Parker v. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah et al

Filing 46

ORDER granting in part 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; 32 Motion for Summary Judgment; and 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is Remanded to the State Court of Chatham County. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 7/13/17. (cmr)

IN THE

UNITED

STATES DISTRICT

COURT

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

*

DEON MAURICE PARKER,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*

v,

THE

MAYOR AND ALDERMEN

CITY OF SAVANNAH;

OF

CV

416-126

THE

THE CHATHAM

COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS;

CITY OF POOLER,

GA;

AGENT K.

WRIGHT, individually and in her
official capacity; CORPORAL
MICHAEL SWORDS, individually
and in his official capacity;
and JOHN DOES 1-5, individually
and in their official

capacities,
Defendants,

ORDER

Presently before the Court is:
County

Board

of

Commissioner

(a)

("Chatham County")

Wright's motion for summary judgment

The Mayor
Savannah")

and Aldermen
motion

for

of the
summary

Defendants City of Pooler,
Michael

Clerk

Swords'

of Court

motion

gave

for

Defendants The Chatham

(doc.

29);

(doc.

GA ("City of Pooler")
summary

Plaintiff

Agent

(b)

Defendant

City of Savannah's
judgment

judgment

timely

notice

("City

32);

and

of
(c)

and Corporal

(doc.

of

K.

and

34) .

these

The

summary

judgment motions and the summary judgment rules, of the right to

file

affidavits

consequences

or

of

other

default.

materials
(Docs.

in

30,

opposition,

33,

Cir.

1985)

(per

filed a response
and

Defendants

filed
36,

replies
37,

41,

motions

43.)

Upon

law,

of

and

July

Department's

2,

of

for

the

parties'

772 F.2d 822,

825

Plaintiff

Pooler,

motions
the

respective

Swords

motions.

filing

of

and

(Docs.

materials

are

ripe

record

briefs,

in

for

evidence,
Defendants'

IN PART.

I.

On

time

and

the

satisfied.

respective

consideration

the

are GRANTED

City

their

The

Therefore,

each summary judgment motion

Savannah,

expired,

consideration.
relevant

of

support

has

have been

opposition to

City

in

38,

opposition

in

curiam),

the

35.)

notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright,

(11th

and

2014,

("SCMPD")

BACKGROUND

Savannah-Chatham
Officer

Keri

Metropolitan

McNaughton

Police

responded

to

a

possible robbery at a bank in Savannah, Georgia.

(Aff. of Keri

McNaughton,

Upon arriving

at

the

Doc.

bank,

Matthew

32-3,

Officer

Nelson

that

at 36-42, 5 10 & Ex. A.)
McNaughton

he

had

himself as "Deon Parker"

patrol

car.1

(Id.)

was

detained

advised
an

by

SCMPD

individual

Officer

identifying

(the "Suspect") in the rear seat of his

After obtaining

the Suspect's

consent,

1 The Suspect was actually non-party Mr. Jamie Parker.
(Dep. of Deon Parker,
Doc. 22-1, at 25, 97-98.)
Jamie Parker is Plaintiff's brother.
(Id. at 14.)
Defendants

never

maintain

revealed

his

-

and

true

Plaintiff

does

not

identity during his
2

dispute

-

that

interactions

Jamie

with

Parker

the

law

Officer

bags

McNaughton

containing

confirmed

-

searched

a

to

his

substance
be

vehicle

believed

cocaine.

and

-

discovered

and

(Id.)

later

three

tested

Accordingly,

and

Officer

McNaughton detained the Suspect for suspicion of possession of a
controlled

substance

with

intent

to

arriving

McNaughton

was

at

Counter Narcotics

the

by

met

two

Team

released the

A.)

Suspect

nearby

into

After the Suspect

SCMPD

agents

("SCCNT")

adopting the Suspect's case,

and

transported

(IcL_ 11 10-11 & Ex. A.)

him to a nearby SCMPD precinct.

Upon

distribute

from

precinct,

the

Officer

Savannah-Chatham

and advised that they would be

at which point

their custody.

Officer McNaughton

(Id.

M

13-15

& Ex.

was transferred to SCCNT's custody,

was interviewed by SCCNT agent Defendant Kristen Wright.

of Kristen Wright,

Doc.

1

29-1,

7.)

According

to

he

(Aff.

Defendant

Wright,

she was assigned to interview the Suspect because he

"wished

to

become

a

confidential

informant"

in

the

hopes

the charges to be brought against him would be dropped.
8-9.)

The Suspect "was not booked,

fingerprinted,

as

the

policies

with instructions "to appear at
enforcement

officers

unknown

McNaughton Aff.

2 Defendant

identified

to

said

and

(Id^ 1 10.)

investigations dictate."2

otherwise

arrested,

law

herein

and

(Id. SIS!

photographed or

procedures

of

drug

Rather, he was released

[SCCNT]

enforcement

that

headquarters

that

his

true

officers.

to begin

identity

(Id.

at

was

25-27;

If 17-18.)

Wright

did,

however,

perform searches

of

the

National

Crime

Information Center, Georgia Crime Information Center, and Chatham County's
databases using the name and date of birth provided to her (i.e., Plaintiff's
name and date of birth), which revealed no record of Plaintiff having been
previously arrested.

(Wright Aff. If 11-12.)
3

the

confidential

Suspect

subsequently

Defendant

2014,

informant

Wright

based

failed

swore

upon

process."

the

to

out

a

(Id.

appear

at

warrant

information

Suspect's detainment on July 2,

SI

13.)

SCCNT

on

or

obtained

When

headquarters,

about

at

the

the

August

time

of

11,

the

2014 - i.e., a warrant for the

arrest of "Deon Parker" for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute

On

Pooler

June

14,

Police

at

33,

on

131-32.)

A

(Dep.

tag

11 14-16.)

Swords

was traveling behind

routine patrol.

101,

(Id.

Defendant Michael

Department

Grand Am while

22-1,

2015,

(the "Warrant").

of

search

of

the City of

a black

Deon

of

Pontiac

Parker,

the

Doc.

Grand Am's

license plate showed that the registered owner (i.e., Plaintiff)
had

an

active
(Id.

Warrant).
follow

outstanding

warrant

at 100-01, 132.)

Plaintiff

until

he

for

exited

his

car,

arrest

(i.e.,

the

Defendant Swords continued to

turned

into

parking lot and parked his vehicle.
Plaintiff

his

Defendant

a

convenience

(Id.
Swords

at 33,

store's

132.)

detained

When

Plaintiff

and advised him that there was an active warrant for his arrest.3
(Id.

at

33-36,

Warrant's

132.)
the

132.)

validity

Defendant

via

SCMPD's

Swords

records

then

confirmed

department.

(Id.

the
at

Despite the protests of Plaintiff and the passenger in
Grand

arresting

Am,

the

Arnette

wrong

Singleton,

person

and

that

should

Defendant

instead

Swords

be

was

arresting

3 Before detaining Plaintiff, Defendant Swords asked Plaintiff if he was "Deon
Parker," to which Plaintiff responded in the affirmative.
(Parker Dep. at
33.)
4

Plaintiff's
Plaintiff

and

brother,

under

transported

("CCDC").

Jamie

arrest

him

for

to

Parker,
the

the

Defendant

crime

set

Chatham

forth

County

in

the

Detention

placed
Warrant

Center

(Id^ at 32-38, 132.)

Upon arriving at the CCDC,

Plaintiff was processed by jail

officials and placed in a holding cell with
other

Swords

While

being

processed,

Plaintiff continued to profess his innocence.

(Id.

at 40-41.)

When

they

discovered

system.

(Id.

that

individuals.

jail

(Id.

officials

at

38-51.)

approximately nine

fingerprinted

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff's fingerprints were not in the

45.)

