The Ford Plantation Club, Inc. et al v. Scott et al

Filing 24

ORDER denying 17 Motion to Compel; granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 5/10/17. (jlm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
THE FORD PLANTATION CLUB, )
INC. and THE FORD PLANTATION )
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
)
)

Plaintiffs,
)

V.

MICHAEL & NANCY SCOTT,

CV416-309

)
)

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiffs The Ford Plantation Club, Inc., and The Ford Plantation
Association, Inc., a golf club community and homeowners' association,
sued defendants Michael and Nancy Scott for assessments and club
dues owed (and unpaid) on their Ford Plantation Club property.
doe. 1-1 (Complaint) at

IT

See

7-9, 11-14, 20-22. Defendants

counterclaimed that they were fraudulently induced into buying their
property and that plaintiffs have breached the various governing
documents/agreements for dues and assessments, and seek a
declaratory judgment that those governing documents are invalid.

See

doe. 13 (Amended Answer and Counterclaim). The Scotts propounded
Interrogatories and Requests for Production on plaintiffs, seeking

information "reasonably calculated" to prove their allegations that
plaintiffs have trapped them in a bad contract, rendered their property
worthless, and won't allow them to forfeit the property in payment of
the clues and assessments because they "prefer to simply keep assessing
the costs against" them. Doc. 17 at 2. Plaintiffs refused, contending
that the discovery sought amounts to a mere fishing expedition, and
oppose defendants' instant motion to compel the production of both
interrogatory responses and documents. Doe. 19.
Despite defendants' moving to compel responses, the Court is
unable to determine precisely which interrogatories and document
requests are the subject of dispute: defendants don't specify anywhere
in their three-page motion. See doe. 17 at 1-3 (arguing that "Plaintiffs
have failed and refused to answer Defendants' Interrogatories and to
provide the information sought in the Request for Production of
Documents" but not listing any specific numbers or reasons the
responses were inadequate); see also doe. 21 at 1-3 (explaining that they
have objected to "all of the Plaintiffs' responses because there is no
information provided by the Plaintiff in response to a single
Interrogatory or Request for Production," despite that there are several
2

responses and multiple notes indicating that exhibits were indeed
attached to those responses). On that basis alone, the Court could
procedurally reject defendants' motion and make them try again.
See S. D. Ga. L. R. 26.5(a)-(c). 1
Diving into the correspondence between counsel, however, it
appears that defendants are unsatisfied with 8 out of 13 of the Club's
responses to interrogatories (largely seeking personal identifying
information for individuals not related to this case) and 13 out 32 of
both plaintiffs' responses to document requests (largely seeking copies
of various records and communications between plaintiffs and
individuals not related to this case). See does. 17-8 & 19-1. Plaintiffs
objected to these requests on multiple grounds, and partially answered
several by construing them more narrowly.

See, e.g., doe. 17-5. And

1

LR 26.5 Discovery Motions and Objections. Discovery motions in accordance with
Rules 26, 33, 34, 36, and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and objections
relating to discovery shall:
(a) quote verbatim each interrogatory, request for admission, or request for
production to which a motion or objection is taken;
(b) include the specific ground for the motion or objection; and
(c) include the reasons assigned as supporting the motion, which shall be
written in immediate succession to one another. Such objections and grounds
shall be addressed to the specific interrogatory, request for admission, or
request for production and may not be made generally.
3

defendants were clearly unsatisfied by their responses, given the
exchange of calls and meet-and-confer letters saying so (without any
specifics about why the responses were insufficient) and filing of a
motion to compel further responses (with nary an argument or citation
to a single authority in support of the insufficiency, of course).

See

doc. 17. Once more, defendants fail to provide any specificity regarding
their arguments or objections, apparently assuming that the Court will
sniff them out like pigs do truffles. See, again, S.D. Ga. L. R. 26.5.
But, muddling through the exhibits to cobble together their
arguments (as they must exist), it appears that the Scotts believe that
(1) while much of the information sought is publicly available, plaintiffs
must have it archived in some way so that production would be more
cost-effective for plaintiffs to bear; and (2) plaintiffs' refusal to provide
personal identifying information of unrelated individuals is bad faith,
since that identifying information can support defendants' counterclaim
of an overarching conspiracy to induce folks to buy Club properties, lock
some in to those contracts, and exempt others from those same burdens
for various subjective reasons.

See doe. 17-8 (listing insufficient

responses by number and explaining that counsel "do[es] not believe

that these are valid or good faith objections certainly, this is
information that is in the control of The Club and is relevant to the
issues being presented to the Court."); doe. 17-9 ("You're quite correct
that I'm seeking information in regard to 'other member[s'] accounts'
The information you provided is absolutely worthless in terms of
this discovery. You have asked us to go search public records for
information that you have and that your client can produce of [sic] less
cost in terms of time and money. We are not on a fishing expedition[,]
but we need information[,] specifically the information pointed out in
our pleadings and discovery."). Plaintiffs object that this sort of
information could only be relevant to a derivative action, as it would
concern all members of the Club, not just the Scotts. Doe. 19 at 4 (citing

Crittenton v. Southland Owners Ass'n, 718 S.E.2d 839, 842-43 (Ga. App.
2011)). Defendants -- in keeping with their failure to provide specific
citations to the record or authority -- don't respond. Instead, they list
(nonexhaustively) plaintiffs' objections and conclude that they are
insufficient. See doe. 21 at 1-3.
For example, The Ford Plantation Club, Inc.'s Response to
Defendants' First Interrogatories:
5

1. Has any applicant to the Club or prospective purchaser of
property at the Ford Plantation ever been denied membership in
the Club? If so, identify the name and last known address and
phone number of such denied applicant(s), and provide a brief
description of the reason such applicant was denied membership
in the Club.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this request because it is
irrelevant to the subject matter of this matter, and the
information sought is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff further objects to this
request [because] the request intrudes upon the applicant's
seclusion or solitude, or into his or her private affairs, may lead to
a public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
applicant and/or may cause publicity which places the applicant in
a false light in the public eye.

II...]
3. Identify all persons who have been delinquent in payment of
their dues or other obligations to the Club, and for each such
person state the date(s) of such delinquency, a brief description of
the delinquency including the amount owed and the reason such
amount was owed (i.e. club dues, or other default), and provide a
description of what action(s) the Club took against such member
(i.e. filing a lien, sending a demand letter, terminating
membership, suspending membership, filing a lawsuit, or
foreclosing on real property).
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this request because it is
irrelevant to the subject matter of this matter, and the
information sought is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff further objects to this
discovery request because it is so broad and unlimited as to time
and scope as to be an unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment,
and is oppressive. To comply with the request would be an undue
burden and expense on the plaintiff. The request is calculated to
annoy and harass plaintiff. Plaintiff further objects to this
request [because] the request intrudes upon the member's

seclusion or solitude, or into his or her private affairs, may lead to
a public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
member and/or may cause publicity which places the member in a
false light in the public eye. Plaintiff further objects to disclosing
any information that may be a violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, and may violate confidentiality
agreements, if any. Plaintiff further objects to this request due to
the fact that the information sought regarding liens, lawsuits and
foreclosures in this discovery request is equally available to the
propounding party through public records.
Doe. 17-5 at 2-4. Plaintiffs explained in their meet-and-confer letter
that they would not provide "personal, sensitive information" regarding
"other members' accounts," applications, or delinquencies, and that
defendants "have equal opportunity to search public records" to find
this sort of information.

See doe. 19-1. Bar one specific-ish response,

the Scotts don't offer much except their mere disagreement to rebut
these objections. See generally does. 17 & 21; see also doe. 21 at 2 ("If
it's a matter of public record, it can hardly be a violation of [the] Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.").
All this is to say that it is clear the parties have not meaningfully
met and conferred to narrow the scope of their dispute before
defendants sought court intervention. 2 See S.D. Ga. L. R. 26.5

2

Requiring meaningful consultation can lead to informal resolution and thus
conservation of court resources. Avera v. United Airlines, Inc., 465 F. App'x 855,
7

("Counsel are reminded that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) [] require[s] a party
seeking a protective order or moving to compel discovery to certify that
a good faith effort has been made to resolve the dispute before coming to
court."); Scruggs v. Int'l Paper Co., 2012 WL 1899405, at *2 (S.D. Ga.
May 24, 2012) ("There is an argument for the use of general objections -they save time and repetition -- and IP makes it here. [But] there are
many arguments against them. That issue will not be resolved now,
however, because the lawyers here are professionals" and thus capable
of fulfilling their Local Rule 26.5 duty to fully meet and confer before
seeking the court's intercession). They must do so, and return to this
Court only with narrowed, specific, and supported objections to
plaintiffs' alleged nonresponsiveness. Put another way, the parties
shall in good faith (at least by phone if not in person) attempt to resolve
movant's objections without further Court involvement. Fees will be
assessed for any bad faith shown.'

858-59 (11th Cir. 2012) (magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying,
without prejudice, plaintiff's motion to compel discovery where plaintiff had not
sought to resolve his discovery dispute with defendant before filing the motion); J0
Ann Howard & Associates, P.C. v. Cassity, 2012 WL 1247271, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13,
2012) (rejecting compulsion request in part because "the failure of the parties to
communicate materially impeded their resolution of this matter.") (emphasis added).
The parties are reminded that
[SJ

C. CONCLUSION
In sum, defendants' motion to compel production of documents
and interrogatories (doc. 17) is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants'
request for extension of discovery (doe. 18) is GRANTED only regarding these
disputed discovery responses, in that the parties must meaningfully meet and
confer and plaintiffs must answer to the extent that defendants can muster specific,
convincing, and legally persuasive reasons supporting the relevance and
proportionality of these requests.
The scope of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) is broad and includes
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claims
or defense of any party involved in the pending action. Those resisting
discovery must show specifically how the objected-to request is unreasonable
or otherwise unduly burdensome.

Claims and defenses determine discovery's scope. Evidence is relevant if it has
any tendency to make the existence of any fact or consequence more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Daniel Def, Inc. v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 2015 WL 6142883 at * 2 (S.D. Ga. Oct.
19, 2015) (cites and quotes omitted).
"The standard for what constitutes relevant evidence is a low one." United States
v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1120 (11th Cir. 2002); McCleod v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 2014 WL 1616414 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2014) ("Rule 26, quite simply, sets
forth a very low threshold for relevancy, and thus, the court is inclined to err in favor
of discovery rather than against it."). The recent changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (in particular, Rule 26), although substantive and substantial, do not
change the definition of relevance. Instead, they reemphasize and highlight
requirements already present in the Rules, like proportionality. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26, advisory committee note (2015) ("Restoring the proportionality calculation to
Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the parties
to consider proportionality. . . ."); Sibley v. Choice Hotels Intl, 2015 WL 9413101 at
* 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) ("While proportionality factors have now been
incorporated into the Rule 26(b)(1) definition, those factors were already a part of
Federal discovery standards, appearing in Rule 26(b) (2) (C) (iii)").

SO ORDERED, this 10th day of May, 2017

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERJbT DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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