Parker v. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah et al
Filing
46
ORDER granting in part 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; 32 Motion for Summary Judgment; and 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is Remanded to the State Court of Chatham County. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 7/13/17. (cmr)
IN THE
UNITED
STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
*
DEON MAURICE PARKER,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
v,
THE
MAYOR AND ALDERMEN
CITY OF SAVANNAH;
OF
CV
416-126
THE
THE CHATHAM
COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS;
CITY OF POOLER,
GA;
AGENT K.
WRIGHT, individually and in her
official capacity; CORPORAL
MICHAEL SWORDS, individually
and in his official capacity;
and JOHN DOES 1-5, individually
and in their official
capacities,
Defendants,
ORDER
Presently before the Court is:
County
Board
of
Commissioner
(a)
("Chatham County")
Wright's motion for summary judgment
The Mayor
Savannah")
and Aldermen
motion
for
of the
summary
Defendants City of Pooler,
Michael
Clerk
Swords'
of Court
motion
gave
for
Defendants The Chatham
(doc.
29);
(doc.
GA ("City of Pooler")
summary
Plaintiff
Agent
(b)
Defendant
City of Savannah's
judgment
judgment
timely
notice
("City
32);
and
of
(c)
and Corporal
(doc.
of
K.
and
34) .
these
The
summary
judgment motions and the summary judgment rules, of the right to
file
affidavits
consequences
or
of
other
default.
materials
(Docs.
in
30,
opposition,
33,
Cir.
1985)
(per
filed a response
and
Defendants
filed
36,
replies
37,
41,
motions
43.)
Upon
law,
of
and
July
Department's
2,
of
for
the
parties'
772 F.2d 822,
825
Plaintiff
Pooler,
motions
the
respective
Swords
motions.
filing
of
and
(Docs.
materials
are
ripe
record
briefs,
in
for
evidence,
Defendants'
IN PART.
I.
On
time
and
the
satisfied.
respective
consideration
the
are GRANTED
City
their
The
Therefore,
each summary judgment motion
Savannah,
expired,
consideration.
relevant
of
support
has
have been
opposition to
City
in
38,
opposition
in
curiam),
the
35.)
notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright,
(11th
and
2014,
("SCMPD")
BACKGROUND
Savannah-Chatham
Officer
Keri
Metropolitan
McNaughton
Police
responded
to
a
possible robbery at a bank in Savannah, Georgia.
(Aff. of Keri
McNaughton,
Upon arriving
at
the
Doc.
bank,
Matthew
32-3,
Officer
Nelson
that
at 36-42, 5 10 & Ex. A.)
McNaughton
he
had
himself as "Deon Parker"
patrol
car.1
(Id.)
was
detained
advised
an
by
SCMPD
individual
Officer
identifying
(the "Suspect") in the rear seat of his
After obtaining
the Suspect's
consent,
1 The Suspect was actually non-party Mr. Jamie Parker.
(Dep. of Deon Parker,
Doc. 22-1, at 25, 97-98.)
Jamie Parker is Plaintiff's brother.
(Id. at 14.)
Defendants
never
maintain
revealed
his
-
and
true
Plaintiff
does
not
identity during his
2
dispute
-
that
interactions
Jamie
with
Parker
the
law
Officer
bags
McNaughton
containing
confirmed
-
searched
a
to
his
substance
be
vehicle
believed
cocaine.
and
-
discovered
and
(Id.)
later
three
tested
Accordingly,
and
Officer
McNaughton detained the Suspect for suspicion of possession of a
controlled
substance
with
intent
to
arriving
McNaughton
was
at
Counter Narcotics
the
by
met
two
Team
released the
A.)
Suspect
nearby
into
After the Suspect
SCMPD
agents
("SCCNT")
adopting the Suspect's case,
and
transported
(IcL_ 11 10-11 & Ex. A.)
him to a nearby SCMPD precinct.
