Fields v. Heap

Filing 9

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS dismissing the 1 Complaint filed by Kelvin Jerome Fields. (Objections to R&R due by 1/24/2019). The Clerk is directed to send the Report and Recommendation to the Plaintiff's account custodian. Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher L. Ray on 1/10/19. (wwp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
KELVIN JEROME FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MS. MEG HEAP,
Defendant.

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CV418-030

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Kelvin Jerome Fields, an inmate at Chatham County
Detention Center (CCDC), filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint against
District Attorney Meg Heap for alleged procedural defects related to his
state criminal case. See doc. 1 at 5-9. The Court granted Fields’ request
to pursue his case in forma pauperis (IFP), doc. 3, and he returned the
necessary forms, docs. 4 & 5, as well as an Amended Complaint. Doc. 6.1

1

Both the Complaint and Amended Complaint levy a claim of malicious prosecution
against Heap. Docs. 1 & 6. Fields simultaneously also filed a “Brief in Support for
Civil Suit[ ] CV418-030,” contending that his due process rights were violated because
his state court case is proceeding to trial on accusation even though he did not first
waive his right to indictment by grand jury,. See doc. 7 at 1-5 (citing criminal case,
State of Georgia v. Fields, CR16-2514 (Chatham Super. Ct.) and alleging that the case

The Court now proceeds to screen the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. 2
Fields alleges the warrants for his arrest were invalidly executed and
“void.”

Doc. 6 at 2-5; see id. at 19 (attaching habeas corpus filings

challenging criminal case, State of Georgia v. Fields, CR16-2514 (Chatham
Super. Ct.)). Warrant W16001617 is “void and of no effect” because it was
“ex[e]cuted” or signed on June 13, 2016, yet he did not appear before a
judicial officer until months later. Id. at 2-5, 8. The other two warrants
are, he contends, thus tainted and also invalidated. Id. at 3. Fields asks
the return of his “freedom . . . that has been illegal[l]y taken” by defendant
Heap in violation of his “Fourth Amendment rights.” Doc. 6 at 27.
Liberally

construed,

plaintiff’s

Complaint

alleges

malicious

prosecution. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007) (the tort of
malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied . . . by wrongful

proceeded in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70).
2

Because the Court applies Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards in screening a complaint
pursuant to § 1915A, Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001),
allegations in Fields’ Amended Complaint are taken as true and construed in the light
most favorable to him. Bumpus v. Watts, 448 F. App’x 3, 4 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011).
Conclusory allegations, however, fail. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).
2

institution of legal process.”).

The Eleventh Circuit “has identified

malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable
constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d
872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). But — as Fields well knows 3 — an essential
element of a malicious prosecution claim is the termination of the criminal
prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 882. And there is no allegation
that the Chatham County criminal case has been resolved in Fields’ favor.
See docs. 1 & 6; see also State v. Fields, CV16-2514. Indeed, it appears to
have crystalized into a conviction that he is currently serving.

See

http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/GDC/Offender/Query, accessed January 8,

3

This is not Fields’ first rodeo. See CV417-129, doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2017) (“Fields
I”); CV417-212, doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2017) (“Fields II”). In Fields I, he claimed
that District Attorney Heap and others were liable for malicious prosecution because,
inter alia, his arrest warrants were invalid and his continued detention was
unconstitutional. See Fields I, doc. 1 at 7, 15-16 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2017). The Court
dismissed the Fields I Complaint without prejudice because he did not allege that his
state criminal proceeding had terminated in his favor. Id., doc. 8 at 3-4 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
22, 2017); id., doc. 11 at 1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2017) (judgment). In Fields II, he asserted
similar malicious prosecution claims against Heap and others. Fields II, doc. 1 at 3-4
(S.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2017). The Court dismissed the Fields II Complaint, again without
prejudice. Id., doc. 10 at 4-5 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2017); id., doc. 14 at 1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5,
2018) (judgment). The Court found that Heap was entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity and denied Fields’ request for injunctive relief, as it was relief the Court
could not provide. Id.; see id., doc. 6 at 3 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 29, 2017); id., doc. 10 (S.D. Ga.
Dec. 14, 2017) (incorporating undisturbed portions of prior recommendation, doc. 6).
Meaning, Fields is well aware of the pleading requirement to set forth a malicious
prosecution claim in this court (Fields I and Fields II). His claim fails yet again.
3

2019.