According to Plaintiff,

officials

stated to

upon making this discovery,

Plaintiff that

at

jail

someone had "made a mistake"

in arresting him but that there was nothing they could do until

Plaintiff went before the judge the following morning.4

(Id. at

45-48.)

On the afternoon of June 15,

appearance

before

video

from the

feed

2015, Plaintiff made his first

the Recorder's
CCDC.

(Id.

Court
at

of Chatham County via

51-52.)

After

the

charges

against Plaintiff were read, Defendant Wright informed the court
that

a

mistake

individual

had

she had

been

made

and

that

Plaintiff

sought under the Warrant.

was

(Id.

not

the

at 52-54;

4 According to Plaintiff, a jail official processing Plaintiff's information
also noticed that his social security number did not match up with the one on

record.
(Parker Dep. at 49.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Swords
walked into the room shortly after this discovery and that the jail official
told Defendant Swords that he had arrested the wrong individual; Defendant

Swords allegedly stated in response that Plaintiff had indeed informed him
that he had arrested the wrong individual,
could do.

(Id.)
5

but that there was nothing he

Wright

Aff.

M

17-18.)

Accordingly,

the

presiding

judge

dismissed the charges against Plaintiff and ordered his release;

Plaintiff was

discharged from the CCDC at approximately 11 p.m.

that same evening.
Aff.

1

(Parker Dep. at 54, 58, 103-04,

130; Wright

19.)

On or about May 2,

2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the

State Court of Chatham County,

violations

under

42

U.S.C.

Defendants

Wright

and

Georgia,

§

1983

alleging constitutional

and

state-law

Chatham County removed the

claims.5

case

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, and 1441.

to

this

Defendants

now move for summary judgment.

II.

Summary

genuine

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

judgment

dispute

as

to

is

STANDARD

appropriate

any

material

only

fact

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The

Court

shall

grant

summary

judgment

if

and

"there

the

is

no

movant

is

Fed. R. Civ. P.
"if

the

56(a).

pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with

the affidavits,

if any,

show that

there

is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."
Corp. v.

N.

Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259,

2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
5 Deon Maurice Parker v.

al.f
(Doc.

1260

Hickson

(11th Cir.

The "purpose of summary judgment is

The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, et

State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, Civil Action No. STCV16-00637.
1,

at 4-12.)
6

to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether
Indus.

there
Co.

is

v.

a

genuine

Zenith

need

Radio

for

trial."

Corp.,

475

Matsushita

U.S.

574,

Elec.

587

(1986)

(internal citation omitted).

"[The]
initial
basis

party

seeking

responsibility

for

[record

its

motion,

before

the

summary

of

judgment

informing

and

court]

the

district

identifying
which

it

always

movant

477

U.S.

carries

317,

its

court

of

the

of

the

demonstrate

the

believes

323

(1986).

If

initial

burden,

the

-

the

portions

those

absence of a genuine issue of material fact."

Catrett,

bears

Celotex Corp.

and

only

non-movant

if

-

may

v.

the

avoid

summary judgment by demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine
issue

as

Clark,

to

the

Inc.,

"material"

929

material

F.2d

facts

604,

608

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

its

(11th

if they could affect

the governing substantive law.

'genuine'

of

the

case.

Cir.

outcome

Clark

1991).

of

the

v.

Facts

&

are

suit

under

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc.,

A dispute of those material facts "is

. . . [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
When

Coats

ruling

on

the

motion,

evidence in the record in the

the

Court

light most

must

view

Id.
all

favorable to the

the
non-

moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving
party's

favor.

Matsushita,

475 U.S.

at 587.

also avoid weighing conflicting evidence.

The Court must

Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255;
934

McKenzie
(11th

v.

Cir.

Davenport-Harris
1987).

Funeral

Nevertheless,

Home,

the

834

F.2d

non-moving

930,

party's

response to the motion for summary judgment must consist of more

than conclusory allegations,
will

not

Cir.

1990);

198 9).

suffice.

Walker

Pepper

v.

and a mere "scintilla" of evidence

v.

Darby,

Coates,

887

911

F.2d

F.2d

1573,

1493,

1577

1498

(11th

(11th

Cir.

"The non-moving party cannot create a genuine issue of

material fact

through speculation,

is

^merely colorable'

v.

Dougherty Cty.

or

Sch.

conjecture,

or evidence that

^not significantly probative.'"

Sys.,

382 F.

App'x

914,

917

Bryant

(11th Cir.

2010)

(citing Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir.

2008;

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

249-50

(1986))).

III.

In his complaint,
a

constitutional

Plaintiff raises four primary claims:

violation

negligence claim;

DISCUSSION

under

§

1983;

a

state-law

(3) a state-law wrongful arrest claim; and (4)

a state-law false imprisonment claim.6
in

(2)

(1)

The Court addresses each

turn.

A.

Under

Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.

Section

1983,

individuals

§

may

1983 Claims

recover

money

damages

from VN[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

6 Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and attorney's fees.
10.)
8

(Doc.

1-1, at

regulation,

custom,

or

usage

causes to be subjected,
any

rights,

deter

504

state

U.S.
actors

161

individuals of

provide

relief

to

or other
the

local

State

42 U.S.C.

if

government may
body

the

badge

such

be

itself

omitted).

only

for

§ 1983;

of

by

the

authority

Local

"their

own

fails."

(1978))).

to

liable under this

a person

a

section if

person

(internal quotations

to

a

*to be subjected' to

563 U.S.

governments,

illegal

(citing

"A municipality

51,

60 (2011)

however,

acts"

and

vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees'
Id.

or

see also Wyatt

their

deterrence

Connick v. Thompson,

responsible

secured

^subjects'

deprivation of rights or ^causes'

(citations

. subjects,

("The purpose of § 1983 is to

435 U.S. 247, 254-57

such deprivation."

.

their federally guaranteed rights and to

victims

governmental

.

to the deprivation of

immunities

(1992)

from using

deprive

Carey v. Piphus,

or

. . . ."

158,

any

any citizen ...

privileges,

Constitution and laws

v. Cole,

of

and citations omitted).

"are

are

not

actions."

Accordingly,

" [p]laintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments
under

§

1983

must

prove

that

action

municipal policy caused their injury."7

7 "Official

municipal

policy

includes

the

pursuant

to

official

Id. at 60-61.

decisions

of

a

government's

lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices ^ so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick,
563 U.S.

at 61

(citations omitted).
9

1.

Plaintiff
Pooler

Defendants Swords and City of Pooler

contends

that

unconstitutionally

Defendants

deprived

Swords

Plaintiff

of

and
his

City

of

procedural

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by "wrongfully

arrest[ing]"
policies

Plaintiff

regarding

pursuant

how

to

to

the

Warrant

properly determine

"without

whether

a

proper
warrant

is not only facially valid, but substantively accurate."8
37-1,

at

customs

6;

of

see

the

also

City

id.

of

at

5

("The

Savannah,

policies,

City

of

(Doc.

practices

Pooler

and

and

Chatham

County regarding flipping criminals into confidential informants

and

executing

search

warrants

deprived

[Plaintiff]

of

his

federally protected right to be

free

liberty [without due process] . ") . )

"An individual has
from

unlawful

arrest

a

and

detention

resulting

in

a

significant

restraint of liberty and violation of this right may be grounds
for

suit

Park,

under

Tex.,

42

950

U.S.C.

F.2d

§

272,

1983."

278

Duckett

(5th

Cir.

v.

City

1992)

of

Cedar

(citations

omitted); see also Chapman v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App'x 922,
924

(11th Cir.

