Harris v. McKie et al

Filing 23

ORDER denying as moot 21 Motion for Default Judgment; denying as moot 20 Clerk's entry of default; denying 22 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge James E. Graham on 4/2/19. (wwp) Modified on 4/2/2019 (wwp).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
DARNELL LAMAR HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

)
JOHN P. MORRIS, et al.,
Defendant.

CV418-040

)
)
)

ORDER
Plaintiff has filed motions for entry of default and default
judgment against “defendants,” contending that they have not timely
answered the Complaint. Docs. 20 & 21. That contention is patently
belied by the record, which reflects that defendant John Morris timely
filed his Answer in November 2018 (doc. 13).1

These motions are

therefore DENIED as moot.
Harris further requests that counsel be appointed to aid in his
representation, because he is an incarcerated “layman” uneducated in
the law.

Doc. 22 at 1. In this civil case, however, plaintiff has no

constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Wright v. Langford,
562 F. App’x 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d
1

The “CNT Task Force Agents” named in the Complaint are currently permitted as
Doe defendants only until their names can be determined through discovery. See
doc. 6 at 4 n. 3. Thus, they have not yet been served and cannot be in default.

1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)).

“Although a court may, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, it has
broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint counsel
only in exceptional circumstances.” Wright, 562 F. App’x at 777 (citing
Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320). Appointment of counsel in a civil case is a
“privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as
where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require
the assistance of a trained practitioner.”

Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d

1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025,
1028 (11th Cir. 1987), and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “the key” to assessing
whether counsel should be appointed “is whether the pro se litigant
needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or her position to
the court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will
not need such help.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 457 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)). A
review of the record and pleadings in this case reveals no such
“exceptional circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel.
2

Though plaintiff is incarcerated, this Court has repeatedly found
that “prisoners do not receive special consideration notwithstanding the
challenges of litigating a case while incarcerated.” See, e.g., Hampton v.
Peeples, 2015 WL 4112435 at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2015). “Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courts’ decisions to
refuse appointment of counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions similar to this
case for want of exceptional circumstances.”

Id. (citing Smith v.

Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App’x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015);
Wright, 562 F. App’x at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t,
523 F. App’x 696, 702 (11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels, 405 F. App’x at 457;
Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App’x 410, 414 (11th Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899
F.2d at 1091, 1096; Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174).

This case is not so

complex, legally or factually, as to prevent plaintiff from presenting “the
essential merits of his position” to the Court.
appointment of counsel (doc. 22) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 2nd

day of April, 2019.

3

His request for