Williams et al v. Karpf et al

Filing 9

ORDERED that Plaintiffs are to return their individual, completed IFP forms and their signed Third Amended Complaint within 14 days of this Order re 8 Amended Complaint filed by Jabbar Williams. (Compliance due by 7/6/2018). Signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith on 6/22/18. (wwp) Modified on 6/22/2018 (wwp).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JABBAR MUHAMMAD ALI
WILLIAMS; PAULETTE SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL KARPF, et al.,
Defendants.

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CV418-121

ORDER
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Jabbar Williams brings
this action against various state judicial and quasi-judicial officials,
attorneys, the Garden City police department and its officers, and the
Chatham County Counter Narcotic Team contending that his state
criminal prosecution is unlawful. Doc. 1 at 1-110 & doc. 3 at 1-60 & doc.
4 at 1-5. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), but it is
not clear that the application is submitted on his own or both plaintiffs’
behalves. See doc. 2. The Court therefore cannot evaluate plaintiffs’
abilities to pay the filing fee. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
provide plaintiffs with a blank IFP application forms. Plaintiffs must
individually complete and return their respective forms, sworn under

penalty of perjury to be true and correct, within 14 days of service of this
Order.
Another

threshold

problem

arises

before

the

Court

can

preliminarily screen1 their Complaint:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name -- or by a
party personally if the party is unrepresented. . . . The court must
strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected
after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
Only Jabbar Williams has signed the Complaint, the Amended
Complaints, and the IFP application.2 Doc. 1 at 4-5 & 20; doc. 2 at 4;
doc. 3 at 56-59; doc. 4 at 5. Because each plaintiff here is proceeding pro
se, neither has any authority to represent the legal interest of any other
party. See FuQua v. Massey, 615 F. App’x 611 (11th Cir. 2015) (right of
1

In cases where the plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, the Court is required to screen
each case and must dismiss it at any time if the Court determines either that the
allegation of poverty is untrue or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
2

Williams has also submitted what appears to be a request for the production and
inspection of documents under the title “Amendment to Complaint.” Doc. 8. If
plaintiff wishes to serve discovery on defendants, he must do so pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -- meaning, any discovery requests are mailed to the
party (or that party’s attorney) from whom he seeks that discovery. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5(b) (describing procedure for service). Discovery requests are not filed with the
Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (initial disclosures and discovery requests/responses are
not filed until they are used for a motion or the court orders them to be filed).
2

parties to appear pro se is limited to parties conducting their own cases
and does not extend to non-attorney parties representing the interests of
other). This means Williams cannot represent Smith. Each plaintiff
must sign above their own name, thus signifying that they represent only
themselves.
Within 14 days of the date this Order is served, then, the plaintiffs
shall amend their Complaint and individual IFP applications with a
proper signature page. Failure to do so will likely be fatal to their claim.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (courts “must strike an unsigned paper unless the
omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney’s or
party’s attention”). Every filing thereafter must similarly abide by Rule
11(a)’s signature requirement. See Bouttry v. United States, 2012 WL
2153961 at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 13, 2012).
And finally, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

3

(2007)). In other words, a complaint may not simply allege a wrong has
been committed and demand relief. The pleading standard “demands
more

than

an

unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation[;]” the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). Further, while factual
allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Williams’ single-page Third Amended Complaint is bereft of even a
hint of the harm he alleges he suffered or the relief he seeks, though his
statement that he is “totally innocent of all charges” suggests that he
seeks to bring a malicious prosecution claim against defendants. Doc. 4
at 1. The flip side of the coin is that a meandering morass of words -here 170 total pages’ worth between docs. 2 and 3, some of which is
entirely illegible and much of which is unorganized by claim or
chronology -- violates Rule 8(a)(2)’s admonition as well.

The court

affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding
them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

4

89, 94 (2007). This liberal construction does not mean that the court has
a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314,
1320 (11th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs must amend (and sign) their Third

Amended Complaint within 14 days of service of this Order, alleging in
as clear and concise a manner as possible precisely what happened, how
they contend their civil rights have been violated, and what other claims
(if any) they seek to bring.3
Plaintiffs are advised that their third amended complaint will

3

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, two elements must be satisfied.
First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him “of some right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff
must allege that the act or omission was committed by “a person acting under color
of state law.” Id. Neither public defenders nor court-appointed defense counsel
under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Wilson v. Dollar-Thrifty Auto Polk v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)) (public defenders); Pearson v. Myles, 189 F. App’x
865, 866 (11th Cir. 2006) (appointed counsel).
Judges, meanwhile, “are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for
those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity.” Williams v.
Alabama, 425 F. App’x 824, 826 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)). That absolute judicial immunity “applies even when [a]
judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.”
Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. And prosecutors enjoy “absolute immunity in § 1983 actions
for activities that are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.’” Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009)); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 409 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the
prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”); Jackson v.
Capraun, 534 F. App’x 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2013) (prosecutor entitled to absolute
immunity for initiating prosecution even if he did so with malicious intent).
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supersede the original complaint and therefore must be complete in
itself. Once plaintiffs file a third amended complaint, the prior pleadings
will no longer serve any function in the case.

See Malowney v. Fed.

Collection Deposit Grp, 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An
amended complaint supersedes an original complaint”); Varnes v. Local
91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370
n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (“As a general rule, an amended complaint
supersedes and replaces the original complaint unless the amendment
specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading”).
In sum, plaintiffs are ORDERED to return their individual,
completed IFP forms and their signed Third Amended Complaint within
14 days of service of this Order. Once plaintiffs have complied with the
conditions of this Order, the Court will review their Third Amended
Complaint to determine which, if any, claims are viable and which, if
any, defendants should be served with a copy of the Third Amended
Complaint. If no response is timely received from plaintiffs, the Court
will presume that they desire to have this case voluntarily dismissed.
Failure to comply with this Order shall result in the recommendation of
dismissal of plaintiffs’ case, without prejudice.

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SO ORDERED, this 22nd

day of June, 2018.

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