Crawford v. Place Properties, LP et al
Filing
20
ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss; denying 16 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 1/26/17. (cmr)
IN THE UNITED
FOR THE
STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JACQUELINE CRAWFORD,
*
•
Plaintiff,
*
v,
*
PLACE PROPERTIES, LP, PLACE
MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, and
FORT STEWART LIBERTY, LLC,
doing business as Independence
Place Apartments,
CV
416-146
*
*
*
*
*
Defendants.
*
ORDER
In this case,
Defendants,
because:
Defendants
viewed
Court
in
claims
Court
facts
her
is
to
support
administrative
the
light
most
satisfied that
for relief.
lacks
whether
move
to
dismiss
(1) her claims are time-barred;
sufficient
exhaust
which arises from Plaintiff's employment with
(2) she failed to plead
claims;
remedies.
favorable
Plaintiff
has
and
When
to
complaint
(3)
the
Plaintiff,
timely
she
failed to
complaint
however,
is
the
alleged plausible
And because the record currently before the
sufficient
Plaintiff
her
Plaintiff's
evidence,
exhausted
the
her
Court
is
unable
administrative
to
decide
remedies.
Accordingly,
(doc.
the
Court
DENIES
Defendants'
motion
to
7).
I.
Accepting
the
Factual Background
facts
alleged
in
Plaintiff's
complaint
true and viewing the allegations in the light most
Plaintiff,
as
Martinez,
this
the
480
case
are
1. The
Court
F.3d
as
must,
1043,
see
1057
Am.
(11th
United
Cir.
favorable to
Life
2007),
as
Ins.
the
Co.
v.
facts
of
follows.
Parties
Defendants
3.)
dismiss
own and operate apartment
Defendants
Place
Management
Group,
complexes.
LLC
and
(Compl.
SI
Independence
Place Apartments are subsidiaries of Defendant Place Properties,
LP.
(See
properties
id.
SI
Place
4.)
Place
Management
Properties owns,
manages
many
of
the
including Independence Place.
(Id.)
Under this business
human-resources,
"[h]iring
and
personnel
[are]
Atlanta
training,
firing
payroll,
decisions
Defendants
Management]
share accounting,
and management services,
related
Management]
also made by management who work[]
out of the
officers
[are]
of
also
individual properties,
Place
officers
to
and
[Place
Place Properties office . . . ."
"[s]everal
6.)
structure,
(Id.
Properties
of
the
SI 7. )
and/or
other
including Independence
In fact,
[Place
and/or
Place."
the
(Id.
SI
Furthermore,
Place Properties employs a property manager at
each of its properties.
regional managers,
management.
directly
was
The
president
the
Properties.
Plaintiff
working
to
(Id.
for
Defendants
vice
Mike
of
Place
who
at
Management
of
property
time
the
and
management
this
an
of
officer
suit,
of
Place
She
began
SISl 8, 16.)
is
a
former
until
employee
in
2009
12.)
At
2014,
when
was a property manager.
the
time
as
of
a
Defendants.
She
August
(Id.)
of
(Id.
Place.
terminated.
president
Rouen,
Defendants
Independence
Property managers report to
who answer to the vice president of property
(Id.)
reports
(Id. SI 8.)
her
leasing
consultant
at
employed
by
remained
her
employment
termination,
was
Plaintiff
(Id.)
2. Plaintiff's Employment and Termination
As
noted,
in 2009.
(Id.)
(Id. )
In
cancer,
which
14.)
Anna
Not
after
Plaintiff
Plaintiff's
would
was
diagnosed
with
breast
diagnosis,
regional
not
be
manager,
able
to
Rouen
to
SI
instructed
fire
perform
(Id.
Plaintiff
her
duties
(^d^ I 16.)
summer of
underwent
consultant
she was promoted to property manager.
Plaintiff's
"Plaintiff
In the
2013,
a leasing
required regular chemotherapy treatment.
long
sufficiently."
she
In 2012,
December
Sullivan,
because
Plaintiff began working as
and
2014,
Plaintiff took medical
recovered
from
surgery.
leave while
(Id.
SI
20.)
Plaintiff received eleven weeks of disability leave, which began
July
4,
20.)
2014,
and was
set
to
Following her surgery,
end September
Plaintiff's
19,
doctor
2014.
sent
(Id.
SI
Defendants
a letter explaining that Plaintiff would be cleared to return to
work on September 8, 2014.
With
essentially
separation
notice
(Id. SI 21.)
prior
notice,
late
in
no
July,
which
July to recover from surgery.
return until
marks
Sept [ember]
omitted).)
second
for
notice
separation
in
stated:
Per doctors
2014."
Then,
Plaintiff
(Id.
some
SI
reason,
August
2014
Other
note."
than
(Id.
these
(internal
(internal
that
Defendants
Plaintiff why they fired her.
month
of
quotation
received
provided:
a
"Given
Unable to return per
quotation
reasons,
a
note unable to
Plaintiff
the month of July to recover from surgery.
doctor's
"Given
[sic]
26
received
marks
(Id. SI 28.)
II.
Soon
after
she
was
and retaliation.
(Id.
allegations,
(Id.
fired,
Plaintiff
filed
a
charge
SI
30.)
found
After
Doc.
lawsuit on June 14,
of
investigating Plaintiff's
probable
cause
to
support
and it issued a right-to-sue letter on March 15,
30-31;
to
EEOC alleging disability discrimination
EEOC
claims,
explained
Procedural Background
discrimination with the
the
never
omitted).)
1-1.)
Accordingly,
Plaintiff
filed
her
2016.
this
2016, alleging that Defendants violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA").
Defendants now move to
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.
Ill.
"To
survive
relief
a
motion
factual
sufficient
to
Legal Standard
matter,
that
is
to
dismiss,
accepted
plausible
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009)
550
U.S.
544,
570
on
(2007)).
two-part
the
test.
See
plaintiff
rather
whether
relief.
than
has
mere
those
id.
at
679.
facts
to
face.'"
Bell
First,
specific
Atl.
plausibly
Corp.
Iqbal,
Twombly,
asks
Second,
rise
to
claim
requires
supporting
give
a
v.
v.
Court
Id.
contain
^state
standard
the
facts
must
Ashcroft
this
conclusions.
might
complaint
true,
Applying
stated
legal
as
its
(quoting
a
whether
a
claim
it
a
a
asks
right
to
Id^ at 680.
The first prong of the inquiry requires that the plaintiff
plead
"factual
reasonable
content
inference
misconduct alleged."
must
accept
complaint,"
as
it
"true
need
that
that
the
Iqbal,
all
not
allows
the
defendant
556 U.S.
of
court
the
"accept
couched as a factual allegation."
is
at 678.
allegations
as
true
Id.
a
to
draw
for
liable
the
the
While the Court
contained
legal
in
a
conclusion
Generalized conclusions
and "bare allegations" will not allow the plaintiff to "unlock
the
doors
of
discovery."
See
id.
The
plaintiff
must
specific facts that "show" the defendant's misconduct.
679.
assert
Id.
at
Once
the
from mere
and
Court
separates
legal conclusions,
"determine
entitlement
to
states
whether
[is]
a
specific
factual
it must accept those
they
relief."
a
the
Id.
plausibly
allegations
facts
give
rise
"Determining whether
plausible
claim
context-specific task that
a
as
to
relief
the
reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
Well-pleaded facts
misconduct;
misconduct
allege
they
was
facts
an
complaint
for
requires
true
Id.
cannot be merely consistent with the alleged
must
allow
plausible.
that
push
the
Id.
the
conceivable to plausible."
Court
at
to
678.
claim
infer
"across
Id. at 683
such
complaint
The
that
must
the
line
from
(internal quotation marks
omitted) .
Finally,
while
a
"allege
'contain
the
recovery under
some
Inc.
v.
Stephens,
material
viable
Inc.,
elements
inferential
necessary
legal theory.'"
500
F.3d
allege
a
complaint
or
or
to
each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a
direct
element
have
precision'
either
every
not
fact'
all
cover
does
'specific
respecting
to
plaintiff
1276,
allegations
to
Fin.
1282-83
'with
sustain
a
Sec. Assur.,
(11th
Cir.
2007)(quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d
678,
683
(11th Cir.
2001)).
IV.
Defendants
reasons.
move
First,
barred.
they
Second,
allege
that
Defendants
Plaintiff
for
to
Place
Management
failed
to
and
exhaust
her
1. P l a i n t i f f ' s
See Bryant v.
2011)
("Under
the
covered
and
the
Place
by
Place
that
ADA.
claims
the
are
ADA.
Management
show
And
Properties
administrative
a
four
time-
that
Third,
argue
they
finally,
argue
that
employed
Defendants
that
Plaintiff
remedies.
plaintiff must
receives
U.S.
Plaintiff's
for
Plaintiff failed to adequately
facts
of
complaint
claims are not time-barred.
ADA,
she
are
plead
purposes
the
Plaintiff's
that
Properties
failed
after
argue
Defendants
Plaintiff
days
dismiss
they argue that
Place
Under
to
Discussion
a
right-to-sue
Steel Corp.,
ADA,
a
bring
suit
letter
from
428 F. App'x 895,
plaintiff
must
within
comply
ninety
the
897
EEOC.
(11th Cir.
with
the
same
procedural requirements to sue that exist under Title VII."); 42
U.S.C.
§
2000e-5(f) (1) .
Defendants
because
she
did
contend
not
that
file
Plaintiff's
suit
until
received her right-to-sue letter.1
1
Defendants
also
contend
that
claims
ninety-one
are
time-barred
days
after
she
Specifically, they argue that
the
right-to-sue
letter
attached
to
Plaintiff's complaint is invalid.
Specifically, they argue that the EEOC had
already issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter when it issued the one
Plaintiff now relies on,
and that it did not have the authority revoke the
prior letter and issue a new one.
To support this argument, Defendants rely
on a number of documents other than the complaint.
Because the Court
declines to convert Defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment, it will not address the merits of this argument.
7
she pleaded in her complaint that she received her right-to-sue
letter on March 15, 2016.
Accordingly,
they argue,
she had to
file suit by June 13, 2016, which she failed to do.
Plaintiff does,
"received
(Compl.
her
SI
32.)
Plaintiff's
a
complaint.
the
Notice
But
of
this
about
a
v. City of Miami,
Although
end
the
which
Plaintiff
letter provides
1985)
in
she
2016."
because
attached
them
to
the
exhibits
are
as
part
of
the
LLP,
678
And "if the allegations of
exhibit
1277
that
a
inquiry
When
conflict
(11th Cir.
her
letter on March
(affirming
15,
Ratterree & Adams,
it was
See Robinson v. City of Fairfield,
Cir.
that
with
the exhibit controls."
alleges
right-to-sue
March
is
treats
2012).
811 F.3d 1271,
right-to-sue
(11th
not
particular
received her
date.
on
Court
contents of the exhibit itself,
complaint
sue
Painter,
(11th Cir.
her
statement.
the
Reese v. Ellis,
complaint
does
in
to
letter,
complaint,
1215-16
allege
Right
that
contradicts
to
F.3d 1211,
fact,
right-to-sue
complaint,
attached
[]
in
district
Hoefling
2016).
complaint
15,
the
2016,
that
the
actual
simply mailed on
750 F.2d 1507,
court's
finding
she
that
1510-11
that
a
plaintiff did not receive a right-to-sue letter on the same day
it was mailed,
because
even though he stated in a filing that
"[e]ven the most
expeditious method of
he did,
delivery by our
postal service . . . would not have" delivered the letter before
the day after it was sent) .
Thus, when the allegations in the
8
complaint
are
viewed in
the
light most
favorable
to
Plaintiff,
the Court is unconvinced that her claims are untimely — at least
at this stage of the litigation.
Defendants'
motion on this
Accordingly,
the Court DENIES
issue.
2 . Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendants are
covered by the ADA.
Defendants
contend
that
Plaintiff
Defendants are covered by the ADA.2
failed
to
are
covered
§ 12111(5) (A).
by
the
[ADA] ."
According
to
that
In her complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that "Defendants employ more than fifteen
and
plead
1
(Compl.
Defendants,
9);
this
(15)
see
employees
42
U.S.C.
statement
is
too
conclusory to satisfy the pleading requirements of Bell Atlantic
Corporation
Iqbal,
556
v.
Twombly,
U.S.
662
Plaintiff has met
Cove
Marina
4751578,
plaintiff
under
at
VII,
(2009).
Assoc,
(M.D.
adequately
Title
U.S.
544
the
But
(2007),
Court
the pleading standard.
Condo.
*3-4
550
No.
Fla.
pleaded
even
though
and
is
Cf.
Ashcroft
satisfied
Booher v.
8:14-cv-3158-T-36EAJ,
Aug.
that
she
11,
a
2015)
defendant
did
not
was
that
Turtle
2015
(finding
an
v.
that
WL
a
employer
specifically
allege
that the defendant was an employer,
because she alleged that she
"was
(citation omitted)
employed with"
the
defendant
(emphasis
2 In the portion of their brief that addresses this issue, Defendants
refer only to Independence Place.
Presumably, this is because they believe
the claims against Place Management and Place Properties should fail for
other
reasons.
But
because
the
claims
against
all
Defendants
will
forward, the Court refers to all Defendants when discussing this issue.
go
in
original)).
this
Thus,
the
Court
DENIES
Defendants'
Place Management
failed
to
sufficiently
term
^employer'
1289,
1297
how much
plead
Peppers
2016).
In
whether
the
alleged
modify
employment."
Defendants
Id.
contend
"one
otherwise
the
terms
In
the
applies
employer while
independent
employer
and
employed
have
v.
exerted
had
to
this
case
contracting
company,
the
the
—
sufficient control of the terms and conditions
In her complaint,
F.3d
"(1)
hire,
employee's
—
which
consider
faith with an
for
itself
of employment of
the employees who are employed by the other employer."
Riviera Beach Assocs.,
to
courts
retained
the
employee,
context
in good
has
835
power
of
joint-employer
In
consider
on
the
conditions
her.
Cty.,
courts
and
Plaintiff
interpreted
Cobb
general,
alleged employer
Management
argue that
they
"courts
the
or
whether
cases,
liberally."
(11th Cir.
that
control
(2)
Place
and Place Properties
employment-discrimination
fire,
on
issue.
3. Plaintiff adequately pleaded that
Place Properties are her employers.
and
motion
Virgo v.
30 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Place Management
and Independence Place are "under the control of their parent
corporation,
accounting,
Place Properties";
human-resources,
that Place Properties provides
training,
payroll,
and management
services to properties managed by Place Management; that Place
10
Properties
makes
Management;
and
SISI
4,
8.)
Court
is
hiring
that
While
and
Place
firing
Properties
decisions
paid
her
for
salary.
Place
(Compl.
these allegations may prove to be untrue,
unconvinced
that
Plaintiff's
claims
against
the
Place
Properties and Place Management should fail at this stage of the
litigation.
this
Accordingly,
the Court DENIES Defendants'
motion on
Court
not
Plaintiff
issue.
4. The
will
yet
address
whether
exhausted her administrative remedies.
Place
Management
Plaintiff's
them
in
party
claims
her
not
subsequent
however,
EEOC
in
Place
them
It
the
is
this
sued.
30
cannot
F.3d
argue
she
that,
charge
at
requirement,
[law] are fulfilled,
charge" may still be
because
true
Virgo,
construe
Properties
fail
EEOC
action."
liberally
purposes of the
against
charge.
named
civil
and
did
that
not
" [o] rdinarily,
be
sued
1358.
and
in
the
similarity
"[w]here
Courts
interest
between
the
named
(3) whether the unnamed parties received adequate
notice of the charges;
(4)
whether the unnamed
parties had an adequate opportunity to participate
in the reconciliation process; and (5) whether the
unnamed
party
actually
was
prejudiced
by
its
exclusion from the EEOC proceedings.
at
1359.
11
the
look to a
party
and
the
unnamed party;
(2)
whether
the
plaintiff could have ascertained the identity of the
unnamed party at the time the EEOC charge was filed;
Id.
a
a party unnamed in the EEOC
Id. at 1358-59.
of
a
Courts,
number of factors when making this decision:
(1)
name
And
exhaust
when
faced
with
administrative
a
remedies,
the plaintiff's
complaint.
1376
2008).
(11th Cir.
motion
to
dismiss
for
a court may often
See
Bryant
v.
Rich,
it may do
But
so
only
if
Here,
to
a
develop
little
factual
evidence
therefore,
the parties
on
have
record
this
on
issue
DENIES Defendants'
the
reasons
motion
Defendants'
motion to strike
January,
ENTERED
Id.
the
(footnote
opportunity
Indeed,
Court.
there
The
is
Court,
Conclusion
dismiss
at
before
explained
Defendants'
ORDER
to
issue.
1368,
"the parties
had an ample
this
F.3d
motion on this issue.
V.
For
not
to
look beyond
530
have sufficient opportunity to develop a record."
omitted).
failure
above,
(doc.
(doc.
Augusta,
7) .
the
The
Court
Court
DENIES
also DENIES
16).
Georgia
this
^Pffik- day
of
2017.
HONOfRTfeCE \T.
UNITED
STATES
SOUTHERN
12
RAtsTDAL HALL
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
JUDGE
OF GEORGIA
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