Mcgaffin et al v. Cementos Argos S.A. et al

Filing 58

ORDER denying 56 Motion to Quash by Christopher Young. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 8/17/17. (jrb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JIM and BECKY McGAFFIN,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CEMENTOS ARGOS S.A., et al.,
Defendants.

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C4616-104

ORDER
Non-party

Christopher

Young

seeks to

quash defendants’

subpoena in this action, arguing that it is overbroad, seeks privileged
materials, and requires him to independently review the Complaint and
make a “determination as to what constitutes evidence responsive to
the allegations of the Complaint.” Doc. 56 at 2. Defendants respond
that Young failed to contact them prior to filing the motion to quash, a
conference that could have “perhaps short-circuit[ed] the need to even
file a motion.” Doc. 57 at 1. The Court agrees. Young’s “motion packs a
lengthy list of subpoena requests with routine objections [(i.e., “overly
broad, unduly burdensome, and not limited in temporal scope,”
privileged, etc., see, e.g., doc. 56 at 3)] that should have been resolved

through a meaningful conference.”

Conway v. H&R Block Eastern

Enterp., Inc., 2017 WL 2120074 at *3 (S.D. Ga. May 15, 2017).
It is clear from their papers that the parties have not met and
conferred -- much less meaningfully so -- to narrow the scope of their
dispute before seeking court intervention. 1 C.f. S.D. Ga. Loc. R. 26.5(c)
(“Counsel are reminded that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and 37(a)(1) require a
party seeking a protective order or moving to compel discovery to certify
that a good faith effort has been made to resolve the dispute before
coming to court.”). They must do so, and return to this Court only with
narrowed, specific, and supported objections to defendant’s subpoena.
Put another way, they shall in good faith (at least by phone if not in
person) attempt to resolve movant’s objections without further Court
involvement. Fees will be assessed for any bad faith shown. 2

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Requiring meaningful consultation can lead to informal resolution and thus
conservation of court resources. Avera v. United Airlines, Inc., 465 F. App’x 855, 85859 (11th Cir. 2012) (magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying, without
prejudice, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery where plaintiff had not sought to
resolve his discovery dispute with defendant before filing the motion); Jo Ann
Howard & Associates, P.C. v. Cassity, 2012 WL 1247271, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13,
2012) (rejecting compulsion request in part because “the failure of the parties to
communicate materially impeded their resolution of this matter.”) (emphasis added).
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The parties are reminded that
The scope of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) is broad and includes
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claims
2

Accordingly, Young’s motion to quash the subpoena (doc. 56) is
DENIED without prejudice.

or defense of any party involved in the pending action. Those resisting
discovery must show specifically how the objected-to request is unreasonable
or otherwise unduly burdensome.
Claims and defenses determine discovery’s scope. Evidence is relevant if it has
any tendency to make the existence of any fact or consequence more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Daniel Def., Inc. v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 2015 WL 6142883 at * 2 (S.D. Ga. Oct.
19, 2015) (cites and quotes omitted).
“The standard for what constitutes relevant evidence is a low one.” United States
v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1120 (11th Cir. 2002); McCleod v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 2014 WL 1616414 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2014) (“Rule 26, quite simply, sets
forth a very low threshold for relevancy, and thus, the court is inclined to err in favor
of discovery rather than against it.”). The recent changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (in particular, Rule 26), although substantive and substantial, do not
change the definition of relevance. Instead, they reemphasize and highlight
requirements already present in the Rules, like proportionality. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26, advisory committee note (2015) (“Restoring the proportionality calculation to
Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the parties
to consider proportionality. . . .”); Sibley v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 2015 WL 9413101 at
* 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) (“While proportionality factors have now been
incorporated into the Rule 26(b)(1) definition, those factors were already a part of
Federal discovery standards, appearing in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)”).
Here, Young is a former employee of defendants who filed a Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration complaint a month after being
terminated. Doc. 57 at 2. During the course of litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel indicated
that they “have knowledge of non-privileged documents that were forwarded to
Argos’ in-house counsel that are relevant to [their] claims” and indicated familiarity
with both Young’s “position and responsibilities with Argos” and his possession of
documents relevant to proving their case. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs notified defendants that
they are deposing Young (and seek no documents to be produced at that deposition),
and so defendants quite reasonably subpoenaed certain documents they believe may
help them prepare for that deposition. Id. Whether those requests are indeed
“overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not limited in temporal scope,” doc. 56 at 3,
is a matter for counsel to discuss without Court involvement and prior to the taking
of his deposition.
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SO ORDERED, this 17th day of August, 2017.

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