Parker v. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah et al

Filing 46

ORDER granting in part 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; 32 Motion for Summary Judgment; and 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is Remanded to the State Court of Chatham County. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 7/13/17. (cmr)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION * DEON MAURICE PARKER, * * Plaintiff, * * v, THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN CITY OF SAVANNAH; OF CV 416-126 THE THE CHATHAM COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; CITY OF POOLER, GA; AGENT K. WRIGHT, individually and in her official capacity; CORPORAL MICHAEL SWORDS, individually and in his official capacity; and JOHN DOES 1-5, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants, ORDER Presently before the Court is: County Board of Commissioner (a) ("Chatham County") Wright's motion for summary judgment The Mayor Savannah") and Aldermen motion for of the summary Defendants City of Pooler, Michael Clerk Swords' of Court motion gave for Defendants The Chatham (doc. 29); (doc. GA ("City of Pooler") summary Plaintiff Agent (b) Defendant City of Savannah's judgment judgment timely notice ("City 32); and of (c) and Corporal (doc. of K. and 34) . these The summary judgment motions and the summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits consequences or of other default. materials (Docs. in 30, opposition, 33, Cir. 1985) (per filed a response and Defendants filed 36, replies 37, 41, motions 43.) Upon law, of and July Department's 2, of for the parties' 772 F.2d 822, 825 Plaintiff Pooler, motions the respective Swords motions. filing of and (Docs. materials are ripe record briefs, in for evidence, Defendants' IN PART. I. On time and the satisfied. respective consideration the are GRANTED City their The Therefore, each summary judgment motion Savannah, expired, consideration. relevant of support has have been opposition to City in 38, opposition in curiam), the 35.) notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, (11th and 2014, ("SCMPD") BACKGROUND Savannah-Chatham Officer Keri Metropolitan McNaughton Police responded to a possible robbery at a bank in Savannah, Georgia. (Aff. of Keri McNaughton, Upon arriving at the Doc. bank, Matthew 32-3, Officer Nelson that at 36-42, 5 10 & Ex. A.) McNaughton he had himself as "Deon Parker" patrol car.1 (Id.) was detained advised an by SCMPD individual Officer identifying (the "Suspect") in the rear seat of his After obtaining the Suspect's consent, 1 The Suspect was actually non-party Mr. Jamie Parker. (Dep. of Deon Parker, Doc. 22-1, at 25, 97-98.) Jamie Parker is Plaintiff's brother. (Id. at 14.) Defendants never maintain revealed his - and true Plaintiff does not identity during his 2 dispute - that interactions Jamie with Parker the law Officer bags McNaughton containing confirmed - searched a to his substance be vehicle believed cocaine. and - discovered and (Id.) later three tested Accordingly, and Officer McNaughton detained the Suspect for suspicion of possession of a controlled substance with intent to arriving McNaughton was at Counter Narcotics the by met two Team released the A.) Suspect nearby into After the Suspect SCMPD agents ("SCCNT") adopting the Suspect's case, and transported (IcL_ 11 10-11 & Ex. A.) him to a nearby SCMPD precinct. Upon distribute from precinct, the Officer Savannah-Chatham and advised that they would be at which point their custody. Officer McNaughton (Id. M 13-15 & Ex. was transferred to SCCNT's custody, was interviewed by SCCNT agent Defendant Kristen Wright. of Kristen Wright, Doc. 1 29-1, 7.) According to he (Aff. Defendant Wright, she was assigned to interview the Suspect because he "wished to become a confidential informant" in the hopes the charges to be brought against him would be dropped. 8-9.) The Suspect "was not booked, fingerprinted, as the policies with instructions "to appear at enforcement officers unknown McNaughton Aff. 2 Defendant identified to said and (Id^ 1 10.) investigations dictate."2 otherwise arrested, law herein and (Id. SIS! photographed or procedures of drug Rather, he was released [SCCNT] enforcement that headquarters that his true officers. to begin identity (Id. at was 25-27; If 17-18.) Wright did, however, perform searches of the National Crime Information Center, Georgia Crime Information Center, and Chatham County's databases using the name and date of birth provided to her (i.e., Plaintiff's name and date of birth), which revealed no record of Plaintiff having been previously arrested. (Wright Aff. If 11-12.) 3 the confidential Suspect subsequently Defendant 2014, informant Wright based failed swore upon process." the to out a (Id. appear at warrant information Suspect's detainment on July 2, SI 13.) SCCNT on or obtained When headquarters, about at the the August time of 11, the 2014 - i.e., a warrant for the arrest of "Deon Parker" for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute On Pooler June 14, Police at 33, on 131-32.) A (Dep. tag 11 14-16.) Swords was traveling behind routine patrol. 