Williams v. Allen

Filing 3

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS denying the 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, and dismissing 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Ronnie Williams. As to any future civil actions sought to be commenced in forma pauperis (IFP) by petitioner, the Clerk be DIRECTED' to receive the papers, open a single miscellaneous file for tracking purposes, and forward them to the presiding judge for a determination as to whether petitioner qualifies for IFP status and whether he has stated a habeas claim with any arguable merit. Only if the pleading alleges a plausible claim for relief will the Court allow it to be filed. IFP petitions that fail to pass muster shall be DISMISSED without any further judicial action after THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date the Clerk receives the petition, unless the Court orders otherwise. This automatic dismissal ofinsubstantial claims "will reduce the burden of paper-moving and explanation-writing, conserving a little judicial time for li tigants whodeserve attention."' Thus, although the Court will read and consider any future IFP application and petition that Williams endeavors to file, it will not necessarily enter an order addressing the IFP application orpetition. If no order is forthcoming, then THIRTY (30) DAYS after the petition's receipt the Clerk shall, without awaiting any further direction, notify Williams that his case has been dismissed per the form attached asan appendix to this R&R. Objections to R&R and filing fee due by 4/5/2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 3/22/17. (wwp) Modified on 3/22/2017 (wwp). Modified on 3/22/2017 (wwp).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
RONNIE EUGENE WILLIAMS,

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Petitioner,

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CV4 17-036

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MARTIN ALLEN, Warden,

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Respondent.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Ronnie Williams, currently incarcerated at Georgia State Prison in
Reidsville, Georgia, once again (for at least the twelfth time) asks for
habeas relief on his state criminal conviction despite the Court's
unambiguous warning that further requests for recalculation of his
sentence would expose him to further sanctions.

See Williams v. Allen,

No. CV416-324, doc. 5 (imposing $500 sanction after petitioner filed an

eleventh petition for habeas relief, despite prior warnings). Yet again, the
Court notes that:
Petitioner has wasted this Court's resources several times through
the years with unmeritorious (and unauthorized) successive
attempts at habeas relief from his state court conviction and
sentence. See Williams v. Owens, No. 412CV019 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 28,
2012) (R&R recommending dismissal of his fifth § 2254 attempt).
See also Williams v. State Board of Pardon and Paroles, No.
408CV105 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2008); Williams v. Barrow, No.

405CV167 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2005); Williams v. Johnson, No.
403CV069 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 2003); Williams v. Johnson, No.
402CV044 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2002); Williams v. Smith, No.
495CV176 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 1995). And that is just in the Southern
District of Georgia.
Byson, No. CV416-232, doc. 6 at ii.

see also Williams v. Toole, CV414-

088 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2015) (denying his seventh § 2254 petition on the
merits).' Yet, petitioner returns again without authorization from the

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As summarized by this Court in (one of several) prior decisions on the merits:
Williams is a serial burglar. In 1991, he was indicted on nine counts of
burglary, three counts of entering an auto, and a recidivist count. He pled
guilty to all charges and received a 15-year sentence (15 years for the burglary
counts, to run concurrently to each other, and 5 years on the entering-an-auto
counts, to run concurrently to each other and to the burglary counts). He was
ultimately paroled on February 22, 1993.
Williams wasted no time after his release from prison before reentering his life
of crime. He was indicted in August 1993 for a burglary committed between
March 14-16, 1993, and for another burglary on April 6, 1993. A jury found
him guilty of the April 6 burglary, one count of theft by receiving, and one of
obstruction of a police officer. On February 3, 1994, the state court sentenced
him to one year for theft, one year for obstruction, and 20 years for burglary,
all of which Williams was to serve "consecutive to Parole sentence now
serving."
n.1 On March 24, 2000, the trial court issued a "corrected sentence"
clarifying that it sentenced Williams to serve 20 years for burglary
"consecutive to any sentence previously adjudged," one year for theft,
and one year for obstruction, to run consecutively to each other and
the 20 year burglary sentence, for a total of 22 years to serve.
Shortly after the jury's verdict, his parole was revoked for the 1991 burglary
and entering-an-auto convictions.

Toole, CV414-088, doc. 16 at 2-3 (internal cites omitted). Williams has since found it
impossible to accept his "corrected sentence" -- despite several decisions on the
merits indicating he should so do.
Each time in his § 2254 petitions (and § 2254 petitions disguised as § 2241
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Eleventh Circuit and "[w]ithout so much as a hint that he has run his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 claims through this Court [nine] times before," to
challenge the calculation and application of his state sentence. CV412-

petitions), Williams challenges the same handful of things, in various combinations:
the admission of fingerprint evidence, the admission of evidence of a prior burglary
conviction (of which he had several) at trial, the "corrected sentence" entered by the
trial court clarifying that his sentence for the 1994 burglary was not to begin until he
finished the full sentence for his 1991 burglary, and the revocation of his parole for
the 1991 burglary when he was convicted for the 1994 burglary. See No. CV416-232
(denied as successive claim that the "corrected sentence" denied him "credit" he is
entitled to "without due process of law"); No. CV414-088 (denying on the merits
claim that his sentences should run concurrently and that parole was
unconstitutionally revoked); No. CV412-019 (denied as successive claims that the
court erred by admitting evidence of fingerprints and prior conviction and that he
was denied representation of counsel prior to entry of the "corrected sentence"); No.
CV408-105 (denied as successive claim that the denial of parole at sentencing
(somehow by the parole board, perhaps in collusion with, the trial court) violated due
process); No. CV405-167 (transferred from the Northern District of Georgia, denied
as successive that the trial court erred by admitting fingerprint evidence); No.
CV403-069 (denied on the merits claim that the trial court's "corrected sentence"
somehow violated due process and Fifth Amendment double jeopardy), id. at doe. 27
(mandate denying Certificate of Appealability because Williams "failed to make the
requisite showing" under 28 U.S.C. § 22533(c)(2)); No. CV402-044 (denied as
successive claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of fingerprints and
prior conviction and that his "corrected sentence" did "not accurately reflect[ I the
oral sentence"); No. CV495-176 (denied on the merits challenge to sentence and
admission of evidence), id. at doe. 32 (mandate denying Certificate of Probable Cause
because Williams "has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal
right."). See also Williams v. Chatman, No. 2013-HC-27-JS (Tatnall Super. Ct. Sept.
19, 2014) (denying writ of habeas corpus as to whether his sentences are
consecutive); Williams v. Chatman, No. S15H0225 (Ga. Mar. 2, 2015) (denying
certificate of probable cause to appeal).
Having learned, somewhat, from this Court's prior order imposing sanctions,
petitioner apparently seeks to circumvent this Court's sanctions warning with
conclusory claims that his "liberty" and "due process" rights are being violated by his
continued incarceration. Doc. 1 at 6-8. Of course, he still lacks authorization from
an Eleventh Circuit panel to be heard, despite the Court's unambiguous instructions
to either gain that authorization or stop filing unauthorized petitions which are dead
in the water. See, e.g., CV416-324, doe. 5 at 3.
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019, doe. 4 at 1.
"Before a second or successive application permitted by this section
is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate
court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider
the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Because Williams sought no
such permission, this court "is not at liberty to consider" his ninth
§ 2254 petition. Smalls v. St. Lawrence, 2012 WL 1119766 at * 1 (S.D.
Ga. Feb. 27, 2012). Accordingly, his unauthorized successive § 2254
petition, which is otherwise meritless, should be DISMISSED. 2 And,