2006)

("The cause of action for mistaken arrests

8 (See also Doc. 1-1 SI 43 ("The failure of the Defendant (s) to properly
screen, train and supervise its agents and police officers and its subsequent
decision

to

seek

the

arrest

of

[Plaintiff]

for

a

crime

which

he

commit deprived Plaintiff of his rights secured under the Fourth,
Fourteenth Amendments

of the United States Constitution.

did not

Fifth and

These violations

include, but are not limited to: [(a)] Failing to properly investigate police
officers before hiring them; [(b)] Failing to train its police officers to

investigate before testifying under oath;
measures to ensure
arrested[; and (d)]

[(c)] Failing to institute safety

innocent citizens are not wrongfully detained and
Failing to acquire proper information from a suspect

before releasing them.").)
10

sounds

in the

Fourth Amendment.") .

be unlawful if

it

is

are

probable

cause

liberty.

Id.

therefore

before

Id.

required

any

(citations omitted).
to

Fourteenth

make

significant

(citations omitted);

443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)
the

or detention may

accomplished without due process of law as

required by the Constitution."
officers

"An arrest

a

Police

determination

pretrial

restraint

see also Baker v.

of

of

McCollan,

("By virtue of its 'incorporation' into

Amendment,

the

Fourth

Amendment

requires

the

States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable
cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of

liberty.");
(11th Cir.
of

arrest

Kingsland
2004)

v.

City of Miami,

382

F.3d

1220,

1226

("The existence of probable cause at the time

. . . constitutes

action for false arrest."

an

absolute bar to

a section 1983

(citations omitted)).

A law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest "if,
at the time of the arrest,

prudent

person's

belief

he had knowledge that would warrant a

that

the person

committed or was committing a crime."
see also Harvey v.
when the

arrest

State,

is made,

Duckett,

469 S.E.2d 176,
the

facts

arrested had already
950 F.2d at 278;

178 (Ga.

1996)

and circumstances

("If,

known to

the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a prudent person

in believing that the accused had committed or is committing an
offense,

the warrantless arrest passes constitutional muster."

(citations omitted)).

Probable cause also exists where a law

11

enforcement
from

the

officer

National

learns
Crime

source.

United

States

1983) .

Further,

when

cause

to

arrest

one

of

a

warrant

Information

v.
a

Roper,

law

party,

1345-46

797,

(11th

802

Cir.

2002)

(1971));

("Because

Chapman

was

F.2d

enforcement

and

.

.

or

984,

other

989

official

arrest

reliable

(11th Cir.

has

Hill

Farrell,
v.

Chapman,

arrested

suspect's

"probable

. reasonably mistake [s]

Rodriguez v.

also

a

a

then the arrest of the second

(citing

see

Center

702

second party for the first party,

party is a valid arrest."

for

and

California,

192

held

280 F.3d 1341,

F.

401

App'x

pursuant

U.S.

at

to

a

925

valid

arrest warrant and because she was released from custody in less

than
her

24 hours,
claims

"When

of

the

existed

is

not entitled to more process

innocence

facts

appropriate."
1990)

she was

a

are

in the

not

question

in

of

face

of

the mistaken

dispute,

law,

whether

and

to review
arrest.").

probable

summary

cause

judgment

is

Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.

(citations omitted).

The Supreme

Court's

opinion

in the matter of Baker

instructive to the resolution of the instant dispute.

is

In Baker,

a suspect masquerading as his brother was arrested on narcotics
charges.

Baker,

443 U.S. at 140-41.

When booked,

the suspect

identified himself as his brother and was released on bail.

Id.

at

the

141.

A

warrant

was

later

issued

for

the

suspect in the name of the suspect's brother.
12

arrest

Id.

of

Police

stopped
because

after

Id.
Id.

the
of

suspect's
the

warrant,

discovering

The

brother

their

brother

for

arrested

traffic

him.

mistake,

eventually

a

Id.

police

brought

violation

Three

released

suit

under

days

the

and,
later,

brother.

Section

1983.

In denying the brother's claim, the Supreme Court stated:
Whatever claims this
under state tort law,
claim

under

the

situation
we think
United

might give rise
it gives rise to
States

to
no

Constitution.

Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a
period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant
conforming,
for purposes of our decision,
to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Obviously, one
in
respondent's
position
could
not
be
detained

indefinitely

in

the

face

of

repeated

arrested and detained met

Amendment.

For

the

the

of

under which he

innocence even though the warrant

protests

was

standards

Constitution

of

likewise

the

Fourth

guarantees

an accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation
of the speedy trial right need not await indictment or
other formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable cause
is itself sufficient.
We may even assume, arguendo,

that, depending on what procedures the State affords
defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial,
mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the
face of repeated protests of innocence will after the
lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused
of

liberty

without

due

process

of

law.

But

we

are

quite certain that a detention of three days over a
New

Year's

weekend

does

not

and

could

not

amount

to

such a deprivation.

Respondent's innocence of the charge contained in the
warrant, while relevant to a tort claim of false
imprisonment in most if not all jurisdictions, is
largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of
liberty without due process of law.
The Constitution
does not guarantee that only the guilty will be
arrested.

If it did,

§ 1983 would provide a cause of
13

action

for

every

defendant

acquitted

—

indeed,

for

every
suspect
released.
Nor
are
the
manifold
procedural protections afforded criminal
defendants
under the Bill of Rights without limits.
Due process
does not require that every conceivable step be taken,
at whatever cost,
to eliminate the possibility of
convicting an innocent person.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all
deprivations of liberty.
It protects only against
deprivations
of
liberty
accomplished
without
due
process of law.
A reasonable division of functions
between

law

magistrates,

enforcement

officers,

and judicial officers —

committing

all

of

whom may

be potential defendants in a § 1983 action - is
entirely consistent with due process of law.
Given
the requirements that arrest be made only on probable
cause

and

trial,

we

that

do

one

not

detained

be

accorded

a

speedy

think a sheriff executing an arrest

warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate
independently every claim of innocence, whether the
claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such

as lack of requisite intent.
Nor is the official
charged with maintaining custody of the accused named
in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform
an error-free investigation of such a claim.
The
ultimate

determination of

such claims

of

innocence

is

placed in the hands of the judge and the jury.

Section
rights

1983 imposes
protected
by

liability for violations of
the
Constitution,
not
for

violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.

Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in
state
Just

court under traditional
as
medical
malpractice

tort-law principles.
does
not
become
a

constitutional violation merely because the

victim is

a

become

prisoner,

violation

the

of

defendant

false
the

is

imprisonment

Fourteenth

a

state

does

Amendment

official.

not

merely

a

because

Having

been

deprived of no rights secured under the United States
14

Constitution,
§

Id.

respondent had no claim cognizable under

1983.

at

144-46

(internal quotations,

citations,

alterations,

and

footnotes omitted).

Here,

there

is

no

Plaintiff's brother,
possession of

when

bags

After

Plaintiff's

subject

of

issued

the

arrested.

cocaine

released

name.

As

for

as

were

found

failing

the

When

soon

Chatham County

and

to

arrest

Plaintiff

warrant

Defendant Wright

the

masquerading as Plaintiff,

containing

was

regarding

a controlled substance with

being

warrant

dispute

by

was

intent

in

Defendant

to

his

distribute

possession.

as

directed,

Plaintiff's
later

identified

Swords,

as

Plaintiff

identity was

a

brother

in
the

was

discovered by

at Plaintiff's initial appearance

Recorder's Court,

facts.

was detained for

appear

of

the mistaken

material

before the

the claims against

were dropped and he was released later that night.

Plaintiff
Notably,

Plaintiff was discharged less than forty-eight hours after being
arrested.

concludes
warrant

Under

that:

for the

the

totality of

(i)

probable

arrest

of

the

cause

circumstances,

existed

Plaintiff's brother;

to

the

Court

seek/issue

(ii)

a

Plaintiff's

arrest was made pursuant to a reasonable mistake; and (iii)

he

was discharged without unreasonable delay upon the discovery of
that mistake.

Moreover,

Plaintiff has

failed to

introduce any

evidence demonstrating a material issue of fact or other basis
upon

which

a

reasonable

factfinder
15

could

reach

a

contrary

conclusion.
violation

Therefore,

occurred

as

via

deprived of no rights

a

his

matter

arrest

of

or

law,

no

constitutional

detention.

Having

secured under the Constitution,

been

Plaintiff

has no claim cognizable against Defendants Swords or the City of
Pooler under

2.

Section

1983.

Defendants Wright,

Plaintiff

Savannah,

also

and

City of Savannah,

contends

Chatham

County

that

and Chatham County

Defendants

have

Wright,

unconstitutionally

Plaintiff of his procedural due process rights.
at

8-9;

Doc.

38-1,

at

5-7.)

Notably,

Rather,

to this case is,

at best,

eventually

to

Plaintiff's

led

theory

of

36-1,
these

their relation

limited to requesting the Warrant that

Plaintiff's

exact

none

of

deprived

(See Doc.

however,

Defendants actually arrested Plaintiff.

City

for

arrest.
imposing

Accordingly,
liability

upon

while
these

Defendants is murky,9 the Court interprets Plaintiff's argument
as being that the policy allegedly held and/or enforced by these
Defendants

to

not

book,

arrest,

photograph,

or

fingerprint

suspects who intend to become confidential informants created an

9 (See,

e.g.,

Doc.

36-1,

at 8-9

("Defendants have asked the

[C]ourt to grant

summary judgment against Plaintiff's due process claims by conveniently
overstepping the fact that the true culprit in this case was not booked,
arrested, photographed or fingerprinted, as the policies and procedures of
drug investigations dictate. . . . Suffice it to say, there are genuine
issues as to what policymaker(s) of the City of Savannah and/or Chatham
County were a moving force behind the implementation of the policy which
deters local government officials from collecting identifying information
from

individuals

informants.

arrested

for

narcotics

and then

flipped

into

confidential

Thus the City of Savannah and Chatham County are liable under §

1983 for defective training or policies regarding the Savannah Chatham Metro

Police Department and Chatham County Narcotics Team.");
(same);

see also fn.8,

supra.
16

Doc.

38-1,

at 5-6

unnecessary

danger

constitutional

"[I]t

is

of

unlawful

arrest

and,

consequently,

a

violation.

well-established

that

a

constitutional

violation

arises when an officer signs a probable cause affidavit which no
reasonable

probable

well-trained

cause."

officer

Malley

("If such was the case,

objectively

reasonable,

v.

would

Briggs,

have

475

believed

U.S.

335,

established

345

(1986)

the application for the warrant was not

because

it

danger of an unlawful arrest.").

created

the

unnecessary

Similarly, "the Constitution

prohibits an officer from making perjurious or recklessly false

statements in support of a warrant."

Kelly v.

1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Franks v.
154, 156 (1978)); but see id.

at 1554-55

Curtis, 21 F.3d

Delaware,

438 U.S.

("At the same time, we

have explicitly limited the Franks rule to cases of perjurious

or recklessly false statements
officer

in support

or omissions made by a police

of a warrant;

the rule does not

apply to

negligent misrepresentations or omissions. . . . When the Fourth
Amendment

demands

a

factual

showing

sufficient

to

comprise

'probable cause,' the obvious assumption is that there will be a
truthful showing.

This does not mean

'truthful'

in the sense

that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily
correct,

for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay as well

as

information

upon

within

the

affiant's

sometimes must be garnered hastily.

17

own knowledge

that

But surely it is to be

'truthful'

believed

in

or

the

sense

appropriately

(internal quotations,
Here,

showing

that

accepted

information

by

the

put

forth

affiant

as

is

true."

citations, and alterations omitted)).

Plaintiff

that

the

has

Defendant

failed

Wright

to

any

had

introduce

doubts

any

that

evidence

the

Suspect

was not who he purported to be or that a reasonable officer in
Defendant Wright's position would have otherwise questioned his

identity.

198 9)

See

Tillman v.

Coley,

886

F.2d 317,

321

(11th Cir.

("Although the law does not require that every conceivable

step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
convicting

an

innocent

person,

due

process

does

require

that

some steps be taken to eliminate doubts concerning identity that

exist prior to obtaining the warrant and to arrest."

quotations and citations omitted) ).

(internal

Plaintiff has also failed

to introduce any evidence that Defendant Wright lacked probable
cause

that

to

seek

a

she acted

Warrant.

warrant

for

maliciously

See Rodriguez,

or

arrest

Wright's

application

for the Warrant

outside

the

of

has

a

been

no

Moreover,

Suspect

in

reasonable

Accordingly,

she

Plaintiff

because Plaintiff has

Defendant

Plaintiff's

or

has

See Baker,

the

21 F.3d at

that

mistake

and/or

sought

Kelly,

showing

demonstrate a constitutional violation.

144-46.

the

280 F.3d at 1345-46;

Indeed,

misrepresentation.

of

recklessly when

1554-55.

scope

there

the

name was

negligent

failed

to

443 U.S.

at

failed to demonstrate

that

he

suffered a

violation

of

his

constitutional

rights

as

a

result of the issuance of the Warrant and/or his arrest pursuant

thereto,
392

no municipal

F.3d

1283,

liability exists.

1289

(11th

Cir.

liability on a municipality,
constitutional

rights

were

See McDowell v.

2004)

T[T]o

impose

a plaintiff must show:
violated;

(2)

that

(1)

the

Brown,
§

1983

that his

municipality

had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference
to that constitutional right;

caused the violation.").10

and

(3)

that the policy or custom

Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal law claims.
B.

In

addition

asserted

several

Plaintiff's

to

his

state

State Law Claims

Section
law

supplemental jurisdiction.

1983

claims

claims,

over

Plaintiff

which

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

the

also

Court

has

Having determined

that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's

federal

claims,

however,

the

Court

declines

to

exercise

jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff's state law claims.
U.S.C.

exercise

§

1367(c)

(indicating

supplemental

that

jurisdiction

a

if

court

it

may

has

See 28

decline

dismissed

to

all

claims under which it has original jurisdiction); see also Raney

v.

Allstate Ins. Co.,

370 F.3d 1086, 1089

(11th Cir. 2004)

have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining

claims when,

as here,

("We

state

the federal claims have been dismissed

10 Because Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 fail, so does his request for

attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
19

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

prior

to

trial.")

Frye,

Inc.,

(citing

L.A.

Draper

F.2d

414,

428

County,

Broward

735

(11th

654

F.

App'x

&

Son

Cir.

408,

v.

1984));

411

state

claims

McDuffie

(11th

("[F]ederal district courts in removal cases must

than dismiss,

Wheelabratorv.

Cir.

2016)

remand,

rather

over which they decline

to

exercise

supplemental jurisdiction." (citations omitted)).

IV.

Based upon
concludes
all

of

foregoing

Defendants

Plaintiff's

exercise
state

that

the

federal

supplemental

law

Defendants'

CONCLUSION

claims.

and due

are
law

entitled
claims.

jurisdiction

See

28

U.S.C.

respective motions

32, 34) are GRANTED IN PART.11

consideration,

over
§

to

summary

The

on

declines

to

Plaintiff's

remaining

Accordingly,

for summary judgment

(docs.

29,

The Clerk is directed to REMAND

this case to the State Court of Chatham County.12
654

Court

judgment

Court

1367(c)(3).

the

See McDuffie,

F. App'x at 411.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this _[S_ day of July,
2017.

J.

RANDAL 'HALL,'CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT

^OU^ERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

11 i.e., summary judgment is granted in Defendants' favor on all federal law
claims.

12 Deon Maurice Parker v.

The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, et

al., State Court of Chatham County, Georgia, Civil Action No. STCV16-00637.
20