Upon
distribute
from
precinct,
the
Officer
Savannah-Chatham
and advised that they would be
at which point
their custody.
Officer McNaughton
(Id.
M
13-15
& Ex.
was transferred to SCCNT's custody,
was interviewed by SCCNT agent Defendant Kristen Wright.
of Kristen Wright,
Doc.
1
29-1,
7.)
According
to
he
(Aff.
Defendant
Wright,
she was assigned to interview the Suspect because he
"wished
to
become
a
confidential
informant"
in
the
hopes
the charges to be brought against him would be dropped.
8-9.)
The Suspect "was not booked,
fingerprinted,
as
the
policies
with instructions "to appear at
enforcement
officers
unknown
McNaughton Aff.
2 Defendant
identified
to
said
and
(Id^ 1 10.)
investigations dictate."2
otherwise
arrested,
law
herein
and
(Id. SIS!
photographed or
procedures
of
drug
Rather, he was released
[SCCNT]
enforcement
that
headquarters
that
his
true
officers.
to begin
identity
(Id.
at
was
25-27;
If 17-18.)
Wright
did,
however,
perform searches
of
the
National
Crime
Information Center, Georgia Crime Information Center, and Chatham County's
databases using the name and date of birth provided to her (i.e., Plaintiff's
name and date of birth), which revealed no record of Plaintiff having been
previously arrested.
(Wright Aff. If 11-12.)
3
the
confidential
Suspect
subsequently
Defendant
2014,
informant
Wright
based
failed
swore
upon
process."
the
to
out
a
(Id.
appear
at
warrant
information
Suspect's detainment on July 2,
SI
13.)
SCCNT
on
or
obtained
When
headquarters,
about
at
the
the
August
time
of
11,
the
2014 - i.e., a warrant for the
arrest of "Deon Parker" for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute
On
Pooler
June
14,
Police
at
33,
on
131-32.)
A
(Dep.
tag
11 14-16.)
Swords
was traveling behind
routine patrol.
101,
(Id.
Defendant Michael
Department
Grand Am while
22-1,
2015,
(the "Warrant").
of
search
of
the City of
a black
Deon
of
Pontiac
Parker,
the
Doc.
Grand Am's
license plate showed that the registered owner (i.e., Plaintiff)
had
an
active
(Id.
Warrant).
follow
outstanding
warrant
at 100-01, 132.)
Plaintiff
until
he
for
exited
his
car,
arrest
(i.e.,
the
Defendant Swords continued to
turned
into
parking lot and parked his vehicle.
Plaintiff
his
Defendant
a
convenience
(Id.
Swords
at 33,
store's
132.)
detained
When
Plaintiff
and advised him that there was an active warrant for his arrest.3
(Id.
at
33-36,
Warrant's
132.)
the
132.)
validity
Defendant
via
SCMPD's
Swords
records
then
confirmed
department.
(Id.
the
at
Despite the protests of Plaintiff and the passenger in
Grand
arresting
Am,
the
Arnette
wrong
Singleton,
person
and
that
should
Defendant
instead
Swords
be
was
arresting
3 Before detaining Plaintiff, Defendant Swords asked Plaintiff if he was "Deon
Parker," to which Plaintiff responded in the affirmative.
(Parker Dep. at
33.)
4
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff
and
brother,
under
transported
("CCDC").
Jamie
arrest
him
for
to
Parker,
the
the
Defendant
crime
set
Chatham
forth
County
in
the
Detention
placed
Warrant
Center
(Id^ at 32-38, 132.)
Upon arriving at the CCDC,
Plaintiff was processed by jail
officials and placed in a holding cell with
other
Swords
While
being
processed,
Plaintiff continued to profess his innocence.
(Id.
at 40-41.)
When
they
discovered
system.
(Id.
that
individuals.
jail
(Id.
officials
at
38-51.)
approximately nine
fingerprinted
Plaintiff,
Plaintiff's fingerprints were not in the
45.)
According to Plaintiff,
officials
stated to
upon making this discovery,
Plaintiff that
at
jail
someone had "made a mistake"
in arresting him but that there was nothing they could do until
Plaintiff went before the judge the following morning.4
(Id. at
45-48.)
On the afternoon of June 15,
appearance
before
video
from the
feed
2015, Plaintiff made his first
the Recorder's
CCDC.
(Id.
Court
at
of Chatham County via
51-52.)
After
the
charges
against Plaintiff were read, Defendant Wright informed the court
that
a
mistake
individual
had
she had
been
made
and
that
Plaintiff
sought under the Warrant.
was
(Id.
not
the
at 52-54;
4 According to Plaintiff, a jail official processing Plaintiff's information
also noticed that his social security number did not match up with the one on
record.
(Parker Dep. at 49.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Swords
walked into the room shortly after this discovery and that the jail official
told Defendant Swords that he had arrested the wrong individual; Defendant
Swords allegedly stated in response that Plaintiff had indeed informed him
that he had arrested the wrong individual,
could do.
(Id.)
5
but that there was nothing he
Wright
Aff.
M
17-18.)
Accordingly,
the
presiding
judge
dismissed the charges against Plaintiff and ordered his release;
Plaintiff was
discharged from the CCDC at approximately 11 p.m.
that same evening.
Aff.
1
(Parker Dep. at 54, 58, 103-04,
130; Wright
19.)
On or about May 2,
2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the
State Court of Chatham County,
violations
under
42
U.S.C.
Defendants
Wright
and
Georgia,
§
1983
alleging constitutional
and
state-law
Chatham County removed the
claims.5
case
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, and 1441.
to
this
Defendants
now move for summary judgment.
II.
Summary
genuine
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
judgment
dispute
as
to
is
STANDARD
appropriate
any
material
only
fact
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The
Court
shall
grant
summary
judgment
if
and
"there
the
is
no
movant
is
Fed. R. Civ. P.
"if
the
56(a).
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with
the affidavits,
if any,
show that
there
is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."
Corp. v.
N.
Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259,
2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
5 Deon Maurice Parker v.
al.f
(Doc.
1260
Hickson
(11th Cir.
The "purpose of summary judgment is
The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, et
State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, Civil Action No. STCV16-00637.
1,
at 4-12.)
6
to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see
whether
Indus.
there
Co.
is
v.
a
genuine
Zenith
need
Radio
for
trial."
Corp.,
475
Matsushita
U.S.
574,
Elec.
587
(1986)
(internal citation omitted).
"[The]
initial
basis
party
seeking
responsibility
for
[record
its
motion,
before
the
summary
of
judgment
informing
and
court]
the
district
identifying
which
it
always
movant
477
U.S.
carries
317,
its
court
of
the
of
the
demonstrate
the
believes
323
(1986).
If
initial
burden,
the
-
the
portions
those
absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Catrett,
bears
Celotex Corp.
and
only
non-movant
if
-
may
v.
the
avoid
summary judgment by demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine
issue
as
Clark,
to
the
Inc.,
"material"
929
material
F.2d
facts
604,
608
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
its
(11th
if they could affect
the governing substantive law.
'genuine'
of
the
case.
Cir.
outcome
Clark
1991).
of
the
v.
Facts
&
are
suit
under
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,
A dispute of those material facts "is
. . . [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
When
Coats
ruling
on
the
motion,
evidence in the record in the
the
Court
light most
must
view
Id.
all
favorable to the
the
non-
moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving
party's
favor.
Matsushita,
475 U.S.
at 587.
also avoid weighing conflicting evidence.
The Court must
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255;
934
McKenzie
(11th
v.
Cir.
Davenport-Harris
1987).
Funeral
Nevertheless,
Home,
the
834
F.2d
non-moving
930,
party's
response to the motion for summary judgment must consist of more
than conclusory allegations,
will
not
Cir.
1990);
198 9).
suffice.
Walker
Pepper
v.
and a mere "scintilla" of evidence
v.
Darby,
Coates,
887
911
F.2d
F.2d
1573,
1493,
1577
1498
(11th
(11th
Cir.
"The non-moving party cannot create a genuine issue of
material fact
through speculation,
is
^merely colorable'
v.
Dougherty Cty.
or
Sch.
conjecture,
or evidence that
^not significantly probative.'"
Sys.,
382 F.
App'x
914,
917
Bryant
(11th Cir.
2010)
(citing Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir.
2008;
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
249-50
(1986))).
III.
In his complaint,
a
constitutional
Plaintiff raises four primary claims:
violation
negligence claim;
DISCUSSION
under
§
1983;
a
state-law
(3) a state-law wrongful arrest claim; and (4)
a state-law false imprisonment claim.6
in
(2)
(1)
The Court addresses each
turn.
A.
Under
Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.
Section
1983,
individuals
§
may
1983 Claims
recover
money
damages
from VN[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
6 Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and attorney's fees.
10.)
8
(Doc.
1-1, at
regulation,
custom,
or
usage
causes to be subjected,
any
rights,
deter
504
state
U.S.
actors
161
individuals of
provide
relief
to
or other
the
local
State
42 U.S.C.
if
government may
body
the
badge
such
be
itself
omitted).
only
for
§ 1983;
of
by
the
authority
Local
"their
own
fails."
(1978))).
to
liable under this
a person
a
section if
person
(internal quotations
to
a
*to be subjected' to
563 U.S.
governments,
illegal
(citing
"A municipality
51,
60 (2011)
however,
acts"
and
vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees'
Id.
or
see also Wyatt
their
deterrence
Connick v. Thompson,
responsible
secured
^subjects'
deprivation of rights or ^causes'
(citations
. subjects,
("The purpose of § 1983 is to
435 U.S. 247, 254-57
such deprivation."
.
their federally guaranteed rights and to
victims
governmental
.
to the deprivation of
immunities
(1992)
from using
deprive
Carey v. Piphus,
or
. . . ."
158,
any
any citizen ...
privileges,
Constitution and laws
v. Cole,
of
and citations omitted).
"are
are
not
actions."
Accordingly,
" [p]laintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments
under
§
1983
must
prove
that
action
municipal policy caused their injury."7
7 "Official
municipal
policy
includes
the
pursuant
to
official
Id. at 60-61.
decisions
of
a
government's
lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices ^ so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick,
563 U.S.
at 61
(citations omitted).
9
1.
Plaintiff
Pooler
Defendants Swords and City of Pooler
contends
that
unconstitutionally
Defendants
deprived
Swords
Plaintiff
of
and
his
City
of
procedural
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by "wrongfully
arrest[ing]"
policies
Plaintiff
regarding
pursuant
how
to
to
the
Warrant
properly determine
"without
whether
a
proper
warrant
is not only facially valid, but substantively accurate."8
37-1,
at
customs
6;
of
see
the
also
City
id.
of
at
5
("The
Savannah,
policies,
City
of
(Doc.
practices
Pooler
and
and
Chatham
County regarding flipping criminals into confidential informants
and
executing
search
warrants
deprived
[Plaintiff]
of
his
federally protected right to be
free
liberty [without due process] . ") . )
"An individual has
from
unlawful
arrest
a
and
detention
resulting
in
a
significant
restraint of liberty and violation of this right may be grounds
for
suit
Park,
under
Tex.,
42
950
U.S.C.
F.2d
§
272,
1983."
278
Duckett
(5th
Cir.
v.
City
1992)
of
Cedar
(citations
omitted); see also Chapman v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App'x 922,
924
(11th Cir.