2

Even assuming his petition was authorized procedurally, it is meritless
substantively. Unedited and in full, petitioner contends that he is entitled to "release
from imprisonment" because:
Ground One: Deprivation of liberty without Due Process of Law 14
Amendment
The petitioner is confined under the State of Georgia Department of
Correction without any protection of due process of law which deprive the
petitioner his right to liberty an that the state department continued to keep
the petitioner imprisonment deprivation of a right without any authority
under Georgia law.
The petitioner deprivation
Ground Two: Denied Due Process of Law 14 Amendment
There were no requirement of a notice or hearing by the department of
Correction of GEORGIA before the petitioner were taken away of his rights
the petitioner unlawful confinement continuing by the State of GEORGIA
Department of Correction
Deprive of a right
Deprivation of liberty Contrary to Law 14 Amendment

pursuant to the Court's prior Orders in CV416-324 (doe. 5) and CV416232 (doe. 6), his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is
DENIED. Williams is ORDERED to pay the $5 filing fee within 14
days of this Order.
By "continuing to raise a claim that he is statutorily prohibited
from pursuing" -- conduct that the Court repeatedly cautioned him
would be considered "vexatious litigation that warrant[s] some type of
sanction," see, e.g., CV 416-324, doe. 5 at 5-6; CV416-232, doe. 6 at 5 -Williams has again crossed the sanctions line. Given the persistence of
his abuse, undeterred even in the face of the Court's repeated warnings
and recommendation of a $500 sanction (to be collected from his prison
account), the time has come to manage an inmate who won't manage
The State continued to keep the petitioner incarcerated without any Due
Process of Law the petitioner is house at Georgia State Prison in violation of
the Constitution of the United State/unlawfully confine an that the State
Department of Correction has deprive the Petitioner his rights to liberty.
Doc. 1 at 5-8, 14. Word soup peppered with constitutional triggerwords is obviously
not enough. Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (no
hearing required on claims "which are based on unsupported generalizations").
Habeas petitioners cannot simply laundry-list their claims and hope that the court
will develop (hence, litigate) them on their behalf. Chavez v. Secy Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) ("allegations must be factual and specific, not
conclusory. Conclusory allegations are simply not enough to warrant a hearing.");
see also Johnson v, Razdan, 564 F. App'x 481, 484 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Although pro se
briefs are to be construed liberally, a pro se litigant who offers no substantive
argument on an issue in his initial brief abandons that issue on appeal."). Williams is
not entitled to relief in this Court and his petition otherwise should be dismissed.
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himself. In that regard, the Court recognizes that "[a]ccess to the courts
is unquestionably a right of considerable constitutional significance," but
it "is neither absolute nor unconditional."

Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d

1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gofield v. Ala. Pub. Seri). Comm'n,
936 F.2d 512 1 516 (11th Cir. 1991)). Sometimes, "[c]onditions and
restrictions on [a] person's access are necessary to preserve the judicial
resource for all other persons." Id. "Frivolous and vexatious law suits,"
like those continually pressed by Williams, "threaten the availability of a
well-functioning judiciary to all litigants." Id. 3

"Every lawsuit filed, no matter how frivolous or repetitious, requires the
investment of court time, whether the complaint is reviewed initially by a law clerk, a
staff attorney, a magistrate, or the judge." Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072
(11th Cir. 1986). The federal courts thus have used a variety of "injunctive devices"
to protect their dockets from abuse by litigants who monopolize judicial resources
through the serial riling of frivolous lawsuits, and they have "considerable
discretion" in selecting the appropriate measure to curtail such abuse. Id. at 1072,
1074. Courts, however, may not "completely close the courthouse doors to those who
are extremely litigious." Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512,
517 (11th Cir. 1991); Miller, 541 F.3d at 1097 (in dealing with an abusive litigant,
courts may "not impose blanket prohibitions on" all future filings by that litigant).
But they are empowered to impose severe restrictions on an abusive litigant's ability
to file further cases, including the requirement "to seek leave of court before filing
pleadings in any new or pending lawsuit." Procup, 792 F.2d at 1072.