101, (Id. Defendant Michael Department Grand Am while 22-1, 2015, (the "Warrant"). of search of the City of a black Deon of Pontiac Parker, the Doc. Grand Am's license plate showed that the registered owner (i.e., Plaintiff) had an active (Id. Warrant). follow outstanding warrant at 100-01, 132.) Plaintiff until he for exited his car, arrest (i.e., the Defendant Swords continued to turned into parking lot and parked his vehicle. Plaintiff his Defendant a convenience (Id. Swords at 33, store's 132.) detained When Plaintiff and advised him that there was an active warrant for his arrest.3 (Id. at 33-36, Warrant's 132.) the 132.) validity Defendant via SCMPD's Swords records then confirmed department. (Id. the at Despite the protests of Plaintiff and the passenger in Grand arresting Am, the Arnette wrong Singleton, person and that should Defendant instead Swords be was arresting 3 Before detaining Plaintiff, Defendant Swords asked Plaintiff if he was "Deon Parker," to which Plaintiff responded in the affirmative. (Parker Dep. at 33.) 4 Plaintiff's Plaintiff and brother, under transported ("CCDC"). Jamie arrest him for to Parker, the the Defendant crime set Chatham forth County in the Detention placed Warrant Center (Id^ at 32-38, 132.) Upon arriving at the CCDC, Plaintiff was processed by jail officials and placed in a holding cell with other Swords While being processed, Plaintiff continued to profess his innocence. (Id. at 40-41.) When they discovered system. (Id. that individuals. jail (Id. officials at 38-51.) approximately nine fingerprinted Plaintiff, Plaintiff's fingerprints were not in the 45.) According to Plaintiff, officials stated to upon making this discovery, Plaintiff that at jail someone had "made a mistake" in arresting him but that there was nothing they could do until Plaintiff went before the judge the following morning.4 (Id. at 45-48.) On the afternoon of June 15, appearance before video from the feed 2015, Plaintiff made his first the Recorder's CCDC. (Id. Court at of Chatham County via 51-52.) After the charges against Plaintiff were read, Defendant Wright informed the court that a mistake individual had she had been made and that Plaintiff sought under the Warrant. was (Id. not the at 52-54; 4 According to Plaintiff, a jail official processing Plaintiff's information also noticed that his social security number did not match up with the one on record. (Parker Dep. at 49.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Swords walked into the room shortly after this discovery and that the jail official told Defendant Swords that he had arrested the wrong individual; Defendant Swords allegedly stated in response that Plaintiff had indeed informed him that he had arrested the wrong individual, could do. (Id.) 5 but that there was nothing he Wright Aff. M 17-18.) Accordingly, the presiding judge dismissed the charges against Plaintiff and ordered his release; Plaintiff was discharged from the CCDC at approximately 11 p.m. that same evening. Aff. 1 (Parker Dep. at 54, 58, 103-04, 130; Wright 19.) On or about May 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the State Court of Chatham County, violations under 42 U.S.C. Defendants Wright and Georgia, § 1983 alleging constitutional and state-law Chatham County removed the claims.5 case Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, and 1441. to this Defendants now move for summary judgment. II. Summary genuine SUMMARY JUDGMENT judgment dispute as to is STANDARD appropriate any material only fact entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Court shall grant summary judgment if and "there the is no movant is Fed. R. Civ. P. "if the 56(a). pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259, 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 5 Deon Maurice Parker v. al.f (Doc. 1260 Hickson (11th Cir. The "purpose of summary judgment is The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, et State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, Civil Action No. STCV16-00637. 1, at 4-12.) 6 to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether Indus. there Co. is v. a genuine Zenith need Radio for trial." Corp., 475 Matsushita U.S. 574, Elec. 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted). "[The] initial basis party seeking responsibility for [record its motion, before the summary of judgment informing and court] the district identifying which it always movant 477 U.S. carries 317, its court of the of the demonstrate the believes 323 (1986). If initial burden, the - the portions those absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Catrett, bears Celotex Corp. and only non-movant if - may v. the avoid summary judgment by demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine issue as Clark, to the Inc., "material" 929 material F.2d facts 604, 608 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). its (11th if they could affect the governing substantive law. 