Epps v. Hein et al
Filing
6
ORDER that Epps' RLUIPA and nutrition claims would survive preliminary review if he included additional facts. He thus has leave to amend his Complaint, within 30 days of the date this Order is served, to include allegations relating to the sinc erity of his Rastafarian beliefs, and to demonstrate deliberate indifference to his nutritional needs. Regardless of whether he amends, Epps dental deprivation and sanitary conditions claims should be DENIED for the reasons given above. Meanwhile, it is time for Epps to pay his filing fee. His PLRApaperwork reflects $32.83 in average monthly deposits and a $1 average monthly balance over the six month period prior to the date of his Prison Account Statement. Doc. 9. He therefore owes a $6.57 initial partialfiling fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (requiring an initial fee assessmentwhen funds exist, under a specific 20 percent formula). Plaintiffs custodian (or designee) shall remit the $6.57 and shall set aside 20 p ercent of all future deposits to his account, then forward those funds to the Clerk each time the set aside amount reaches $10.00, until the balance of the Court's $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. Also, the Clerk is DIRECTED t o send this Order to plaintiff's account custodian immediately, as this payment directive is non dispositive within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), so no Rule 72(b) adoption is required. In the event plaintiff is transferred to another ins titution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this Order and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee and costs in this case to plaintiff's new custodian. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 6/6/16. (wwp) Modified on 6/7/2016 (wwp).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
HARVEY ANTHONY EPPS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. CV416-100
JEFFREY S. HEIN, Jail
Administrator and LISA BOYD, Asst
Jail Administrator,
Defendants.
ORDER
Proceeding pro se , Harvey Epps brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against two Liberty County Jail employees who, he alleges,
unconstitutionally denied him a special religious diet. Doc. 1 at 5-8. He
also inveighs against the jail’s lack of a grievance procedure,
nutritionally deficient diet, the denial of appropriate medical care, and
unsanitary conditions. Id. at 7-8. The Court preliminarily reviews his
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 1
1
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires federal courts to conduct early
screening of all suits filed by prisoners or detainees for the purpose of identifying
claims that are subject to immediate dismissal because they are frivolous or
malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary damages from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (which applies to
prisoner/detainee complaints against governmental entities or officials, whether
I. BACKGROUND 2
Epps professes to be a practicing Rastafarian. 3 After five months of
“put[ting] in numerous request[s] for [a] religious diet,” he at some point
received the food requested. Doc. 1 at 5. On February 17, 2016,
plaintiff is proceeding IFP or has paid the filing fee); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
(imposing the same dismissal obligation as to any case filed IFP, whether by a
prisoner/detainee or any other “person”); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (imposing the same
dismissal obligation as to “any action brought with respect to prison conditions”).
On initial screening of a prisoner complaint, only “cognizable claims” may be allowed
to proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). All three statutory provisions contemplate the
dismissal of non-cognizable claims prior to service of process upon any defendant. §
1915A (requiring screening “before docketing if feasible or . . . as soon as practicable
after docketing”); § 1915(e)(2) (requiring dismissal “at any time” the court
determines the suit to be factually or legally insubstantial); § 1997e(c)(1) (requiring
dismissal of insubstantial claims on the court’s “own motion”).
2
As noted, screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A determines whether the
plaintiff states a cognizable claim. The facts contained consequently are taken as
true for purposes of this Order.
3
Rastafarian religion resembles Christianity in some respects. See Overton v.
Department of Correctional Services , 499 N.Y.S. 2d 860, 863-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
For both, a triune God exists and Jesus was his son. See Wilson v. Schillinger , 761
F.2d 921, 923 (3d Cir. 1985). Rastafarians, unlike Christians, believe that Jesus
incarnated a second time (in the form of Haile Selassie, emperor of Ethiopia from
1930-1974) and many of their religious practices ( e.g. , the spiritual use of marijuana)
diverge from those of mainstream Christian denominations. Timothy B. Taylor,
Redemption Song: An Update on the Rastafarians and the Free Exercise Clause , 9
Whittier L. Rev. 663, 664-65 (1988). Nevertheless, like many Jews, Rastafarians
“follow a strict dietary regimen.” Id. at 665. In fact,
[t]he importance of these dietary restrictions to practicing Rastafarians is
difficult to overemphasize. . . . They eat only foods that are ‘I-tal,’ a word
analogous to ‘kosher’ meaning pure, natural or clean. . . . This excludes meats
(especially pork), predatory fish, crustaceans, dairy products, white flour
breads, alcohol, sweets and salt.
Id. at 680.
however, his “religious diet was canceled because of [kosher] items [he]
ordered on store call.” Id.
Epps asked a Lieutenant Donaldson about the cancellation, and he
relayed that defendant Lisa Boyd “said no because when [Epps] first got
locked up [he] didn’t mention [he] had a religious preference and
something about ‘I can’t change my religion.’” Doc. 1 at 5. He also says
that defendant Jeffrey Hein penned a letter informing him that his
“special diet based on [his] claimed religion is canceled effective
02/18/2016. After a review of your store call purchases it is apparent that
you only requested a religious meal for personal nefarious reasons.
Please stop with your bogus claims of religious preference as they will no
longer be tolerated.”
Epps claims to the contrary -- that “[t]here is documented proof,”
in the form of records from his time in Vermont prisons, “of [him] being
Rastafarian.” Doc. 1 at 5. Despite that, Hein and Boyd, says Epps, “had
it out for [him],” and “didn’t want to do it.” Id. at 6-7. To that end,
when he asked for a grievance form to complain about Hein and Boyd’s
actions, Lt. Jacobsen told him that “the issue has been solved” and thus
was “not grievable.” Id. at 4, 7. Epps never received a form.
3
In addition to his religious diet claim, Epps complains that
defendants ignored his requests for dental care. Apparently half of a
filling fell out, “but [he] could not see a doctor until [he] put in 2 more
sick calls which will cost [him] $5 dollars each trip and whatever the
price for the medication as well.” Doc. 1 at 7. Rounding out his
Complaint, Epps states that he is “not receiving the proper amount of
food or proper nutrition on a daily basis,” and that bathrooms and living
areas are unsanitary. 4 See id. at 8.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Free Exercise Claim
Epps cites no constitutional or statutory provision as the basis for
his religious discrimination claim. Nevertheless, he presents sufficient
facts to suggest (if not state for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)) a
claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1.
4
Inmates “use the same mop head every day without it being swap[ped] or
change[d] for months.” Doc. 1 at 8. Nor does the jail provide “proper tools or
chemicals [(meaning plastic gloves and bleach)] to clean [the] shower.” Id. Finally,
the jail cells themselves contain “exposed rust throughout.” Id.
5
RLUIPA
2
1. Exhaustion
As a preliminary matter, dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is not proper at this stage. Under the PLRA
exhaustion provision, a prisoner must exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing an action that challenges the
conditions of his confinement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action
is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise
heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with this
Court's precedents. Ten years before RLUIPA's enactment, the Court held, in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872,
878-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), that the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of
general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. . . . The Court
recognized, however, that the political branches could shield religious exercise
through legislative accommodation. . . . Responding to Smith , Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat.
1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. . . . In City of Boerne [ v. Flores , however,] this
Court invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding
that the Act exceeded Congress' remedial powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . Congress again responded, this time by enacting RLUIPA.
Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 714-15 (2005).
More expansive than prisoners' rights under the First Amendment, RLUIPA
‘affords to prison inmates a heightened protection from government-imposed
burdens, by requiring that the government demonstrate that the substantial
burden on the prisoner's religious exercise is justified by a compelling, rather
than merely a legitimate, governmental interest. Smith v. Allen , 502 F.3d
1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on
other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas , ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179
L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). Thus, if [Epps’] RLUIPA rights were not violated, neither
were his First Amendment rights.
Gardner v. Riska , 444 F. App'x 353, 354 (11th Cir. 2011).
5
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 .
. . by a prisoner confined in any jail ... until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”). Exhaustion is a “precondition to suit” that must be enforced even if the available
administrative remedies are either “futile or inadequate.”
Harris v.
Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Jones v.
Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 199–200 (2007) (“There is no question that
exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA.”).
Not only does the PLRA require exhaustion, it “requires proper
exhaustion,” Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), which means an
inmate must “us[e] all steps” in the administrative process, and
comply with any administrative “deadlines and other critical
procedural rules,” before filing a complaint about prison conditions in
federal court. Id. at 89–91 (citation omitted). Thus, if an inmate has
filed an “untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative
grievance or appeal,” he has not properly exhausted his administrative
remedies. Id. at 83–84; see also Lambert v. United States , 198 Fed.
Appx. 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2006) (proper exhaustion requires filing
grievance “under the terms of and according to the time set by” prison
11
officials). If a prisoner fails to complete the administrative process or
falls short of compliance with procedural rules governing prisoner
grievances, he procedurally defaults his claims. Johnson v. Meadows ,
418 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005). In Georgia, “proper exhaustion”
means that prisoners are required to complete a three step grievance
process, consisting of an informal grievance, a formal grievance, and
an appeal, before filing suit in federal court. Helton v. Burks , 2012 WL
6097036 at * 2 (M.D. Ga. May 4, 2012) (citing Ga. Dep't of Corr. SOP
IIB05–001 § VI).
Epps’ allegations are, at least on preliminary review, sufficient to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement. He says that he asked for a
grievance form to complain about the lack of a religious diet and
denial of medical care, but prison officials told him the “issue is not
grievable and they was not going to give me a grievance because the
issue has been solved.” Doc. 1 at 4. He also insists that “nothing is
ever documented with paper work,” and that the jail lacks a grievance
procedure in any case.
Id. at 6. In the face of those allegations,
dismissal for failure to exhaust would be improper.
See Cole v.
Secretary, Department of Corrections , 451 F. App’x 827, 828 (11th Cir.
7
2011) (“The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, and a
prisoner is not required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his
complaint.”) (citing Jones , 549 U.S. at 216). If, however, defendants
move to dismiss and put forward proof showing that Epps failed to
exhaust and defendants did not inhibit his efforts to do so, the PLRA
obligates the Court to dismiss his claims. See Turner v. Burnside , 542
F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008); Harris, 190 F.3d at 1285–86.
2. RLUIPA
Under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise” of prisoners “unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). To
succeed on a claim under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case under
RLUIPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in a
religious exercise; and (2) that the religious exercise was
substantially burdened. Smith v. Allen , 502 F.3d 1255, 1276
(11th Cir. 2007).
***
The Supreme Court has cautioned that it is “not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
interpretation of those creeds.” Hernandez v. C.I.R. , 490 U.S.
680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989). Thus, RLUIPA
defines “religious exercise” broadly to include “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). “Although RLUIPA
8
bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is
‘central’ to a prisoner's religion . . . the Act does not preclude
inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity.”
Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161
L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). Therefore, to be protected, a plaintiff must
show that the practice he wishes to engage in is both sincerely
held and rooted in religious belief.
Benning v. Georgia , 864 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
Epps alleges that he wishes to engage in a religious exercise -maintaining a kosher, Rastafarian diet. Doc. 1 at 5; see Daley v.
Lippin , 555 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2014) (Rastafarian diet
constituted religious exercise for purposes of religious freedom claims).
He also contends that defendants have unreasonably prevented him
from doing so. Doc. 1 at 5. Even so (and excluding examination of
material “not within the judicial ken,” Hernandez , 490 U.S. at 699),
Epps fails to include facts bearing on the “sincerity of [his] professed
religiosity.” Cutter , 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13.
Nevertheless, “when a more carefully drafted complaint might
state a claim, a district court should give a pro se plaintiff at least one
chance to amend the complaint before the court dismisses the action.”
Jenkins v. Walker , 620 F. App'x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Bank v.
Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v.
01
Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp. , 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n. 1 (11th Cir.
2002) (en banc)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (courts should grant
leave to amend “freely . . . when justice so requires”).”
Seckinger v.
Bank of Am., N.A. , No. CV415-306, 2016 WL 1381814, at *2 (S.D. Ga.
Apr. 6, 2016). That’s the case here. Epps’ RLUIPA claim would survive
preliminary review (if not a motion for summary judgment) if he
included sincerity facts. The Court in its discretion therefore will give
him a chance to amend his Complaint accordingly. He must do so within
30 days of the date this Order is served.
