Earnest et al v. Great West Casualty Company et al

Filing 73

ORDER granting 6 Motion to Remand. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 9/29/17. (jlm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

MARK EARNEST, as heir at law
of Jerry Wayne Earnest,
deceased, and as Co-

U. S. DISTRICT COURT
Southern District of GA
Filed In Office

Administrator of the Estate

M

of Jerry Wayne Earnest, and

20

JEFF EARNEST, as heir at law
of Jerry Wayne Earnest,
deceased, and as Co-

Deputy Clerk

Administrator of the Estate

of Jerry Wayne Earnest,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. CV416-278

V,

GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY;
GEORGIA FREIGHTWAYS

CORPORATION; CMA-CGM

(AMERICA), LLC; SOUTH
ATLANTIC CONSOLIDATED CHASSIS
POOL LLC; CONSOLIDATED
CHASSIS MANAGEMENT LLC;

INTERPOOL, INC., d/b/a Trac
Intermodal; DIRECT

CHASSISLINK, INC.; and DAVID
J. GIBBONS;

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Mark Earnest and Jeff
Earnest's Motion to Remand. (Doc. 6.) For the reasons that

follow. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART and this case
is REMANDED to the State Court of Chatham County, Georgia.
Because

this

case

is

remanded

to

the

State

Court,

all

pending motions (Doc. 39; Doc. 47) are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
BACKGROUND

This

case

involves

the

tragic

death

of

Jerry

Wayne

Earnest in a horrible vehicle accident caused by a tractor

trailer colliding with stopped traffic along Interstate-15
at the interchange with Interstate-95. (Doc. 6 at 2.) The
tractor trailer was being driven by Defendant Gibbons, whom

was employed by Defendant Georgia Freightways Corporation.
(Doc. 1 at 90-91.) Defendant Great West Casualty Company

provided

insurance

coverage

for

Defendant

Georgia

Freightways. (Id. at 90.) The remaining defendants all had
some connection to the shipping container. (Id. at 91-96.)

In

the

complaint.

Plaintiffs

allege

that

Defendant

Gibbons negligently operated the tractor trailer, which
resulted

in

the

collision,

and

that

Defendant

Georgia

Freightways is responsible as Defendant Gibbons's employer.
(Id. at 90-91.) Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants Direct
Chassislink, Inc., South Atlantic Consolidated Chassis Pool
LLC,

and

Interpool,

Inc.

are

liable

because

Defendant

Gibbons qualifies as their statutory employee by operation
of several federal regulations setting forth requirements

for intermodal equipment providers. (Id. at 91.) Finally,
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant CMA-CGM (AMERICA), LLC is

vicariously liable "as an ocean coitimon carrier by virtue of
46 use § 40102(6)(A)
Defendants

(1^ at 94.)

removed this case from the

Chatham County on the

grounds that the

State

Court of

complaint raised

substantial questions of federal law, specifically whether
Defendants violated the Shipping Act of 1984 or the Federal

Motor

Carrier

Sli 9-10.)

Safety Administration

Defendants

reason

that

Regulations.
because

(Doc.

resolution

1
of

Plaintiffs' negligence claims will require interpretation
of

federal

empowered

statutes

to

and

adjudicate

regulations,

Plaintiffs'

this

claims

Court

under

is

its

federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In his
Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs argue that the Shipping Act,
Motor Carrier Act, and associated regulations do not create

independent federal causes of action. (Doc. 6 at 3-5.)
According to Plaintiffs, reference to these federal sources

does not operate to turn his basic state-law negligence
claim

into

a

substantial

federal

question

sufficient

to

trigger this Court's jurisdiction. (Id.)
ANALYSIS

I.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

In

this

case.