2006)
("The cause of action for mistaken arrests
8 (See also Doc. 1-1 SI 43 ("The failure of the Defendant (s) to properly
screen, train and supervise its agents and police officers and its subsequent
decision
to
seek
the
arrest
of
[Plaintiff]
for
a
crime
which
he
commit deprived Plaintiff of his rights secured under the Fourth,
Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
did not
Fifth and
These violations
include, but are not limited to: [(a)] Failing to properly investigate police
officers before hiring them; [(b)] Failing to train its police officers to
investigate before testifying under oath;
measures to ensure
arrested[; and (d)]
[(c)] Failing to institute safety
innocent citizens are not wrongfully detained and
Failing to acquire proper information from a suspect
before releasing them.").)
10
sounds
in the
Fourth Amendment.") .
be unlawful if
it
is
are
probable
cause
liberty.
Id.
therefore
before
Id.
required
any
(citations omitted).
to
Fourteenth
make
significant
(citations omitted);
443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)
the
or detention may
accomplished without due process of law as
required by the Constitution."
officers
"An arrest
a
Police
determination
pretrial
restraint
see also Baker v.
of
of
McCollan,
("By virtue of its 'incorporation' into
Amendment,
the
Fourth
Amendment
requires
the
States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable
cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of
liberty.");
(11th Cir.
of
arrest
Kingsland
2004)
v.
City of Miami,
382
F.3d
1220,
1226
("The existence of probable cause at the time
. . . constitutes
action for false arrest."
an
absolute bar to
a section 1983
(citations omitted)).
A law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest "if,
at the time of the arrest,
prudent
person's
belief
he had knowledge that would warrant a
that
the person
committed or was committing a crime."
see also Harvey v.
when the
arrest
State,
is made,
Duckett,
469 S.E.2d 176,
the
facts
arrested had already
950 F.2d at 278;
178 (Ga.
1996)
and circumstances
("If,
known to
the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a prudent person
in believing that the accused had committed or is committing an
offense,
the warrantless arrest passes constitutional muster."
(citations omitted)).
Probable cause also exists where a law
11
enforcement
from
the
officer
National
learns
Crime
source.
United
States
1983) .
Further,
when
cause
to
arrest
one
of
a
warrant
Information
v.
a
Roper,
law
party,
1345-46
797,
(11th
802
Cir.
2002)
(1971));
("Because
Chapman
was
F.2d
enforcement
and
.
.
or
984,
other
989
official
arrest
reliable
(11th Cir.
has
Hill
Farrell,
v.
Chapman,
arrested
suspect's
"probable
. reasonably mistake [s]
Rodriguez v.
also
a
a
then the arrest of the second
(citing
see
Center
702
second party for the first party,
party is a valid arrest."
for
and
California,
192
held
280 F.3d 1341,
F.
401
App'x
pursuant
U.S.
at
to
a
925
valid
arrest warrant and because she was released from custody in less
than
her
24 hours,
claims
"When
of
the
existed
is
not entitled to more process
innocence
facts
appropriate."
1990)
she was
a
are
in the
not
question
in
of
face
of
the mistaken
dispute,
law,
whether
and
to review
arrest.").
probable
summary
cause
judgment
is
Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.
(citations omitted).
The Supreme
Court's
opinion
in the matter of Baker
instructive to the resolution of the instant dispute.
is
In Baker,
a suspect masquerading as his brother was arrested on narcotics
charges.
Baker,
443 U.S. at 140-41.
When booked,
the suspect
identified himself as his brother and was released on bail.
Id.
at
the
141.
A
warrant
was
later
issued
for
the
suspect in the name of the suspect's brother.
12
arrest
Id.
of
Police
stopped
because
after
Id.
Id.
the
of
suspect's
the
warrant,
discovering
The
brother
their
brother
for
arrested
traffic
him.
mistake,
eventually
a
Id.
police
brought
violation
Three
released
suit
under
days
the
and,
later,
brother.
Section
1983.
In denying the brother's claim, the Supreme Court stated:
Whatever claims this
under state tort law,
claim
under
the
situation
we think
United
might give rise
it gives rise to
States
to
no
Constitution.
Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a
period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant
conforming,
for purposes of our decision,
to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Obviously, one
in
respondent's
position
could
not
be
detained
indefinitely
in
the
face
of
repeated
arrested and detained met
Amendment.
For
the
the
of
under which he
innocence even though the warrant
protests
was
standards
Constitution
of
likewise
the
Fourth
guarantees
an accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation
of the speedy trial right need not await indictment or
other formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable cause
is itself sufficient.
We may even assume, arguendo,
that, depending on what procedures the State affords
defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial,
mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the
face of repeated protests of innocence will after the
lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused
of
liberty
without
due
process
of
law.
But
we
are
quite certain that a detention of three days over a
New
Year's
weekend
does
not
and
could
not
amount
to
such a deprivation.
Respondent's innocence of the charge contained in the
warrant, while relevant to a tort claim of false
imprisonment in most if not all jurisdictions, is
largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of
liberty without due process of law.
The Constitution
does not guarantee that only the guilty will be
arrested.
If it did,
§ 1983 would provide a cause of
13
action
for
every
defendant
acquitted
—
indeed,
for
every
suspect
released.
Nor
are
the
manifold
procedural protections afforded criminal
defendants
under the Bill of Rights without limits.
Due process
does not require that every conceivable step be taken,
at whatever cost,
to eliminate the possibility of
convicting an innocent person.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all
deprivations of liberty.
It protects only against
deprivations
of
liberty
accomplished
without
due
process of law.
A reasonable division of functions
between
law
magistrates,
enforcement
officers,
and judicial officers —
committing
all
of
whom may
be potential defendants in a § 1983 action - is
entirely consistent with due process of law.
Given
the requirements that arrest be made only on probable
cause
and
trial,
we
that
do
one
not
detained
be
accorded
a
speedy
think a sheriff executing an arrest
warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate
independently every claim of innocence, whether the
claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such
as lack of requisite intent.
Nor is the official
charged with maintaining custody of the accused named
in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform
an error-free investigation of such a claim.
The
ultimate
determination of
such claims
of
innocence
is
placed in the hands of the judge and the jury.
Section
rights
1983 imposes
protected
by
liability for violations of
the
Constitution,
not
for
violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.
Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in
state
Just
court under traditional
as
medical
malpractice
tort-law principles.
does
not
become
a
constitutional violation merely because the
victim is
a
become
prisoner,
violation
the
of
defendant
false
the
is
imprisonment
Fourteenth
a
state
does
Amendment
official.
not
merely
a
because
Having
been
deprived of no rights secured under the United States
14
Constitution,
§
Id.
respondent had no claim cognizable under
1983.
at
144-46
(internal quotations,
citations,
alterations,
and
footnotes omitted).
Here,
there
is
no
Plaintiff's brother,
possession of
when
bags
After
Plaintiff's
subject
of
issued
the
arrested.
cocaine
released
name.
As
for
as
were
found
failing
the
When
soon
Chatham County
and
to
arrest
Plaintiff
warrant
Defendant Wright
the
masquerading as Plaintiff,
containing
was
regarding
a controlled substance with
being
warrant
dispute
by
was
intent
in
Defendant
to
his
distribute
possession.
as
directed,
Plaintiff's
later
identified
Swords,
as
Plaintiff
identity was
a
brother
in
the
was
discovered by
at Plaintiff's initial appearance
Recorder's Court,
facts.
was detained for
appear
of
the mistaken
material
before the
the claims against
were dropped and he was released later that night.
Plaintiff
Notably,
Plaintiff was discharged less than forty-eight hours after being
arrested.
concludes
warrant
Under
that:
for the
the
totality of
(i)
probable
arrest
of
the
cause
circumstances,
existed
Plaintiff's brother;
to
the
Court
seek/issue
(ii)
a
Plaintiff's
arrest was made pursuant to a reasonable mistake; and (iii)
he
was discharged without unreasonable delay upon the discovery of
that mistake.
Moreover,
Plaintiff has
failed to
introduce any
evidence demonstrating a material issue of fact or other basis
upon
which
a
reasonable
factfinder
15
could
reach
a
contrary
conclusion.
violation
Therefore,
occurred
as
via
deprived of no rights
a
his
matter
arrest
of
or
law,
no
constitutional
detention.
Having
secured under the Constitution,
been
Plaintiff
has no claim cognizable against Defendants Swords or the City of
Pooler under
2.
Section
1983.
Defendants Wright,
Plaintiff
Savannah,
also
and
City of Savannah,
contends
Chatham
County
that
and Chatham County
Defendants
have
Wright,
unconstitutionally
Plaintiff of his procedural due process rights.
at
8-9;
Doc.
38-1,
at
5-7.)
Notably,
Rather,
to this case is,
at best,
eventually
to
Plaintiff's
led
theory
of
36-1,
these
their relation
limited to requesting the Warrant that
Plaintiff's
exact
none
of
deprived
(See Doc.
however,
Defendants actually arrested Plaintiff.
City
for
arrest.
imposing
Accordingly,
liability
upon
while
these
Defendants is murky,9 the Court interprets Plaintiff's argument
as being that the policy allegedly held and/or enforced by these
Defendants
to
not
book,
arrest,
photograph,
or
fingerprint
suspects who intend to become confidential informants created an
9 (See,
e.g.,
Doc.
36-1,
at 8-9
("Defendants have asked the
[C]ourt to grant
summary judgment against Plaintiff's due process claims by conveniently
overstepping the fact that the true culprit in this case was not booked,
arrested, photographed or fingerprinted, as the policies and procedures of
drug investigations dictate. . . . Suffice it to say, there are genuine
issues as to what policymaker(s) of the City of Savannah and/or Chatham
County were a moving force behind the implementation of the policy which
deters local government officials from collecting identifying information
from
individuals
informants.
arrested
for
narcotics
and then
flipped
into
confidential
Thus the City of Savannah and Chatham County are liable under §
1983 for defective training or policies regarding the Savannah Chatham Metro
Police Department and Chatham County Narcotics Team.");
(same);
see also fn.8,
supra.
16
Doc.
38-1,
at 5-6
unnecessary
danger
constitutional
"[I]t
is
of
unlawful
arrest
and,
consequently,
a
violation.
well-established
that
a
constitutional
violation
arises when an officer signs a probable cause affidavit which no
reasonable
probable
well-trained
cause."
officer
Malley
("If such was the case,
objectively
reasonable,
v.
would
Briggs,
have
475
believed
U.S.
335,
established
345
(1986)
the application for the warrant was not
because
it
danger of an unlawful arrest.").
created
the
unnecessary
Similarly, "the Constitution
prohibits an officer from making perjurious or recklessly false
statements in support of a warrant."
Kelly v.
1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Franks v.
154, 156 (1978)); but see id.
at 1554-55
Curtis, 21 F.3d
Delaware,
438 U.S.
("At the same time, we
have explicitly limited the Franks rule to cases of perjurious
or recklessly false statements
officer
in support
or omissions made by a police
of a warrant;
the rule does not
apply to
negligent misrepresentations or omissions. . . . When the Fourth
Amendment
demands
a
factual
showing
sufficient
to
comprise
'probable cause,' the obvious assumption is that there will be a
truthful showing.
This does not mean
'truthful'
in the sense
that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily
correct,
for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay as well
as
information
upon
within
the
affiant's
sometimes must be garnered hastily.
17
own knowledge
that
But surely it is to be
'truthful'
believed
in
or
the
sense
appropriately
(internal quotations,
Here,
showing
that
accepted
information
by
the
put
forth
affiant
as
is
true."
citations, and alterations omitted)).
Plaintiff
that
the
has
Defendant
failed
Wright
to
any
had
introduce
doubts
any
that
evidence
the
Suspect
was not who he purported to be or that a reasonable officer in
Defendant Wright's position would have otherwise questioned his
identity.
