as is taurine.
taurine,
Inc.
and
other
harmful
chemicals,"
responds that caffeine is safe sind
Dkt. No. 14-1 at 9.
It was enough for the complaint to allege—as it did, with citations
medical
literature—"the
toxicity
of
the
[taurine]/caffeine
to
combination."
McClain
(11th Cir. 2005)
v.
Metabolife
Int'l,
(emphasis added); Dkt. No.
1233,
1237
1 til 7-23, 31, 51, 98.
Inc.,
401
F.3d
Red
Bull, Inc.'s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
It cites
McClain to argue that studies need to be definitive to establish general
causation, dkt. no. 22 at 8, but McClain analyzed scientific expert
testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993) .
That involves a far closer inquiry than does failure to
state
a
claim.
Red
Bull,
Inc.'s
other
citations
are
to
cases
where
complaints do not allege what about a product makes i t dangerous.
Moore
V.
MyIan,
Inc.,
840 F.
Supp.
2d 1337,
1344-45
(N.D.
Ga.
2012)
(considering general allegations that defendants' FDA-approved products
"were unreasonably dangerous"); Goodson v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 1:11-CV3023, 2011 WL 6840593, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011)
(considering
general allegations that defendant's products "were not reasonably safe
for
their intended use and were defective as a
matter of law"
(citation
omitted)); Henderson, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1378-79 (considering allegations
of defendant's manufacturing defects that were unrelated to the case).
Here,
by contrast,
the complaint zeroed in on Red Bull's supposed
"dangerous levels of caffeine,
H 98.
taurine,
This pleading was adequate.
and other chemicals."
Dkt. No.
1
Hardware
(Ga.
Ct.
& Fixture
App.
Co,
v.
1999)).
Lettemnan,
'MGJeneral,
510
S.E.2d
875;
877-78
conclusory allegations,
devoid of any specific, factual content to support the legal
conclusions are plainly insufficient . . .
Id.
at 1379.
The complaint contains a mere conclusory allegation that Red
Bull
caused
Wade's
circumstances
exclude all
death.
surrounding
causes
two.
Mr.
No.
Wade's
other than RED
devoid of any specific,
Bull consumption,
Dkt.
1
SI
39
injuries
BULL'S
(^^[T]he
and
death
failure.").
It
is
factual content regarding Wade's Red
his death,
or the relationship between the
Lemley's design defect claim must be dismissed.
There is nothing to the contrary in Edwards v. Wisconsin
Pharmacal Co.,
987 F. Supp.
The complaint
in that
2d 1340, 1344-45
case gave
the
specific date that the
plaintiff used the defendant's product,
after
[use]
.
.
.
and
as
a
result
(N.D. Ga. 2013).
then alleged:
thereof,
experienced third degree burns to his person."
8-9,
Edwards v.
Ga. Aug. 15, 2013) .
Wise.
No.
Plaintiff
Dkt.
No.
3:13-CV-143
1-1
(N.D.
This allowed the district court to infer
proximate causation in a
not.
Pharmacal Co.,
the
^^Soon
way that the current complaint does
It would have been one thing for the complaint here to
have alleged,
for instance,
that Wade died of a
shortly after consuming Red Bull.
alleges,
Lemley's
case
could
just
But,
as
heart attack
for all the complaint
readily
be
based
on
Wade's having drunk two cans of Red Bull when the drink was
first
introduced in 1987,
three decades later.
dkt.
no.
1 % 6,
then dying nearly
Edwards does not excuse the exceedingly
vague pleading here.
II.
LEMLEY'S FAILURE TO WARN CLAIM IS DISMISSED.
Lemley's strict liability failure to warn claim must be
dismissed for the same reason.
One of the elements of failure
to warn under Georgia law is that the defendant proximately
caused the plaintiff's
Transobturator
Sling
injuries.
Prods.
1348, 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2010)
Liab.
Litig.,
711
F.
ObTape
Supp.
2d
(citing Dietz v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp. ,
598 F.3d 812,
law).
The complaint here does not even adequately allege that
drinking
Red
Bull
815
In re Mentor Corp.
was
(11th Cir.
part
of
2010))
the
(applying Georgia
chain
of
events
that
ultimately toppled Wade; it thus cannot adequately allege that
the product's labeling was the first domino to fall.^
'
The
Court
rejects
Red
Bull,
Inc.'s
contention
that
this
claim
was
inadequately alleged because the complaint "contains no allegations that
Mr. Wade read the product label."
Dkt. No. 14-1 at 13.
True, Wade's
failure to read the label would "fatally undermine[] [Lemley's] claim that
the warning itself was inadequate," because i t would disprove that
language absent from the warning proximately caused Wade to drink Red
Bull.
*5
Girieco v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., No. 4:12-CV-195,
(S.D.
Ga.
Oct.
23,
2013);
see
also
Camden
Oil
2013 WL 5755436, at
Co.
v.
Jackson,
609
S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) .
But Lemley did not admit that Wade
never read the label.
The complaint is merely silent on this point.
This
silence does not foreclose Lemley's case.
See Sheckells v. AGV-USA Corp.,
987 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993) (reversing grant of summary judgment
to defendants because plaintiff "did not testify that he did not read the
warnings, only that he did not remember doing so."); In re Stand ^N Seal
Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
15,
2009)
(same,
1:07MD1804, 2009 WL 2145911, at *6
denying summary judgment).
to plead away defendants'
(N.D. Ga. July
Plaintiffs are not required
every possible defense.