Fields, therefore, cannot state a claim for damages until that

conviction is overturned. 4
Fields also waves at a § 1983 due process claim 5 arising from his
allegedly invalid arrest warrants and trial on accusation without an
indictment waiver. Docs. 6 & 7. To state a procedural due process claim,
a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, (2) state action, and (3) constitutionally inadequate
process. Shaarbay v. Palm Beach Cty. Jail, 350 F. App’x 359, 361 (11th
Cir. 2009).

Fields contends his rights under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62

(warrantless arrests) and O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70 (trial on accusation) were
violated, entitling him to “freedom.”

Doc. 6 at 27.

But, it must be

4

Indeed, Fields complains of defects that necessarily imply his conviction’s invalidity.
In that case, § 1983 affords him no remedy: “[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use
a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. . . . He must seek
federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.” Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quotes and cites omitted); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481
(1994) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges
the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even
though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.”). And before he can
bring a federal habeas action, he must first exhaust his available state remedies
through either a direct appeal or another petition for state collateral relief. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. at 79 (federal “habeas corpus actions require a petitioner fully to exhaust
state remedies, which § 1983 does not”); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c).
5

Claims involving the mistreatment of pre-trial detainees while they are in custody,
as Fields was when he filed this action, are governed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996).
4

remembered, he was arrested pursuant to a warrant (three, in fact) and
§ 17-7-70.1(a.1) specifically authorizes the district attorney to proceed to
trial on accusation for violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 without obtaining
a waiver of indictment so long as there has been a finding of probable
cause. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1(a.1). Fields meets both conditions — he was
charged with an excepted crime and had a probable cause hearing on
October 24, 2016 (doc. 6 at 6, 19; doc. 7 at 6, 11). Simply put, even were
Heap a viable defendant, 6 Fields has not identified any liberty interest to
which he was entitled that was then violated.
Though a pro se prisoner normally should be given an opportunity
to amend his complaint, see, e.g., Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 724
(11th Cir. 2014); Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010), “a

6

After all, the allegations thus far against District Attorney Heap appear to stem
entirely from her “function as advocate.” She is therefore absolutely immune from
suit. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (prosecutors are entitled
to absolute immunity for their acts or omissions in the course of initiating a
prosecution).
Despite the lack of any apparent basis for viable amendment, Fields’ opportunity to
object to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days of service, see infra, affords
him an opportunity to resuscitate his case. He may also submit a Second Amended
Complaint during that period if he believes it would cure the legal defects discussed
above. See Willis v. Darden, 2012 WL 170163, at * 2 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012) (citing
Smith v. Stanley, 2011 WL 1114503, at * 1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2011)). To state a
claim, however, Fields must be able to both plead the requisite elements of his § 1983
claims and identify a defendant who is not immune from suit.
5

district court need not allow amendment if the amended complaint would
still be subject to dismissal.” Jenkins v. Walker, 620 F. App’x 709, 711
(11th Cir. 2015). Fields’ malicious prosecution and due process claims are
dead on arrival, and do not appear amendable.
Accordingly, the Complaint should be DISMISSED. It is also time
for Fields to pay his filing fee. Since his PLRA paperwork reflects an
average monthly balance of $0.00, doc. 4, he does not owe any initial
partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring an
initial fee assessment “when funds exist”). Fields’ custodian (or designee)
shall therefore set aside and remit 20 percent of all future deposits to his
account, then forward those funds to the Clerk each time the set aside
amount reaches $10.00, until the balance of the Court’s $350.00 filing fee
has been paid in full.
Also, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send this Report and
Recommendation (R&R) to Fields’ account custodian immediately, as this
payment directive is nondispositive within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a), so no Rule 72(b) adoption is required. In the event he is transferred
to another institution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this
R&R and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee
6

and costs in this case to Fields’ new custodian. The balance due from him
shall be collected by the custodian at his next institution in accordance
with the terms of the payment directive portion of this Order.
This R&R is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 72.3.
Within 14 days of service, any party may file written objections to this
R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should
be

captioned

“Objections

to

Magistrate

Judge’s

Report

and

Recommendations.” Any request for additional time to file objections
should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district
judge.
After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The
district

judge

will

review

the magistrate

judge’s

findings

and

recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are
advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of
rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v. V.A. Leasing Corp., 648
F. App’x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F. App’x
542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
7

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this

10th

day of

January, 2019.
_______________________________
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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