Mitchell v. Savannah Airport Commission et al

Filing 17

ORDER denying as moot 7 Motion for More Definite Statement. Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 12/14/17. (jlm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
LAKISHA MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAVANNAH AIRPORT COMMISSION,
et al.
Defendants.

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CV417-188

ORDER
Defendant Savannah Airport Commission moves for a more definite
statement of the second claim in plaintiff’s Complaint. See doc. 7 at 1.
Plaintiff has not opposed that motion, and she has filed two amended
complaints. See docs. 14 & 15. The Commission moves to strike the
second-filed amendment on the ground that only one amendment is
allowed as a matter of course. See doc. 16 at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)).

As the Second Amended Complaint does not substantially

alter the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, the Court will
construe its filing as an implicit request for leave.1 Further, since both
1

Although the Court does not minimize the importance of following proper
procedure, nor disagree with the Commission that plaintiff has failed to do so here, the

amendments rectify the Commission’s objection to the original
Complaint, its request for a more definite statement is moot.
Although amendments beyond the first require consent or the
Court’s leave, the Rules instruct the Court to grant leave “freely.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “‘Unless a substantial reason exists to deny leave to
amend, the discretion of the District Court is not broad enough to permit
denial.’” Florida Evergreen Foliage v. E.U. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
470 F.3d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shipner v. E. Air Lines,
Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 407 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Here, the second-filed

amendment is virtually identical to the first filed amendment. The only
substantive differences (as opposed to merely typographical differences in
the margins or font) between the two versions are the title (the first-filed
is captioned “Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint,” doc. 14 at 1, whereas
the second-filed is captioned simply “Complaint,” doc. 15 at 1); the
specification of the retroactive promotion that plaintiff seeks (the
first-filed amendment requests a retroactive promotion “to the position,”
Federal Rules counsel that procedure be observed “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1
(emphasis added). As explained below, the Court sees no reason to wait for plaintiff
to respond to defendant’s Motion to Strike and subject the proceedings to the delay
and expense that such a response would incur. Nevertheless, the Court expects that
members of its Bar will follow all requirements of the Federal Rules and its Local
Rules. Further indulgence of counsel’s failure to do so should not be expected.

doc. 14 at 7, whereas the second-filed amendment seeks a retroactive
promotion “to the GS-15 level,” doc. 15 at 7); the change of counsel’s last
name from “Brantley” to “Hamilton” and the insertion of her typed
“signature.” Compare doc. 14 at 8, with doc. 15 at 8. Those changes do
not amount to a “substantial reason” to deny plaintiff leave to amend, and
the Commission has identified none. See doc. 16 at 2-3. Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint a second
time. The second amended Complaint (doc. 15) shall be the operative
version of plaintiff’s Complaint. See, e.g., Malowney v. Fed. Collection
Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An amended
complaint supersedes an original complaint”); Varnes v. Local 91, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n. 6 (11th Cir.
1982) (“As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces
the original complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or
adopts the earlier pleading.”).
Plaintiff’s

amendment

supplies

the

information

that

the

Commission contends was missing from her original Complaint.

The

Commission sought a more definite statement of plaintiff’s second claim
because it failed to specify a statute or cause of action. Doc. 7 at 2.

Although its language is still ambiguous, plaintiff’s amended complaint
clarifies her allegation that the discriminatory conduct violated “Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U[.]S[.]C[.] 2000e[,] et seq.” Doc. 15 at
6.

Since plaintiff has supplied the requested information, the

Commission’s request for a more definite statement is DENIED as
moot. Doc. 7.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of December, 2017.