III.
LEMLEY'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED.
Likewise,
Lemley's
negligent
design,
manufacture,
and
sale claim, and her negligent failure to warn claim, are due
to
be
dismissed.
proven, can
''[B]efore
be
actionable,
any
negligence,
that negligence ^must
the proximate cause of the injuries sued upon.'"
Campbell,
--- S.E.2d
even
, No. A16A0755,
if
be
Edwards v.
2016 WL 6024275, at *4
(Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2016).
IV.
LEMLEY'S FRAUD CLAIM IS DISMISSED.
The same is true of Lemley's fraud claim.
LLC V.
Manton,
662 S.E.2d 880,
885
(Ga.
Duke Galish,
Ct. App.
2008)
('MA]n
essential element of a fraud claim is proximate cause.").
This claim must also be dismissed because the complaint
fails
to
meet
the
heightened
pleading
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
standard
imposed
by
The Rule requires the
complaint to state
(1) precisely what . . . omissions were made, and
(2) the time and place of each such statement and
the person responsible for . . . not making[] same,
and
(3)
the
content
of
such
statements
manner in which they misled the plaintiff,
and
the
and
(4)
what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the
fraud.
Ziemba v.
2001)
Inc. ,
Cascade Int'l,
(quoting Brooks
116 F.3d 1364,
in original).
v.
1371
Inc.,
Blue
256 F.3d 1194,
Cross
& Blue
(11th Cir. 1997))
1202
(11th Cir.
Shield of
Fla.,
(quotation omitted
The complaint here merely gives the Court some
reason to believe that Red Bull, Inc. profited by selling Wade
some
Red Bull.
Dkt.
No.
1
HH
74-83.
Therefore,
Lemley's
fraud claim must be dismissed.
V.
LEMLEY'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES CLAIM IS DISMISSED.
Lemley's claim for breach of implied warranties must also
be dismissed,
albeit for a different reason.
A Georgia claim
for breach of implied warranties requires plaintiff-defendant
privity.
In re Mentor Corp.,
711 F.
complaint alleges that Red Bull,
selling
RED
distribut[ed]
HH 86,
93.
BULL"
and
Supp.
Inc.
2d at 1365.
''was in the business of
"[sold],
deliver[ed]
the defective RED BULL to Mr. Wade."
However,
47,
51.
Red Bull,
purchaser privity" with Wade.
Dkt.
No.
22 at 3.
Inc.
No.
"did not
20.
1
Inc. sent
H 35; see
disavows "direct seller-
Dkt.
sell
It is,
No.
14-1 at 18; see also
then,
[Red Bull]
so lacked privity with him.
2d a t
Id.
No.
Lemley did not reply to this disavowal.
See generally Dkt.
Bull,
Inc.
and/or
Dkt.
it also alleges that Red Bull,
Wade's Red Bull into "the stream of commerce."
also id.
The
undisputed that Red
directly to
In re Mentor Corp.,
[Wade],"
and
711 F. Supp.
1366.
Thus,
Lemley's
will be dismissed.
drafted
for
breach
Furthermore,
claim with prejudice,
carefully
claim
the
of
implied
warranties
Court will dismiss
this
finding no reason to think that "a more
complaint
might
state
a
claim."
Bank
v.
Pitt,
928
F.2d
1108,
overruled in part,
1112
(11th
Wagner v ♦
314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002)
VT.
Cir.
1991)
(per
Daewoo Heavy Indus.
(en banc)
curiam) ,
Am.
Corp.,
(unanimous opinion).
LEMLEY'S WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM IS DISMISSED.
With all of Lemley's direct claims requiring dismissal,
her wrongful death claim also fails.
''^Under Georgia law ... a
suit for wrongful death is derivative to the decedent's right
of
action.
A
survivor
cannot
recover
for
the
decedent's
wrongful death if the decedent could not have recovered in his
or her own right."
48,
50
(Ga.
2014)
Dion v. Y.S.G.
Enters.,
(quoting Mowell v.
704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004))
Inc.,
Marks,
766 S.E.2d
603 S.E.2d 702,
(alterations in original).
The Court
has already held that it must dismiss the claims that Wade
could have brought.
VII.
Thus, this claim meets the same outcome.
LEMLEY'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS DISMISSED.
Also derivative to the other claims is Lemley's claim for
punitive damages.
754 S.E.
2d 640,
See, e.g., Stephen A. Wheat Tr. v. Sparks,
648
(Ga.
Ct. App.
2014) .
It must therefore
also be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For
the
Dismiss,
dkt.
DISMISSED
warranties,
reasons
above.
no.
is
WITHOUT
which
14,
GRANTED.
PREJUDICE,
is
Red
except
DISMISSED WITH
10
Bull,
Inc.'s
Motion
to
Plaintiffs'
claims
for
of
implied
All
pending
breach
PREJUDICE.
are
motions
Court
in
is
this
case
DIRECTED
are
to
DISMISSED
enter
the
AS
MOOT.
appropriate
The
Clerk
judgment
dismissal.
SO ORDERED,
this 9th day of December,
2016.
L^A g5dbS!y WipOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
D72A
ev. 8/82)
11
of
of
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