'genuine' of the case. Cir. outcome Clark 1991). of the v. Facts & are suit under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A dispute of those material facts "is . . . [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." When Coats ruling on the motion, evidence in the record in the the Court light most must view Id. all favorable to the the non- moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving party's favor. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. also avoid weighing conflicting evidence. The Court must Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; 934 McKenzie (11th v. Cir. Davenport-Harris 1987). Funeral Nevertheless, Home, the 834 F.2d non-moving 930, party's response to the motion for summary judgment must consist of more than conclusory allegations, will not Cir. 1990); 198 9). suffice. Walker Pepper v. and a mere "scintilla" of evidence v. Darby, Coates, 887 911 F.2d F.2d 1573, 1493, 1577 1498 (11th (11th Cir. "The non-moving party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through speculation, is ^merely colorable' v. Dougherty Cty. or Sch. conjecture, or evidence that ^not significantly probative.'" Sys., 382 F. App'x 914, 917 Bryant (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986))). III. In his complaint, a constitutional Plaintiff raises four primary claims: violation negligence claim; DISCUSSION under § 1983; a state-law (3) a state-law wrongful arrest claim; and (4) a state-law false imprisonment claim.6 in (2) (1) The Court addresses each turn. A. Under Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, individuals § may 1983 Claims recover money damages from VN[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 6 Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and attorney's fees. 10.) 8 (Doc. 1-1, at regulation, custom, or usage causes to be subjected, any rights, deter 504 state U.S. actors 161 individuals of provide relief to or other the local State 42 U.S.C. if government may body the badge such be itself omitted). only for § 1983; of by the authority Local "their own fails." (1978))). to liable under this a person a section if person (internal quotations to a *to be subjected' to 563 U.S. governments, illegal (citing "A municipality 51, 60 (2011) however, acts" and vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' Id. or see also Wyatt their deterrence Connick v. Thompson, responsible secured ^subjects' deprivation of rights or ^causes' (citations . subjects, ("The purpose of § 1983 is to 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 such deprivation." . their federally guaranteed rights and to victims governmental . to the deprivation of immunities (1992) from using deprive Carey v. Piphus, or . . . ." 158, any any citizen ... privileges, Constitution and laws v. Cole, of and citations omitted). "are are not actions." Accordingly, " [p]laintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that action municipal policy caused their injury."7 7 "Official municipal policy includes the pursuant to official Id. at 60-61. decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices ^ so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). 9 1. Plaintiff Pooler Defendants Swords and City of Pooler contends that unconstitutionally Defendants deprived Swords Plaintiff of and his City of procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by "wrongfully arrest[ing]" policies Plaintiff regarding pursuant how to to the Warrant properly determine "without whether a proper warrant is not only facially valid, but substantively accurate."8 37-1, at customs 6; of see the also City id. of at 5 ("The Savannah, policies, City of (Doc. practices Pooler and and Chatham County regarding flipping criminals into confidential informants and executing search warrants deprived [Plaintiff] of his federally protected right to be free liberty [without due process] . ") . ) "An individual has from unlawful arrest a and detention resulting in a significant restraint of liberty and violation of this right may be grounds for suit Park, under Tex., 42 950 U.S.C. F.2d § 272, 1983." 278 Duckett (5th Cir. v. City 1992) of Cedar (citations omitted); see also Chapman v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App'x 922, 924 (11th Cir. 2006) ("The cause of action for mistaken arrests 8 (See also Doc. 1-1 SI 43 ("The failure of the Defendant (s) to properly screen, train and supervise its agents and police officers and its subsequent decision to seek the arrest of [Plaintiff] for a crime which he commit deprived Plaintiff of his rights secured under the Fourth, Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. did not Fifth and These violations include, but are not limited to: [(a)] Failing to properly investigate police officers before hiring them; [(b)] Failing to train its police officers to investigate before testifying under oath; measures to ensure arrested[; and (d)] [(c)] Failing to institute safety innocent citizens are not wrongfully detained and Failing to acquire proper information from a suspect before releasing them.").) 