Plaintiffs

filed

a

Supplemental

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand. (Doc. 31.) In

that filing. Plaintiffs argue that this Court is bound by a

previous ruling remanding a related case. (Id. at 2.) That
case

is

one

defendants.

around

the

of

six

Those

same

that

cases

time,

involves

were

and

all

also

the

same

filed

removed

in

to

facts

state

federal

and

court

court

around the same time. The Clerk of Court assigned five of

those cases to this Court, while one case was assigned to

Judge Wood. Ultimately, Judge Wood granted the plaintiff's
motion

to

remand

(CV416-276,

Doc.

and

28.)

remanded

that

Plaintiffs

case

argue

to

state

that

court.

collateral

estoppel applies to preclude any different outcome in any
of the related cases, including this one. (Doc. 31 at 2.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs "respectfully urge[s] that the Court
enter an order consistent with Judge Wood's order." (Id.)

After

being

directed

to

file

a

response.

Defendants

responded in opposition to Plaintiffs' request. (Doc. 64.)
After

careful

consideration,

the

Court

easily

concludes that collateral estoppel is inappropriate in this
case. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that

[b]oth issue preclusion and claim preclusion
operate across a two—lawsuit continuum. First,
parties litigate a dispute to a final judgment on
the merits. Second, in a later, separate suit
between the parties, one party brings to court
evidence of an earlier judgment and contends that
issue or claim preclusion should apply to prevent

her opponent from litigating a previously decided
issue or cause of action.

Graham

v.

R.J.

(11th

Cir.

Reynolds

2017).

litigation,

but

a

Tobacco Co., 857

Judge

Wood's

F.3d

was

case

contemporaneously filed

1169, 1214

not

case.

prior

In

other

words, the case pending before this Court is not "a later,

separate

suit

between

the

parties".

Id.

Accordingly,

collateral estoppel does not operate to bar the Court from

considering

the

merits

of

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Remand

because no prior decision existed at the time Plaintiffs
filed this case.
II.

MOTION TO REMAND

A defendant who removes a case to federal court bears

the

burden

of

proving

the

propriety

of

federal

jurisdiction. Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552
F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Leonard v. Enter.

Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002)). If a
district

court

has

reservations

as

to

the

existence

of

federal jurisdiction, that doubt must be resolved in favor
of remanding the case to state court. Id. (citing Diaz v.
Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Congress

has

conferred

to

federal

district

courts

original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28

U.S.C.

§ 1331.

The

most

obvious

example

of

a

case

arising under federal law is where a plaintiff pleads a

cause of action that is created by federal law. See Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson^
also

Grable

&

Mfq.,

545

U.S.

claim

need

Sons

not

Metal

Prods.,

Inc.

312

(2005).

However,

308,
be

district

alleging

a

created

court's

478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986); see
Darue

a

by federal law

to

jurisdiction.

claim

may

still

Enq^g

&

plaintiff's

A

original

state-law

v.

invoice

the

complaint

invoke

federal

jurisdiction if "a well-pleaded complaint establishes . . .
that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution

of

a

substantial

question

of

federal

law."

Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.

677,

690 (2006)

(quoting

Franchise

Tax

Bd.

of

Cal.

v.

Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,

27-28

(1983)).

While

not

an

automatic

grant

of

jurisdiction, a state-law claim may fall under the original
jurisdiction of federal district courts if the court must

interpret an important federal law when deciding whether a
plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id.

The Supreme Court has crafted a two-part test for
determining

whether

interpretation

of

a

a

state-law

federal

claim

law

that

requires

triggers

federal

jurisdiction. First, the state—law claim must require the
resolution

of

a

substantial

and

disputed

question

of

federal law. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314; Adventure Outdoors,

552 F.3d at 1295. Second, a district court must not upset

"any congressionally approved balance of federal and state

judicial

responsibilities"

in

adjudicating

the

dispute.

Grable, 545 U.S. at 314; Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at

1295.

The

Supreme

Court

has

noted

that

it

is

a

slim

category of cases that will meet this test. Empire, 547
U.S. at 701.

In determining whether a claim requires the resolution
of a substantial and disputed question of federal law, the

Supreme Court has looked to whether interpretation of the
federal

issue

state-law

would

claim.

Id.

resolve
In

an

essential

fact,

the

element

of

interpretation

the

of

a

federal statute in Grable was the "only legal or factual

issue contested in the case." Id. Also, a federal question

is substantial and important where "its resolution is both

dispositive
numerous

of

the

other

case

cases."

and

would

Empire,

547

be

controlling

U.S.

at

700.

in
In

addition, the Supreme Court has looked to the interest of
the

federal

government

in

a

proper

and

consistent

interpretation of the federal issue. Grable, 545 U.S. at
315.

To assess whether asserting jurisdiction would upset

the

balance

of

federal

and

state

responsibilities,

the

Supreme Court has considered the frequency that state—law

issues

find

will

be

decided

jurisdiction.

warranted

if

it

in

Id.

would

federal

Federal
result

court

should

the

jurisdiction

in

traditional

court

is

not

state-law

issues being routinely litigated in federal courts. Also,

the Supreme Court has looked at whether a state court is
competent to interpret and apply any relevant federal law
when adjudicating a traditionally state-law claim. Empire,
547 U.S. at 701.

Both

Grable

and

Empire

illuminate

the

distinctions

between substantial and unsubstantial federal questions. In

Grable, the plaintiff initiated an action to quiet title to
real property purchased by the defendant at an IRS tax

delinquency

sale.

545

U.S.

at

310-11.

The

IRS

served

plaintiff with notice, via certified mail, that it was
seizing his property.

at 311. The plaintiff filed the

quiet—title action in state court, arguing that the sale
was ineffective

§ 6335(a),

because the

required

that

governing statute, 26 U.S.C.

he

be

personally

served

with

notice. Id. Defendant removed the case to federal court,

asserting
because

that

federal

resolution

of

question
the

case

jurisdiction
depended

existed
on

the

interpretation of the federal statute. Id.

After crafting the two—part test, the Supreme Court
held

that the

district court properly exercised federal

jurisdiction. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he meaning of
the federal tax provision is an important issue of federal
law that sensibly belongs in a federal court." Id. at 315.
In addition, the Court observed that the federal government

has a strong interest in preserving its ability to collect

delinquent taxes by seizing and selling real property. Id.

Also, the plaintiff's right to relief turned on only the
resolution of a singular legal issue—the interpretation of
the federal statute. Id. The interpretation of the federal

question was not a fact-bound determination, and "was both

dispositive

of

the

case

and

would

be

controlling

in

numerous other cases." Empire, 547 U.S. at 700 (discussing
Grable).

In Empire, the plaintiff was an insurance carrier that

managed a health plan for federal employees, making it
subject

to

the

Federal

Employees

Health

Benefits

Act

("FEHBA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914. 547 U.S. at 683. The
defendant, an insured under the health plan, negotiated a

settlement with the parties responsible for his injuries
after he received payment from the insurer under the plan's
terms. Id. The insurer filed suit in federal court seeking
reimbursement for medical care provided under the terms of

the

plan. The

defendant argued that the federal court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the cause of

action

was

for

breach

of

contract—a

state-law

claim.

The

plaintiff asserted that federal question jurisdiction was
proper

because

a

determination

of

plaintiff's

right

to

relief depended on an interpretation of the FEHBA, which
required the application of federal common law.
In Empire, the Supreme Court applied the Grable test

and found that federal question jurisdiction did not exist.
The Court observed that the controversy in Empire concerned

a

settlement

agreement

between

private

parties,

not

an

action by a government agency. Id. at 700. Also, the Court
noted

that resolution

of the federal question

in

Empire

would be "fact-bound and situation-specific," rather than

the pure issue of law presented in Grable. Empire, 547 U.S.
at 700. Therefore, resolution of the federal question in

Empire would not have the same conclusory effect on other
similar cases.

Id. In addition, the Court was concerned

that exercising federal jurisdiction in Empire may upset
the delicate federal-state

balance envisioned by Congress

by moving personal injury claims, typically litigated in
state courts, to federal courts. Id.

While this case lies somewhere in between Grable and

Empire, the factors outlined by the Supreme Court place it
far closer to Empire. An analysis of the factors as they
relate

to

this

case

indicate
10

that

Plaintiffs'

right

to

relief

does

not "necessarily depend[] on

resolution

of

a

substantial question of federal law." Empire, 547 U.S. at

690. A simple interpretation of whether Defendants violated
a

federal

issue

in

statute
this

assessing
resolution

or

case,

but only

Plaintiffs'
of these

regulation
one

negligence

claims

is

not

the

dispositive

analytical step toward

based

involves

claims.

Ultimate

substantial issues

of

state law, a task best left to state courts. This is far

from

the

singular

dispositive

issue

of

federal

law

presented in Grable, where the federal issue was "the only
legal or factual issue contested in the case." 545 U.S. at
315.

Also, it is unlikely that this Court's interpretation
of the relevant statutes and regulations would be either

dispositive in this case or controlling in many others.
Unlike Grable, this Court would be required to make several
determinations

based

on

facts

unique

to

this

case.

For

example. Plaintiffs' theories of negligence also rely on a
multitude of state laws. As a result, any decision by the

Court with respect to the federal statutes and regulations

may

ultimately

play

little

part

in

determining

the

negligence of any single Defendant. Therefore, this Court's
resolution

of

the

controversy

11

presently

before

it

is

unlikely to be controlling in other cases because of the
factually sensitive nature of the inquiry.

Finally, while the Federal Government does have some
interest

in

the

outcome

of

this

case,

the

Government's

interest here is significantly less that its interest in
Grable. In this case, the dispute is exclusively between

private

parties

and

chiefly

concerns

the

negligence

of

numerous parties based on a variety of theories. Again,
this stands in stark contrast to Grable, where the dispute

"centered on the action of a federal agency (IRS) and its

compatibility with a federal statute." Adventure Outdoors,
552 F.3d at 1296.

This case also fails the second prong of the Grable

test because allowing Defendants to remove this case to

federal

court

would

upset

the "congressionally

approved

balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."

545 U.S. at 315. The Supreme Court has been explicit in

addressing

the

responsibilities

balance

of

federal

relating to

and

negligence

state

judicial

claims invoking

federal law:

[A] complaint alleging a violation of a federal
statute as an element of a state cause of action,

when Congress has determined that there should be
no private, federal cause of action for the
violation, does not state a claim "arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."

12

Merrell,

478

§ 1331)).

U.S.

804,

Allowing

817

(1986)

Defendants

(quoting

to

28

remove

U.S.C.

Plaintiffs'

straightforward negligence claims to federal court based on

a

possibility

federal

law

that

would

their

disturb

resolution
the

balance

might

touch

articulated

upon

by the

Supreme Court by allowing a broad category of traditionally
state-law

claims

to

be

brought

in

a

federal forum.

See

Empire, 547 U.S. at 700 (expressing concern that permitting

personal injury claims to be removed would upset delicate
federal-state balance envisioned by Congress).

For

all

reservations

of

these

about

its

reasons,

power

to

this

Court

has

adjudicate

serious

Plaintiffs'

claims. Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden

of establishing federal jurisdiction, this Court must grant
Plaintiff s Motion to Remand and return this case to the

State Court of Chatham County, Georgia.^
CONCLUSION

After

careful

consideration.

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Remand to State Court (Doc. 6) is GRANTED and this case is
REMANDED to the State Court of Chatham County, Georgia.
Because

this

case

is

remanded to the

State

Court, all

^ Plaintiff withdrew the request for attorney's fees
included in their Motion to Remand. (Doc. 69.) Therefore,
the Court will not discuss Plaintiff's entitlement to fees
in this case.
13

pending motions (Doc. 39; Doc. 47) are DISMISSED AS MOOT,
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED this ^ /— day of September 2017.

WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN

14

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA