Ajibade et al v. Harris et al

Filing 46

ORDER denying 40 Motion for Entry of Default; granting 43 Motion to Open Default; granting 45 Motion to Open Default. Within ten days of the date this Order is served Defendant Vinson must refile a complete answer. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 5/9/2016. (loh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
SOLOMON OLUDAMISI AJIBADE
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV416-082

V.

ROY HARRIS in his official capacity
as Chatham County Sheriff, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action involving a Chatham county,
Georgia jail inmate's in-custody death, plaintiffs served defendants (and
then-jail correction officers) Eric Vinson and Frederick Burke
(collectively, "defendants") on April 9, 2016. Docs. 43 & 45 at 1; doc. 40
at 1 (plaintiffs' motion for default stating that service occurred on April
10, 2016). Neither man timely answered, see Fed. R. civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i) (defendants must answer within 21 days of service), so

plaintiffs moved for entry of default. Doe. 40. That motion remains
pending, as do defendants' motions to "open" their defaults.' Id.
Vinson and Burke claim they failed to timely answer because (1)
they thought they had 21 weekdays within which to do so, and (2) their
employer unexpectedly declined to provide counsel, a decision not made
until at least nine days into their response period. See, e.g., doe. 43 at 1.
Once defendants learned of plaintiffs' default motion, they immediately
began preparing answers. Burke has since filed his answer (doe. 44),
while Vinson included a partial Answer with his motion to open default.
Doe. 43 at 2, 5.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), the Court "may set aside an entry of
default for good cause." No default has actually been entered against
Vinson or Burke, but they unquestionably are in default, having not
timely answered. That said, the Court finds good cause to allow their
answers.' Both motions to open default (doe. 43; doe. 45) therefore are

Because plaintiffs' motion remains pending, their motions are in substance
oppositions to plaintiffs' motion for entry of default.
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"In this case, default has not yet been entered, but because the Court sees no point
in granting default only to set it aside, it will look to the 'good cause' standard in
Rule 55(c) to determine whether to grant [Vinson and Burke]'s motion[s to open
default]." Murphy v. Farmer, 2016 WL 1424060 at * 9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016).

2

GRANTED, while plaintiffs' motion for entry of default (doc. 40) is
DENIED. The answer Vinson filed with his motion, however, is
incomplete (it appears he omitted part of the first paragraph, see doc. 43
at 2). Hence, within 10 days of the date this Order is served, he must
refile a complete answer.

'Good cause' is a mutable standard, varying from situation to situation. It is
also a liberal one -- but not so elastic as to be devoid of substance." Coon v.
Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989). We recognize that 'good cause' is not
susceptible to a precise formula, but some general guidelines are commonly
applied. Id. Courts have considered whether the default was culpable or
willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether
the defaulting party presents a meritorious defense. [Commercial Bank of
Kuwait v.] Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d {238,] 243 [(2d Cir. 1994)11; see also
Robinson v. United States, 734 F.2d 735, 739 (11th Cir. 1984). We note,
however, that these factors are not 'talismanic,' and that courts have
examined other factors including whether the public interest was implicated,
whether there was significant financial loss to the defaulting party, and
whether the defaulting party acted promptly to correct the default. E.g.,
Dierschke v. OCheskey, 975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992). 'Whatever factors
are employed, the imperative is that they be regarded simply as a means of
identifying circumstances which warrant the finding of 'good cause' to set
aside a default." Id. However, if a party willfully defaults by displaying either
an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings, the court need
make no other findings in denying relief. Shepard Claims Service, Inc. v.
William Darrah & Associates, 796 F.2d 190, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1986).

Compania Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88
F.3d 948, 951-52 (11th Cir. 1996), quoted in Farmer, 2016 WL 1424060 at * 9.
Vinson and Burke acted promptly to correct their defaults (no entry of default has
even been entered yet), nothing indicates any intentional conduct on either's part,
and plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice from allowing them to proceed. That's enough
to show good cause.
3

c,1
SO ORDERED, this / day of May, 2016.

UNITED S ATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA