Hampton v. Latimore

Filing 10

ORDER grants leave to file an amended 1 Complaint filed by James Angelo Hampton. ( Amended complaint due by 11/4/2016.) Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 10/4/16. (wwp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JAMES ANGELO HAMPTON,

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Plaintiff,

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C/O R. Latimore

Case No. CV416-210

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Defendant.

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ORDER
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, plaintiff James Hampton
brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against a correctional officer at
Chatham County Jail. Liberally construing' his allegations, plaintiff
pleads Eighth Amendment violations. Doc. 1. The Court screens his
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 2

1

See Gilbert v. Daniels, 624 F. App'x 716, 717 (11th Cir. 2015) ("We liberally
construe the pleadings of pro se parties. . . .") (citing Campbell v, Air Jamaica Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014)).
2

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires federal courts to conduct an
early screening in all civil cases of any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a government entity or official. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The purpose of the
early screening is to "identify cognizable claims" in the prisoner's complaint and to
dismiss any claims that: (1) are frivolous; (2) are malicious; (3) fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted; or (4) seek monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief. Id. Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2) allows the Court,

I.

BACKGROUND
Hampton's Complaint is short on factual allegations. He writes

that
My hands where in restraints behind my back and my legs
where in restraints. The officer struck me with a pare of leg
restraints and a mop for nothing. This happend 07/11/2016
between 11:00 a.m., and 01:00 p.m. It's now 07/20/2016 and
they will not take me to medical. The officer['s] name is R.
Latimore.
Doc. 1 at 5 (unedited and reproduced in its entirety).
II.

ANALYSIS
A. Administrative Exhaustion
As a preliminary matter, dismissal for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is not proper at this stage. Under the PLRA
exhaustion provision, a prisoner must exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing an action that challenges the
conditions of his confinement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a
under the same four standards for dismissal listed in § 1915A, to dismiss any prisoner
suit brought "with respect to prison conditions." Therefore, the Court examines
plaintiff's Complaint to determine whether he has stated a claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Because the Court applies Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards in screening a
complaint pursuant to § 1915A, Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79
(11th Cir. 2001), allegations in the Complaint are taken as true and construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bumpus v, Watts, 448 F. App'x 3, 4 n.1 (11th Cir.
2011). Conclusory allegations, however, fail. Ashcroft v. Iqbai, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).

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"pre-condition to suit" that must be enforced even if the available
administrative remedies are either "futile or inadequate."

Harris v.

Gamer, 190 F.3d 1279 1 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 199-200 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion is
mandatory under the PLRA").
Plaintiff's allegations are, at least on preliminary review, sufficient
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. He says that he filed a grievance
and spoke with investigative officers, but his grievance had not yet been
resolved by the time of filing. Doc. 1 at 3-4. It is unclear whether he has

fully exhausted his administrative remedies in that he claims both that
he appealed an adverse decision and that the grievance is still being
investigated. Id. At this stage of the proceedings, however, dismissal for
failure to exhaust would be improper. See Cole v. Secretary, Department

of Corrections, 451 Fed. Appx. 827, 828 (11th Cir. 2011) ("The exhaustion
requirement is an affirmative defense, and a prisoner is not required to
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint") (citing Jones, 549
U.S. at 216). If, however, defendant later moves to dismiss and puts
forward proof showing that plaintiff failed to exhaust and defendant did
not inhibit his efforts to do so, the PLRA requires the Court to dismiss

3

his claims.'

See Turner v. Burnside, 542 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.

2008); Harris, 190 F.3d at 1285-86.
B. Eighth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff (though barely) has pled facts sufficient to state a claim for
use of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
governs the amount of force that prison officials are entitled to use
against inmates. See Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir.
1999). A prisoner must prove both that the prison official's conduct was
objectively "sufficiently serious," Farmer i'. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994), and that the force was used "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm" rather than "a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (the use of force does

Not only does the PLRA require exhaustion, it "requires proper exhaustion,"
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), which means an inmate must "us[e] all
steps" in the administrative process, and comply with any administrative "deadlines
and other critical procedural rules," before filing a complaint about prison conditions
in federal court. Id. at 89-91 (citation omitted); see also Lambert v. United States,
198 Fed. Appx. 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2006) (proper exhaustion requires filing a
grievance "under the terms of and according to the time set by" prison officials). If a
prisoner fails to complete the administrative process or falls short of compliance with
procedural rules governing prisoner grievances, he procedurally defaults his claims.
Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005).

not violate the Constitution if it is applied "in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline"). 5
Plaintiff states a plausible claim that Latimore used excessive force
against him on the date of the incident. He alleges that, for no reason,
defendant struck him with leg restraints and a mop while he was
immobilized. And, he claims that he sustained some type of injury
which, though unspecified, required medical attention. Taking these
allegations as true, plaintiff posed no threat to the officer and thus there
was simply no need for the application of injury-inducing force. This
claim survives frivolity review.'
Hampton, however, fails to state a claim for denial of medical care
against Latimore. A prison official's deliberate indifference "to an
inmate's serious medical needs violates the inmate's right to be free from
To determine whether the force was used for the "malicious and sadistic purpose
of causing harm" or was applied in good faith, courts consider "the need for the
application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used,
the extent of injury that the inmate suffered, the threat reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful
response." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Fennell v. Giistrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir.
2009); Skelly v. Okaloosa Gty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 456 F. App'x 845, 848 (11th Cir.
2012).
6

If Hampton elects to amend his complaint (as this Order allows him to do with
respect to his medical claim), he must reassert his allegation of excessive force in the
amended complaint. He may simply re-write his current excessive-force claim,
though in any amended complaint he should specify the type of harm he sustained as
a result of being struck (i.e., the nature of physical injury or pain he endured).

5

cruel and unusual punishment." Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033
(11th Cir. 1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 972 104 (1976). See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 832-33 (although prison conditions may be restrictive and
harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and personal safety).
At best, Hampton alleges that he has not been taken to see a
medical professional since the incident. But he fails to allege that he had
or has any "serious medical need 117 warranting such action, much less
that defendant was "deliberately indifferent" to his serious medical need.
Plaintiff's mere desire to see a doctor -- without more -- is simply not
enough to demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred.
C. Leave to Amend
As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Nevertheless, the

A "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1243 (11th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Hutchinson v. N.Y. State Corr. Officers, 2003 WL
22056997 at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003) (a "condition of urgency, one that might
produce death, degeneration or extreme pain"). Only "those deprivations denying
the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the
basis of an Eighth Amendment violation."
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. "Mere
'malpractice' allegations do not suffice." Jackson v. Franks, 2012 WL 6626020 at * 1
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2012).

Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that a pro se prisoner should be
given an opportunity to amend his complaint at least once.

See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Boyd, 568 Fed. App'x 719, 724 (11th Cir. 2014); Duff v. Steub,
378 F. App'x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010). Hampton therefore gets another
crack at drafting a Complaint. 8
III. CONCLUSION
Because he adequately alleged excessive force used in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, the Court greenlights this claim. His claim for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs, however, must be re-pled.
Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiff leave to file an Amended
Complaint within 30 days of the day this Order is served or face a
recommendation of dismissal. The Amended Complaint must contain
facts establishing each claim against Officer Latirnore.
Hampton is advised that his amended complaint will supersede the
original complaint and therefore must be complete in itself.' Once he

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Hampton must include a coherent "short and plain statement of the claim
showing" that he is entitled to the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That means
he must present the Court with the factual allegations that support his constitutional
claims. See Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (complaints must
contain factual allegations "sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level"). Mere conclusions that defendant violated the law are not enough. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbai, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
See Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp, 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n. 1 (11th Cir.

7

files an amended complaint, the original pleading will no longer serve
any function in the case.
SO ORDERED, this 4th day of October, 2016.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

1999) ("An amended complaint supersedes an original complaint"); Varnes v. Local
91, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n. 6 (11th Cir.
1982) ("As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original
complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier
pleading").
ru