Ajibade et al v. Harris et al

Filing 73

ORDER denying as moot 54 Motion for Entry of Default; granting 72 Motion to open default. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 6/14/16. (wwp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
SOLOMON OLUDAMISI AJIBADE
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV416-082

V.

ROY HARRIS in his official capacity
as Chatham County Sheriff, et al.,
Defendant.

ORDER
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action involving a Chatham county,
Georgia inmate's death while in the county jail, defendant Mark capers
moves to open his default. Doc. 72. Plaintiffs served capers, a
corrections officer at the jail who is proceeding here pro se (id. at 1), on
April 25, 2016. Doc. 31 at 1. He did not answer by the May 16 deadline,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (defendants must answer within 21 days
of service), so plaintiffs moved for entry of default against him. Doc. 54.
That motion remains pending. Id.
Capers claims he failed to timely answer because his employer
(Chatham County) unexpectedly declined to provide him an attorney.

Doc. 72 at 1. He denies all liability and asks the Court to file his Answer.
Id. at 2.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), the Court "may set aside an entry of
default for good cause." No default has actually been entered against
Capers, but he unquestionably is in default, having not timely answered.
That said, the Court finds good cause to allow his answer.' His motion to

"In this case, default has not yet been entered, but because the Court sees no point
in granting default only to set it aside, it will look to the 'good cause' standard in Rule
55(c) to determine whether to grant [Folsome]'s motion [to open default]." Murphy v.
Farmer, 2016 WL 1424060 at * 9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016).
'Good cause' is a mutable standard, varying from situation to situation. It is
also a liberal one -- but not so elastic as to be devoid of substance." Coon v.
Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989). We recognize that 'good cause' is not
susceptible to a precise formula, but some general guidelines are commonly
applied. Id. Courts have considered whether the default was culpable or
willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether
the defaulting party presents a meritorious defense. [Commercial Bank of
Kuwait v.1 Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d [238,] 243 [(2d Cir. 1994)]; see also
Robinson v. United States, 734 F.2d 735, 739 (11th Cir. 1984). We note,
however, that these factors are not 'talismanic,' and that courts have examined
other factors including whether the public interest was implicated, whether
there was significant financial loss to the defaulting party, and whether the
defaulting party acted promptly to correct the default. E.g., Dierschke v.
OCheskey, 975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992). Whatever factors are employed,
the imperative is that they be regarded simply as a means of identifying
circumstances which warrant the finding of 'good cause' to set aside a default."
Id. However, if a party willfully defaults by displaying either an intentional or
reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings, the court need make no other
findings in denying relief. Shepard Claims Service, Inc. v. William Darrah &
Associates, 796 F.2d 190, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1986).
Compania Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88
F.3d 948, 951-52 (11th Cir. 1996), quoted in Farmer, 2016 WL 1424060 at * 9.
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open default is GRANTED. Doc. 72. Plaintiffs' motion for entry of
default (doe. 54) is DENIED AS MOOT.

SO ORDERED, this 14th day of June, 2016.

UNiTED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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