B. Deprivation of Dental Care and a Nutritious Diet
Epps’ medical care allegations sound the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bell (his
form Complaint’s header identifies it a pleading under that provision,
too). “‘To establish a claim under [that provision], a plaintiff must
prove: (1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.’”
McDaniels v. Lee , 405 F. App’x 456, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Holmes v. Crosby , 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005)). Jail officials
violate a pre-trial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
10
when they act with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Andujar v. Rodriguez , 486 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2007). 6
To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
show: (1) a serious medical need; 7 (2) defendant's deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) causation between the
defendant’s indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. Mann v. Taser
Int'l, Inc. , 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009).8 In order to
establish deliberate indifference on the part of a defendant, a
plaintiff must show: ‘(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than
gross negligence.’ Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty. , 601 F.3d 1152,
1158 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). With respect to the ‘subjective knowledge’ component,
we have stated that defendants ‘must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and must also draw the inference.’ Bozeman
[ v. Orum ], 422 F.3d [1265,] 1272 [(11th Cir. 2005)] (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
6
It’s unclear from the Complaint whether Epps is a pre-trial detainee in Liberty
County, or stands convicted. Nevertheless, because “the minimum standard for
providing medical care to a pre-trial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment is
the same as the minimum standard required by the Eighth Amendment for a
convicted prisoner,” the Court analyzes his claims under the decisional law of both
amendments. Andujar , 486 F.3d at 1203 n. 3.
7
A “serious medical need is considered one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Farrow v. West , 320 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11th Cir. 2003) (quotes and cite omitted). “Only ‘those deprivations denying the
‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis
of an Eighth Amendment violation.’ Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
Mere ‘malpractice’ allegations do not suffice. Gonzalez v. Sarreck , 2011 WL 5051341
at * 18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2011).” Jackson v. Franks, 2012 WL 6626020 at * 1 (S.D.
Ga. Dec. 19, 2012).
8
An Eighth Amendment medical care claim contains the same three elements. See
Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (establishing and explaining the
constitutional cause of action for Eighth Amendment medical deprivation claims).
11
McDaniels , 405 F. App’x at 458 (footnotes added).
Epps fails to state a medical care claim. Although a dental issue
may (in some situations) constitute a “serious medical need,” one
partially cracked filling is not. Too, he alleges nothing remotely
suggesting deliberate indifference. Even if he did, he also admits that
the jail did not actually deprive him of care. Instead, it refused to replace
his filling until he “put in 2 more sick calls.” Doc. 1 at 7. Epps
apparently balked at that requirement because of its cost ($5 for each
visit, and he does not claim that he lacked those funds), but he ultimately
chose not to make the calls to get the care he says he needed; no one
prevented him from doing so. Because no second chance could cure that
defect, his dental claim fails.
His lack of nutrition claim -- in its entirety: “I am not receiving the
proper amount of food or proper nutrition (doc. 1 at 8) -- falls short, too.
But unlike the dental care claim, if amended to include additional facts -including those demonstrating deliberate indifference by prison officials
-- it could survive. Epps thus has 30 days from the date this Order is
served to amend his nutrition claim.
12
C. Unsanitary Jail Conditions
The Eleventh Circuit:
and the old Fifth Circuit, have long recognized a “well established”
Eighth Amendment right “not to be confined . . . in conditions
lacking basic sanitation.” Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1065–
66 (11th Cir. 1991). In Chandler v. Baird, the plaintiff alleged that
he had been deprived of toilet paper for three days, running water
for two days, and was not provided with soap, a toothbrush,
toothpaste, or bed linens. These conditions, combined with the
inadequate heating of his cell, were sufficient to state an Eighth
Amendment violation. Id. at 1063. We explained that “conditions
that ‘deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities' are violative of the ‘contemporary standard of decency’”
that the Eighth Amendment demands. Id. at 1064 (quoting Rhodes
v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59
(1981)).
***
Indeed, every sister circuit (except the Federal Circuit) has
recognized that the deprivation of basic sanitary conditions can
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Budd v. Motley ,
711 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“[A]llegations of
unhygienic conditions, when combined with the jail's failure to
provide detainees with a way to clean for themselves with running
water or other supplies, state a claim for relief.”); DeSpain v.
Uphoff , 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Exposure to human
waste, like few other conditions of confinement, evokes both the
health concerns emphasized in Farmer and the more general
standards of dignity embodied in the Eighth Amendment.”); Young
v. Quinlan , 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It would be an
abomination of the Constitution to force a prisoner to live in his
own excrement for four days. . . .”), superseded by statute on other
grounds as recognized by Nyhuis v. Reno , 204 F.3d 65, 71 n. 7 (3d
Cir. 2000); Howard v. Adkison , 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting that “inmates are entitled to reasonably adequate
sanitation” and finding Eighth Amendment violation where cell
was “covered with . . . human waste”); Inmates of Occoquan v.
13
Barry , 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (recognizing “sanitation”
as a “basic need” for prisoners protected by the Eighth
Amendment); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 1986)
(“[T]he Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from being . . .
denied the basic elements of hygiene.”) (quotation omitted); Green
v. McKaskle , 788 F.2d 1116, 1126 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A] state must
furnish its prisoners with reasonably adequate . . . sanitation . . . to
satisfy [the Eighth Amendment's] requirements.”) (quotation and
alteration omitted); Hoptowit v. Spellman , 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th
Cir. 1985) (noting that the failure to provide “minimally sanitary”
conditions “amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment”);
Hawkins v. Hall , 644 F.2d 914, 918 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining that
prison conditions “must be sanitary”) (quotation omitted); Hite v.
Leeke , 564 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that “the
denial of decent and basically sanitary living conditions and the
deprivation of basic elements of hygiene” can violate the Eighth
Amendment) (quotation omitted); LaReau v. MacDougall , 473 F.2d
974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Causing a man to live, eat and perhaps
sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing
and degrading to be permitted.”).
Brooks v. Warden , 800 F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2015). As with all
Eighth Amendment claims, defendants who complain about a lack of
basic hygiene must plausibly allege deliberate indifference by prison
officials. See id. at 1303.
As he did with his medical care deprivation claim, Epps fails to
allege any facts showing deliberate indifference. Even if he did, his
prison conditions claim still fails because those conditions (exposed rust,
a lack of plastic gloves and bleach, and a mildewed mop head) simply do
not constitute “deprivation of basic elements of hygiene,” Brooks , 800
14
F.3d at 1304, as does, for example, depriving a prisoner of “toilet paper
for three days, running water for two days, and” failing to provide “soap,
a toothbrush, toothpaste, or bed linens.”
Chandler, 926 F.2d at 1065.
No new facts could cure that deficiency, so a chance to amend is
unnecessary.
III. CONCLUSION
Epps’ RLUIPA and nutrition claims would survive preliminary
review if he included additional facts. He thus has leave to amend his
Complaint, within 30 days of the date this Order is served, to include
allegations relating to the sincerity of his Rastafarian beliefs, and to
demonstrate deliberate indifference to his nutritional needs. Regardless
of whether he amends, Epps’ dental deprivation and sanitary conditions
claims should be DENIED for the reasons given above.
Meanwhile, it is time for Epps to pay his filing fee. His PLRA
paperwork reflects $32.83 in average monthly deposits and a $1 average
monthly balance over the six month period prior to the date of his Prison
Account Statement. Doc. 9. He therefore owes a $6.57 initial partial
filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (requiring an initial fee assessment
“when funds exist,” under a specific 20 percent formula). Plaintiff’s
15
custodian (or designee) shall remit the $6.57 and shall set aside 20
percent of all future deposits to his account, then forward those funds to
the Clerk each time the set aside amount reaches $10.00, until the
balance of the Court's $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full.
Also, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send this Order to plaintiff's
account custodian immediately, as this payment directive is
nondispositive within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), so no Rule
72(b) adoption is required. In the event plaintiff is transferred to
another institution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this
Order and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee
and costs in this case to plaintiff's new custodian. The balance due from
the plaintiff shall be collected by the custodian at his next institution in
accordance with the terms of the payment directive portion of this Order.
SO ORDERED , this 6th day of June, 2016.
UNHED SlATES MAGISTRATE JLJDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
16
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