198 9)
See
Tillman v.
Coley,
886
F.2d 317,
321
(11th Cir.
("Although the law does not require that every conceivable
step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
convicting
an
innocent
person,
due
process
does
require
that
some steps be taken to eliminate doubts concerning identity that
exist prior to obtaining the warrant and to arrest."
quotations and citations omitted) ).
(internal
Plaintiff has also failed
to introduce any evidence that Defendant Wright lacked probable
cause
that
to
seek
a
she acted
Warrant.
warrant
for
maliciously
See Rodriguez,
or
arrest
Wright's
application
for the Warrant
outside
the
of
has
a
been
no
Moreover,
Suspect
in
reasonable
Accordingly,
she
Plaintiff
because Plaintiff has
Defendant
Plaintiff's
or
has
See Baker,
the
21 F.3d at
that
mistake
and/or
sought
Kelly,
showing
demonstrate a constitutional violation.
144-46.
the
280 F.3d at 1345-46;
Indeed,
misrepresentation.
of
recklessly when
1554-55.
scope
there
the
name was
negligent
failed
to
443 U.S.
at
failed to demonstrate
that
he
suffered a
violation
of
his
constitutional
rights
as
a
result of the issuance of the Warrant and/or his arrest pursuant
thereto,
392
no municipal
F.3d
1283,
liability exists.
1289
(11th
Cir.
liability on a municipality,
constitutional
rights
were
See McDowell v.
2004)
T[T]o
impose
a plaintiff must show:
violated;
(2)
that
(1)
the
Brown,
§
1983
that his
municipality
had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference
to that constitutional right;
caused the violation.").10
and
(3)
that the policy or custom
Accordingly,
Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal law claims.
B.
In
addition
asserted
several
Plaintiff's
to
his
state
State Law Claims
Section
law
supplemental jurisdiction.
1983
claims
claims,
over
Plaintiff
which
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
the
also
Court
has
Having determined
that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's
federal
claims,
however,
the
Court
declines
to
exercise
jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff's state law claims.
U.S.C.
exercise
§
1367(c)
(indicating
supplemental
that
jurisdiction
a
if
court
it
may
has
See 28
decline
dismissed
to
all
claims under which it has original jurisdiction); see also Raney
v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
370 F.3d 1086, 1089
(11th Cir. 2004)
have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining
claims when,
as here,
("We
state
the federal claims have been dismissed
10 Because Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 fail, so does his request for
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
19
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
prior
to
trial.")
Frye,
Inc.,
(citing
L.A.
Draper
F.2d
414,
428
County,
Broward
735
(11th
654
F.
App'x
&
Son
Cir.
408,
v.
1984));
411
state
claims
McDuffie
(11th
("[F]ederal district courts in removal cases must
than dismiss,
Wheelabratorv.
Cir.
2016)
remand,
rather
over which they decline
to
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction." (citations omitted)).
IV.
Based upon
concludes
all
of
foregoing
Defendants
Plaintiff's
exercise
state
that
the
federal
supplemental
law
Defendants'
CONCLUSION
claims.
and due
are
law
entitled
claims.
jurisdiction
See
28
U.S.C.
respective motions
32, 34) are GRANTED IN PART.11
consideration,
over
§
to
summary
The
on
declines
to
Plaintiff's
remaining
Accordingly,
for summary judgment
(docs.
29,
The Clerk is directed to REMAND
this case to the State Court of Chatham County.12
654
Court
judgment
Court
1367(c)(3).
the
See McDuffie,
F. App'x at 411.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this _[S_ day of July,
2017.
J.
RANDAL 'HALL,'CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
^OU^ERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
11 i.e., summary judgment is granted in Defendants' favor on all federal law
claims.
12 Deon Maurice Parker v.
The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, et
al., State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, Civil Action No. STCV16-00637.
20
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