on

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the following restrictions
be imposed upon petitioner:
1. As to any future civil actions sought to be commenced in forma

pauperis (IFP) by petitioner, the Clerk be DIRECTED' to receive the
papers, open a single miscellaneous file for tracking purposes, and
forward them to the presiding judge for a determination as to whether
petitioner qualifies for IFP status and whether he has stated a habeas
claim with any arguable merit. Only if the pleading alleges a plausible
claim for relief will the Court allow it to be filed. IFP petitions that fail
to pass muster shall be DISMISSED without any further judicial action
after THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date the Clerk receives the petition,
unless the Court orders otherwise. This automatic dismissal of
insubstantial claims "will reduce the burden of paper-moving and
explanation-writing, conserving a little judicial time for litigants who
deserve attention."' Thus, although the Court will read and consider

The Clerk is further DIRECTED to E-Serve this ruling upon Georgia's Attorney
General, who is asked to assist in serving this Report and Recommendation, along
with any adoption order and judgment, upon the prison account custodian for this
petitioner. The custodian shall immediately remit the $5 filing fee.

Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1997) (imposing, inter
alia, a $500 sanction on a pro se inmate raising frivolous arguments in support of a
third successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and instituting a special procedure where
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any future IFP application and petition that Williams endeavors to file,
it will not necessarily enter an order addressing the IFP application or
petition. If no order is forthcoming, then THIRTY (30) DAYS after the
petition's receipt the Clerk shall, without awaiting any further direction,
notify Williams that his case has been dismissed per the form attached as
an appendix to this R&R.
2. The Clerk shall not docket any further petitions, motions or
papers in this case. The Clerk also shall not docket any further petitions,
motions or papers in a case automatically dismissed pursuant to the
directive above -- except for a notice of appeal. Any papers other than a
notice of appeal shall be returned to petitioner unfiled. If he files a
notice of appeal, the Clerk shall forward a copy of this Order, the notice
of appeal, and the dismissed petition to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
shall remain responsible for appellate filing fees or he may move this
Court to grant IFP status on appeal.

any future collateral attack filings "will be deemed rejected, without the need for
judicial action, unless the court orders otherwise.") (applied in Williams v. Darden,
No. CV411-213, doe. 66 (S.D. G.a. Oct. 21, 2016) (imposing a special review procedure
for all future filings for a vexatious litigant), and United States V. Hall, CV493-045,
doe. 21 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2010) (imposing $200 sanction against serial habeas filer
and instituting a special review procedure for any future filings)).

3.

To ensure that all future pleadings filed by Williams are

properly consolidated for review, the Clerk shall personally advise each
deputy clerk of the Court's ruling in this case and develop a procedure for
ensuring that all future complaints filed by Williams are immediately
assigned and forwarded to the presiding district judge in this case,
regardless of which divisional clerk's office receives and dockets the
papers.
4. Petitioner may file a motion to modify or rescind the imposition
of these restrictions NO EARLIER THAN ONE (1) YEAR from the
date of this Order.
5. A copy of this R&R shall be forwarded to each judicial officer in
this district.
Applying the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards set forth
in Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9,
2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage of the
litigation, so no COA should issue either. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Rule
11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases ("The district court must issue
or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse
to the applicant") (emphasis added). And, as there are no non-frivolous

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issues to raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Thus, in forma pauperis status on appeal should likewise be DENIED.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This R&R is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3.
Within 14 days of service, any party may file written objections to this
R&R with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document
should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendations." Any request for additional time to file objections
should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district
judge.
After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The
district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are
advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of
rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v. V.A. Leasing Corp.,
648 F. App'x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. U.S., 612 F. App'x
542 1 545 (11th Cir. 2015).

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SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this 22nd day of
March, 2017.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

IN RE: RONNIE EUGENE
WILLIAMS

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Case No. MC

NOTICE
TAKE NOTICE that the case that you filed in forma pauperis on
20_, has been DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
pursuant to this Court's Order in Williams v. Allen, CV417-036, doe. 3,
adopted, doe. -. The filing, a copy of which is attached hereto, has been
docketed in In re Williams, MC

. No further action will be taken on

your case. You may resubmit it with the full filing fee payment.
SCOTT L. POFF, Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk

Date:

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