10 sounds in the Fourth Amendment.") . be unlawful if it is are probable cause liberty. Id. therefore before Id. required any (citations omitted). to Fourteenth make significant (citations omitted); 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) the or detention may accomplished without due process of law as required by the Constitution." officers "An arrest a Police determination pretrial restraint see also Baker v. of of McCollan, ("By virtue of its 'incorporation' into Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty."); (11th Cir. of arrest Kingsland 2004) v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 ("The existence of probable cause at the time . . . constitutes action for false arrest." an absolute bar to a section 1983 (citations omitted)). A law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest "if, at the time of the arrest, prudent person's belief he had knowledge that would warrant a that the person committed or was committing a crime." see also Harvey v. when the arrest State, is made, Duckett, 469 S.E.2d 176, the facts arrested had already 950 F.2d at 278; 178 (Ga. 1996) and circumstances ("If, known to the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or is committing an offense, the warrantless arrest passes constitutional muster." (citations omitted)). Probable cause also exists where a law 11 enforcement from the officer National learns Crime source. United States 1983) . Further, when cause to arrest one of a warrant Information v. a Roper, law party, 1345-46 797, (11th 802 Cir. 2002) (1971)); ("Because Chapman was F.2d enforcement and . . or 984, other 989 official arrest reliable (11th Cir. has Hill Farrell, v. Chapman, arrested suspect's "probable . reasonably mistake [s] Rodriguez v. also a a then the arrest of the second (citing see Center 702 second party for the first party, party is a valid arrest." for and California, 192 held 280 F.3d 1341, F. 401 App'x pursuant U.S. at to a 925 valid arrest warrant and because she was released from custody in less than her 24 hours, claims "When of the existed is not entitled to more process innocence facts appropriate." 1990) she was a are in the not question in of face of the mistaken dispute, law, whether and to review arrest."). probable summary cause judgment is Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court's opinion in the matter of Baker instructive to the resolution of the instant dispute. is In Baker, a suspect masquerading as his brother was arrested on narcotics charges. Baker, 443 U.S. at 140-41. When booked, the suspect identified himself as his brother and was released on bail. Id. at the 141. A warrant was later issued for the suspect in the name of the suspect's brother. 12 arrest Id. of Police stopped because after Id. Id. the of suspect's the warrant, discovering The brother their brother for arrested traffic him. mistake, eventually a Id. police brought violation Three released suit under days the and, later, brother. Section 1983. In denying the brother's claim, the Supreme Court stated: Whatever claims this under state tort law, claim under the situation we think United might give rise it gives rise to States to no Constitution. Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant conforming, for purposes of our decision, to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, one in respondent's position could not be detained indefinitely in the face of repeated arrested and detained met Amendment. For the the of under which he innocence even though the warrant protests was standards Constitution of likewise the Fourth guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation of the speedy trial right need not await indictment or other formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable cause is itself sufficient. We may even assume, arguendo, that, depending on what procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of liberty without due process of law. But we are quite certain that a detention of three days over a New Year's weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation. Respondent's innocence of the charge contained in the warrant, while relevant to a tort claim of false imprisonment in most if not all jurisdictions, is largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of 13 action for every defendant acquitted — indeed, for every suspect released. Nor are the manifold procedural protections afforded criminal defendants under the Bill of Rights without limits. Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person. The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations of liberty accomplished without due process of law. A reasonable division of functions between law magistrates, enforcement officers, and judicial officers — committing all of whom may be potential defendants in a § 1983 action - is entirely consistent with due process of law. Given the requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause and trial, we that do one not detained be accorded a speedy think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent. Nor is the official charged with maintaining custody of the accused named in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such a claim. The ultimate determination of such claims of innocence is placed in the hands of the judge and the jury. Section rights 1983 imposes protected by liability for violations of the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state Just court under traditional as medical malpractice tort-law principles. does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a become prisoner, violation the of defendant false the is imprisonment Fourteenth a state does Amendment official. not merely a because Having been deprived of no rights secured under the United States 14 Constitution, § Id. respondent had no claim cognizable under 1983. at 144-46 (internal quotations, citations, alterations, and footnotes omitted). Here, there is no Plaintiff's brother, possession of when bags After Plaintiff's subject of issued the arrested. cocaine released name. As for as were found failing the When soon Chatham County and to arrest Plaintiff warrant Defendant Wright the masquerading as Plaintiff, containing was regarding a controlled substance with being warrant dispute by was intent in Defendant to his distribute possession. as directed, Plaintiff's later identified Swords, as Plaintiff identity was a brother in the was discovered by at Plaintiff's initial appearance Recorder's Court, facts. was detained for appear of the mistaken material before the the claims against were dropped and he was released later that night. Plaintiff Notably, Plaintiff was discharged less than forty-eight hours after being arrested. concludes warrant Under that: for the the totality of (i) probable arrest of the cause circumstances, existed Plaintiff's brother; to the Court seek/issue (ii) a Plaintiff's arrest was made pursuant to a reasonable mistake; and (iii) he was discharged without unreasonable delay upon the discovery of that mistake. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence demonstrating a material issue of fact or other basis upon which a reasonable factfinder 15 could reach a contrary conclusion. violation Therefore, occurred as via deprived of no rights a his matter arrest of or law, no constitutional detention. Having secured under the Constitution, been Plaintiff has no claim cognizable against Defendants Swords or the City of Pooler under 2. Section 1983. Defendants Wright, Plaintiff Savannah, also and City of Savannah, contends Chatham County that and Chatham County Defendants have Wright, unconstitutionally Plaintiff of his procedural due process rights. at 8-9; Doc. 38-1, at 5-7.) Notably, Rather, to this case is, at best, eventually to Plaintiff's led theory of 36-1, these their relation limited to requesting the Warrant that Plaintiff's exact none of deprived (See Doc. however, Defendants actually arrested Plaintiff. City for arrest. imposing Accordingly, liability upon while these Defendants is murky,9 the Court interprets Plaintiff's argument as being that the policy allegedly held and/or enforced by these Defendants to not book, arrest, photograph, or fingerprint suspects who intend to become confidential informants created an 9 (See, e.g., Doc. 36-1, at 8-9 ("Defendants have asked the [C]ourt to grant summary judgment against Plaintiff's due process claims by conveniently overstepping the fact that the true culprit in this case was not booked, arrested, photographed or fingerprinted, as the policies and procedures of drug investigations dictate. . . . Suffice it to say, there are genuine issues as to what policymaker(s) of the City of Savannah and/or Chatham County were a moving force behind the implementation of the policy which deters local government officials from collecting identifying information from individuals informants. arrested for narcotics and then flipped into confidential Thus the City of Savannah and Chatham County are liable under § 1983 for defective training or policies regarding the Savannah Chatham Metro Police Department and Chatham County Narcotics Team."); (same); see also fn.8, supra. 16 Doc. 38-1, at 5-6 unnecessary danger constitutional "[I]t is of unlawful arrest and, consequently, a violation. well-established that a constitutional violation arises when an officer signs a probable cause affidavit which no reasonable probable well-trained cause." officer Malley ("If such was the case, objectively reasonable, v. would Briggs, have 475 believed U.S. 335, established 345 (1986) the application for the warrant was not because it danger of an unlawful arrest."). created the unnecessary Similarly, "the Constitution prohibits an officer from making perjurious or recklessly false statements in support of a warrant." Kelly v. 1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Franks v. 154, 156 (1978)); but see id. at 1554-55 Curtis, 21 F.3d Delaware, 438 U.S. ("At the same time, we have explicitly limited the Franks rule to cases of perjurious or recklessly false statements officer in support or omissions made by a police of a warrant; the rule does not apply to negligent misrepresentations or omissions. . . . When the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to comprise 'probable cause,' the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing. This does not mean 'truthful' in the sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay as well as information upon within the affiant's sometimes must be garnered hastily. 17 own knowledge that But surely it is to be 'truthful' believed in or the sense appropriately (internal quotations, Here, showing that accepted information by the put forth affiant as is true." citations, and alterations omitted)). Plaintiff that the has Defendant failed Wright to any had introduce doubts any that evidence the Suspect was not who he purported to be or that a reasonable officer in Defendant Wright's position would have otherwise questioned his identity. 198 9) See Tillman v. Coley, 886 F.2d 317, 321 (11th Cir. ("Although the law does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person, due process does require that some steps be taken to eliminate doubts concerning identity that exist prior to obtaining the warrant and to arrest." quotations and citations omitted) ). (internal Plaintiff has also failed to introduce any evidence that Defendant Wright lacked probable cause that to seek a she acted Warrant. warrant for maliciously See Rodriguez, or arrest Wright's application for the Warrant outside the of has a been no Moreover, Suspect in reasonable Accordingly, she Plaintiff because Plaintiff has Defendant Plaintiff's or has See Baker, the 21 F.3d at that mistake and/or sought Kelly, showing demonstrate a constitutional violation. 144-46. the 280 F.3d at 1345-46; Indeed, misrepresentation. of recklessly when 1554-55. scope there the name was negligent failed to 443 U.S. at failed to demonstrate that he suffered a violation of his constitutional rights as a result of the issuance of the Warrant and/or his arrest pursuant thereto, 392 no municipal F.3d 1283, liability exists. 1289 (11th Cir. liability on a municipality, constitutional rights were See McDowell v. 2004) T[T]o impose a plaintiff must show: violated; (2) that (1) the Brown, § 1983 that his municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; caused the violation.").10 and (3) that the policy or custom Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal law claims. B. In addition asserted several Plaintiff's to his state State Law Claims Section law supplemental jurisdiction. 1983 claims claims, over Plaintiff which 28 U.S.C. § 1367. the also Court has Having determined that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal claims, however, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff's state law claims. U.S.C. exercise § 1367(c) (indicating supplemental that jurisdiction a if court it may has See 28 decline dismissed to all claims under which it has original jurisdiction); see also Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining claims when, as here, ("We state the federal claims have been dismissed 10 Because Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 fail, so does his request for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). prior to trial.") Frye, Inc., (citing L.A. Draper F.2d 414, 428 County, Broward 735 (11th 654 F. App'x & Son Cir. 408, v. 1984)); 411 state claims McDuffie (11th ("[F]ederal district courts in removal cases must than dismiss, Wheelabratorv. Cir. 2016) remand, rather over which they decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction." (citations omitted)). IV. Based upon concludes all of foregoing Defendants Plaintiff's exercise state that the federal supplemental law Defendants' CONCLUSION claims. and due are law entitled claims. jurisdiction See 28 U.S.C. respective motions 32, 34) are GRANTED IN PART.11 consideration, over § to summary The on declines to Plaintiff's remaining Accordingly, for summary judgment (docs. 29, The Clerk is directed to REMAND this case to the State Court of Chatham County.12 654 Court judgment Court 1367(c)(3). the See McDuffie, F. App'x at 411. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this _[S_ day of July, 2017. J. RANDAL 'HALL,'CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ^OU^ERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 11 i.e., summary judgment is granted in Defendants' favor on all federal law claims. 12 Deon Maurice Parker v. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, et al., State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, Civil Action No. STCV16-00637. 20

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